Sharing a Polluted River Network

A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and downstream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network. Based on the two theories in international disputes, namely the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) and the Unlimited Territorial Integrity (UTI), we propose three different cost sharing methods for the problem. They are the Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS), the Upstream Equal Sharing (UES), and the Downstream Equal Sharing (DES), respectively. The LRS and the UES generalize Ni and Wang (Games Econ Behav 60:176–186, 2007) but the DES is new. The DES is based on a new interpretation of the UTI. We provide axiomatic characterizations for the three methods. We also show that they coincide with the Shapley values of the three different games that can be defined for the problem. Moreover, we show that they are in the cores of the three games, respectively. Our methods can shed light on pollution abatement of a river network with multiple sovereignties.     

A common trends model of UK core inflation

In this paper the long-run trend in RPI inflation (core inflation) for the UK over the 1961–1997 period is estimated within the framework of a multivariate common trends model which extends the bivariate VAR approach of Quah and Vahey (1995). In this context core inflation is directly linked to money and wage growth and interpreted as the long-run forecast of inflation from a small-scale, cointegrated macroeconomic system. First version received: September 1999/Final version received: October 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  We thank two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. Work on this paper was partially conducted when C. Morana was at Heriot-Watt University.     

核心能力共享的逻辑

首先给出了核心能力共享的定义，继而从核心能力共享可行性的基础分析、学者对于核心能力共享的论述和企业共享实践等多方面论证了核心能力共享的逻辑，以期澄清人们对于核心能力共享的一些错误认识，为核心能力理论研究开拓新的视角和领域提供重要参考。     

Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule

The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.     

经济适用住房退出机制的构建

经济适用住房退出的关键在于"资源获利"的合理产权退出。基于共有产权的"合同回购权"是政府规制的法理和经济基础。政府设立专门的监管和回购机构,并进一步深入研究与核定退出经济适用住房的家庭收入标准门槛和回购价格与收益分配方式,提供"基本型"产品等内容是经济适用住房退出机制构建的关键领域。     

收入分配从效率型到公平型的经济法调控

中国国民收入差距有扩大化的趋势,其根源在于交易不公开口制度缺失,只有公平分配才能体现社会正义,从效率型到公平型的收入分配价值取向是避免收入差距的基础。要遏制贫富分化,就必须保障国家分配权、规范市场主体行为并完善社会保障等方面的经济法律制度。     

和谐社会视阈下的亚里士多德分配公正观

要构建和谐社会,必须把分配正义放在重要的位置。在希腊后期,人们则倾向于把正义等同于公正。在亚里士多德（以下简称亚氏）看来,只有在分配上真正做到比例平等,城邦才能幸福稳定长久。尽管在具体操作层面亚氏的分配公正存在些许问题,但是直到今天它仍闪耀着思想的光辉。     

论中国审计资源配置方式的特殊性及其优化

审计资源配置的目标以社会需求为导向，以效益性为核心。审计资源配置的方式应是计划与市场相结合。并从宏观与微观两个层面，制定审计资源配置的具体优化措施。     

The commons,common property,and environmental policy

The conceptual confusion among property, common property, open access resources, and the tragedy of the commons is identified and rectified. Property rights are defined and clarified. From that it is possible to understand the traditional confusion between open access resources and common property resources. It is urged that common property regimes be used in place of common property resources. This will emphasize that institutional arrangements are human creations and that natural resources can be managed as private property, as common property, or as state property. It is the property regime — an authority system — that indicates the rules of use of a variety of natural resources.     

Equilibria in infinite-dimensional production economies with convexified coalitions

Summary. This paper deals with a private ownership production economy assuming that the commodity space is infinite-dimensional. It is first showed that the fuzzy core allocations, a concept that goes back to J.-P. Aubin, are in a one-to-one correspondence with certain core allocations of a continuum economy suitably defined. This result is obtained under convexity of preferences and production sets and separability of the commodity space. In the case of nonconvex preferences and production sets, the set of fuzzy coalitions can be enlarged in order to obtain that every allocation of the core accordingly defined is supported by a non zero price. The proof of the equivalence result when the positive cone of the commodity space has the empty interior, is obtained under assumptions of properness for preferences relations and production sets. Received: July 9, 1998; revised version: December 6, 1999     

公平竞争与企业生产率：配置优化还是竞争逃离？

政府对企业的过度干预及歧视性干预造成了竞争的缺失和竞争的不公平,严重损害了企业的生产效率。公平竞争审查制度是对政府规制行为的再规制,是竞争政策的具体化,可以发挥优化资源配置效应和竞争逃离效应提升企业生产率。以公平竞争审查制度出台为准自然实验构建倾向得分匹配双重差分（PSM-DID）模型,研究发现公平竞争审查制度实施对受冲击企业的平均生产率水平有显著的正向影响,且随制度推行逐渐深化。这一正向影响在低初始生产率及国有企业等低效率企业中尤为显著,说明公平竞争审查制度实施中显著提升了市场主体而非生产要素的公平竞争,以致竞争逃离效应显著而优化资源配置效应不足。而抑制企业寻租活动、破除地方保护和规制行政垄断是公平竞争审查制度提高市场竞争程度,进而激发低效率企业竞争逃离效应的重要渠道机制。研究结论为企业高质量发展及强化公平竞争政策地位提供了有益的政策启示。     

从会计计量角度看公允价值

会计环境的变化对传统的历史成本计量提出了严峻的挑战,笔者通过剖析公允价值的概念,论述了公允价值与计量属性的关系及运用此关系的难点和前景,提出公允价值是一个新的计量观念,历史成本计量与公允价值计量将长期并存。     

The equilibrium of the bargaining game and core convergence theorem on an exchange economy with limited traders

Debreu and Scarf (1963), Hildenbrand (1974), Aumann (1964), Dierker (1975), Bewley (1973), and others have shown that the core of an exchange economy with infinitely many or finitely many traders converges. However, an exchange economy does not always consist of infinitely many or finitely many traders. This note provides proof of the core convergence theorem on an exchange economy with limited traders by a bargaining game methodology. The main contribution of this note is to innovate the equilibrium solution to the bargaining game in the exchange economy. In this note, the concept of common payoff is introduced; in the bargaining game of a coalition on its common payoff, all coalition members will get the same distribution, thus the distribution scheme of the cooperation surplus of the exchange economy is determined. This note shows that the bargaining game among the traders on the distribution of the cooperation surplus will make the pure exchange economy with limited traders converge to the Walrasian equilibrium, all the allocations other than the Walrasian equilibrium will be eliminated from the core of this economy.     

从我国能源消费现状看建设资源节约型社会的必要性和紧迫性

本文根据大量最新统计资料，详细分析了我国的能源消费现状以及国际能源市场的最新变化，指出了我国建设资源节约型社会的必要性和紧迫性。针对建设资源节约型社会在能源领域的实现途径．本文随后给出了若干政策建议。     

现代物流企业间知识共享的博弈分析

研究了物流企业间进行知嵌共享的问题,运用博弈论的相关理论,通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型,对影响企业间知识共享条件的相关因素进行了分析,得知：知识共享安全系数与企业的最优利润值成正比;同时企业间知识共享机制的建立也受到利润分配比例的影响。     

Participatory institutions: The context of common and private property resources

Participation is the initiation and continuance of an active process by which beneficiary groups influence the direction and execution of development activity. In the context of resource management participatory institutions often present an alternative when the market and/or the state fail to maintain resource stocks at desirable levels. This paper presents two case-studies of the emergence of participatory institutions and builds up analytical models that explain the process of their evolution in an inter-temporal framework.It is shown that the evolution, sustenance and replication of participation and its impact on levels of resource conservation depends on (a) the nature of the links between common and private property resources, (b) the possibility of taking advantage of scale economies, and finally (c) the distributional rules and arrangements.     

Open access,common property and scarcity rent in fisheries

Open access resources are frequently not managed efficiently, resulting in falling stock levels and a declining income for fishermen. In the late 1970's, the policy response to this problem was the implementation of 200-mile fishing zones, which enabled the European Union to formulate and implement the Common Fisheries Policy, aimed at (among other things) conservation and distribution of available stocks. In Germany, this shift from an open access regime towards a common property regime had favourable outcomes. The trend of falling prices was reversed. The conclusion was that intertemporal efficiency had increased as a result of (inter)governmental policy. Apparently, a wedge was formed between price and marginal harvesting costs, implying that scarcity rent had returned as a component of prices.     

民营企业连锁经营中的核心能力共享

连锁经营运用现代化大工业生产原理、以获得规模效益为目的,这一经营形式近几年来被中国大多数企业运用,并取得了快速的发展。核心能力共享使连锁经营具有强大吸引力和很高的成功率,连锁经营的崛起也进一步促成了核心能力共享。应根据民营企业不同规模大小和核心能力状况,确定利用连锁进行扩张的不同形式,制定出连锁经营方式选择模型;并基于民营企业的核心能力共享,选择连锁经营的运作模式。     

黑龙江省科技资源配置效率的DEA分析

科技资源配置效率对科技系统的功能和效率有重要的影响,在很大程度上决定着区域科技能力的强弱。本文运用数据包络分析(DEA)方法常用的C2R和BC2模型,评价分析了黑龙江省各地区科技资源配置的有效性,并提出了黑龙江省科技资源优化配置的对策和建议。     

Endogenous Growth and Negative Externalities

Received March 5, 2001; revised version received August 5, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003