Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning

This paper provides theoretical background for some effects of social networks on trust. We study the implications of a model with rational actors in two settings with three actors. In the first setting, there are two trustees who are involved in transactions with one truster implying that the truster has an exit option. In the second setting, two trusters play with one trustee, which gives the trusters options for voice, i.e., complaining and informing each other about the trustee's behavior. We compare these models with a baseline model in which there is only one truster and one trustee. It turns out that the opportunities for placing and honoring trust do not change for the exit model compared to the baseline model. The opportunities for trust in the voice model differ from the baseline model only if both trusters inform each other at a rate that is high enough. Only if the possibilities for receiving information and transmitting information are large enough for both trusters, trust will increase due to the information exchange possibilities in the voice model.     

基于非合作博弈的期货市场策略分析

本文基于非合作博弈的方法,通过建立非合作博弈模型对期货市场多空双方的行动策略进行分析,分别就完全信息博弈、不完全信息博弈和不完美信息博弈三种不同的博弈环境,讨论了多空双方在不同的市场形势下的行动策略、博弈的均衡及结果。分析结果表明在不同的博弈环境下,无论是均势市场、多头市场还是空头市场,资金和信息对于期货市场多空双方的博弈策略具有至关重要的影响。基于此结论,本文进一步提出,为了获得资金优势和信息优势,建立期货投资基金,形成博弈联盟是一种有效的博弈形式,以此为基础的合作博弈分析方法是分析联盟博弈的有效方法。     

The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement

Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood (SL) that links uncertainties about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability of coalitions. We show that the concept of SL improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analyses. Moreover, our numerical application qualifies conclusions from a recent strand of literature based on stylised models with ex-ante symmetric players that learning has a negative impact on the success of coalition formation in context of uncertainty.      

Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies*

Bertrand supergames with non‐binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero‐cost, low‐cost and high‐cost. Prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly. Moreover, costly communication decreases the number of messages, but more importantly, it enhances the stability of collusive agreements. McCutcheon (1997) presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices. Although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of McCutcheon's (1997) argument, the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms.     

Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure

Summary. Theories of equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games, as well as the notion of risk dominance, depend heavily on the so-called linear tracing procedure. This is the first paper to give direct, simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. The first proof utilizes a result that is related to Kakutani's fixed point theorem and that is an extension of Browder's fixed point theorem. The second proof shows that it is even possible to avoid the use of correspondences. Received: June 8, 1998; revised version: November 8, 1998     

反倾销争端与外国对华的歧视待遇--基于博弈论视角的解析

从动态博弈的角度看,进口国想方设法地加大出口商的在反倾销中的成本,是使得反倾销威胁变得可置信的一种“承诺行动;”外国对华涉案出口企业不区别征税是我国企业应诉积极性不高的重要原因;西方国家对华反倾销特点形成的主要原因是外国对华的歧视待遇。西方对华的歧视待遇实质上是增加其反倾销威胁的可信性的重要手段,改变这样的状况需要相当的努力和智慧。     

基于知识交互的链式产业集群知识传播分析

基于产业集群中主体知识交互博弈这一微观作用机制,研究链式产业集群中知识传播的宏观行为。分析链式产业集群主体在知识学习效应、知识协同效应和网络互惠效应下的知识交互行为。应用演化博弈方法,分析集群中主体知识交互的内在机理和动态演化过程,以及影响链式产业集群中知识传播的重要因素。最后提出相关策略。     

电子货币洗钱行为的经济学解释

具有匿名性、即时性和跨国界性等特征的电子货币将有利于洗钱,并给反洗钱造成潜在的威胁,但是迄今为止还未发现利用电子货币进行洗钱的实例.根据洗钱者的成本收益比较分析,作出了一个合理的解释,并用博弈论对电子货币反洗钱策略进行了研究.     

Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest

Abstract: The authors' aim in this article was to show how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. The basic game is a version of the beauty contest game (BCG), a simple guessing game in which repetition lets students react to other players' choices and converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution. The authors perform this experiment with undergraduate students with no previous training in game theory. After four rounds, they observe a clear decreasing tendency in the average submitted number in all groups. Thus, the findings show that by playing a repeated BCG, students quickly learn how to reach the NE solution.     

最低工资提高对企业员工人力资本的影响分析

最低工资对人力资本的影响是其效应的一个重要方面。本文基于博弈论的方法,从企业雇员培训和工人自身人力资本投资两个角度对最低工资提高于企业员工人力资本的影响进行分析,发现最低工资提高会增加中等技术水平工人的入力资本积累,同时可能减少低技能水平工人的人力资本积累。最后,提出相关建议,认为政府应提高对低技能工人的关注度。     

Social Preferences in the Lab: A Comparison of Students and a Representative Population

We report from a lab experiment conducted with a sample of participants that is nationally representative for the adult population in Norway and two student samples (economics students and non‐economics students). The participants make choices both in a dictator game (a non‐strategic environment) and in a generalized trust game (a strategic environment). We find that the representative sample differs fundamentally from the student samples, both in the relative importance assigned to different moral motives (efficiency, equity, and reciprocity) and in the level of selfish behavior. It is also interesting to note that the gender effects observed in the student samples do not correspond to the gender effects observed in representative sample. Finally, whereas economics students behave less pro‐socially than non‐economics students, the two student groups are similar in the relative importance they assign to different moral motives.     

变革中多渠道信息传递对员工绩效的影响机制

面对日趋复杂的外部环境,组织变革成为企业获得竞争力的重要方式。员工参与是组织变革成败的关键,充足的组织变革信息有利于员工积极投入变革。本文以社会信息加工理论为基础,对来自被兼并企业的36个工作团队185名员工进行研究,探索多渠道变革信息传递对员工的影响机制。基于多层次线性模型的数据分析结果表明:(1)变革情境下,组织正式渠道进行信息沟通和变革氛围包含的非正式信息,均能正向促进员工变革绩效;(2)员工所持有的积极变革期望,在多渠道信息传递和变革绩效间起到中介作用;(3)变革氛围跨层调节变革信息沟通对员工积极变革期望的正向作用,相比于低变革氛围情景,具有高变革氛围的团队,通过变革信息沟通更能显著提升员工对变革的积极期望。研究结论对企业变革实践中信息传递和沟通工作具有现实指导意义。     

基于博弈论的企业品牌战略决策分析

博弈思维的全面导入,为企业品牌战略决策提供了重要的理论依据。由“非合作性博弈”向“合作性博弈”转换是当今国际市场主流发展趋势,市场主导企业与非主导企业结成品牌合作联盟,实施品牌合作战略,可以有效抵制外来企业的入侵,达到“双赢”的目的。     

西部大开发中环境保护的博弈分析与对策建议

环境保护的有效性，在一个区域内主要取决于政府，企业和民众诸方博弈的力量比较及环境政策的调整程度，在西部大开发中，为更有效的培植良好的资源利用环境，应建立起合理，有效的政府调节与市场调节相结合的环境保护机制，本文试图通过污染治理的博弈分析。探寻在西部开发中环境保护与治理的制度保证。     

中国产品质量监管的声誉模型分析

当前中国商品市场上假冒伪劣现象严重,损害消费者权益的事件层出不穷.在两阶段声誉模型中,消费者运用贝叶斯法则推断企业诚信状况并决定下期的购买行为,此时声誉力量可以约束企业的投机主义倾向,将造假企业驱逐出市场.而对重点行业加强监管、加大处罚力度、鼓励消费者投诉,可以促进市场净化,加快诚信社会的建设步伐.     

A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding

Unlawful collusion is when firms have a mutual understanding to coordinate their behavior for the purpose of achieving a supracompetitive outcome. Given the legal focus on mutual beliefs, this paper explores the role of mutual beliefs in producing collusion. Focusing on price leadership, firms are assumed to commonly believe that price increases will be at least matched but lack any shared understanding about who will lead, when they will, and at what prices. Sufficient conditions are derived which ensure that supracompetitive prices emerge. However, price is bounded below the maximal equilibrium price.     

对我国上市公司退出机制的探讨

健全的退出机制是一国证券市场完善的重要标志,本文结合我国证券市场的特殊国情,对上市公司退出机制的现状进行了实证分析,并在此基础上提出了我国上市公司退出机制的基本模式及相应的政策建议。     

生态工业园企业合作非正式契约的博弈分析

企业间稳定的合作关系是生态工业园顺利成长的前提条件．要保证这种合作关系就必须有强有力的制度保障。新制度经济学理论提出将长期契约用来代替纵向一体化经营,同时将长期契约分为正式契约和非正式契约。由于正式契约的非完备性和未来的不确定性,提高了它的实施成本,因此,非正式契约在规范园区企业行为方面提供了强有力的保证。本文对防止园区企业机会主义行为的非正式契约进行了博弈分析．着重用不完全信息下的动态博弈理论阐释非正式契约运行的内在机理,并对如何规范园区企业间合作关系提出了建议与对策,以期有助于生态工业园的健康成长。     

中国环保传播的内在机理及绩效评估体系研究

环保传播是环境可持续发展的重要内容,是促进可持续发展的有效途径,受到学术界广泛关注。目前环保传播活动的实际绩效(实际效果)非常低下,甚至模糊不清,成为急需解决的一个问题。文章在文献总结的基础上,重点分析环保传播的内在机理,并构建了绩效评估理论框架,提出符合环保传播绩效评估指标体系。理论上分为四个阶段:认知扩散阶段、信念形成阶段、行为塑造阶段和价值观变革阶段;具体绩效测定因子包括:意识绩效—察觉、态度、自我效能、个体传播认知,行为绩效——记忆、接受、自我行动、他人效仿。     

基于累积前景理论的农村环境治理决策行为演化博弈研究

从政府的角度出发,以排污企业作为研究对象,合理改进累计前景理论的价值函数,建立村民参与监督下政府和排污企业的农村环境治理决策行为演化博弈模型,进而得到使排污企业积极治理农村环境的约束条件。在综合考虑双方前景价值感知的基础上引入环境治理补贴,构建环境补贴对排污企业价值感知与环境治理决策行为的影响模型,最后运用系统动力学分析村民参与下政府和排污企业环境治理前景价值感知与治理决策行为。解决了传统博弈论完全理性假设和均衡分析方法的局限性,考虑政府和排污企业前景价值感知与环境治理补贴下积极参与农村环境治理的行为特征与规律,以及村民参与监督对政府和排污企业环境治理决策行为的影响,为构建我国农村环境多主体治理机制提供决策参考。