TRADING AMBIGUITY: A TALE OF TWO HETEROGENEITIES

We consider markets with heterogeneously ambiguous assets and heterogeneously ambiguity-averse investors whose preferences are a parsimonious extension of the mean–variance framework. We study portfolio choice and trade upon arrival of public information, and show systematic departures from the predictions of standard theory, that occur in the direction of empirical regularities. In particular, our theory speaks to several phenomena in a unified fashion: the asset allocation puzzle, the observation that earnings announcements are followed by significant trading volume with small price change, and that increases in uncertainty are positively associated with increased trading activity and portfolio rebalancing toward safer assets.     

NONSUBSTITUTION THEOREMS FOR A SMALL TRADING COUNTRY

This paper proves a nonsubstitution theorem for small trading economies, under quite plausible conditions. Conditions are established under which the consumption possibility set for an economy that has nontradeable factors of production and nontradeable consumption goods is bounded by a hyperplane, rather than by a curved surface. The theorem allows the possibility that the prices of nontradeable factors, and hence the incomes of their owners, may depend on domestic supplies of nontradeable factors. It is concluded that the equilibrium wage and the equilibrium prices of all consumption goods are independent of domestic endowments or the shape of demand functions. The theorem tends to strengthen the view that, in the absence of trade barriers, differences in real wages across countries cannot be explained by differences in resource endowments.     

OBSERVABLE REPUTATION TRADING*

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners bid for the firms that are for sale. Customers learn the owner's type, which reflects the quality of the good or service provided, through experience. After observing an ownership change they may want to switch firms. However, in equilibrium, good new owners buy from good old owners and retain high‐value customers. Hence reputation is a tradable intangible asset, although ownership change is observable.     

WATERSHED-BASED EFFLUENT TRADING: THE NONPOINT SOURCE CHALLENGE

In 1996 the Environmental Protection Agency released draft guidelines intended to encourage the development of watershed-based effluent trading systems. Effluent trading systems allow dischargers the opportunity to transfer legal and financial requirements for effluent control in order to lower control costs. To assure that equivalent control is being exchanged, accurate measurement (quantification) of effluent load is necessary. Many argue that measurement of nonpoint source load represents a significant challenge for designing and implementing effluent trading systems. A nonpoint source delivers effluent over a diffuse area. This paper argues that the physical properties of nonpoint source discharge may not offer as significant a barrier to trading as often is presumed. Many measurement challenges are not unique to nonpoint sources, and measurement issues are successfully addressed within a number of local and regional water quality programs. Trading system design can stimulate institutional and technical innovations in nonpoint source measurement.     

THE J CURVE: CHINA VERSUS HER TRADING PARTNERS

The short‐run effects of currency depreciation are said to be different from its long‐run effects. In the short run, the trade balance deteriorates and improvement comes after some time; hence, the J‐curve phenomenon. Previous studies that tested the response of the trade balance to exchange rate changes in China employed aggregate trade data and provided mixed results. Indeed, most of them concluded that real depreciation has no long‐run impact on the Chinese trade balance. In this paper, we disaggregate the data by country and using recent advances in time series modelling estimate a trade balance model between China and her 13 major trading partners. We show that real depreciation of the Chinese currency has a favourable impact on her trade balance with a few partners, especially the USA. Not much support is found for the J‐curve hypothesis.     

IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE EMISSION TRADING PLANS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Abstract.  Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, with an aggregate cap on emissions distributed as emission allowances, and baseline-and-credit, with firms earning emission reduction credits for emissions below baselines. Theory suggests the long-run equilibria of the plans will differ with baselines proportional to output. To test this prediction we develop a computerized environment in which subjects representing firms can adjust their emission rates and capacity levels and trade emission rights in a sealed-bid auction. Demand for output is simulated. We report on six laboratory sessions with variable emissions rates, but fixed capacity: three each with the cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit mechanisms.     

内部人交易与股票市场回报——来自中国市场的证据

本文系统地分析了自2007年6月1日以来,我国上市公司内部人的公开市场交易行为。本文的结论表明,在实施了内部人交易监管法规以来,我国上市公司的内部人依然能够利用私有信息在二级市场上赚取超额收益。当内部人购买或出售公司股票时,股票市场都会出现异常反应。而这些超额收益的大小直接受到公司的股权集中度、企业是否为国有等因素的影响。公司治理结构越差,则内部人赚取的超额收益越多。依据上述结论,笔者提出了相应的政策建议。     

DYNAMIC TRADING IN A DURABLE GOOD MARKET WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION*

We analyze a dynamic version of the Akerlof–Wilson “lemons” market in a competitive durable good setting. There is a fixed set of sellers with private information about the quality of their wares. The price mechanism sorts sellers of different qualities into different time periods—prices and average quality of goods traded increase over time. Goods of all qualities are traded in finite time. Market failure arises because of the waiting involved—particularly for sellers of better quality. The equilibrium path may exhibit intermediate breaks in trading.