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1.
Summary. We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents,
maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by
optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
Received: October 23, 1995; revised version: June 25, 1997 相似文献
2.
Abstract. The majority of Treasuries use discriminatory auctions to sell government debt. A few Treasuries use uniform auctions. The
Spanish Treasury is the only one that uses a hybrid format of discriminatory and uniform auctions. All Treasury auctions are
multiple-unit multiple-bid auctions, usually assumed to be common and unknown value auctions. Taking in account these features,
we analyze the Spanish auction format, taking a linear approximation to bidders' multiple bids, and characterize a parameter
set in which the Spanish format gives higher expected seller's revenue than discriminatory and uniform auctions. Policy implications
are obtained by calibrating theoretical results with data.
We thank S. Nu?ez, and seminar participants at GREQAM, CEFI, the 1999 CEF meeting in Boston and the 57th European Meeting
of the Econcometric Society for suggestions. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees for detailed comments that
greatly improved the paper. Any error is our responsability. The authors express their thanks for financial support to Ministerio
de Ciencia y Teconologia from Proyecto SEC2000-0723, no 9114. 相似文献
3.
Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit
auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria
in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria
for the uniform price auction.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献
4.
In-Uck Park 《Economic Theory》1998,11(2):413-426
Summary. In a novel formulation of revealed preference analysis, Green and Osband [8] show that for expected-utility maximizers, acts
partition the state-simplex into linear polyhedral blocks. The question naturally arises whether this characterization distinguishes
expected utility theory from non-expected utility theories. This paper investigates the weighted utility theory of Chew [2]
and shows that the corresponding partition is systematically different from the expected utility theory: the boundaries of
the partition blocks are quadratic rather than linear. This result contains useful empirical contents.
Received: May 15, 1995; revised version: November 22, 1996 相似文献
5.
Robert Wilson 《Economic Theory》1998,12(2):433-440
Summary. The sequential equilibrium of an ascending-price auction of a single item is derived explicitly for the case of log-normal
distributions and a multiplicative valuation model comprising both common and private factors, and allowing asymmetries. If
the prior distribution on the common factors is diffuse, or of the form obtained by Bayesian updating from a diffuse prior
distribution, then the equilibrium strategies are log-linear with coefficients obtained by solving a set of linear equations.
A similar construction applies to normal distributions and additive terms in the valuation model. An example illustrates the
predictions derived from the model.
Received: December 11, 1996; revised version: July 15, 1997 相似文献
6.
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):563-584
Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We
prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where
we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary
short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations
equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive
compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all
its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting.
Received: December 20, 1995; revised version: December 6, 1996 相似文献
7.
Kin Chung Lo 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):1-20
Summary. Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that each bidder's beliefs about opponents' valuations are represented by a probability
measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsberg Paradox, this paper examines the consequences of relaxing
this assumption in the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values. The multiple priors model
of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141–153] is adopted specifically to represent the bidders' (and the auctioneer's) preferences. The unique equilibrium
bidding strategy in the first price auction is derived. Moreover, under an interesting parametric specialization of the model,
it is shown that the first price auction Pareto dominates the second price auction.
Received: December 15, 1995; revised version: February 19, 1997 相似文献
8.
Summary. In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially
after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world
is changing stochastically over time during the learning process, only temporary informational cascades – situations where
socially valuable information is wasted – can arise. Furthermore, no cascade ever arises when the environment changes in a
sufficiently unpredictable way.
Received: December 5, 1996; revised version: February 11, 1997 相似文献
9.
Julio Dávila 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):213-223
Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably
many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously
of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a
cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies
may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative
statics exercises.
Received: May 19, 1995; revised version: March 24, 1997 相似文献
10.
Summary. We show that when bankruptcy, subject to penalties, is allowed, it is possible to prove the existence of equilibrium in a model with a continuum of states without imposing any assumptions on ex-post endowments.Received: November 20, 1995; revised version: September 16, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
11.
Summary. This article characterizes all of the continuous social welfare orderings which satisfy the Weak (resp. Strong) Pareto principle
when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. With Weak Pareto, on both the nonnegative and positive orthants the social welfare
ordering must be representable by a weakly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function while on the whole Euclidean space
the social welfare ordering must be strongly dictatorial. With Strong Pareto, on the positive orthant the social welfare ordering
must be representable by a strictly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function but on the other two domains an impossibility
theorem is obtained.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 7, 1996 相似文献
12.
Paulo Klinger Monteiro 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):221-227
Summary. In this paper I prove that a quasiconcave separable utility function defined on an atomless space is concave.
Received: August 11, 1997; revised version: October 2, 1997 相似文献
13.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integral 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article
we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional.
Received: January 27, 1997; revised version: April 28, 1997 相似文献
14.
Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Indranil Chakraborty 《Economic Theory》1999,13(3):723-733
Summary. Auctioneers often face the decision of whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey
auction (or any other revenue equivalent auction form) there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that
when the number of bidders is fewer than that critical number the seller strictly prefers a bundled sale and when there are
more bidders the seller prefers unbundled sales. This property holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated
for a given bidder. The results have been proved using a mathematical technique of quantiles that can be extremely useful
for similar analysis.
Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: January 21, 1998 相似文献
15.
Summary. In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection,
in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including
some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an
outside option of positive value.
Received: February 27, 1996; revised version: March 28, 1997 相似文献
16.
Nora Szech 《Journal of Economic Theory》2011,146(6):2596-2607
We study a symmetric independent private values auction model where the revenue-maximizing seller faces a cost cn of attracting n bidders to the auction. If the distribution of valuations possesses an increasing failure rate (IFR), the seller overinvests in attracting bidders compared to the social optimum. Conversely, if the distribution is DFR, the seller underinvests compared to the social optimum. If the distribution of valuations becomes more dispersed, both, a revenue- and a welfare-maximizing seller, attract more bidders. 相似文献
17.
Maher Said 《Games and Economic Behavior》2011,73(1):236-243
We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of private-value auctions for differentiated goods. New buyers and new objects may arrive at random times. Since objects are imperfect substitutes, buyers? values are not persistent. Instead, each buyer?s private value for a new object is a new independent draw from the same distribution.We consider the use of second-price auctions for selling these objects, and show that there exists a unique symmetric Markov equilibrium in this market. In equilibrium, buyers shade their bids down by their continuation value, which is the (endogenous) option value of participating in future auctions. We characterize this option value and show that it depends not only on the number of buyers currently present on the market and the distribution of their values, but also on anticipated market dynamics. 相似文献
18.
Keith Waehrer 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):171-181
Summary. In the model presented, a buyer uses competitive bidding to facilitate her purchase of a good (the primary good of the exchange). Not included in the original purchase is the possible procurement of a good related to the original
purchase: the supplementary good. The primary and supplementary goods are closely related; knowing a bidder's cost of producing the primary good implies
that the buyer can infer the bidder's cost of producing the supplementary good. I show that a bidding mechanism for the primary
good will fail to ensure an efficient allocation if the buyer learns the bid of the winner and the price of the supplementary
good is determined through sequential bargaining.
Received: August 22, 1996; revised version: June 23, 1997 相似文献
19.
In a premium auction, the seller offers some “payback”, called premium, to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders? risk preferences. We analyze a two-stage English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values, in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring. Upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium, we show that the premium causes the expected revenue to increase in the bidders? risk tolerance. A “net-premium effect” is key to this result. 相似文献
20.
Niels Anthonisen 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):143-169
Summary. The paper introduces a version of rationalizability that ignores strategies that are supported by negligible sets of beliefs,
where a negligible set is one whose Lebesgue measure is zero. The theory is developed solely for the special case of point
rationalizability; conditions are then derived under which point rationalizability entails no loss of generality. When these
conditions obtain, the predictions yielded by this approach are often (although not always) a significant reduction over what
is predicted by rationalizability.
Received: September 10 1996; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献