Who pays for switching costs?

Earlier work characterized pricing with switching costs as a dilemma between a short-term “harvesting” incentive to increase prices versus a long-term “investing” incentive to decrease prices. This paper shows that small switching costs may reduce firm profits and provide short-term incentives to lower rather than raise prices. We provide a simple expression which characterizes the impact of the introduction of switching costs on prices and profits for a general model. We then explore the impact of switching costs in a variety of specific examples which are special cases of our model. We emphasize the importance of a short term “compensating” effect on switching costs. When consumers switch in equilibrium, firms offset the costs of consumers that are switching into the firm. If switching costs are low, this compensating effect of switching costs causes even myopic firms to decrease prices. The incentive to decrease prices is even stronger for forward looking firms.     

Quality signaling via strikethrough prices

Why do firms often advertise their current price together with their past price? Although consumers expect high quality products to have high prices, such firms may optimally charge lower prices when faced with low production costs. Thus in markets in which quality is difficult to ascertain and costs often fall over time, for example technology products, high quality firms may face a challenge of signaling their quality through current price alone. In this paper we develop a price signaling model in which uninformed consumers draw inference not only from the current price but also the prior period's price (the “strikethrough price”) if the firm chooses to disclose it. We find that a high quality firm benefits from using strikethrough pricing when the prior probability of high quality is relatively low while the probability of costs falling is relatively high.     

Is Cost-of-Service Regulation Worth the Cost?

Cost-of-service regulation that reduces prices will also reduce incentives to control cost. Increased output counteracts this trend when there are economies of scale. We derive closed-form approximations for the maximum cost increase that leaves a positive welfare gain when regulation reduces price by some percentage. To be useful to regulators, these approximations depend only on demand elasticity and the ratio of fixed to total cost. For low demand elasticities typical of regulated industries, price must fall by half to outweigh cost increases of as little as 2%. Cost-of-service regulation appears to reduce welfare unless economies of scale are strong. These conclusions may be reversed if regulators favor consumers, but only a slight bias in favor of the firm exacerbates them. Regulatory methods that preserve incentives to be efficient by divorcing price from cost become more appealing.     

Quality disclosure in the presence of strategic consumers

Consider a market for short-life products, such as smartphones, where a firm and consumers have asymmetric quality information, the firm sells products in two periods, and consumers make purchase decisions strategically. We investigate when a firm should disclose quality and the interaction between consumers' strategic behavior and the firm's disclosure behavior. We obtain several findings. First, regardless of whether consumers have low or high patience, the firm should disclose quality information if product quality is high and conceal it if product quality is low. However, for products with moderate quality levels, the firm will disclose more quality information to consumers with relatively high or low patience levels than when consumer patience is moderate. Second, firms will disclose less information when consumers behave strategically than when they are myopic. Third, when concealing quality information is an equilibrium, product prices are affected only by disclosure costs and independent of true product quality. Finally, the firm can benefit from consumers' strategic behavior and a higher disclosure cost, but greater patience might be detrimental to consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Information Technology and Consumer Search for Health Insurance

We explore the impact of information technology on the level of premiums paid for individual health insurance by asking which kinds of buyers will have larger gains from the use of new technology. We compare ‘asking price’ data posted on an electronic insurance exchange with survey data on premiums actually paid before the advent of exchange and examine whether the pattern of differences between asking prices and transactions prices can be explained using a simple search theory. We hypothesize that older consumers, expecting to pay higher premiums for a given policy, had engaged in more intensive search than younger consumers, given the same distribution of prices and search costs. Therefore, the introduction of an electronic exchange that lowers the cost of search should have a larger effect on decreasing the level of premiums paid for those who previously searched less (i.e., younger consumers). We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis.     

The strategic use of early bird discounts for dealers

We study a widely used ordering process (“Early Bird Discounts”) whereby a profit-maximizing manufacturer permits his dealers to place advance orders at a discount before they set retail prices. We show that such discounts may be used to shift just enough channel profits to dealers to enable them to cover their fixed costs and stay in business. If the manufacturer instead simply cut his wholesale price in order to generate gross margins for his dealers, these margins would soon dissipate as price competition among dealers selling the same product forced retail prices back down to the per-unit cost. We show that when dealer fixed costs are low, the manufacturer offers an Early Bird Discount to his multiple dealers that induces all but two of them to exit; when fixed costs are high, the manufacturer offers no preorder discount (i.e. switches to linear pricing) and induces all but one dealer to exit. Although uniform slotting allowances could also be used to reward dealers, a sales-based alternative like an Early Bird Discount sometimes has a key advantage when the manufacturer has dealers in cities of different sizes. If the same Early Bird Discount is offered, dealers in markets with more consumers, who typically have larger fixed costs, will preorder larger amounts and will automatically receive higher gross margins. To duplicate such payments with slotting allowances, non-uniform allowances would have to be offered to firms in different markets, which is divisive and possibly illegal.     

Business Conditions and Business Starts

This paper analyses the effect of business conditions on new firm starts. The birth of new firms displays a pro-cyclical behaviour, more firms being created when GDP is growing fast and the interest rate is low. The entry response to industry profitability is tempered by the level of sunk costs; for a given profit signal, more entry occurs where sunk costs are low.     

Effects of Joint Outsourcing on Consumer Welfare

This work models outsourcing under oligopolistic competition with nonlinear costs. I show that in a covered market, if each firm’s marginal cost before outsourcing is lower than the industry’s average cost, outsourcing leads to increased prices and decreased consumer welfare. Joint outsourcing is more profitable if the firms’ equilibrium quantity produced is in the economies of scale part of their cost curve.     

Would You Like to be a Prosumer? Information Revelation,Personalization and Price Discrimination in Electronic Markets

Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how her decision interacts with the pricing strategy of a monopolist who may abuse the information to obtain a larger share of total surplus. We consider two scenarios, one where consumers have different tastes but identical willingness to pay and another with high and low valuation customers. In both cases full revelation may only result if the monopolist can commit to a maximum price before consumers decide about disclosure.     

Technical Change in Banking: Evidence From Transition Countries

This paper investigates the effect of technical change on the costs of banking firms operating in 11 Central and Eastern European countries using Fourier‐flexible cost function specification for the period 1995–2002. A common cost frontier with country‐specific variables is employed in order to take into account macro‐economic and regulatory conditions that vary over country and time. Our findings suggest that the rate of reduction in costs resulting from technical change increased during the sample period. Banks operating in Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland benefited more from technical change than their counterparts. In terms of cost reduction, large banks benefited more from technical progress. This indicates that large banks are more able to change their optimal input mix in response to changes in technology.     

Can Mergers to Monopoly,Price Fixing,and Market‐Division Agreements Raise Welfare?

Naked market division, price fixing agreements and mergers which result in dominant positions have long been opposed by the courts and the government because of the high likelihood that they will result in a reduction in output and an increase in price. We show that the opposite may be true if the market is characterized by marketing spillovers. When marketing investment is required to educate consumers about the general capabilities or qualities of a product, marketing efforts by one producer will benefit rival producers. A theoretical model of these types of markets shows that marketing spillovers can forestall entry altogether or force incumbent firms to engage in ‘limit marketing’ that leaves the market underserved from a welfare‐maximizing perspective. Under these circumstances, market output and social welfare are potentially raised not only through horizontal agreements among competitors, but also through cost‐raising strategies and commitments to predatory behavior by incumbent firms.     

RELIABILITY AND REGULATION IN PRICING PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICE

The principal question addressed in this paper concerns the optimal price profile for a regulated public utility where demand is stochastic. Through the introduction of rationing costs and a rate-of-return constraint, marginal revenue will be approximately equated to the cost associated with satisfying the last unit of consumers’demand. This has significant implications for capacity expansion. Namely, capacity is added to keep the risk of failure minimal. As a result, to the extent that the associated costs are higher for the last unit of capacity, a higher marginal revenue and hence price will result. That is, if the marginal unit of capacity has a high operating and delivery cost and low capital cost with high reliability and consequent high total cost (e.g., an internal combustion peaking unit), the indicated result follows. Consequently, there is a direct trade off between the level of risk of failure and marginal revenue. This provides a rationalization for the existence of the price differential between firm and interruptible customers. Finally, if the firm is contrained to earn a fair return on its capital investment, it will set prices to favor the consumers generating the expansion in capacity.     

State dependent pricing, invoicing currency, and exchange rate pass-through

We analyze exchange rate pass-through and volatility of import prices in a dynamic framework where firms are subject to menu costs and decide on price adjustments in response to exchange rate innovations. The exchange rate pass-through and import price volatility then depend on the invoicing currency in combination with functional forms of cost and demand functions. In particular, there is lower pass-through, less frequent price adjustments, and lower price volatility when prices are set in the importer's currency than when prices are set in the exporter's currency.     

R&D Costs,Innovative Output and Firm Size in the Pharmaceutical Industry

This study examines the relationships between firm size, R&D costs and output in the pharmaceutical industry. Project–level data from a survey of 12 US–owned pharmaceutical firms on drug development costs, development phase lengths and failure rates are used to determine estimates of the R&D cost of new drug development by firm size. Firms in the sample are grouped into three size categories, according to their pharmaceutical sales at the beginning of the study period. The R&D cost per new drug approved in the US is shown to decrease with firm size, while sales per new drug approved are shown to increase markedly with firm size. Sales distributions are highly skewed and suggest that firms need to search for blockbuster drugs with above–average returns. The results are consistent with substantial economies of scale in pharmaceutical R&D, particularly at the discovery and preclinical development phases.     

Manufacturers' brand advertising and how it influences manufacturers' and retailers' margins

This article describes the effects of manufacturers' brand advertising on the costs, margins and prices of firms in a real-life, 'dual-stage' world where manufacturers sell to retailers who resell to consumers. Unlike 'single-stage' models, which are frequently used by economists, in which manufacturers appear to sell directly to consumers or to deal with them through an inert distribution system, retailers in a dual-stage world neither buy nor sell as perfect competitors. Although in some industry structures advertising will raise prices to consumers, the welfare effects of advertising are far more benign in a dual-stage world. In intensively advertised categories consumers are more disposed to switch stores within brand than brands within store (just the opposite of relationships in categories where brand franchises are weak) causing there to be an inverse association between margins at the two stages. Thus, while intensive advertising will normally raise factory prices it will drive down retailer margins, often to the point that retail prices are below the levels that would be obtained if the industry were only lightly advertised.     

The effect of exogenous product familiarity on endogenous consumer search

When a consumer is familiar with one product but not its competitor, she is faced with a decision: either buy what she knows, or engage in search to learn more. When search is costly, competing firms may attempt to encourage or discourage search by adjusting prices. In this paper we consider how competitive dynamics between two quality differentiated firms are affected if one product enjoys a familiarity advantage. Familiarity is defined as a consumer’s ex-ante knowledge of fit for a particular product. An increase in the level of familiarity for one product allows a firm to charge higher prices since there are more consumers with information on that product relative to the competition. We call this the direct effect of familiarity. However, an increase in familiarity also has an indirect effect, since it gives the rival firm a stronger incentive to decrease price in order to encourage searching, in turn increasing overall competition. The effect of familiarity on profits depends on the magnitudes of these effects, and it is moderated by the level of quality differentiation between products. For very high or very low levels of differentiation, the results are relatively straightforward. However, when the level of differentiation is moderate, the results are more nuanced, with the higher-quality firm realizing higher profits from more familiarity, even if it must lower prices due to the indirect effect. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, overall competition may be higher when firms are more quality differentiated. This is driven by the fact that higher quality differences bolster the indirect effect, with a lower quality firm providing deeper price cuts to counter increased familiarity of a high quality rival. We conclude by examining how changes in the cost of searching impact equilibrium outcomes.

     

Retail Market Power in a Shopping Basket Model of Supermarket Competition

Supermarket retailers typically operate with relatively low margins, suggesting a highly competitive retail environment. However, despite the fact that consumers purchase an entire shopping basket at a time from supermarkets, this evidence is largely based on models of retail competition with single-category purchases. In this paper, we develop and test an empirical model of retail price competition that explicitly accounts for the effect of demand complementarity among items in consumer shopping baskets. Relative to the case where consumers purchase products with independent demands, we demonstrate that equilibrium prices are higher for all items when retailers take demand-complementarity into account. Our findings indicate that non-price strategies intended to encourage complementarity, such as co-merchandising, strategic shelf-positioning, or featuring complementary goods tend to soften price competition, and lead to higher equilibrium prices.     

How do firms make money selling digital goods online?

We review research on revenue models used by online firms who offer digital goods. Such goods are non-rival, have near zero marginal cost of production and distribution, low marginal cost of consumer search, and low transaction costs. Additionally, firms can easily observe and measure consumer behavior. We start by asking what consumers can offer in exchange for digital goods. We suggest that consumers can offer their money, personal information, or time. Firms, in turn, can generate revenue by selling digital content, brokering consumer information, or showing advertising. We discuss the firm’s trade-off in choosing between the different revenue streams, such as offering paid content or free content while relying on advertising revenues. We then turn to specific challenges firms face when choosing a revenue model based on either content, information, or advertising. Additionally, we discuss nascent revenue models that combine different revenue streams such as crowdfunding (content and information) or blogs (information and advertising). We conclude with a discussion of opportunities for future research including implications for firms’ revenue models from the increasing importance of the mobile Internet.     

Productivity, terms of trade and the ‘home market effect’

This paper analyzes the international transmission and welfare implications of productivity gains and changes in market size when macroeconomic adjustment occurs both along the intensive margin of trade (changes in the relative price of existing varieties of tradable goods) and the extensive margin (creation and destruction of varieties). We draw a distinction between productivity gains that enhance manufacturing efficiency and gains that lower the cost of firms' entry and of product differentiation. Countries with lower manufacturing costs have higher GDP but supply their products at lower international prices. Instead, countries with lower entry costs supply a larger array of goods at improved terms of trade. Output growth driven by demographic expansions, as well as government spending, is associated with an improvement in international relative prices and firms' entry. While trade liberalization may result in a smaller array of goods available to consumers, efficiency gains from deeper economic integration benefit consumers via lower goods prices. The international transmission mechanism and the welfare spillovers vary under different asset market structures, depending on trade costs, the elasticity of labor supply, and consumers' taste for varieties.     

A macroeconomic model of international price discrimination

This paper builds a baseline two-country model of real and monetary transmission in the presence of optimal international price discrimination by firms. Distributing traded goods to consumers requires nontradables, making the price elasticity of demand country-specific and a function of the exchange rate. Profit-maximizing monopolistic firms drive a wedge between prices across countries, optimally dampening the response of import and consumer prices to exchange-rate movements. We derive general equilibrium expressions for the pass-through into import and consumer prices, tracing the differential impact of real and monetary shocks on marginal cost and markup fluctuations through the exchange rate.