Commons,Collective Action,and Corruption

John R. Commons tried to save capitalism by making it good. His career was characterized by a sustained attempt to reduce social inequality by promoting collective action. Thanks to his proximity to the terrain, Commons often found himself close to authentic examples of corruption. Indeed, in his published works, corruption was treated exclusively from this perspective. His analysis reveals that collective action is not only the cause, but also the consequence of corruption, and that, in addition, the struggle against corruption is dependent on collective action for its success. I argue that Commons’s position is diametrically opposed to the theses developed later by Nathaniel Leff and Samuel Huntington. For Commons, the main issue is not that there is too much control over individual actions, but that there is too little.     

Information and Common Knowledge in Collective Action

The paper suggests a theoretical game framework to explain collective action dynamics by learning processes. When a certain fact becomes common knowledge due to a certain event, people accumulate knowledge about the state of the world and act accordingly. We concentrate on a conceptual example of the bandwagon dynamic showing the insights which this approach adds to existing studies. We analyze two other conceptual examples showing that the accumulation of information does not always bring people to know the truth about the state of the world. On the other hand, it may make them aware of their ignorance. Several practical implications follow.     

集体行动何以可能？——关于集体行动动力机制的文献综述

社会科学界对集体行动动力机制的研究由来已久。结构主义者认为结构才是集体行动的本源,结构决定了意识形态从而也决定了集体行动;功利主义认为有着共同利益的群体成员才有集体行动的可能,但个人理性会令集体行动陷入困境;而建构主义则认为人们是依据意义的社会建构来采取行动的,但集体行动所需的共同意识、资源、成员都需要组织者积极动员,除了群体的意义建构在影响集体行动,行动者的理性也仍然在考察不断变化的周围世界的基础上参与行动抉择。在借鉴国外最新理论的基础上,结合特定社会情境,中国学者建立了一个解释现阶段中国社会正在发生的集体行动的本土化模型。     

集体行动与社会规范的演进

文章描述了达成集体行动基础的两条研究路径,一是关注实验研究提供的证据及其可能的理论解释;二是考察真实世界的经验证据。关于集体行动的这两条研究路径是很活跃的研究领域,出现了很多重要的研究成果。其中一个重要的发现是,世界上的人有许多类型,有一些人会比另一些人更愿意为了集体行动的潜在收益而发起互惠行动。因此,一个核心的问题是,潜在的合作者如何相互发出信号,以及如何设计制度以促成而不是破坏有条件的合作。尽管还没有完全成熟的理论面世,不过,基于演化的一些理论对各种基于实验或者田野调查的研究发现的解释力也许是最强大的,因而有可能成为这一领域的核心理论。     

Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence

Collective action can take place at a plurality of levels. It has to be based on a constitution which defines the basic rules of interaction. Here, we are concerned with the problem of the constitutional setting of bottom-up formal institutions with a club nature. The pressure to improve the efficiency of services pushes local administrations to co-ordinate to produce public goods. This process has stimulated the birth of different forms of agencies or private companies with a club nature. The aim of this paper is to discuss the effects of institutional interdependence on the efficiency of this kind of collective action. In order to shed some light on this problem, the paper first discusses the problem of the relativity of efficiency to the institutional setting. A framework of analysis is then discussed to identify the main factors affecting collective action. Finally some evidence will be provided by a comparative institutional analysis performed on some case studies concerning local associational forms among communes in north-eastern Italy.     

西方集体行动理论的演化与进展

集体利益的公共产品特性导致成员普遍的搭便车行为,形成"集体行动的困境".如何克服搭便车、走出集体行动的困境,就成为集体行动理论研究的核心内容.西方对集体行动的研究成果非常丰富,但是不同学者之间观点针锋相对、分歧很大.本文把各种观点主要归类为集体行动的理性选择理论、意识形态理论和社会资本理论三种理论流派.各种理论流派各有所长,但都有一定的局限性.     

Continuous Time Models of Collective Action and Political Change

This paper presents continuous time models for an analysis of dynamic systems using them to examine the complex dynamics of collective action and political change. The study concentrates on the mutual dependence and behavior of two variables over time: the number of citizens participating in collective action, and the amount of resources mobilized by the government to combat such collective action. The models presented highlight the key components that determine outcomes, and allow for planning, of particular dynamics of collective action and political change. Specifically, the proposed models analyze the impact of collective action on the transition toward democracy as well as possible dynamics of revolution.     

Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

Olson's Logic of Collective Action: A Review Article

This comment is offered as a defense of humanistic economics whose feminist credentials have been questioned by Julie Nelson. To her, our contribution is little less than orthodox economics, an ideology enshrining masculine values. We find her arguments based on a clear misreading or misinterpretation of our work. Especially needing correction is her charge that our key notion of a dual self is contaminated by traditional hierarchy and masculinized reason, and the idea of a ‘mushroom man’ operating in a social vacuum. Once her arguments, which we find contrived, are deconstructed it can be readily seen that there remains little difference between her own and our economics.     

集体行动的逻辑与可持续发展的困境

个体理性的效率追求是经济活动的动力,但个体理性往往导致集体非理性。本文从个体理性与集体理性概念的相对性出发,探讨个体、地方政府、国家在经济活动中本位利益的追求与可持续发展目标的背离。纯粹的市场效率追求会导致“市场失灵,”政府在解决“市场失灵”时如果无法有效约束个体理性的本位利益追求与政绩偏好,在可持续发展问题上就会出现一定程度的“政府失灵”。在“双重失灵”的情况下,集体行动的逻辑必然导致可持续发展陷入困境。要在个体理性的效率追求与集体理性的“共同信念”中实现可持续发展战略,必须明确政府责任并进行追加性制度投资。     

“气”与中国乡村集体行动的再生产

本文认为当代中国乡村集体行动再生产的基础并非利益或理性,而是伦理。这种伦理在中国文化中有其独特的概念:"气"。本文着重从农民与基层政府的互动角度分析了"气"在乡村集体行动再生产过程中的作用机制,指出基层政府对行动精英惯有的强力打压引发了反弹,使农民的抗争变成了为获得人格尊严和底线承认的殊死斗争。本文认为应该把"承认的政治学"提高到与"团结的政治学"并重的高度,并对如何纾解集体行动中的"气"、减少群体性事件的发生提出了一些对策建议。     

Leading by numbers

We measure to determine where we stand financially or in our quality outcomes. As people see the connection of measures and the success of the company, everything makes more sense. Izzo (2005) writes that profits/net margins are important to an organization and are like oxygen to a person. If we have oxygen, we can focus on the important things in life; if we don't we are preoccupied with gasping for air. Organizations are the same way. With the oxygen of profits, organizations can focus on those things that matter most to the staff and the customer. But when the search for profits becomes obsessive because of greed for excess profits or impending financial doom, everybody loses. Izzo (2005) reminds us that organizations shouldn't exist for only profit, just as people don't exist for only oxygen. Oxygen is merely an enabler for us to do the work of living. Measurement and numbers are the oxygen needed to achieve excellence. As people in organizations use numbers as their servants rather than being slaves to numbers, everyone will succeed. If the use of measurement is seen as punitive, and not a system of serving people to attain that zest for business and a higher mission, we will not achieve the level of excellence our people, patients, and communities deserve.     

社会网络视野下的集体行动——以林镇群体性事件为例

本文试图研究当前中国集体行动暴力生成机制,探讨在当前中国基层社会,有哪些因素或机制影响着集体行动中民众对斗争手法的选择,从而使其呈现出暴力型、常规型和破坏型这3种基本类型.本文运用社会运动理论和社会网络理论,以集体行动常见的3种形态为依据,选取林镇近几年发生的群体性事件中的3个典型案例进行比较分析,并以此为基础提出了一个关于社会网络所提供的社会资本总量同集体行动暴力程度之间特定关系的命题.     

农地制度安排与村民集体行动——小产权房问题探析

小产权房是一个新问题,同时也是一个攸关中国土地制度改革的大问题.文章通过分析小产权房供给背后的黑匣子,认为催生小产权房的制度根源在于我国的城乡二元结构和不完善的土地产权制度,这种制度诱导了村民的集体行动.短期政策要注意平衡各方利益,利用经济手段而非激烈的行政手段慎重地解决小产权房问题;在长期要着眼于土地制度的建设和完善.     

An Evolutionary Theory of Collective Action: Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship for the Common Good

This paper presents the foundations of a dynamictheory of collective action. Firstly, the role of public entrepreneursin processes of institutional development is characterized. Secondly,the protagonists of social change are analyzed in regard to theirmotivation, strategic options, levels of action, and specificcapabilities. A new perspective on successful collective actionis opened up.     

Retests on the Theory of Collective Action: The Olson and Zeckhauser Model and its Elaboration

The Olson-Zeckhauser model explaining contributions to international organizations, which used economic size as the dominant indicator, lost its predictive power by the 1970s. I suggest a broad explanatory factor: contribution incentives experienced by an organization's members. International relations theory enables us to identify systemic reasons why the large industrialized nations might feel less incentive to contribute to international governmental organizations regardless of their policy area. The reasons, changing characteristics of the international system including multipolarity and international economic competition, have intensified since the early 1970s in step with changing contribution patterns. I propose an empirical model, a specific incarnation of the collective-action framework. This proposed model argues that a state's burden-sharing reflects the nature of its international preferences, themselves a function of a country's domestic conditions and international incentives. A variety set of tests supports my hypothesis that the decreasing interest of large nations in bankrolling international institutions arises from the increasingly decentralized nature of international influence.     

国际主流信用风险度量技术的比较

巴塞尔银行监管委员会于2003年4月发布了巴塞尔新资本协议(the New Basel Capital Accord，Basel Ⅱ)第三次征求意见稿(CP3)，进一步明确激励银行研究开发更为复杂、更为先进的风险度量技术和内部评级法(Internal Ratings—Based(IRB)approaches)，提高最低资本要求的风险敏感度。