最高人民法院关于审理环境污染刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释（2006年6月26日最高人民法院审判委员会第1391次会议通过）

中华人民共和国最高人民法院公告 《最高人民法院关于审理环境污染刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释》已于2006年6月26日由最高人民法院审判委员会第1391次会议通过．现予公布．自2006年7月28日起施行。     

不能承受的污染之重

6月19日,最高人民法院、最高人民检察院发布的《关于办理环境污染刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释》正式实施。这是2011年《刑法修正案（八）》对刑法规定的＂重大环境污染事故罪＂完善后,首次对环境污染违法行为认定进行细化,比如环境污染致30人以上中毒将追刑责。     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Tax Loopholes

This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue‐maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.     

Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax Evasion

Income tax evasion is modeled as a risky activity and integrated into a standard optimal tax problem in which there is a good whose sales are observable. If the penalty for evasion is proportional to the tax evaded (the Yitzhaki scheme), the optimal tax structure is unaffected by evasion. If the penalty is proportional to unreported income (the Allingham–Sandmo scheme), it is efficient to tax both the observable good and income. The cost of the risk of tax evasion is traded off against the distortion from taxing the observable good. For equal penalties, Allingham/Sandmo is more efficient than Yitzhaki.     

Tax Evasion and Limited Liability

Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) suggest that imposing very high penalties for tax evasion is not possible under bankruptcy or limited liability constraints. In this paper, we complement their suggestion by showing that, in the presence of these constraints, imposing very high penalties can make an economy Pareto worse‐off. This result helps provide a further insight into why governments typically do not set very high penalties for tax evasion in practice. Implications for optimal deterrence policies in the context of tax evasion are also explored.     

Tax Overpayments, Tax Evasion, and Book-Tax Differences

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analyzed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government take into account these effects when pursuing their own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.     

Tax Amnesties In A Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion

We present a dynamic model of tax evasion, where tax liabilities last for two periods and the probability of an inspection decreases with the sum of taxes evaded this period plus taxes evaded last period. We show that a tax amnesty that pardons more than the evasion penalties (an extensive amnesty) can temporarily improve compliance. Whenever the inspection technology improves, steady state compliance also improves, but the economy takes time to transit from one steady state to the other. We show that an amnesty may accelerate this transit, or even make it instantaneous if the amnesty is extensive enough.     

Tax Liability and Tax Evasion in a Competitive Labor Market

In a competitive labor market, a change in the legal incidence of a tax on labor will not alter employment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, this irrelevance result may no longer apply if taxes can be evaded. In particular, a shift from payroll to income taxes will lower employment. This will be the case if workers exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, have a utility function, which is strongly separable in income and the disutility from working, and the penalty for evasion is not proportional to the amount of taxes evaded. Accordingly, tax evasion opportunities can make the legal incidence of a tax on labor an important determinant of its economic incidence.     

我国逃税行为的经济学分析

逃税作为一种信息不对称状态下的机会主义行为,在各个国家普遍存在。在转轨经济背景下,我国逃税现象更为严重,它给我们的资源配置及收入分配均带来负面影响。本文在介绍评价A-S经典模型的基础上,结合我国国情,从逃税心理成本的角度拓展了A-S模型的内容,从而更好地解释了我国的逃税现象并据此提出治理逃税行为的政策建议。     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Market Entry

We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.     

商标权与企业名称权冲突的法律问题探析

商标权与企业名称权之间的冲突,是知识产权领域权利冲突的重要表现形式之一.近来,这两种权利之间的冲突有愈演愈烈的趋势,如果处理得不好,将不利于我国市场经济健康有序的发展.本文分析了商标权与企业名称权发生冲突的主要原因,提出处理冲突应遵循的原则,指出两种权利的冲突中在先权利的救济方式,并对减少两种权利冲突的措施进行了探讨.     

Tax Evasion and the Time Consistency of the Government's Income Tax Policy

It is shown that it is not necessarily optimal for the government to tax capital income at a high rate even when capital is in fixed supply because the supply of capital for tax purposes may be elastic if capital income tax evasion occurs. An example is given where the wage tax rate is positive and greater than the interest income tax rate even though capital is in fixed supply. Conditions are also derived under which the capital income tax rate is lower in the closed-loop policy game, where capital is fixed, than in the open-loop game, where it is not.
JEL Classification Numbers: E61, H26.