Habitual entrepreneurs: Possible cases of entrepreneurship addiction?

We examine the underlying psychological processes that may motivate habitual entrepreneurs to engage in entrepreneurship repeatedly. By drawing on the psychology literature on behavioral addictions, such as workaholism and Internet use, we develop a framework that defines the symptomatology of what we identify as a “behavioral addiction to entrepreneurship.” Through interviews with two habitual entrepreneurs, we demonstrate how these addiction symptoms manifest in the entrepreneurial context. We also demonstrate how psychological, emotional, and physiological aspects of the entrepreneurial experience reinforce a behavioral addiction to entrepreneurship. Our theorizing offers insights into the psychological origins of repeated engagement in venture creation activities and yields insights into possible “dark side” of entrepreneurship outcomes.     

Pioneering strategies for entrepreneurial success

Entrepreneurs are, by definition, pioneers in that they innovate new products/services, create new processes, open new markets, or organize new industries. Dramatic changes in the global environment suggest that successful entrepreneurs must master three key strategies: (1) develop a clear vision; (2) manage cash creatively, or learn to “bootstrap”; and (3) be able to persuade others to commit to the venture using social skills. This article discusses pioneering strategies and offers guidance on how to implement these.     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

Narrative attributions of entrepreneurial failure

We examine how organizational stakeholders use narratives in their psychological processing of venture failure. We identify a range of “narrative attributions”, alternative accounts of failure that actors draw on to process the failure and their role in it. Our analysis provides a view of entrepreneurial failure as a complex social construction, as entrepreneurs, hired executives, employees and the media construct failure in distinctively different ways. Narratives provide means for both cognitive and emotional processing of failure through grief recovery and self-justification.     

Ago\ra Partnerships Nicaragua: A micro venture capital fund

Agora Partnerships is a micro venture capital fund founded by Benjamin Powell in the US and Ricardo T. Teran in Nicaragua. Agora started operations in 2005 with the goal of identifying and supporting entrepreneurs and business plans with high potential for success. The fund faces some unique challenges. First, the size of the businesses that is investing in does not allow for a traditional “management fee” structure. Secondly, traditional investment exits are nearly impossible in Nicaragua. This teaching case includes analysis on sources of investment capital, deal structures, and expected returns. The unresolved dilemma remains how to structure an investment proposal attractive to both investors and entrepreneurs. The case also allows discussing how to adapt the venture capital model to an emerging country like Nicaragua.     

The birth and growth of toshiba's laptop and notebook computers: A case study in Japanese corporate venturing

This case study presents the “under the table” birth, accelerated growth, and ultimate success of two major technological and market innovations: (1) the Toshiba laptop computer, a project vetoed twice by corporate headquarters, and (2) the notebook computer, a project hidden from headquarters. Because of the vision, persistence, and championing efforts of a team of passionate Japanese corporate entrepreneurs, a new business was created that is now part of Toshiba's mainstream operations and that has become a significant contributor to the growth and profitability of the corporation. We follow the evolution of this corporate venture from initial failures in 1978 to the success of the laptop computer, first in Europe (1985), then in the United States, and finally in Japan. This was followed by the reincorporation of the venture in the corporate “mainstream” (1987), the worldwide success of the notebook computer (1989), and the continued growth of the business in parallel with repeated promotions of the entrepreneurs.First, a framework is presented for interpreting the case within current theories and practices of the management of innovation and the processes of championing innovative corporate ventures. This framework is expanded to include recent studies on how major corporations have achieved worldwide leadership in high-tech markets. Second, using the analogy of human life from conception to adulthood, the key phases, events, and entrepreneurial actions of Toshiba's PC business are summarized in Table 1. Third, the theoretical framework is applied to a discussion of the unusual aspects of this case. Fourth, we analyze the business strategy and the technology strategy developed by Toshiba. Finally, we summarize the cultural and organizational context of Toshiba as well as other critical factors that contributed to the enduring success of this corporate venture.There are four aspects, in addition to the international setting, that make this case interesting for both scholars and practitioners: (1) the “under the table” development of both the laptop and notebook, (2) the unexpected success of the first product, followed by a second success, (3) the evolution of champi oning at various organizational levels, and (4) the continuity of the strategic vision for Toshiba's information systems business from 1978 to the present, and how this vision was translated into specific business and technological strategies.From the perspective of management of innovation, the successes of both the laptop and the notebook computers were due to the “back to the future“ market research and design process summarized in Table 2. This process, where market requirements drive the design process, was developed by the lead entrepreneur, Tetsuya Mizoguchi, after repeated failures of the conventional process, where the results of R&D drive the design and productspecifications, regardless of market requirements. From the perspective of the championing processes, we can observe both bottom-up and top-down roles (Day 1994): Mizoguchi was the product champion and Nishida the marketing champion in Europe, while General Manager Koga protected Mizoguchi from interference by headquarters; executive champion Mizushima orchestrated the difficult transition of the venture into a corporate mainstream operation. The evolution of the championing process is summarized in Table 3, using the Venkatamaran et al. model (1992). We conclude that the most appropriate model for interpreting this case is a combination of the Day and Venkatamaran et al. models, which emphasizes both multiple championing roles and the transfer of the lead role from one champion to another during the corporate entrepreneurship process.The business strategy and market and technological strategies developed by Toshiba for achieving worldwide leadership in the portable PC market are summarized in Figures 1 and 2. More broadly, the process and critical factors that determined Toshiba's success can be visualized according to Figure 3. The corporate entrepreneurs and champions were driven away from mainframes by a vision of distributed and interconnected computing that compelled them to focus on personal computers. This focus determined the winning business strategy (fully compatible portable units) which in turn determined the technological and market strategies (miniaturization and complementarity to IBM). At the same time, this focus allowed the entrepreneurs to concentrate their scarce resources on the “back to the future” design process and develop unique core competencies. This coupling of winning strategies with unique core competencies made possible Toshiba's potential leadership in the marketplace. Actual leadership was achieved through continuous, step-by-step learning by doing and through market feedback that further reinforced the adopted strategies and enhanced the core competencies. Six critical factors contributed to the long-term success of the corporate venture: (1) the venture had the potential to achieve worldwide leadership in a mainstream area of the corporation, (2) the PC market in Europe and the United States (but not initially in Japan) was fragmented and highly receptive to unique innovations, (3) the corporate entrepreneurs were driven by a long-range vision of the business, with focused strategies and well-defined objectives, (4) the entrepreneurs were persistent and undeterred by repeated failures in the marketplace and by the distrust and hostility of headquarters, (5) the organizational context, because of slack internal controls, allowed the diversion of funds and manpower to the “under the table” venture and, finally (6) the role of entrepreneurs evolved from underground innovators to product, executive, and corporate champions in order to reinforce, broaden, and implement their vision.     

Entrepreneurial learning from failure: An interpretative phenomenological analysis

This article develops a deeper conceptualisation of the process and content dimensions of learning from venture failure. I propose that recovery and re-emergence from failure is a function of distinctive learning processes that foster a range of higher-level learning outcomes. This qualitative research demonstrates that entrepreneurs learn much not only about themselves and the demise of their ventures but also about the nature of networks and relationships and the “pressure points” of venture management. This article also provides evidence that these powerful learning outcomes are future-oriented, increasing the entrepreneur's level of entrepreneurial preparedness for further enterprising activities.     

National culture,effectuation, and new venture performance: global evidence from student entrepreneurs

Studies examining the relationship between national culture and entrepreneurial activity have largely ignored the influence of culture on individual decision-making. Recent years have witnessed considerable interest in cognitive logics employed by entrepreneurs. A growing body of literature examines factors contributing to the relative reliance on causal and effectual reasoning as entrepreneurs attempt to launch and grow new ventures, with evidence suggesting expert entrepreneurs engage more heavily in effectual reasoning than do novice entrepreneurs. The present study examines the mediating role of cognitive logic in explaining venture performance in differing cultural contexts. A series of hypotheses are tested using a sample of 3411 new ventures started by student entrepreneurs from 24 countries based on the Global University Entrepreneurial Spirit Students’ Survey. The findings indicate that both venture cognitive logics have positive effects on new venture performance and serve as mediators in the culture-performance relationship. Based on these findings, we conclude entrepreneurial reasoning is shaped not only by personal characteristics of entrepreneurs but also by aspects of the cultural context.     

Emerging life sciences ventures: The quest for legitimacy

As an emerging life sciences venture, gaining legitimacy (credibility) with external stakeholders (e.g., investors) is a critical challenge in today's environment. This quest for legitimacy relates to issues that focus on the individual, the environment, and the process. Integrating insights gained from interviews with three CEOs of life sciences companies along with the academic literature, we provide guidance for entrepreneurs regarding the unique challenges facing life sciences ventures. We propose that these ventures are driven by a “quest for legitimacy” and that life sciences entrepreneurs therefore must be aware of the strategic issues which impact legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders (e.g., investors).     

Assessing the effectiveness of guided preparation for new venture creation and performance: Theory and practice

Governments in virtually all developed countries subsidise “guided preparation” for entrepreneurial activity. Despite being so widespread, the evidence that this assistance enhances venture performance remains in dispute, primarily because of a lack of consensus over statistical approaches. This paper provides a new — to entrepreneurship scholars-approach, applying it to a programme guiding nascent and new entrepreneurs in Denmark. It concludes that the programme contributes to the survival and size of new ventures, but its impact on growth is less clear. It also finds that impact is sensitive to changing the eligibility criteria of the programme — such as requiring a modest payment from participants or selecting participants according to observable entrepreneurial characteristics.     

Some methodological problems associated with researching women entrepreneurs

There is a need to feminize the research on entrepreneurs — to include the experiences of women in what we know to be true about entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurial process. This paper highlights some of the most significant methodological problems in researching women's entrepreneurial experience, problems which in the past, have prevented researchers from gaining an understanding of this experience, and which continues to stand in the way of developing female perspectives. Instead of using the existing male-based models, new approaches are called for in incorporating women's experiences into entrepreneurship theory. This paper outlines the state of research and suggests future directions for developing research on women as entrepreneurs.Lois Stevenson, B. Comm., M.B.A., PhD (submitted) was a professor in the Faculty of Management, Acadia University, Canada. Her research interests are in the area of entrepreneurship and new venture development, entrepreneurship education, and the emerging role of women as entrepreneurs. Several papers and articles have been published from her work and she is very active in leading seminars and workshops on business start-up and entrepreneurship development, particularly for women.     

Venture capitalists and serial entrepreneurs

Habitual entrepreneurship is receiving growing attention, much of which has focused on entrepreneurs who have started more than one venture. This paper examines the importance of habitual entrepreneurs to the venture capital industry, with particular emphasis on those who have exited from an initial investment in the venture capitalist's portfolio, termed serial entrepreneurs. As venture capital markets mature, increasing numbers of entrepreneurs are likely to exit from their initial enterprises, creating a pool of entrepreneurs with the potential for embarking on subsequent ventures. Venture capitalists making investments may invest both in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a management buy-out or buy-in. On this wider basis, the paper develops a classification of types of serial venture. A number of issues are raised for venture capitalists, notably the relative attractiveness of reinvesting in exited entrepreneurs and the policy they adopt in tracking and assessing such individuals.The paper addresses venture capitalists' perspectives on investing in serial entrepreneurs based on a representative sample of 55 UK venture capitalists (a response rate of 48.7%, and a follow-up survey of those who had more extensive experience of serial entrepreneurs (23 respondents). The results of the survey show that despite a strong preference for using an entrepreneur who had played a major role in a previous venture, the extent to which exiting entrepreneurs are funded from their own portfolio again is limited, though there is more extensive use of such individuals in a consultancy capacity. In screening entrepreneurs exiting from previous ventures for subsequent investments, venture capitalists scored attributes relating to commercial awareness, experience in a particular sector, and personal ambition of the entrepreneur most highly.Venture capitalists do make extensive use of serial entrepreneurs who have exited from other venture capitalists' portfolios, primarily to lead management buy-ins. Indications from the survey are that venture capitalists rarely assess entrepreneurs formally at the time of exit and that it is unusual to maintain formal links with entrepreneurs after they have exited. These apparent shortcomings suggest that perhaps investment opportunities are being missed. Those venture capitalists preferring serial entrepreneurs generally had a larger volume of funds under investment and were rather older than those venture capitalists who do not prefer to use serial entrepreneurs, reflecting the possibility that longer established venture capitalists have had more opportunity and experience in relation to second-time entrepreneurs.Investment appraisal factors were subject to a principal components analysis to identify underlying dimensions/relationships between them. With respect to the general investment appraisal factors, five factors were identified. Two factors were related to track record; one of these reflected ownership experience, while the other represented management experience. The third factor was related to personal attributes such as age, knowledge, and family background. The fourth factor represented links to the funding institution, and the final factor (a single variable factor) concerned financial commitment. The principal components analysis for screening factors on management buy-ins produced a single factor comprising all variables. These factors were then subject to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with preference for use of a serial entrepreneur as the independent variable. The results suggest that there are significant differences between venture capitalists who prefer serial entrepreneurs and those who do not in respect to their business ownership experience, the length of their entrepreneurial careers, and the number of their previous ventures.The results of the study have implications for practitioners. First, the findings emphasize the importance of not considering previous venture experience in isolation but in the context of other key investment criteria. Second, the lack of strongly greater performance from serial, versus novice, entrepreneurs further emphasizes the care to be taken in assessing experienced entrepreneurs. Third, the relatively low degree of formal and rigorous post-exit assessment and monitoring by venture capitalists suggests that important opportunities to invest in experienced entrepreneurs may be missed.     

Closing the regional equity capital gap: The role of informal venture capital

There is evidence from a number of countries that small firms encounter a shortage of long-term investment finance, particularly at start-up and initial growth. Expansion of the institutional venture capital industry has done little to fill this equity gap on account of its preference for making large investments in established companies and management/leveraged buyouts. Moreover, the supply of venture capital exhibits a high level of spatial concentration. Initiatives by state/provincial and local governments, most notably in economically lagging regions, to increase the supply of risk capital for start-ups and early stage businesses have at best provided a very partial, and often costly, solution. A more appropriate approach to increasing the supply of start-up and early stage finance is to facilitate the more efficient operation of theinformal venture capital market. Informal investors, or business angels, are private investors who provide risk capital directly to new and growing businesses in which they have no family connection. Most business angels are unable to find sufficient investment opportunities and so have substantial uncommitted funds available. There is also considerable scope for expanding the population of business angels. The most cost-effective means of closing the equity gap is therefore for the public sector to underwrite the operating costs of business introduction services whose objective is to overcome the two main sources of inefficiency in the informal venture capital market, namely the invisibility of business angels and the high search costs of angels seeking investment opportunities and entrepreneurs seeking investors, by the provision of a channel of communication between informal investors and entrepreneurs seeking finance.     

Exit, stage left why entrepreneurs end their entrepreneurial careers before retirement

This article examines the process of entrepreneurship from a different perspective. It considers evidence not only about practicing entrepreneurs but also about ex-entrepreneurs: individuals who have ended their entrepreneurial pursuits to work for someone else.Why entrepreneurs ended their entrepreneurial careers is understood by examining not only their expressed reasons for leaving, but also by observing how they exited, when they exited, and who exited compared to who remained.The study's findings are tentative. They are published now because they have important implications for potential entrepreneurs, for practicing entrepreneurs, and for those working with entrepreneurs either directly or indirectly (e.g., policymakers) who must make important decisions before more evidence is available .Overall, the findings indicate that a high-risk profile exists that distinguishes ex-entrepreneurs, particularly those with brief careers, from “more seasoned” entrepreneurs who have experienced longer lives as entrepreneurs.Perhaps the most important implication is that early-career start-ups may be better than previously thought. Preexisting profiles of the “ideal entrepreneurs” place them in their mid- to late thirties at the time of venture start up. But this start-up age (and older ages) were highly correlated in this study with very short, aborted careers compared to practicing entrepreneurs and ex-entrepreneurs who started earlier.A second implication is related to the first: those who started earlier were able to do a better job of anticipating their future entrepreneurial pursuits than were those who started later, mainly because they were sensitized to entrepreneurship as a career possibility at a much earlier age. Early planning for an entrepreneurial career is correlated with longer careers not just because they start earlier but because they last longer.A third implication is the need to scale down the scope (and risk) of the first venture. Such venture “downsizing” can lessen financial requirements while also giving new entrepreneurs the flexibility to start another, often better, venture after they get into business and learn about new opportunities, contacts, and skills that they could not foresee or develop before starting their first ventures.A fourth implication reinforces existing notions about the relative perils of the first few years of an entrepreneurial career. Survival rates increase considerably after the completion of the second year and the probability of a long career rises substantially after the sixth year of entrepreneurial life.A final implication is that the overall costs, risks, and dangers of entrepreneuring have been overstated. Career exit rates are much lower than venture exit rates. Relatively few ex-entrepreneurs apparently suffered truly catastrophic career exits, at least to the extent that they felt that their careers had been very unrewarding and that they had ruled out ever entrepreneuring again.     

Are entrepreneurs influenced by risk attitude,regulatory focus or both? An experiment on entrepreneurs' time allocation

“Hybrid entrepreneurs” — those who maintain a wage job while starting a new enterprise — outnumber pure entrepreneurs in many countries. Yet, how hybrid entrepreneurs allocate their working hours between these two activities is not well understood. To better understand the relationship between hybrid entrepreneurs' division of time between their wage jobs and new enterprises we develop a model that captures hybrid entrepreneurs' decisions on the tradeoffs between financial risk and return as it relates to time allocation. We test two hypotheses based on utility theory, and challenge them with two hypotheses based on regulatory focus theory in a controlled experiment with 25 early stage entrepreneurs and 29 undergraduate students. In the computer-based experiment, entrepreneurs' and students' time allocation decisions (tied to monetary incentives) are used to test what would motivate them to work more or less hours in their entrepreneurial startups. We find that the actual time allocation decisions of the student group are somewhat in tune with utility theory, but that the entrepreneurs' time allocation decisions are better explained by regulatory focus theory.     

Attributions to intuition in the venture founding process: Do entrepreneurs actually use intuition or just say that they do?

Even though entrepreneurs often cite the use of intuition as a basis for their venturing decisions, verifying that entrepreneurs are actually using intuition is very difficult. We distinguish between entrepreneurs' attributions to intuition and their actual use of intuition. We propose characteristics of entrepreneurs that increase the likelihood that they will attribute intuition as a basis for decisions during the venture founding process. We then delineate characteristics that make the development and effective use of entrepreneurial intuition more likely. Theoretical implications for researchers studying intuition and practical implications for entrepreneurs using intuition are discussed.     

Giving up the hats? Entrepreneurs' role transitions and venture growth

At the start of a venture, most entrepreneurs wear many hats. However, entrepreneurs often cannot remain involved in every aspect of the venture process, and so they face important decisions about which roles to give up, which roles to retain, and which new roles to adopt. For many, this process is particularly difficult as roles represent more than just something entrepreneurs do but also an important part of who they are (role identities). Through an inductive field study, this research reveals how and why entrepreneurs add, subtract, or retain roles. We find three mechanisms—perceiving the entrepreneur as someone who ‘gives up the hats,’ discovering new meaning (new role identities) within the venture, and role identity imprinting—lead to a narrowing of one's role set, which ultimately influences venture growth.     

Franchisor strategy and firm performance: Making the most of strategic resource investments

A key decision for entrepreneurs in many retail and service firms is whether, and how much, to use franchising. If the decision is made to franchise, the actor may assume one of two “identities” or tactics: (1) the “chain builder,” who uses a blend of company and franchised outlets, and (2) the “turnkey,” who sells business opportunities but does not own any outlets. To benefit from their chosen strategy, franchisors must put resources in place to support it. We argue that franchisors use the chain building strategy to strike a balance between standardization and innovation by building resources that foster trust and encourage knowledge sharing with franchisees. In contrast, for turnkeys, a valuable set of operational routines is the critical strategic resource. To better appreciate how franchisors choose between the chain builder and turnkey strategies, we gathered survey information from 263 franchisors. Via this data, and as described herein, we learned that franchisors perform better when they invest in resources that best support their selected strategy.     

The ethical concerns of contemporary Zimbabwean managers: A preliminary sounding

An MBA course has recently been introduced in the Department of Business Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. Applications for the course are numerous, so selection can be very rigorous. Thus the students admitted to the course comprise many of the country's most promising junior managers. As an assignment for a course on business ethics, the students were asked to discuss an ethical problem they had met in the course of business. An analysis of the problems discussed is quite revealing. Besides several miscellaneous issues, the problems discussed focussed on sexual harrassment, nepotism, political pressure and particularly public corruption. The emphasis on public corruption is probably explicable in terms of the particular individuals admitted to the MBA course; it should not be explained by claiming that Zimbabwe is just one more corrupt third world country. Most surprising is the total absence of any problems relating to issues of race or to trading with South Africa, which might have been considered the major ethical issues in Zimbabwe business life. The lack of problems relating to these two issues is more difficult to explain.Paul Gifford is Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Zimbabwe. He has published several articles on the cultural and religious developments of Southern Africa. Peter McBurney is a Doctoral Canadidate at the Australian Graduate School of Management in the University of New South Wales. He was awarded the University Medal in Statistics, Australian National University (1980). He is co-author of The Construction of an Index of Socio-Economic Status.     

The Corridor Principle

This article discusses how many entrepreneurs create multiple ventures, and thereby apparently lengthen the duration of their entrepreneurial careers. A new concept, called the Corridor Principle, is proposed as a possible explanation of the multiple venture phenomenon. The Corridor Principle states that the mere act of starting a venture enables entrepreneurs to see other venture opportunities they could neither see nor take advantage of until they had started their initial venture.The Corridor Principle presents an alternative model to the linear single venture career model, embodied by such celebrity entrepreneurs as Ray Kroc of MacDonald' s and Kenneth Olsen of Digital Equipment Corp. Six hypotheses test expectations about the timing and duration of entrepreneurial careers, as well as the relationship between entrepreneurial career length and the creation of multiple ventures.The findings strongly support: • the position that entrepreneurship is a dynamic, multi-venture process for a great many entrepreneurs the rule, rather than the exception. • the existence of a positive correlation between finding at least a second venture and realizing a longer entrepreneurial career. Though there are a variety of explanations for this, and the patterns include both sequential and overlapping ventures, the net effect of creating multiple ventures appears to produce a longer entrepreneurial career. • the position that significant numbers of entrepreneurs create their second venture very early in their entrepreneurial careers especially when contrasted to the group of ex-entrepreneurs, who create multiple ventures (if at all) at a slower rate and later in their careers.Overall, these observations reinforce the notion of the Corridor Principle. Though who can and cannot take advantage of the Corridor Principle is not entirely revealed by the data, some indication exists that an entrepreneurs ability to use Corridor Principle strategy to prolong his or her career is related both to age at startup, and to conscious anticipation and preparation for an entrepreneurial career.The main implications for entrepreneurship practitioners, advisors, researchers, teachers and students are these: Whether studying the entrepreneurial process or planning to start an entrepreneurial career, a long-term view should be taken, one that includes the likely possibility of multiple ventures. The minimum economic returns of earlier ventures can be lower than previously thought if these ventures provide entry to subsequent ventures that possess higher (more acceptable) returns to the entrepreneur. The evidence thus far available indicates that the creation of subsequent ventures occurs relatively quickly when corridors of opportunity become visible and attainable after earlier ventures are established. The likelihood of career failure, as opposed to venture failure, may be lowered if one selects earlier ventures based on their potential to reveal follow-on-venture opportunities that the entrepreneur can investigate and possibly pursue.