外商直接投资区域变化与中西部地区引资困境

根据中国内陆地区对外开放程度逐渐加大、国家对西部开发的重视程度不断加强,以及外资投资区位转移的“雁行理论”等条件推理,内陆地区近年来引进外资的增长幅度应该快于沿海地区。然而,实际分析结果表明,1979年以来的外资由沿海向内陆地区的转移,从1997年开始停滞,中西部地区引进外资总体表现不佳。文章从“路径依赖”、市场规模、基础设施、劳动力素质、产业关联和投资软环境诸方面分析了形成这种现象的原因。在此基础上,提出了加快中西部地区引资的思路。     

EC INTEGRATION AND JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EC

This study proposes two hypotheses to identify the cause(s) behind the short-term cyclical Japanese manufacturing foreign direct investment in the European Community (EC) in the late 1980s and early 1990s: (i) a catch-up process of Japanese firms in anticipation of EC single market integration in 1993 and (ii) the so-called bubble economic phenomenon caused by the overheated economy following expansionary monetary policy in Japan in the late 1980s. Applying multinomial logit models to the data on parent firms of 283 Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries established in the EC from 1988 to 1992 reveals strong support for the bubble economy hypothesis but not for the catch-up hypothesis. Results also show that under a bubble economy situation, tax-related incentive policies in host countries—e.g., an investment tax allowance for foreign direct investment—are quite important in attracting Japanese firms.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO,CRIME, AND ECONOMIC FORCES

This paper re‐examines inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 32 subnational Mexican states based on quarterly data from 2005 to 2015, which includes rising drug‐related crimes. We estimate our models using panel data methods by type of crime, state‐level indicators (real wages and electricity consumption), macroeconomic forces (the real exchange rate and interest rate), and a dummy variable for the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We employ a flexible lag‐length method and find that homicides and thefts have negative and statistically significant effects on FDI, while other crimes have no effects. Subsample work suggests higher negative effects in the most violent states. (JEL F15, F21, F23, F36)     

ARE THERE PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS FROM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA?

We review previous literature on productivity spillovers of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and conduct our own analysis using a firm‐level data set from a World Bank survey. We find that the evidence of FDI spillovers on the productivity of Chinese domestic firms is mixed, with many positive results largely due to aggregation bias or failure to control for endogeneity of FDI. Attempting over 6000 specifications that take into account forward and backward linkages, we fail to find evidence of systematic positive productivity spillovers from FDI in China.     

深圳市仁和海外投资服务有限公司

深圳市仁和海外投资服务有限公司（“仁和海外”），成立于1993年，是国家教育部和公安部认定的留学移民专业服务机构（教外综资认字[2000]222号、粤境准字[2002]0065号），多年来致力于国际教育交流及留学、移民、商务等签证服务工作。     

外国直接投资与经济增长的关系及影响

从中国和其他23个发展中国家总量时间序列资料的分析中可以看出,国内生产总值与外国直接投资之间存在着相互影响、相互促进的互动关系。除经济因素以外,稳定可靠的组织机构和城市化的发展在吸引外国直接投资方面发挥着相当重要的作用,它们是促进经济增长的重要因素。     

EMPIRICS OF CHINA'S OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT

Abstract.  We investigate the empirical determinants of China's outward direct investment (ODI). It is found that China's investments in developed and developing countries are driven by different sets of factors. Subject to the differences between developed and developing countries, there is evidence that: (i) both market-seeking and resource-seeking motives drive China's ODI; (ii) Chinese exports to developing countries induce China's ODI; (iii) China's international reserves promote its ODI; and (iv) Chinese capital tends to agglomerate among developed economies but diversify among developing economies. Similar results are obtained using alternative ODI data. We do not find substantial evidence that China invests in African and oil-producing countries mainly for their natural resources.     

A NOTE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND EXPORTS IN VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED INDUSTRIES

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of a multiproduct multinational firm which supplies vertically differentiated products, and show that the proximity‐concentration trade‐off can generate FDI‐export coexistence, i.e., the firm supplies the low‐quality products through FDI and the high‐quality products through exports. We also show that the opposite can never happen. Moreover, when the multiproduct multinational firm faces price competition in the target markets, it has an incentive to use trade costs to soften price competition, which can reduce its FDI incentive.     

VOLUNTARY IMPORT EXPANSION AND DIRECT INVESTMENT*

This paper analyses the welfare effects of a market‐share Voluntary Import Expansion (VIE) in the presence of foreign direct investment utilizing a duality approach. Introducing the cost burden of VIE explicitly, this paper considers the conditions under which a market‐share VIE is voluntary to the importing country. It is shown that the voluntary nature of VIE depends upon the capital import, cost burden and price difference effects and that a VIE is truly voluntary if it is accompanied by direct investment. We also show the existence of a complementary relationship between VIE and direct investment in attaining a particular level of welfare.     

中国对外直接投资分析

文章对中国对外直接投资数量及投资地区进行了分析，认为我国对外投资的数量与发达国家相比还很少，这与我国在世界经济中的地位不相称，应该改善和创造条件，发展和扶植对外直接投资；而我国对外直接投资的地区分布则与各个国家和地区的经济发展水平比较一致。     

TARIFF JUMPING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION IN A QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED MARKET

Using a product differentiation model, this paper discusses the issue of transnational firms evading tariffs and investing directly in a host country (through foreign direct investment (FDI)). Where product quality is differentiated between foreign and host country firms and assuming a firm's quality requirement is a long‐term strategy and is not affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, we obtain the following findings. First, whether or not a host country firm produces high or low quality products, raising the quality requirement for foreign products will increase the possibility of a foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting a product to the host country. Second, raising the quality requirement for domestic products will lower the possibility of foreign firms choosing FDI without regard to the product's quality. Finally, given a competitor in the host country, in FDI, a foreign high‐quality product‐producing firm has an advantage over a low‐quality product‐producing firm. We also find that even when firms' quality decisions are affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, most of the above results will still hold.     

鄱阳湖生态经济区外商直接投资时空格局研究

通过对鄱阳湖生态经济区外商直接投资绝对差距、相对差距、集聚特征、外资利用水平和发展速度时空格局的深入分析,发现鄱阳湖生态经济区外商直接投资时空格局呈现以下特征:外商直接投资相对差异有所扩大,绝对差异有所缩小;区域集聚程度总体有所缩小,集聚格局由"二"型向"┴"转变;低水平区域由均衡向东北方向演化,高水平区域向南昌市和浙赣线集聚;低水平区域发展速度较快,缩小了区域总体差距。     

THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Using bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks around the world, we explore the importance of a wide range of institutional variables as determinants of the location of FDI. While we find that better institutions have overall a positive and economically significant effect on FDI, some institutional aspects matter more than others do. Especially, the unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, excessive regulatory burden, government instability and lack of commitment play a major role in deterring FDI. For example, the effect of a one standard deviation improvement in the regulatory quality of the host country increases FDI by a factor of around 2. These results are robust to different specifications, estimation methods, and institutional variables. We also present evidence on the significance of institutions as a determinant of FDI over time.     

THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

This paper explores the existence of partisan cycles in foreign direct investment performance. Our theoretical model predicts that the incumbent government's partisanship should affect foreign investors' decision to flow into different sectors of the host country: pro-labor governments would encourage the inflow of the type of investment that complements labor in production; pro-capital governments would promote the entry of investment that substitutes for labor. Empirical evidence from a sample of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries reveals a pattern of foreign investors' response to partisan cycles consistent with the predictions of the model. First, foreign investment systematically flows into different sectors of the host economy under left- and right-leaning incumbents. Second, we find a positive correlation between foreign investment and changes in average wages under left-leaning incumbents, but no effect on wages under right-leaning governments.     

THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN ENDOGENOUS PROTECTION AND DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT

This paper studies the endogenous relationship between direct foreign investgment (DFI) and trade restriction. A domestic labor union interested in both employment and wages bargains with a foreign firm and lobbies against foreign imports. By endogeneizing the wage rate and incorporating resource-using lobbying, we show that more DFI results in higher lobbying efforts and lower imports under fairly general conditions, i.e. a reversal of quid pro quo DFI. We also conduct comparative statics analysis on wages and lobbying efforts.     

THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC INPUTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

A small open economy model is developed that incorporates direct and indirect effects on multinational location decisions associated with public input provision. It is shown that when agglomeration externalities are present in local intermediate goods markets, public input provision can affect multinational firms directly by lowering the fixed costs of production and indirectly by decreasing the costs of intermediate inputs, but growth is contingent on achieving a critical mass of investment. It is further shown that the effectiveness of a policy of public input provision over a policy of subsidy incentives is critically dependent on key market parameters in the host country . ( JEL F2, H4, O1)     

GLOBAL AND DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL RISKS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

This paper investigates whether multinational enterprises (MNEs) take into account both global and diplomatic political risks when investing abroad. Whereas global political risk is common to all foreign investors, diplomatic political risk is dyad-specific as it is related to the overall diplomatic climate between the home and host countries. The main result of this study is that both global and diplomatic political risks matter for U.S. MNEs investing in developing countries. Their required return on investment rises when the political risk faced by all foreign investors worsens or when diplomatic tensions arise between the United States and their host countries, presumably because in both cases uncertainty about future returns increases.