Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

当前世界减税趋势与中国税收政策取向

进入新世纪 ,随着经济全球化的加快发展 ,各国纷纷推出了减税计划和方案 ,形成了新一轮世界性的减税趋势和浪潮。我国自 1 998年以来 ,税收收入连年大幅增长 ,这对增强国家宏观调控能力 ,促进经济形势的好转发挥了重要作用。但是 ,税收长期超常增长 ,加重了企业和居民的负担 ,对刺激投资和消费、扩大内需、提高企业国际竞争力不利。在当前国内外形势下 ,从有利于经济持续发展来看 ,中国应采取完善税制、适度减税政策。     

中国税收持续高速增长之谜

延续12年之久的中国税收收入持续高速增长,在步入“十一五”以后表现出更加强劲的态势,从而在宏观经济运行以及整个经济社会发展进程中激起了更大的波澜。本文由税收收入同现行税制的关联分析入手,在税收收入增长轨迹同现行税制变动轨迹的联系中,试图捕捉支撑税收收入持续高速增长的“特殊”因素。以此为基础,采用特殊视角,逐一聚焦由税收收入持续高速增长所引致的若干重大问题,给出种种政策判断,提出相关政策建议。     

The optimal treatment of tax expenditures

This paper analyzes the optimal treatment of tax expenditures. It develops an optimal tax model where individuals derive utility from spending on a “contribution” good such as charitable giving. The contribution good has also a public good effect on all individuals in the economy. The government imposes linear taxes on earnings and on the contribution good so as to maximize welfare. The government may also finance directly the contribution good out of tax revenue. Optimal tax and subsidy rates on earnings and the contribution good are expressed in terms of empirically estimable parameters and the redistributive tastes of the government. The optimal subsidy on the contribution good is increasing in the size of the price elasticity of contributions, the size of the crowding out effect of public contributions on private contributions, and the size of the public good effect of the contribution good. Numerical simulations show that the optimal subsidy on contributions is fairly sensitive to the size of these parameters but that, in most cases, it should be lower than the earnings tax rate.     

The effects of tax reform on labor supply, tax revenue and welfare when tax avoidance matters

We examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well-functioning asset markets affects the study of labor supply. We discuss the implications for tax policy analysis, and we show that a failure to account for avoidance responses may lead to huge errors when analyzing how tax reform affects labor supply, tax revenue and the welfare cost of taxation. Our model may explain a number of otherwise hard to understand dimensions of taxpayer response.     

Dynamic elasticities of tax revenue: evidence from the Czech Republic

Tax revenue elasticities with respect to tax bases are key parameters for the modeling of public finances. Yet the existing studies estimating these elasticities for emerging countries disregard the effects of tax reforms on tax revenue, which renders their estimates inconsistent. We introduce a framework for estimating both short- and long-run tax revenue elasticities using quarterly data adjusted for the effects of reforms. Our results suggest that the long-run elasticities in the Czech Republic are 1.4 for wage tax, 0.9 for value added tax, 1.7 for profit tax and 1 for social security contributions. The adjustment process for value added tax and social security contributions is fast, but for the remaining two categories, it is important to distinguish between the short- and long-run elasticities: the initial response of revenue to changes in the bases is weak. In the case of wage tax it takes half a year for the elasticity to surpass unity.     

税收与二、三产业互动关系的实证研究——基于省际面板数据的PVAR估计

税收与经济的互动关系,一直是学界关注的热点话题,但从实证角度来分析二者之间的作用方向、反应强度、反应时滞的尚不多见。文章首先从理论上构建了税收与二、三产业之间的相互传导机制;然后以1994-2011年全国30个省市的年面板数据为基础,运用面板数据估计、格兰杰因果检验和面板向量自回归模型等方法,实证分析二、三产业与税收之间的互动关系。结果表明:二、三产业与税收互动关系明显;税收对二、三产业的调控作用显著,且对第三产业的调控作用更大;二、三产业对税收的影响具有滞后性,而税收对二、三产业的影响是即时的。最后,根据理论和实证分析结果,提出了若干结论和相应的建议。     

Excise taxes,over-shifting,cross-elasticity,and tax revenue

This article examines cross-elasticity effects in excise taxation for markets characterized by monopolistic competition and over-shifting. Extending the constant elasticity demand model to consider cross-elasticity leads to notably different results regarding tax revenue maximization. With nonzero but weak cross-elasticity effects relative to the price elasticity, we derive a higher optimal tax-price ratio compared to prior research. With strong cross-elasticity, revenue can continually be increased by raising the excise tax. Overall, the study offers government greater incentive to use excise taxes to obtain revenue.     

基于DEA方法的税收征收效率研究──以湖北省国税系统为例

税收征管效率是税务部门的征税以尽可能低的税务行政成本,取得尽可能多的税收收入,这就需要将征税的"产出"与"投入"结合起来综合考量,DEA分析方法正是进行相对效率研究的有效途径。本文在审慎选取输入指标和输出指标的基础上,利用湖北省国税系统的统计数据,通过DEA模型,得出税收征管效率的评价与改进,并给出相关政策建议。     

论税收对要素收入分配的影响

我国自1994年分税制改革以来,一方面税收收入保持高速增长,另一方面国民收入分配格局发生显著变化——劳动要素分配份额迅速下滑,资本要素分配份额逐渐上升。本文的理论分析表明,税收通过替代效应和收入效应影响要素收入分配,前者改变了生产中要素相对投入比例,从而改变了税前要素收益率,后者则是通过直接税影响到税后要素收益率。本文利用系统GMM估计进行的实证分析表明,我国税收对要素收入分配具有明显影响:就直接税而言,企业所得税降低了资本分配份额,个人所得税中对劳动征税部分降低了劳动分配份额;就间接税而言,增值税明显降低劳动分配份额但对资本分配份额的影响不明显,营业税明显降低资本分配份额而对劳动分配份额的影响不明显。因此,如果从有利于调整要素收入分配格局角度考虑,我国有必要进一步调整现行税收政策、完善税收制度。     

Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy

We study the effect of introducing a less transparent tax tool for the financing of local governments. A political agency model suggests that politicians with stronger re-electoral incentives would raise more tax revenues and use more the less transparent tax tool to enhance their probability of re-election. This prediction is tested by studying a reform that in 1999 allowed Italian municipalities to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax of residents). Exploiting the existence of a term limit for mayors, we use a Difference in Difference approach, to estimate how mayors facing re-electoral concerns reacted to the introduction of the less transparent tax tool compared to mayors facing term limit. We find results in line with theory. We also show that the reduction in the property tax is larger in smaller municipalities and in municipalities with lower level of social capital. The normative implications are then discussed.     

The Laffer curve in schedular multi-rate income taxes with non-genuine allowances: An application to Spain

This paper models the connection between tax revenue and marginal tax rates in modern personal income taxes. In so doing, new analytical expressions for the elasticity of tax revenue to tax rates are derived taking into account global and schedular income taxes in the presence of non-standard allowances. Based on these new analytical elasticities the implicit Laffer curve is characterised and explored in detail. Calculations are performed for the individual taxpayer and the aggregate population. When applied to microdata, the model permits us to locate individually the position of every taxpayer on the entire range of the Laffer curve as well as to characterise the “representative” aggregate Laffer curve. The utility of the model to forecast revenue is illustrated by applying it to Spanish personal income tax. The model confirms that the Laffer curve is essentially an intrinsic individual matter although a virtual aggregate Laffer curve for the whole population can be inferred.     

A model of the Italian cut-off system for taxing small businesses

The Studi di Settore are used by the Italian tax administration to calculate reference revenue levels for small businesses and provide a kind of cut-off level for tax audits. Recently new rules have been introduced in order to render the Studi di Settore more efficient in producing realistic estimates, with the aim of reducing the “legalized evasion” that might arise in case of a systematic downward bias. Voices of the involved categories, however, convinced the Government to partially step back. Building upon the standard firm’s tax evasion model of Cowell [Cowell, F.A., 2004. Carrots and sticks in enforcement. In: Aaron, H.J., Slemrod, J. (Eds.), The Crisis in Tax Administration. The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, pp. 230–275] and the approach of Santoro [Santoro, A.C., 2006. Evasione delle società di capitali: evidenze empiriche e proposte di policy. In: Brosio, G., Muraro, M. (Eds.), Il Finanziamento del Settore Pubblico. SIEP, Angeli, Milano, pp. 163–186] we show that, under given conditions, a stringency increase might backfire implying a larger overall tax evasion and a smaller tax revenue.     

我国遗产税征收的制度设计及其完善

目前在我国开征遗产赠与税的时机已成熟，应参照国际惯例并结合实际国情，采用总遗产税制，以居民的不动产和有形动产为课税对象，实施高起征点、低税收负担率、个人申报制和支票制、轻税重罚，确保收入及时足额入库。     

The two-part instrument in a second-best world

Standard Pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions. First, many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions, and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two-part instrument (2PI): a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution. It is a generalization of a deposit–refund system (DRS). Second, a different literature concerns the second-best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions. Here, we combine the two extensions by looking at the second-best 2PI. When government needs revenue, is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller? We find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions, and we compare these to the rates in a first-best model. The tax–subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect, an environmental effect and a revenue effect. The model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2PI. We also discuss important caveats.     

Commodity taxes and welfare under endogenous market conduct

We consider consumption taxes in a model of endogenous Cournot versus Bertrand competition. It is argued that when the choice of unit versus ad valorem taxes affects longer-term decisions beyond the customary price or quantity decisions, the mix of the two taxes co-determines market conduct. This gives ad valorem taxes an anti-competitive effect that harms ad valorem taxes’ efficiency in comparison with unit taxes. We show that a mix of the taxes—or a unit tax alone if we compare one or the other of the taxes—is sometimes welfare superior on account of consumer-price and tax revenue effects. A practical implication of our findings is that pass-through rates are only sometimes useful guides for policy. In fact, we show when the proper response to demand for higher revenue is a higher unit tax rate and a lower ad valorem tax rate.     

Winners and losers from an announced durable tax hike: Tesla in Denmark

We study the consumer response and tax revenue implications of the early announcement of a durable good tax. In 2015, the Danish government announced a tax hike on electric vehicles several months before its implementation. There was a dramatic surge in sales of Tesla Model S vehicles just before the tax came into effect, and a dramatic ebb in the months following. We find that the government lost 169 million DKK (23 million Euro) in tax revenue on luxury vehicles by announcing the tax change before its implementation. We further find that speculation played at most a limited role in the Tesla sales surge. In total, final consumers of Teslas gained from the roll-out of the law change by avoiding the new tax.     

The optimal taxation of risky capital income: An elasticity rule

Should risky capital income be taxed like safe income or should tax rates be differentiated? The question is analyzed in a 2-assets model of portfolio choice. Flat tax rates are chosen in order to maximize the investor's expected utility from terminal wealth subject to an expected tax revenue constraint. If lump-sum taxes are not available, optimal tax rates are characterized by an elasticity rule: The relative change in the risk remuneration should be equal to the inverse of the product of two elasticities. One is the output elasticity of capital. The other is the demand elasticity for risky investments with respect to a revenue preserving tax variation.     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Tax Loopholes

This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue‐maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.     

Tax progressivity, income distribution and tax non-compliance

This article examines the determinants of tax non-compliance when we recognise the existence of an imperfectly competitive “tax advice” industry supplying schemes which help taxpayers reduce their tax liability. We apply a traditional industrial organisation framework to model the behaviour of this industry. This tells us that an important factor determining the equilibrium price and hence, the level of non-compliance, is the convexity of the demand schedule. We show that in this context, this convexity is affected by the distribution of pre-tax income, the progressivity of the tax-schedule and the way in which monitoring and penalties vary with income. It is shown that lower pre-tax income inequality as well as a less progressive tax code may cause more tax minimisation activities. Therefore, the frequently advocated policy of reducing the highest tax rate may fail as a policy directed at improving tax discipline. One way of offsetting the possible harm to tax compliance from a less progressive tax could be an adjustment of the penalty and monitoring functions.