控制“内部人控制”和规范法人治理结构

我国国有经济严重的委托问题和公司治理结构的缺陷问题,是导致国有企业“内部人控制”的关键因素。控制“内部人控制”必须深层次改革经济体制,在推行现代企业制度的进程中建立起既有意愿又有能力选择、监督和有效制约经营者的规范的法人治理结构。     

从中俄公司治理结构比较中探索中国公司治理模式

本文主要通过对中俄公司治理结构产生的根源和中俄公司治理结构中共同面临的问题———内部人控制,进行比较来探索中国公司治理模式。之所以选择俄罗斯与中国进行公司治理比较,主要由于俄罗斯和我国在公司治理方面有很多共性,其中最显著的是中国与俄罗斯公司治理结构改革共同面临的一个重要问题———“内部人控制”。     

国有企业“内部人控制”问题及其解决对策

国有企业在进行改革,向现代企业制迈进的同时,其“内部人控制”问题日渐突出。究其根本原因还在于国企改革过程中,还没有建立合理的激励机制、约束监督机制,致使经营者有充分的条件去实施“内部人控制”。因此,解决“内部人控制”现象还得从其根本原因入手,即建立行之有效的公司内部治理机制,健全公司内部的激励机制、监督机制、约束机制。     

我国实施MBO对内部人控制的影响

经理层融资收购是公司控制权市场作用的一种表现形式,它不但可以作为公司外部治理机制发挥作用,而且能够影响公司内部治理机制的运作效率。但是,经理层融资收购在解决公司治理结构方面也不是万能的。本文分析了我国实施MBO后新的“内部人控制”问题,提出了相应的政策建议。     

独立董事制度及其有效性研究

现代公司的股权高度分散 ,所有权与经营权高度分离。所有者监督的弱化容易导致公司产生“内部人”控制的问题。人们曾寄希望于资本市场和经理人才市场的约束机制能够有效地抑制“内部人”的自利行为。然而 ,单纯依靠外部市场机制还不足以对“内部人”进行有效约束。在这样的背景下 ,人们开始思考和研究现有公司治理结构的问题与缺陷。所以出现了独立董事制度 ,以期弥补现有公司治理结构的不足、控制和平衡执行董事和经理人权力。然而有时却不尽然 ,这样就迫使我们重新评估独立董事制度的真正有效性。     

国有企业“内部人控制”问题及其解决对策

国有企业在进行改革，向现代企业制迈进的同时，其“内部人控制”问题目渐突出。究其根本原因还在于国企改革过程中，还没有建立合理的激励机制、约束监督机制，致使经营者有充分的条件去实施“内部人控制”。因此，解决“内部人控制”现象还得从其根本原因入手，即建立行之有效的公司内部治理机制，健全公司内部的激励机制、监督机制、约束机制。     

现阶段国有企业“内部人控制”问题研究

现阶段我国国有企业中由于所有权和经营权的分离,使得国有企业的经营者与所有者之间产生了激励不相容和信息不对称问题,导致公司治理结构中出现了“内部人控制”问题。“内部人控制”又使国有企业生产效率低下,引发国有资产流失可能性增大等一系列问题,因此我们要研究和解决“内部人控制”问题。     

俄罗斯转轨期公司“内部人控制”解决途径——全流通后中国上市公司面临治理结构新课题

股改后，随着股权分散化与公司治理结构的变化，中国上市公司“内部人控制”的风险可能会大于“一股独大”的风险。     

现阶段国有企业“内部人控制”问题研究

现阶段我国国有企业中由于所有权和经营权的分离，使得国有企业的经营者与所有者之间产生丁激励不相容和信息不对称问题，导致公司治理结构中出现了“内部人控制”问题。“内部人控制”又使国有企业生产效率低下，引发国有资产流失可能性增大等一系列问题，因此我们要研究和解决“内部人控制”问题。     

股权分置改革后中小股东权益保护问题

股权分置改革是对不合理的股权结构的改革，股权结构变化后，公司治理结构也相应的发生变化。本文提出由于股权结构的分散而给股改后的公司治理带来了中小股东放弃公司控制权、“内部人控制”以及大股东对中小股东的利益侵害加剧三个新问题。如何解决出现的新问题将是一个具有时代意义的课题、     

Late Disclosure of Insider Trades: Who Does It and Why?

We attempt to understand the personal incentives that motivate corporate insiders to engage in unethical behavior such as delayed trade disclosure. Delayed disclosure affects corporate transparency and other shareholders in the firm potentially suffer investment losses because they are unaware of insiders’ activities. Using archival data from the 300 largest Australian firms between 2007 and 2011, the results show that risk factors such as insider age and tenure and wealth effects in the form of insider shareholdings affect the likelihood of delayed reporting. Governance positions such as committee membership mitigate this behavior. Our study highlights the importance of considering individual insider’s wealth and risk factors. The self-monitoring role of governance positions is also indicative of the effectiveness of internal corporate governance in the prevention of illegal insider behavior.     

Institutions,Corporate Governance and Capital Flows

Countries with weaker domestic investor protection hold less diversified international portfolios. An equilibrium business cycle model of North-South capital flow with corporate governance frictions between outside investors and corporate insiders explains this phenomenon through two channels. First, weak governance leads to concentrated ownership in the South because international diversification by insiders is penalized by lower stock market valuation. This reduces the float portfolio, or the supply of South assets. Second, weak governance tilts the demand of South outside investors towards domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. This is due to a higher share of labor in income, which increases labor income risk. In addition, the dynamics of investment under insider control leads relative dividend and labor income to be more negatively correlated in the South, making domestic assets a better hedge against local labor income risk. I find that the insider ownership and hedging channels are responsible for at least 29% and 11%, respectively, of the cross-country variation in international diversification. Thus, weak institutions lower international diversification primarily through concentrated ownership of firms, with outsider hedging also playing a quantitatively significant role.     

论保险公司治理的特殊性——一个数理模型的分析

本文把保险业的特殊性和公司治理的一般理论相结合,构建了一个保险公司治理的数理模型.正文第一部分介绍模型的框架并建立起基本的前提假定,第二部分分析保险公司内部人和外部人的行为策略以及保险公司内外信息不对称的严重性和经营的不确定性以揭示保险公司治理问题的本质,第三部分对模型进行扩展,探讨多种公司治理机制的作用机理以显示保险公司治理的特殊性.     

The Virtues and Weaknesses of Insider Shareholding

Abstract

Following privatization in Russia, insider shareholders secured supremacy in their companies in most cases. The literature concerned with corporate governance in Russia frequently shows too much affection to the claim that the arrangement when control is allocated to insiders is generally sub-efficient in the long run. It is often concluded that the current pattern of control has negative impact on the progress of reforms. This paper argues in favor of a more balanced view, which takes into account the social responsibility of firms towards stakeholders and the influence the latter have over corporate performance. The question addressed is how real the insiders' threat is in privatized Russian enterprises with regard to the advancement of reforms and development of the workable corporate governance system.     

关于完善我国独立董事制度的探讨

在我国二元制公司治理结构下,独立董事制度的引入有利于解决我国上市公司长期以来存在的“内部人控制”现象,更有效地保护中小股东的利益,完善公司治理结构。如何进一步完善与发展独立董事制度,须在具体引进过程中明晰独立董事的“独立性”、权利与义务、激励和约束机制以及与监事会职能的协调等问题。因此,应借鉴国外的经验,并结合自身的实际情况,合理的构建我国的独立董事制度。     

内部审计在公司治理中的效用评价及其发展趋势

企业内部审计的独立性问题一直是困扰我国公司治理有效性的难题.通过内部控制在公司治理风险和控制中的作用研究,与公司治理的有关理论相结合,寻求两者的共赢区间,以扩大公司治理的有效空间,提高内部审计的效用.     

企业资源聚集视角下的利益相关者财务控制权配置

财务控制权配置是财务治理的核心内容。合理的财务控制权安排可以抑制内部人的道德风险,优化公司治理结构。本文从企业资源聚集的角度,构造企业利益相关者的经济效用函数并分析其特征,认为利益相关者之间是相互依存的动态竞争关系,企业的财务控制权应按照以股东为主导的各利益相关者共同分享的模式来分层次配置。     

Board composition and corporate philanthropy

Using agency theory, this study empirically examined the relationship between board composition and corporate philanthropy. Generally, the ratio of insiders to outsiders, the percentage of insider stock ownership, and the proportion of female and minority board members were found to be positively and significantly associated with firms' charitable contributions.Jia Wang received his Ph.D. from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. He is an associate professor of management at California State University at Fresno. His current research interests include corporate governance and corporate social performance.Betty S. Coffey is an assistant professor of management at Appalachian State University. Her research interests are in the area of corporate social performance and functional level strategic management.     

Institutional investors in Bulgarian corporate governance reform: obstacles or facilitators?

Institutional investors can play a special role in corporate governance reform given their dual status as both objects and subjects of corporate governance. In transition economies these investors can turn into an obstacle to good governance practices because of inconsistency of their strategy with the reform goals, internal mechanisms of corporate control precluding equitable treatment of shareholders, and serious problems with transparency and disclosure. The expected positive role of institutional investors as subjects of corporate governance may be problematic if they adopt a strategy of accommodation with the anti-reform status quo.