Joint Implementation under the Second Sulfur Protocol: Analysis and Simulation

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the possibility of introducing a system of transferable discharge permits (TDP) to develop the joint implementation procedure conceived in the Second Sulfur Protocol. The analysis is performed considering not only the European countries that have agreed emission reductions in the Protocol, but also a group of non-signing countries that could possibly abate their emissions and alleviate the reduction burden agreed by the former, presumably receiving certain compensation from them in return. The theoretic elements of the system are analyzed and then a simulation software – the program ATLAS – is developed and applied to study the effects of choosing among the possible implementation parameters. In contrast to other simulation programs developed with a similar aim, ATLAS can simulate multilateral permit trades, which are closer than bilateral ones to the concept of joint implementation conceived in the Protocol. The use of this program anticipates that the amount of feasible and profitable transfers would be much higher if a set of European countries which are not Parties to the Protocol were allowed to take part in the system as permit sellers.     

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

从社会资本角度探索创新排污权初始分配模式

文章主要探讨排污权初始分配的制度性缺陷,分析我国将排污权免费分配给企业的弊端,提出将排污权在初始分配环节按人头免费发放给每一位社会公民的制度设想。分析论证在此制度框架内,政府、企业和社会公众的利益如何实现动态均衡,强化政府对环境保护的监督管理职能,降低寻租可能性;刺激企业降低排污总量,合理决策排污权购买量和治污技术投入量的水平;强化社会公众对于环境保护的动力机制,鼓励全民监督污染源;加快发展第三方中介机构,完善排污权市场的功能。最后提出要实现这一制度设想,还必须破解科学技术、法律政策和环保设施等现实制约条件。