Real effects of banking crises: Imports of capital goods by developing countries

We examine the hypothesis that banking crises have real effects on developing economies by reducing imports of capital goods. We test this hypothesis by estimating a model for the determinants of imports of capital goods by a panel of developing economies during 1961 to 2010. Our results suggest that not only do banking crises have statistically significant and economically important effects on imports of capital goods, but these effects increase the longer a banking crisis lasts. Imports of capital goods are a critical component of the capital stock and the production process in developing economies and, thus, our results highlight one important channel through which banking crises may hamper the growth prospects of these economies.     

The illusive quest: Do international capital controls contribute to currency stability?

We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from currency crises, focusing in particular on both direct and indirect effects of capital controls and how these relationships may have changed over time in response to global financial liberalization and the greater mobility of international capital. We predict the likelihood of currency crises using standard macroeconomic variables and a probit equation estimation methodology with random effects. We employ a comprehensive panel data set comprised of 69 emerging market and developing economies over 1975–2004. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital control intensity (allowing controls to “depreciate” over time) suggest that capital controls have not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation are critical factors preventing currency crises, not capital controls. However, the presence of capital controls greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation, making countries more vulnerable to changes in fundamentals. Our model suggests that emerging markets weathered the 2007–2008 crisis relatively well because of strong output growth and exchange rate flexibility that limited overvaluation of their currencies.     

Sudden stops, banking crises and investment collapses in emerging markets

We evaluate whether financial openness leaves emerging market economies vulnerable to the adverse effects of capital reversals (“sudden stops”) on domestic investment. We investigate this claim in a broad sample of emerging markets during the period 1976–2002. If the banking sector does not experience a systemic crisis, sudden stop events fail to have a significant impact on investment. Bank crises, on the other hand, have a significant negative effect on investment even in the absence of a contemporaneous sudden stop crisis. We also find that openness to capital flows worsens the adverse impact of banking crises on investment. Our results provide statistical support for the policy view that a strong banking sector which can withstand the negative fallout of capital flight is essential for countries that open their economies to international financial flows.     

Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: Currency crises,capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets

Sudden stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows. We investigate whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. Sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2–3%, while a sudden stop reduces output by an additional 6–8% in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is even larger, around 13–15% over a 3-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis.     

金融危机中的衍生工具——基于20世纪80年代以来金融危机视角的思考

本文从20世纪80年代以来金融危机的不同特性对比分析入手,对衍生工具在金融危机中作用的二重性进行了研究。指出衍生工具除了具有引导资金从发达资本市场向发展中经济流动过程中的建构性作用,同时在诱导金融危机的发生和加剧方面还具有助动性作用。从衍生工具的产生和发展,降低了经济运作的透明度、削弱了金融管理当局的监管、威胁到固定汇率体系的稳定性、提高了系统风险和感染风险、进而加速并深化危机等不同角度,对衍生工具在金融危机中的负面作用作了较为具体的论证。     

Capital Openness and Financial Crises: A Financial Contagion Model with Multiple Equilibria

Abstract

This paper explores the effects of capital openness on financial crises and contagion. In the model, we analyze four channels of contagion involved in the process of financial crisis: monsoon effects, spillovers, self‐fulfilling expectations and new information. We empirically test the data from China, an economy with capital account controls, and find that the fundamentals of China (PRC) are now in a vulnerable area which yields multiple equilibria. Consequently, the Chinese economy is easily affected via the channels discussed in this paper. Finally we suggest that the capital account of China should be opened gradually.     

Liberalization,Regulatory Delays and Vulnerability to Systemic Banking Crisis

This work aims at contributing to the improvement of the early warning systems of banking crises using a new approach accounting for model uncertainty. We show that a multinomial logit model based on Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is a good strategy to predict banking crisis. To do this, we argue that differences in vulnerability to banking crisis can be largely explained by an asymmetry between financial market evolution and regulation update on a sample of 49 developed and developing countries between 1980 and 2010. When markets are liberalized, competition pushes bankers to take more risks and take advantage of regulatory delays thus increasing crises probabilities. Our empirical evidence supports that crisis probability is higher in country liberalizing their banking system when regulation is not updated. We developed an early warning system for systemic banking crises based on the multinomial logit model. Its main difference to existing prediction models and its contribution to the literature is that it is intended to identify and resolve what is called by Bussiere and Fratzscher [(2006). Towards a new early warning system of financial crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, 25(6), 953–973] as post-crisis bias in binomial models and to develop a new methodology of leading indicators selection based on BMA. Overall, our model predicts all banking crises during our sample period.     

资本账户自由化、信贷扩张与系统性银行危机风险*

本文研究在资本账户自由化下，信贷扩张与资本流入对于系统性银行危机风险的影响。利用89个国家1973—2016年的长面板数据，并控制影响银行危机风险多项因素后，研究发现资本账户自由化有助于降低银行危机风险。进一步研究发现，FDI流入能显著降低银行危机风险；适量的股权投资流入有助于增强银行业稳定性；但当股权投资大量流入时，伴随着信贷过度扩张和资产泡沫，银行危机风险急剧增加；较低的债权投资流入对银行业稳定性无显著影响，但当超过一定规模时，银行危机风险显著增加。     

Balance Sheet Effects, Growth, and Crises

This paper addresses two questions: are currency crises predicted by increases in a central bank’s external and contingent liabilities relative to assets, and do these “balance sheet effects” generate persistent output losses following a crisis? I find empirical evidence that the answer to both questions is yes. I use data on stocks of gross external assets and liabilities for 167 countries over 1973–2003, in an unbalanced panel probit regression to obtain robust estimates of the probability and determinants of a post‐crisis recession. Several single and simultaneous equation specifications support the idea that the output cost of a currency crisis depends on its transmission mechanism. Specifically, a recession is likely to be severe if it is preceded by a crisis that works its way through the financial sector. In addition, the results show that measures of contingent liabilities, capital flight, and lack of financial depth are significant predictors of costly crises.     

资本账户自由化、信贷扩张与系统性银行危机风险

本文研究在资本账户自由化下,信贷扩张与资本流入对于系统性银行危机风险的影响。利用89个国家1973—2016年的长面板数据,并控制影响银行危机风险多项因素后,研究发现资本账户自由化有助于降低银行危机风险。进一步研究发现,FDI流入能显著降低银行危机风险;适量的股权投资流入有助于增强银行业稳定性;但当股权投资大量流入时,伴随着信贷过度扩张和资产泡沫,银行危机风险急剧增加;较低的债权投资流入对银行业稳定性无显著影响,但当超过一定规模时,银行危机风险显著增加。     

Is the crisis problem growing more severe?

The crisis problem is one of the dominant macroeconomic features of our age. Its prominence suggests questions like the following: Are crises growing more frequent? Are they becoming more disruptive? Are economies taking longer to recover? These are fundamentally historical questions, which can be answered only by comparing the present with the past. To this end, this paper develops and analyses a data base spanning 120 years of financial history. We find that crisis frequency since 1973 has been double that of the Bretton Woods and classical gold standard periods and is rivalled only by the crisis-ridden 1920s and 1930s. History thus confirms that there is something different and disturbing about our age. However, there is little evidence that crises have grown longer or output losses have become larger. Crises may have grown more frequent, in other words, but they have not obviously grown more severe. Our explanation for the growing frequency and chronic costs of crises focuses on the combination of capital mobility and the financial safety net, including the implicit insurance against exchange risk provided by an ex ante credible policy of pegging the exchange rate, which encourages banks and corporations to accumulate excessive foreign currency exposures. We also provide policy recommendations for restoring stability and growth.
— Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria     

The Changing Relationship between Banking Crises and Capital Inflows

Different types of capital inflows have varied effects when predicting banking crises in emerging and developing economies, and these relationships have meaningfully changed over time. In a sample of 29 developing and emerging economies over the period 1976–1991 increases in short‐term debt inflows raised the probability of a banking crisis while increases in inflows for long‐term borrowing by the private sector had the opposite effect. Conversely, over the period 1992–2007 increases in inflows for long‐term borrowing by the private sector and for equity investment both increased the probability of a banking crisis. The findings suggest distinct optimal capital account liberalization policies between the two periods.     

Lessons from the 1997 and the 2008 Crises in Korea

The Korean economy was hit harder than anticipated by the global financial crisis. In the first phase, large capital outflows led to a severe liquidity strain in the foreign exchange market, resulting in a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate. Then, in the second phase, the contraction of global demand led to a collapse of exports and a sharp decline in economic activity, raising concerns about a full‐fledged financial crisis in Korea. This paper describes how the global financial crisis spilled over into the Korean economy and how the Korean government responded to the financial turmoil. It also provides the background and rationale for the Korean government's decisions to adopt specific policy measures. Based on Korean experiences during the 1997 and the 2008 crises, this paper documents the lessons learned from the past two crises and identifies several important policy issues.     

Currency crises and the stock market: empirical evidence for another type of twin crisis

We explore the dependency between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies. Our focus is two-fold. First, the risk of a currency crisis rises as the foreign stake in the domestic stock market increases. Successful economies with high capital flows into their booming stock markets especially are prone to stock market-induced currency crises. Second, we apply the dividend growth model to show that stock markets crash in the run-up to a currency crisis. This new type of twin crisis is empirically tested by employing a logit framework using quarterly data for 33 emerging economies for 1994Q1–2007Q4.     

How does equity capital cost affect bank performance during a financial crisis?

This article theoretically examines how equity capital cost affects return performance and safety of a bank and how this effect varies across a financial crisis comparing to a normal time when the bank manager’s performance reveals the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. We derive two main results. First, an increase in the bank’s equity capital cost from an increase of the interest rate of the Federal funds results in a reduced loan risk-taking at an increased optimal bank interest margin, implying better bank performance. Second, by ignoring the dislike, we find that the better performance is reinforced during a financial crisis but is reduced during a normal time. Financial crises and the dislike preference as such contribute a relatively low return and the stability of banking activities.     

COSTS OF HOUSING CRISES: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

This paper analyses the costs of housing crises in terms of GDP growth and the economic conditions under which crises are particularly costly. Housing crises are often followed by recessions that are longer than other recessions. According to empirical estimates, a housing crisis reduces the GDP growth rate in the following year on average by two percentage points and has still a considerable negative impact in the second year. One important channel through which the effect of housing crises is passed on seems to be the banking sector. In addition, our results suggest that negative wealth effects possibly cause further reductions in GDP growth.     

Optimal versus adequate level of international reserves: evidence for Turkey

The determination of international reserve balance for emerging economies is part of the efforts to strengthen the immunity of these economies to crises. However, there is still evidence on crises even for the countries with large foreign reserves. It has usually been experienced that the countries with greatest need for reserves economize more than others on their holdings since they might underestimate the cost of crisis. In this study, the official international reserves of Turkey are tested against optimality and adequacy. During 1988–2002, the actual reserves fell short of both the optimal and the adequate levels. They are only optimal when the expected cumulative contraction is about 5.2% of real GDP under crisis. However, early evidence from emerging economies and Turkey show that crises hit more heavily. Hence, it is found that the current financial structure in Turkey such as the absence of capital controls and a highly dollarized banking system necessitates more foreign reserves for preventing any future economic and/or financial shocks.     

The effect of financial liberalization on banking sector stability

Several studies indicate that financial liberalization increases likelihood of a financial crisis without distinguishing between a normal period, unstable period preceding the onset of banking panics and crisis/post period. We explain in this paper the relationship between financial liberalization and banking sector vulnerability. Then, we argue that banking sector turmoil is most likely to occur after an intermediate degree of liberalization. Using a recently updated dataset for financial reforms, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and the likelihood of banking crisis for a sample of 49 countries between 1980 and 2010. We used a multinomial logit model in order to take into account what is called the ‘post crisis bias’. We ask whether the relationship remains when institutional characteristics of countries and dynamic effects of liberalization are considered. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking sector stability depends strongly on the strength of capital regulation and supervision. With very weak regulation and supervision, the probability of banking crises is increasing with liberalization but this relationship is reversed as regulation and supervision become significant. The most important type of liberalization in relation to banking crises seems to be operational. A policy implication is that positive growth effects of liberalization can be achieved without increasing the risk of a banking fragility if appropriate institutions are developed.     

论《资本论》及其手稿中的经济危机理论的整体性

《资本论》及其手稿的经济危机理论是对资本运动规律的一种整体分析,具有揭示资本主义经济危机实质的整体性结构。社会主义运动一百多年的发展,不论是高潮还是低谷,大部分都源于《资本论》及其手稿经济危机整体性理论或涉及这个理论,富于战斗精神的几代人在《资本论》及其手稿的经济危机整体性理论中发现了武器,这个武器在反对资本主义和克服经济危机的战斗中总是发挥着巨大指导力量。《资本论》及其手稿经济危机整体性理论,不但直面资本主义市场经济中的问题,而且以独特视角全面分析西方金融危机和债务危机问题。把对西方金融危机和债务危机产生原因的分析,建立在《资本论》及其手稿的经济危机整体性理论的基础上,提出了应对危机的科学方法。