Real earnings manipulation and future performance: A revisit using quarterly data of firms with debt covenants

We investigate the implications of real earnings manipulation (REM) and reversals of REM on firms’ future operating performance using quarterly data of firms with debt covenants. In the presence of debt covenants, firms are under persistent pressure to deliver financial results that exceed the thresholds of the debt covenant requirements. We find that REM is associated with lower future operating performance. More importantly, the reversals of REM in the following quarter have an incremental positive effect on future performance, which largely offsets the negative effect of REM. These results provide new evidence on REM reversals that differs from the existing literature. Instead of interpreting the reversals as an indication of true REM based on their negative association with future performance documented in Vorst (2016), our results suggest that REM reversals may be indicative of firms rewinding REM subsequently, which reduces the REM damage to firms’ future operations.     

Managerial myopia and the unintended real consequences of conditional conservatism

We examine whether the demand for conditional conservatism produces unintended real consequences that are exacerbated by managerial incentives to report higher earnings. We document a robust positive association between conditional conservatism and real earnings management (REM), particularly for firms whose CEOs face greater compensation incentives and capital market incentives to report higher earnings. Using mediation analyses, we find that conservatism has a negative indirect relation with future returns via REM over the next 1–3 years. In additional tests, we find that the relation between conservatism and REM is attenuated for firms with higher debt-to-equity, which suggests that debtholders moderate the negative relation between conditional conservative reporting and REM. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to its monitoring benefit, conditional conservatism can exacerbate managerial myopia, resulting in negative consequences for future firm value.     

A global analysis of Private Investments in Public Equity

Raising equity capital via Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) has been rising in popularity, matching Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). We use over 10,000 PIPEs in a global setting during 1995–2015 to assess how and through which channels institutional frameworks affect the issuers' performance. We document a significant decline in the market reaction, especially during 2004–2015 and find that firms issuing equity via PIPEs have significantly worse fundamentals. We also show that country governance matters as issuing firms operating in countries with better regulatory environments outperform others. Finally, we find that regulatory enforcement is a plausible underlying channel for the positive effect of the institutional frameworks on PIPEs performance.     

Learning,foreign operations and operating performance

We study the effect of a firm's internationalization on operating performance using data on publicly listed non-financial firms in Japan during 1990–2019. The proportion of international firms in the sample has been around 30–40% during the sample period. We show that internationalization is not associated with operating performance. Our evidence shows that international firms do not perform better or worse than matched domestic firms with similar firm characteristics. We also find that the relation between international experience and operating performance is U-shaped. These results have wide-ranging implications for international investment strategies.     

Institutional ownership and commonality in liquidity

We investigate the relation between institutional ownership and commonality in liquidity and whether this relation differs across country-level institutional and information environments. Using a comprehensive dataset for firms across 40 countries for the period between 2000 and 2016, we find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with stock liquidity commonality. In addition, a firm’s information environment plays the moderating role in the relation between institutional ownership and commonality in stock liquidity. Importantly, we document that the negative association between institutional ownership and liquidity commonality is stronger for firms in countries with weak institutional characteristics or less transparent information environments. Our findings provide additional insights into the role of institutional investors as a demand-side factor of liquidity commonality in international financial markets.     

Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide

This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings add to the literature by examining the corporate governance determinants of financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 crisis.     

Financial flexibility,corporate investment and performance: evidence from financial crises

This study examines the impact of financial flexibility on the investment and performance of East Asian firms over the period 1994–2009. We employ a sample of 1,068 firms and place particular emphasis on the periods of the Asian crisis (1997–1998) and the recent credit crisis (2007–2009). The results show that firms can attain financial flexibility, primarily through conservative leverage policies and less commonly by holding large cash balances. Financial flexibility appears to be an important determinant of investment and performance, mainly during the Asian 1997–1998 crisis. In particular, firms that are financially flexible prior to this crisis (1) have a greater ability to take investment opportunities, (2) rely much less on the availability of internal funds to invest, and (3) perform better than less flexible firms during the crisis. Our analysis covering the credit crisis period of 2007–2009 suggests that some of the advantages of flexible firms towards investing persist but are significantly less pronounced over that period. We also find that the value of financial flexibility is region/country specific, which may be explained by the fact that different regions/countries often adopt different macroeconomic policies and operate in diverse economic/legal environments.     

Foreign Investment in Emerging Markets: International Diversification or Familiarity Bias?

This study empirically tests whether foreign investors take advantage of international diversification when investing in emerging Asian markets. Using the 2007–2008 financial crisis as identification, we find that firms with higher foreign ownership had better stock returns during the financial crisis. Moreover, the diversification effect exists in five out of the eight emerging markets and is stronger in markets with a lower dynamic conditional correlation with the global market index. We also find that foreign investors prefer firms with a lower international sales ratio. In conclusion, the evidence consistently suggests that foreign investors take advantage of diversification effects.     

The mediating effect of REM on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and subsequent firm performance moderated by IFRS adoption: A moderated-mediation analysis

The present paper is pursuing a new direction in the analysis of behavioral finance based on examining whether future performance of the firm is related to overconfidence displayed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). We suggest two channels for this relationship, real earnings management (REM) and the mandatory IFRS adoption. First, examining the impact of IFRS adoption on firms’ future performance, we find that overconfident CEOs who do not adopt IFRS exhibit poorer future performance. Other interactions related to overconfidence and IFRS are not significant. Second, examining the relationship between overconfidence and IFRS adoption on REM, we find that overconfident CEOs indulge in higher REM than non-overconfident CEOs. Further, overconfident CEOs who adopt IFRS display greater REM than do those who not adopt IFRS. Therefore, we prove that the indirect effect of CEO overconfidence on the subsequent firm performance through REM is contingent on the mandatory IFRS adoption.     

Non-audit fees, institutional monitoring, and audit quality

We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with high institutional ownership. Our results are robust after controlling for auditor industry specialization, firms’ operating volatility, size effect, and potential endogeneity between institutional ownership and audit quality.     

IFRS reporting, firm-specific information flows, and institutional environments: international evidence

This study investigates whether and how a firm??s voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) influences the extent to which firm-specific information is capitalized into stock prices measured by stock price synchronicity. We also study the role of analyst following and institutional environments in determining the relation between IFRS reporting and synchronicity. Using firm-level data from 34 countries, we find that synchronicity is significantly lower for IFRS adopters than for non-adopters across all regression specifications and that for IFRS adopters it decreases from the pre-adoption period to the post-adoption period. This finding supports the view that voluntary IFRS adoption facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, thereby reducing synchronicity. We also find that the synchronicity-reducing effect of IFRS adoption is attenuated (accentuated) for firms with high (low) analyst following and is stronger (weaker) for firms in countries with poor (good) institutional environments.     

The impact of abnormal real earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks on future operating performance

Motivated by agency conflicts of real earnings management (e.g., opportunistic and signalling perspectives), this study investigates the association between firms that manipulate their business operations to meet earnings benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings, last year's earnings) and subsequent operating performance. We examine the effects of the magnitude of real earnings management on firms' future performance for the period 2009 to 2015 for UK firms. Our analysis shows that the manipulation of operating activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, and production costs to meet earnings benchmarks has a significantly positive consequence for firms' subsequent operating performance and signals firms' good future performance. We also find that firms that manipulate their operating activities in the absence of meeting earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their subsequent operating performance. The findings of this research lend support to our understanding of the process that management follows to evaluate costs and benefits of real earnings management.     

Information asymmetry,leverage and firm value: Do crisis and growth matter?

Drawing on pecking order and agency cost theories, we assess the extent to which information asymmetry is an important determinant of firm value and the extent to which this relationship is conditional on the leverage level of firms. We also assess the impact of information asymmetry on firm value during the pre and post 2007/09 financial crisis period and for high and low growth opportunity firms. Using a large sample of UK firms, our empirical findings suggest that information asymmetry adversely impacts firm value, and that this effect decreases with firm's leverage. We also find that leverage has a negative effect on firm value, and that the marginal effect of leverage is lower for information asymmetric firms. Further, we find that the relation between information asymmetry and firm value is more pronounced in the post-crisis period than the pre-crisis period. Finally, we show that the impact of information asymmetry on firm value is higher (lower) for firms with high (low) growth opportunities.     

How does the executive pay gap influence audit fees? The roles of R&D investment and institutional ownership

Using a sample of US firms from 2003–2014, this study examines how the executive pay gap affects audit fees for firms with different levels of R&D investment and institutional ownership. Consistent with managerial power theory, we find that the executive pay gap is positively associated with audit fees, and that the positive association is attenuated by intense R&D investment and higher institutional ownership. We also find that the executive pay gap more strongly affects audit fees after the passage of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act and the PCAOB's 2012 call to identify the audit risk related to executive incentive compensation. Additional analyses show that the moderating effects of R&D investment and institutional ownership on the pay gap–audit fees association are not conditional on auditor tenure, but the moderating effect of institutional ownership is stronger for firms hiring specialist auditors. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors consider the business context, such as innovation initiative and external monitoring, when assessing audit risk related to the executive pay gap.     

Firm incentives,institutional complexity and the quality of “harmonized” accounting numbers

In this paper, we investigate how firm reporting incentives and institutional factors affect accounting quality in firms from 26 countries. We exploit a unique multicountry setting where firms are required to comply with the same set of international reporting standards. We develop an approach of cross-country comparisons allowing for differences between firms within a country and we investigate the relative importance of country- versus firm-specific factors in explaining accounting quality. We find that financial reporting quality increases in the presence of strong monitoring mechanisms by means of ownership concentration, analyst scrutiny, effective auditing, external financing needs, and leverage. Instability of business operations, existence of losses, and lack of transparent disclosure negatively affect the quality of accounting information. At the country level, we observe better accounting quality for firms from regulatory environments with stronger institutions, higher levels of economic development, greater business sophistication, and more globalized markets. More importantly, we find that firm-specific incentives play a greater role in explaining accounting quality than countrywide factors. This evidence suggests that institutional factors shape the firm's specific incentives that influence reporting quality. Our findings support the view that the global adoption of a single set of accounting standards in isolation is not likely to lead to more comparable and transparent financial statements unless the institutional conditions and the firm-specific reporting incentives also change.     

Institutional investors,controlling shareholders and CEO pay‐performance relationship: evidence from China

Using a large sample of China’s listed firms between 2005 and 2015, we find that domestic mutual funds have a positive effect on the CEO pay‐performance relationship, and this effect becomes stronger when their ownership is higher and closer to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. This effect is stronger in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs), firms facing weaker industry competition incentives, and firms located in more developed regions. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) do not have such an influence. Overall, our study contends that the effectiveness of institutional investors’ monitoring role is subject to their identity, controlling shareholders and institutional environments.     

Does International Accounting Network Membership Affect Audit Fees and Audit Quality? Evidence From China

Regulators suggest that small audit firms join international accounting networks to reduce their resource constraints in serving large clients and providing high-quality service. Bills, Cunningham, and Myers (2016) investigate the issue in the United States and find that both audit fees and quality are higher for members of international accounting networks (i.e., member audit firms). We investigate the effects of network membership on audit fees and quality in China, a relatively weaker institutional environment than the United States. Using data of Chinese listed companies audited by non-Big N audit firms from 2001 to 2010, we find that member audit firms charge 3.9% higher fees than nonmember audit firms, much lower than the 30% fee premiums charged by U.S. member audit firms. We do not find consistent evidence that audit quality is higher for member audit firms. Overall, our results demonstrate that China's weak institutional environment may overwhelm the quality control brought by international accounting networks and that it may weaken or even offset the benefits of audit firms' participation in these networks, resulting in smaller or even no effects of membership on audit fees and quality.     

The effects of board structure on corporate performance: Evidence from East African frontier markets

The effectiveness of the well-known corporate governance practices may not be universal due to fundamental differences in the environments under which firms operate. By using hand-collected data from all the non-financial firms listed on the unexplored East African frontier markets (i.e., Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), we examine the effect of board characteristics on the performance of firms. Our results show that board size has a negative and significant effect on firm performance. The presences of foreigners and civil servants on the board play positive roles on financial performance, where the agency and resource dependence theories apply. Further, we find that board members with higher education also contribute to firm performance. These findings still hold when we consider the 2008–2009 financial crisis period. Overall, we show that in a business climate where ownership is largely dominated by few shareholders, the conventional governance mechanisms do not work effectively.     

Do auditors react to real earnings management?

Prior research has documented an association between audit effort and real earnings management [REM]. Specifically, audit report lags have been shown to be positively associated with REM. We investigate the auditor and firm characteristics underlying this association. Our results indicate that overall, REM is associated with longer abnormal audit report lags [ARLs]. We find, however, that this association is driven largely by non-accelerated filers. This result holds for both suspect firms (those firms just meeting earnings benchmarks) and non-suspect firms, for specialist as well as non-specialist auditors, and for profit as well as loss firms. Together our results indicate that when auditors are not constrained by the time pressure of accelerated filing, encountering REM is associated with greater audit effort. Our results may indicate, however, that with respect to accelerated filers, abnormal ARLs may be an imperfect proxy for additional effort. These results have implications for both future research and for the impact of accelerated filing deadlines on audit quality.     

The Asset Growth Effect and Investor Protection in Emerging Markets: The Role of the Global Financial Crisis

The previous evidence shows that firms experience lower returns after a period with higher growth in assets. Two alternative explanations have been raised to explain this effect: mispricing and optimal investment. This study examines this effect in 26 emerging markets over the period of 2005–2013 with a special attention to the recent global financial crisis. We find a stronger asset growth effect during the crisis years relative to other years. This effect is stronger in firms with small or medium stock turnover ratio and firms operating in industries with low R&D intensity. We also investigate the heterogeneity across countries and find that a stronger asset growth effect during the crisis years exists only for emerging markets with low protection of shareholders and creditors. We argue that this evidence is in line with the mispricing hypothesis.