Dividend Initiations and Asymmetric Information: A Hazard Model

This paper investigates the dynamics of dividend policy using a hazard model. Specifically, the paper examines dividend initiations for a sample of firms that went public between 1990 and 1997. These dividend initiations are examined in the context of an alternative explanation based on the pecking order theory. The results indicate that the probability or the hazard rate of a dividend initiation is negatively related to both the level of asymmetric information and growth opportunities and positively related to the level of cash flow. These results are consistent with a pecking order explanation but inconsistent with a signaling explanation.     

我国货币政策多重非对称效应实证检验

实证检验表明：在不同的年份,我国经济或受到正向货币供给冲击,或受到负向货币供给冲击;我国东部地区、东北地区、西部地区和中部地区并不总是同时处于地区经济周期的繁荣或衰退阶段;我国不同调控方向的货币政策对处于地区经济周期不同阶段的四地区经济的影响是不相同的,即存在货币政策多重非对称效应。     

Income Redistribution in an Economic Union: Does Asymmetric Information Legitimize Centralization?

In this paper the role of information asymmetries between regions and a centralized authority is analyzed. In a model with inter-regional externalities due to capital mobility and a source-based tax instrument, we first derive conditions for which the optimum can be implemented by an adequately designed institution even with decentralized information about preferences for redistribution. Second we demonstrate that social-policy does not have to be centralized in order to implement the optimum. Decentralization of social policies is compatible with efficiency even when source-based taxes have to be used if decentralized authorities can rely on the enforcement of bilateral contracts.     

基于信息不对称的信贷配给均衡模型研究

本文建立了竞争和信息不对称条件下,信贷市场的信贷配给均衡模型,模型表明在为不同的借款人提供由贷款利率和贷款额度组成的相同贷款合同的情况下,信贷市场存在稳定的单合同均衡,信贷市场的均衡在信贷配给点达到,因而从信息不对称和均衡的角度解释了信贷配给现象。     

基于非对称信息视角下的我国上市公司IPO折价原因探析

摘要：文章结合有关[PO折价的几种理论与我国IPO的实情,对中国上市公司IPO折价原因进行了研究,认为IPO发行人、承销商和投资者之间的非对称信息是造成IPO折价根本原因。另外,政府、机构投资者及新股发行制度,投资者的过度反应行为是推动因素。最后针对研究结论提出减少我国IPO折价的三项建议。     

Changing Impact of Shocks: A Time-Varying Proxy SVAR Approach

In this paper, we extend the Bayesian Proxy vector autoregression (VAR) model to incorporate time variation in the parameters. A novel Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampling algorithm is provided to approximate the posterior distributions of the model's parameters. Using the proposed algorithm, we estimate the time-varying effects of taxation shocks in the United States and the United Kingdom and find evidence for a decline in the impact of these shocks on output growth.     

Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants Under Asymmetric Information

This paper develops a theoretical explanation why it may be optimal for higher-level governments to pay categorical block grants or closed-ended matching grants to local governments. We consider a federation with two types of local governments which differ in the cost of providing public goods. The federal government redistributes between jurisdictions, but cannot observe the type of a jurisdiction. In this asymmetric information setting, it is shown that the second-best optimum can be implemented with the help of categorical block grants and closed-ended matching grants, but not with unconditional block grants or open-ended matching grants. JEL Code: H77, D82     

Debt vs. Equity and Asymmetric Information: A Review

Recent Nobel Prizes to Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz motivate this review of basic concepts and empirical evidence on information asymmetry and the choice of debt vs. equity. We first review the literature that holds investment fixed. Then we review capital structure issues related to the adverse investment selection problem of Myers–Majluf. Finally, we discuss the timing hypothesis of capital structure. Empirical studies do not consistently support one theory of capital structure under information asymmetry over the others. Thus, the review suggests that additional theoretical contributions are needed to help understand and explain findings in the empirical literature.     

Simultaneous Public and Private Provision of Services, Asymmetric Information and Innovation

Public and private provision of a service coexist. There is asymmetric information between the government and the agency providing the public service with respect to the costs, the quality of the service and the innovation effort of the agency. We examine the optimal government design of the funding contracts to induce the agency to reveal its costs and exert high innovation effort. The optimizing behaviour of consumers and private firms generates observable information, which can be used by the government to reduce its information problem. In the optimal contracts, the informational rents of the agency increase with the level of innovation effort that the government induces from the agency. Correlation between public and the private sector costs results in a trade-off in the government's policy between inducing innovation and extracting the informational rent of the agency. To increase the redistribution inherent in the public provision of the service, the government will manipulate the expected profits of the private firms to induce higher innovation effort.     

The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks under Measurement Error: A Proxy SVAR Approach

A growing literature considers the impact of uncertainty using SVAR models that include proxies for uncertainty shocks as endogenous variables. In this paper, we consider the impact of measurement error in these proxies on the estimated impulse responses. We show via a Monte Carlo experiment that measurement error can result in attenuation bias in impulse responses. In contrast, the proxy SVAR that uses the uncertainty shock proxy as an instrument does not suffer from this bias. Applying this latter method to the Bloom (2009) data set results in impulse responses to uncertainty shocks that are larger in magnitude and more persistent than those obtained from a recursive SVAR.     

The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.     

基于Agent的保险系统非对称信息博弈研究

本文基于保险系统复杂性特征和复杂性科学在解决系统非线性和复杂性交互行为方面的优势,针对保险系统中非对称信息的特点,运用博弈数学模型系统分析保险系统非对称信息,通过CAS理论构建了基于Agent的保险系统仿真模型并在swarm平台上实现了关于保险系统逆向选择问题的经典模型的动态仿真。结果表明：信息不对称产生了保险逆向选择和道德风险,妨碍了保险机制顺利运行,使保险系统资源配置效率严重降低。     

Institutional Investors and Information Asymmetry: An Event Study of Self-Tender Offers

Our research compares the asymmetric information costs of firms with low levels of institutional ownership to those with high levels. We use self‐tender offers as an information event. Our results show that higher institutional ownership, particularly a higher number of institutional investors, is associated with a lower degree of informed trading. These results persist even after we control for differences in trading activity among our sample firms.     

The Changing Asymmetric Information Component of REIT Spreads: A Study of Anticipated Announcements

This study examines the risk-compensating behavior of REIT market makers. The bid-ask spread is hypothesized to compensate market makers for three costs: asymmetric information, order processing, and inventory. As the market makers perceived likelihood of transacting with a better-informed individual increases (decreases), the percentage of the spread that is attributed to asymmetric information will increase (decrease). This study examines the asymmetric information component of the bid-ask spread immediately prior to and following REIT dividend announcements and REIT funds from operations announcements during 1995 and 1996. The asymmetric information component increases the day before and then declines subsequent to dividend announcements of small and equity REITs. Asymmetric information costs increase following funds from operations announcements.     

融资融券交易对市场和标的个股波动影响的实证研究

作为证券市场的重要制度之一,融资融券交易理论上应具有价格发现、价格稳定、提高流动性等基本功能。本文从融资、融券交易的价格稳定理论机制出发,针对市场和个股两个层面系统而全面地分析融资交易和融券交易的价格稳定作用。研究发现：融资交易对指数波动没有显著影响,融券交易对指数波动有一定平抑作用;融资融券交易对标的个股有价格稳定作用,除极个别个股的融资作用表现不确定。     

Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Venture Capital Industry

In this paper we study a horizontally differentiated market for financial intermediation and develop a simple explanation for concentration in the financial intermediation industry. We show that under asymmetric information, if the demand for funds is not perfectly elastic, the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs in need of financing translates into a barrier to entry. That is, we do not need to resort to learning, weak property rights or exogenous costs of entry to generate this result.     

信息不对称条件下银行业市场结构与市场竞争研究综述

将信息不对称理论纳入银行业市场竞争模型是当前跨经济学与金融学两个领域的热点问题。本文从理清产业组织理论中银行业市场结构与竞争和现代金融学中银行业信息不对称研究的发展脉络出发,对信息不对称与银行信息垄断和市场进入壁垒、信息不对称条件下银行的市场竞争行为等文献进行综述,评估银行业市场竞争程度的测量方法和实证分析结果。希望此综述对未来进一步的研究有所启示。     

上市公司股东不可撤销表决权委托研究——问题、挑战与监管

表决权是上市公司股东参与管理决策的重要方式。证券监管实践表明,不可撤销表决权委托既有规避股份限售和减持规则的动机,也有出于增强控制权转让交易中博弈弹性的考虑。表决权委托并非一项简单的债权债务法律关系,其合规性及对证券市场的影响需引起足够的重视。为规范上市公司股东不可撤销的表决权委托,本文建议:在信息披露监管方面,重点关注表决权委托对权益变动、控制权稳定性、投资者保护的影响;在制度规范方面,发布表决权委托示范协议指引等规则,明确表决权委托的关键要素和监管要求。     

Asymmetric Impact of Oil Price Shock on Stock Market in China: A Combination Analysis Based on SVAR Model and NARDL Model

This article integrates the SVAR model and nonlinear ARDL (NARDL) model to analyze the long-run and short-run asymmetric effect of structural oil price shocks on the Chinese stock market. We reveal that the demand-side shocks of oil price have a significant impact on the Chinese stock market in both short and long run, but the supply shock is an exception. In terms of asymmetric nature, there is no evidence of asymmetric impact when it refers to the supply shock and the oil-specific demand shock on stock market, and only the aggregate demand shock has asymmetric effect in short run.     

实验经济学视角下中国家财险需求不足的实证研究

基于心理学注意衰减模型与内驱力降低理论,使用实验经济学处理效应检验和logit回归方法,探究中国家财险需求不足的问题。结果表明：潜在客户家财险决策以接受相关外部刺激为前提,第一阶段先感知家庭财产风险,第二阶段再评估家财险需求;绝大部分潜在客户难以接受到家财险相关外部刺激是导致保险需求不足的重要原因。鉴于此,可从转变财产险公司营销方式与经营理念、充分履行房地产与物业管理公司自身服务义务、有效发挥政府社会管理职能这三方面着手,将潜在需求逐步转化为家财险保单。