Contingent certificate allocation rules and incentives for power plant investment and disinvestment

The electricity generation mix of many countries is strongly dominated by fossil fuelled power plants. \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) certificate trading is then advocated as a first best instrument for emission abatement in Europe, the US and beyond. An important element of the trading scheme is the initial allocation of allowances. This article is to show how permit allocation rules, applied within an Emission Trading System (ETS), interfere with the long-term pricing and investment on power markets. In particular it is demonstrated that free allocation of certificates contingent on plant availability and fuel used is likely to provide distorting incentives both for continued operation of existing plants and for investments. Consequently, marginal abatement costs within the ETS are increased above efficient levels and new power plant investments may crowd out excessively older power plants. Analytical results are derived for two technology cases and a numerical case study is devoted to the EU 27 power sector.     

On the Stochastic Properties of Carbon Futures Prices

Pricing carbon is a central concern in environmental economics, due to the worldwide importance of emissions trading schemes to regulate pollution. This paper documents the presence of small and large jumps in the stochastic process of the CO $_2$ futures price. The large jumps have a discrete origin, i.e. they can arise from various demand factors or institutional decisions on the tradable permits market. Contrary to the existing literature, we show that the stochastic process of carbon futures prices does not contain a continuous component (Brownian motion). The results are derived by using high-frequency data in the activity signature function framework (Todorov and Tauchen in J Econom 154:125–138, 2010; Todorov and Tauchen in J Bus Econ Stat 29:356–371, 2011). The implication is that the carbon futures price should be modeled as an appropriately sampled, centered Lévy or Poisson process. The pure-jump behavior of the carbon price might be explained by the lower volume of trades on this allowance market (compared to other highly liquid financial markets).     

Consumers’ preferences for a local food product: a real choice experiment

This paper analyses consumers’ preferences for a local food in Spain and assesses their willingness to pay (WTP) using a real choice experiment to mitigate possible hypothetical bias. In particular, preferences for fresh lamb meat were investigated and two attributes evaluated, “locally grown” and the type of lamb meat. Data came from an experiment conducted in Spain during 2009. An error component random Parameter model with correlated errors was used to estimate the effect of the attributes on consumers’ utility and derive their WTP. Results suggest that consumers positively value both attributes and are willing to pay a premium of 9 % price increase for the “locally grown” lamb meat (“Ojinegra from Teruel”) and 13 % price increase for the “Ternasco” lamb meat. If we assume a market where only “Ternasco” lamb meat without indication of the local origin is sold, and then a new “Ternasco” lamb is introduced in the market with the “Ojinegra from Teruel” label, this new local lamb meat would capture 18 % of the market if the package is assumed to be sold at 3.5 \(\hbox {C}\!\!\!\!\!=\) and a 10 % market share if the package is assumed to be sold at 4 \(\hbox {C}\!\!\!\!\!=\) .     

Getting Cars Off the Road: The Cost-Effectiveness of an Episodic Pollution Control Program

Ground-level ozone remains a serious problem in the United States. Because ozone non-attainment is a summer problem, episodic rather than continuous controls of ozone precursors are possible. We evaluate the costs and emissions reductions of a program that requires people to buy permits to drive on high-ozone days. We estimate the demand function for permits based on a survey of 1,300 households in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. Assuming that all vehicle owners comply with the scheme, the permit program would reduce nitrogen oxides ( $\text{ NO }_{\mathrm{x}}$ ) by 42 tons per Code Red day at a permit price of $75. Allowing for non-compliance by 15 % of respondents reduces the effectiveness of the scheme to 33 tons of $\text{ NO }_{\mathrm{x}}$ per day. The cost per ozone season of achieving these reductions is approximately $9 million (2008 USD). Although year-round measures, such as the Tier II emissions standards, might be preferred on benefit-cost grounds, an episodic permit system might be considered as an interim measure before the Tier II emissions standards are fully reflected in the vehicle fleet.     

How Much Does Wind Power Reduce $$\text {CO}_{2}$$ Emissions? Evidence from the Irish Single Electricity Market

This paper evaluates the effect of wind generation on \(\text {CO}_{2}\) emissions using 2008–2012 historical data for the Irish Single Electricity Market. Wind generation displaces \(\text {CO}_{2}\) emissions, as expected, in line with the average system emissions. Over the whole period, wind generation avoided about 8.8 million tons of \(\text {CO}_{2}\), equivalent to about 12% of total system emissions. To understand what drives the level of abatement we evaluate the results by technology and determine that wind generation has similar effects on total emissions from CCGT and coal plants, due to the higher carbon content of coal. Each MWh of wind, however, replaces more generation from CCGTs than from coal plants, in proportion to their generation. We also test the hypothesis that as wind displaces baseload plants it pushes them to generate less efficiently, but find no evidence of a strong negative effect of wind on CCGT or coal plant efficiency. Finally wind displaces about 2.5% fewer emissions when the pumped storage plant is on outage, suggesting that wind is more effective when paired with a flexible system.     

The Welfare Impact of Self-supplied Water Pricing in Canada: A Computable General Equilibrium Assessment

This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model to assess the welfare cost of changing the method of water allocation in Canada towards one that uses prices to ration demand. We model the introduction of a price on both water that is abstracted as well as water that is consumed (that is abstracted, and not returned to the source). We estimate that reducing water consumption by 25 % would require imposition of a price on water consumption of around $$\$0.21/\text{ m }^{3}$$ . Similarly, introduction of a water abstraction charge of about $$\$0.013/\text{ m }^{3}$$ would be sufficient to reduce water abstraction by 25 %. We find that if revenues from water pricing are returned in lump sum to households, the introduction of water pricing would result in a modest welfare loss. When revenues from water pricing are used to offset existing taxes, we find a gain in welfare corresponding to a ‘strong double dividend.’     

Restrictions and identification in a multidimensional risk-sharing problem

We consider $H$ expected utility maximizers that have to share a risky aggregate multivariate endowment $X\in {\mathbb {R}}^{N}$ and address the following two questions: does efficient risk-sharing imply restrictions on the form of individual consumptions as a function of $X$ ? Can one identify the individual utility functions from the observation of the risk-sharing? We show that when $H\ge \frac{2N}{N-1}$ efficient risk sharings have to satisfy a system of nonlinear PDEs. Under an additional rank condition, we prove an identification theorem.     

Controlling Episodic Air Pollution with a Seasonal Gas Tax: The Case of Cache Valley,Utah

Using daily data spanning 10 years, we establish a statistical relationship between episodic particulate-matter \((\hbox {PM}_{2.5})\) concentrations and vehicle trips in Cache Valley, Utah, and estimate an average gas-price elasticity for the region. We also estimate the benefits and costs associated with a seasonal gas tax set to reduce vehicle trips during the winter-inversion season and thereby lower health costs through concomitant decreases in the \(\hbox {PM}_{2.5}\) concentrations. We find a strong positive relationship between vehicle trips reduced and associated reductions in \(\hbox {PM}_{2.5}\) concentrations. Further, we estimate a mean gas price elasticity of approximately \(-\)0.3 in what we call a “high price variability environment.” Incorporating these results, cost-benefit analysis suggests that the social net benefit for Cache Valley associated with the imposition of a seasonal gas tax during the winter-inversion season is highly dependent upon the type of benefit estimation method used.     

Macroeconomic Impacts of Carbon Capture and Storage in China

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a key technology for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But a CCS facility consumes vast amounts of energy and capital. With this in mind we analyze macroeconomic consequences of a large scale introduction of CCS in China. We modify and extend the DRC-CGE, a macroeconomic CGE model of the country that is used for long-term planning and policy analyses. We analyze an internal finance scenario of domestic funding, and an external finance scenario of international funding. In the external finance scenario CCS is installed on 70 % of all power plants by 2050. This increases demand for coal in 2050 by one fifth and import of coal by one fourth. The strain on coal resources may be an important political concern for China. In the internal finance scenario coal resources are not strained since this scenario introduces a price on carbon that lifts prices of energy. Moreover, the price on carbon cuts across the board and the internal finance scenario is much more effective at reducing \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) . On the other hand, in this scenario GDP goes down about 4 %, which also raises political concern.     

Semantics for intuitionistic epistemic logics of shallow depths for game theory

Epistemic logic of shallow depths has been developed by Kaneko–Suzuki using classical logic. In this paper, we adopt intuitionistic logic as the base logic to limit each player’s reasoning to constructive one. The resulting logical system is denoted by IG $_{EF}$ , and we introduce epistemic possible world semantics for IG $_{EF}$ . We show the soundness and completeness of IG $_{EF}$ with respect to this semantics for it. We also show some applications to game theoretical decision making.     

Insider trading with product differentiation

This paper investigates the effect of product differentiation on the real and financial decisions of a publicly-owned firm, competing $\grave{a}$ la Cournot with another privately-owned firm. The results show that the degree of product differentiation affects the stock price coefficients (i.e. the market maker’s response to the real signal and to the total order flow signal) and the output of the publicly-owned firm. It also appears to have a detrimental effect on the manager’s profits and compensation scheme. The paper then proposes an extension of the benchmark model to incorporate Cournot and Stackelberg competition between two insiders in the financial market. The type of the financial competition adopted has also an effect on the results of the benchmark model that sometimes depend on the degree of product differentiation.     

Optimal fixed cost subsidies in Melitz-type models

This paper analyzes the reallocation and welfare effects of fixed cost subsidies in a Melitz-type model. In a closed economy, the planner trades off product variety and average productivity effects. Neither subsidies on entry fixed costs nor on operating fixed costs are welfare enhancing. These results reflect the Pareto optimality of the laissez faire equilibrium. In a “small” open economy à la Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (J Int Econ 78(1):100–112, 2009), an entry fixed cost subsidy does not enhance welfare, while a small operating fixed cost subsidy does. Only the latter affects the relative attractiveness of exporting. The average firm thus realloactes labor from export to domestic activity and operates at a smaller scale, which allows for a larger increase in domestic product variety than in the closed economy.     

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets

This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.     

Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case

In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on ${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$ and ${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$ . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear.     

Community-based incentives for environmental protection: the case of green electricity

This paper examines the effectiveness of using community-level rewards to subsidize environmental protection. Specifically, we study the Connecticut Clean Energy Communities (CCEC) program that provides mostly symbolic rewards in the form of municipal photovoltaic installations in proportion to the number of households that voluntarily purchase green electricity. We find that the program causes a 22 % increase in the number of households purchasing green electricity in CCEC municipalities. The pattern of results suggests that the CCEC leads to the mobilization of community-based recruitment campaigns that increase signup rates by up to 700 % around the period of initial qualification. We also find that a change in the marginal incentive created by the program has little consequence on signup behavior. The implication for policy is that community-based incentives can be effective, but the size of the subsidy itself appears less important. Finally, simple calculations based on CCEC up-front costs reveal upper-bound, cost-effectiveness measures of $570 per household signup, 6.7 $\not {c} $ per kilowatt-hour of annual green-electricity demand, and $113 per ton of annual carbon-dioxide emission reductions.     

Market power and output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues

Output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues combines a tax on emissions with a production subsidy, typically in a revenue-neutral fashion. With imperfect competition, subsidies can alleviate output underprovision. However, when market shares are significant, endogenous refunding reduces abatement incentives and the marginal net tax or subsidy. If market shares differ, marginal abatement costs will not be equalized, and production is shifted among participants. In an asymmetric Cournot duopoly, endogenous refunding leads to higher output, emissions, and overall costs compared with a fixed rebate program targeting the same emissions intensity. These results hold whether emissions rates are determined simultaneously with output or strategically in a two-stage model.     

Eco-Efficiency and Convergence in OECD Countries

This paper assesses the convergence in eco-efficiency of a group of 22 OECD countries over the period 1980–2008. In doing so, three air pollutants representing the impact on the environment of economic activities are considered, namely, carbon dioxide ( ${\text{ CO}}_{2}$ ), nitrogen oxides ( ${\text{ NO}}_\mathrm{X}$ ) and sulphur oxides ( ${\text{ SO}}_\mathrm{X}$ ); furthermore, eco-efficiency scores at both country and air-pollutant-specific level are computed using Data Envelopment Analysis techniques. Then, convergence is evaluated using the recent approach by Phillips and Sul Econometrica 75:1771–1855 (2007), which tests for the existence of convergence groups. First, we find that eco-efficiency has improved over the period, with the exception of ${\text{ NO}}_\mathrm{X}$ emissions. Second, Switzerland is the most eco-efficient country, followed by some Scandinavian economies, such as Sweden, Iceland, Norway and Denmark. In contrast, Southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, in addition to Hungary, Turkey, Canada and the United States, are among the worst performers. Finally, we find that both the most eco-efficient countries and the worst tend to form clubs of convergence.     

Essential data, budget sets and rationalization

According to a minimalist version of Afriat’s theorem, a consumer behaves as a utility maximizer if and only if a feasibility matrix associated with his choices is cyclically consistent. An “essential experiment” consists of observed consumption bundles $(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n})$ and a feasibility matrix $\varvec{\alpha }$ . Starting with a standard experiment, in which the economist has access to precise budget sets, we show that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a utility function rationalizing the experiment, namely, the cyclical consistency of the associated feasibility matrix, is equivalent to the existence, for any budget sets compatible with the deduced essential experiment, of a utility function rationalizing them (and typically depending on them). In other words, the conclusion of the standard rationalizability test, in which the economist takes budget sets for granted, does not depend on the full specification of the underlying budget sets but only on the essential data that these budget sets generate. Starting with an essential experiment $(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n}; \varvec{\alpha }$ ) only, we show that the cyclical consistency of $\varvec{\alpha }$ , together with a further consistency condition involving both $(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n})$ and $\varvec{\alpha }$ , guarantees the existence of a budget representation and that the essential experiment is rationalizable almost robustly, in the sense that there exists a single utility function which rationalizes at once almost all budget sets which are compatible with $(x_{1}, \ldots , x_{n}; \varvec{\alpha }$ ). The conditions are also trivially necessary.     

Measuring market power when firms price discriminate

We propose conduct parameter-based market power measures within a model of price discrimination, extending work by Hazledine (Econ Lett 93:413–420, 2006) and Kutlu (Econ Lett 117:540–543, 2012) to certain forms of second-degree price discrimination. We use our model to estimate the market power of US airlines in a price discrimination environment. We find that a slightly modified version of our original theoretical measure is positively related to market concentration. Moreover, on average, market power for high-end segment is greater than that of low-end segment.