Preemptive investment game with alternative projects

This paper investigates a duopoly with two alternative investment projects. We examine a situation in which a firm cannot invest in any project that has been taken by the rival firm. The first mover's advantage in project choice leads to an equilibrium quite different from that in previous studies. Specifically, we show that in equilibrium, the investment time and the option value are between those in a duopoly with one project and a monopoly with one project. Moreover, we show that a high correlation between project values, unlike in a monopoly with two projects, plays a positive role in mitigating preemptive competition. The results complement the literature of real options games and of max-options and entail new empirical implications.     

The Equivalency Principle for Discounting the Value of Natural Assets: An Application to an Investment Project in the Basque Coast

Making decisions about optimal investments in green infrastructure necessitates setting social discount rates. This paper suggests a practical way for determining the discount rate for projects or programmes in which one of the options is to maintain or restore land to an undeveloped state. We propose an “equivalency principle” to derive a simple rule that sets the discount rate. The rule is based on the premise that the long term value of a piece of undeveloped land ought to be at least the same as the value of an identical piece of land in the vicinity to which permission has been granted for development. We illustrate this principle with various case studies and we apply it to a contentious investment project in the Basque Country associated with the regeneration of a large scale harbour that involves reclaiming undeveloped land that has important ecological values, including for the conservation of a marine ecosystem.     

Minority voting and long-term decisions

In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects including a first-period project that may have long-lasting impact. In the first period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting, only voting losers retain their voting rights in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value, minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.     

泰勒规则及其在中国货币政策中的检验

本文运用历史分析法和反应函数法首次将中国货币政策运用于检验泰勒规则。通过计算中国货币政策中利率的泰勒规则值 ,并与其实际值进行比较表明 ,泰勒规则可以很好地衡量中国货币政策 ,利率规则值与实际值的偏离之处恰恰是政策操作滞后于经济形势发展之时。这表明泰勒规则能够为中国货币政策提供一个参照尺度 ,衡量货币政策的松紧。对中国货币政策的反应函数GMM估计表明 ,通胀率对利率的调整系数小于 1 ,这是一种不稳定的货币政策规则 ,在这一制度下 ,通货膨胀或通货紧缩的产生和发展有着自我实现机制。     

基于实物期权的突破性创新投资决策分析

鉴于突破性创新无论是在创新本身特性还是在机会识别以及技术发展过程等方面均与传统的渐进性创新截然不同,导致其投资决策分析所采用传统的DCF法和NPV判断规则将不能完全反映整个创新过程中投资者所面临诸多动态变化的不确定性影响因素以及由此带来项目价值的改变。因此如何选择正确的投资决策方法来准确估算投资项目的价值,把握项目创新过程中最佳的投资机会,是众多投资者的困惑,也是企业突破性创新发展成功的根本保证之一。通过剖析突破性创新的特点和传统投资决策分析方法的弊端,引入了以二项式或四项式为基础的实物期权模型来估计项目价值,充分考虑了项目突破性创新过程中各种不确定性因素对项目价值的影响,具有很强的实践价值。     

Global emissions effects of CDM projects with relative baselines

CDM is an offset mechanism designed to reduce the overall cost of implementing a given global target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol. A problem with CDM is that it provides incentives to increase, if possible, the baseline emissions for CDM projects, to optimize the value of CDM credits. Under a “relative baselines” crediting rule, the CDM may also unduly increase energy consumption even during the CDM implementation phase. Less than full offset of emissions is then likely, and the CDM will lead to increased global GHG emissions. We show that this is a potentially serious problem, due to asymmetric information between project hosts and the regulator, the CDM Executive Board, and to the basic rules for crediting CDM quotas. In certain cases, the use of “relative baselines” to credit CDM quotas could fully eliminate any emissions reductions achieved by CDM projects. Remedies to overcome the problems are discussed. They may involve setting the baseline independently of initial energy intensity and final output for the project; or involve information revelation mechanisms that minimize policy losses and net rent capture by project sponsors.     

Consistent representative democracy

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.     

A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty

In this paper we use a real option model for assessing uncertain investment projects and we show that—due to a flexibility premium—taxes asymmetrically affect the option value of projects that differ in their riskiness. Hence, this may generate distortions. We analytically identify a set of neutral tax rates (a tax regime) that preserve the post‐tax investment threshold if taxes change, and determine normal and paradoxical settings for investments. Unlike other tax paradoxes neither depreciation rules nor loss offset restrictions cause these paradoxical reactions. Taxes affect each project individually, depending on the project risks involved. This implies that, for a variety of uncertain projects, taxes cannot be neutral on aggregate.     

公安院校治安学专业实训项目的设计与实施

实践教学是高等教育的一个重要环节,是理论联系实际和培养学生能力的重要手段,发挥着理论教学不可替代的作用。实训项目的设计与开发是实践教学的关键。加强公安院校治安学专业实训项目的设计与实施,提高专业学生的实践能力和创新精神,已成为＂治安学人＂探索和思考的重要问题。治安学专业实训项目的设计应坚持围绕人才培养目标,实用、实际和实效等原则,按照治安类民警岗位能力的要求,划分为治安防范（含治安服务）、治安管理和治安问题查处等三大实训模块,在每个实训模块中设计若干实训项目。专业实训项目必须满足一定的条件,按照一定的步骤实施才能实现其价值。     

Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (Am Econ Rev 92:1577–1587, 2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible objects. Each agent announces a vector of bids and a project, which is used as a tie-breaking rule for the case where several aggregate bids finish first in the bidding. We show that removing the (non-intuitive) project announcement and using instead the projects which received some agent’s highest bid to break ties, severely hinders the performance of the mechanism. Specifically, a Nash Equilibrium exists only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for his detailed suggestions and comments and to the SSHRC (Canada) for financial support.     

The Delaying Effect of Financing Constraints on Investment

We develop a simple model in which a firm considers a number of investment projects. Because of limited financial resources, the firm can undertake at most one project. In line with the literature on real options we stress features like irreversibility, uncertainty and the possibility of postponing the investment decision and show under which conditions limited availability of funds tends to increase the value of waiting.     

企业科技创新失败项目政府补偿方式选择

将企业科技创新失败项目分为研发阶段失败和成果转化阶段失败两种,采用实物期权法建立政府资金直接补偿、政府税收优惠补偿两种方式下企业科技创新失败项目价值模型,通过分析不同补偿方式下的政府补偿效率,确定了不同阶段科技创新失败项目的最优政府补偿方式。结果发现,研发阶段科技创新失败项目应优先选择政府资金直接补偿,成果转化阶段科技创新失败项目应优先选择税收优惠补偿。     

Cost sharing with multiple technologies

We study cost sharing problems where gains from cooperation can come from the presence of other agents, such as when agents share their technologies. A simple model is built, where economies of scale are eliminated in order to study this effect. We use as the key axiom the property that, if an agent does not improve the technology of any coalition he joins, he should not get any part of the gain from cooperation. With properties of linearity and symmetry, this axiom characterizes a well-defined set of rules. From this set, we propose a rule derived from the familiar Shapley value. We show that it is the only rule in that set satisfying an upper-limit property on individual cost allocations or a monotonicity property when technology improves. We also derive a distinct rule using a property that ensures that no coalition has an incentive to manipulate the individual demands of its members.     

Cost sharing with multiple technologies

We study cost sharing problems where gains from cooperation can come from the presence of other agents, such as when agents share their technologies. A simple model is built, where economies of scale are eliminated in order to study this effect. We use as the key axiom the property that, if an agent does not improve the technology of any coalition he joins, he should not get any part of the gain from cooperation. With properties of linearity and symmetry, this axiom characterizes a well-defined set of rules. From this set, we propose a rule derived from the familiar Shapley value. We show that it is the only rule in that set satisfying an upper-limit property on individual cost allocations or a monotonicity property when technology improves. We also derive a distinct rule using a property that ensures that no coalition has an incentive to manipulate the individual demands of its members.     

Embedding effects in choice experiment valuations of environmental preservation projects

This paper addresses the question, whether attribute values derived from a CE study of one nature restoration and preservation project depend on the overall scale of nature preservation activities in which it is embedded. A split-sample CE study was undertaken in which a particular nature preservation project was evaluated in three plausible and strictly different embedding contexts. Respondents' attention was drawn to a varying number of forthcoming substitute preservation projects to be implemented prior to the one in question. Results show that while WTP for the project in focus is sensitive to the presentation of substitute projects as such, there does not seem to be any clear and unidirectional relationship between WTP and the number of substitute projects. Furthermore, effects vary across the project's attributes.     

Consistent House Allocation

In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except – maybe – for up to three agents in each object’s priority ordering. We are grateful to the Editor and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. L. Ehlers acknowledges financial support from the SSHRC (Canada)     

实物期权方法在BOT公路投资项目中的应用

投资项目具有多种期权特性,传统的DCF评价方法无法评估多个不确定性对投资项目的影响。实物期权方法为决策者提供了一个有效管理不确定性因素的工具。国内外学者就BOT公路投资项目中的增长期权、延迟期权、投资扩张、政府保证、特许权期限调整、通行费率调整、投资成本和车流量不确定性等多个问题进行了大量的讨论。本文首先对实物期权理论在BOT公路投资项目方面的应用研究进行文献回顾,然后详细的分析了国内BOT公路投资项目收益的不确定性、项目投资的可延迟性、项目的可扩建性、政府的保证以及项目特有的土地开发及广告收益等多个特点具有的期权价值。并对这些期权的定价模型进行了简要的介绍。文章最后对运用实物期权理论应用过程中的难点进行了分析,并在此基础上总结实物期权理论在BOT公路投资项目中应用的研究方向。     

Shadow pricing with suboptimal policy rules

This paper aims to clarify different views on the validity of the little-Mirrlees border price rule for project evaluation in a context where the Government chooses its controls suboptimally in a systematic fashion. The rule is shown to be valid quite generally for small public sector projects when the Government's response restores market-clearing in nontradeables and foreign exchange. It can be invalid in contexts of (a) non-market clearing or (b) private sector projects that generate profits distributed to households. In the latter case special treatment of profit effects is required, along the lines described by Little and Mirrlees (1974).     

Private Benefits,Warm Glow,and Reputation in the Free and Open Source Software Production Model

A great deal of production and consumption behavior takes place in the context of social organizations that seem to fall outside of the traditional paradigm of profit/utility maximization. These organizations are voluntary in nature and rely on contributions from members to achieve their objectives. Examples include the Linux operating system and other FOSS projects, political movements, churches and religious groups, Habitat for Humanity, and similar charitable organizations. In this paper, we consider a world containing agents with heterogeneous abilities who may voluntarily choose to make effort contributions to one or more different public projects. Agents are motivated by a desire to be seen as significant contributors to important and valuable projects, the warm glow from the act of contributing, and a desire to directly enjoy the benefits of projects when complete. We find that contributions from others can be either strategic complements or substitutes. We show that Nash equilibria exist and study how agents’ abilities and project quality affect the equilibrium levels of contributions.     

Signaling quality with increased incentives

Previous work on informed-principal problems with moral hazard suggested that the principal should signal project quality by retaining a larger share of the project and hence lowering incentives for the agent. We show that this view is incomplete. If project quality and effort are complements and effort is more valuable for high-quality projects, a principal with a high-quality project may separate from a principal with a low-quality project by increasing incentives for the agent. This holds with a risk-neutral agent who is protected by limited liability as well as with a risk-averse agent and unlimited liability. A dynamic version of our model in which the agent learns project quality in later periods provides an explanation for the use of initially reduced royalty rates in business-format franchising contracts.