COLLUSIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH UNKNOWN COSTS*

The article studies collusive equilibria in an infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs. I look at collusive pooled Perfect Bayesian equilibria and separating equilibria either with signaling or with communication. In the separating equilibria with signaling the firms play the strictly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period 1 and produce the optimal incentive compatible collusive quantity vector from period 2 onwards. In the separating equilibrium with communication the optimal incentive compatible quantity vector is produced from period 1 onwards. Among these, the optimal separating equilibrium with communication gives the highest expected discounted joint profits.     

LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS IN A MONETARY ECONOMY*

This article presents a microfounded model of money with a consumption and an investment market. We consider an economy in which only part of the investment returns can be pledged. A liquidity constraint arises when the pledgeable part of the returns are not enough to pay for investment costs. We show that when the liquidity constraint is binding, agents may make a cash downpayment and money can perform two roles—as a provider of liquidity services and exchange services. The liquidity constraint constitutes a channel though which underinvestment occurs even at low inflation rates.     

WELFARE AND MONETARY PRECOMMITMENT IN AN ECONOMY WITH MENU COSTS AND UNIONIZED WAGE SETTING

The paper shows that monetary precommitment can be advantageous to the government in a macroeconomic policy game where (i) the government's objectives are explicitly derived from those of the citizens, (ii) inflation has a real cost and (iii) the suboptimality of the output level arises from the structure of the private sector rather than from fiscal policy. It suggests that, to this extent, welfare interpretations of game theoretic monetary policy models are coherent.     

THE TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY IN A MULTISECTOR ECONOMY*

This article constructs and estimates a sticky‐price, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with heterogeneous production sectors. Firms in different sectors vary in their price rigidity, production technology, and the combination of material and investment inputs. In particular, firms buy inputs from all sectors using the actual Input–Output Matrix and Capital Flow Table of the U.S. economy. By relaxing the standard assumption of symmetry, this model allows idiosyncratic sectoral dynamics in response to monetary policy shocks. The model is estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments using sectoral and aggregate U.S. time series.     

DISCOUNT RATE FOR PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN A MONETARY DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMY*

In this paper, we explore the social rate of discount for public investment in a monetary overlapping generations model which allows for market disequilibria arising from price and wage rigidities. Financing public investment with a lump-sum tax on the younger generation, borrowing and money supply, the government maximizes the sum of generational utilities discounted by a social rate of time preference. For the social welfare optimum, it is required to take the boundary-maintaining policy by making demand for output equal to supply. In a stationary state, we show that (i) the social rate of discount on the Keynesian-repressed inflation boundary should be the weighted average of the social rate of time preference and the market rate of interest, the weights depending on the amount of private investment crowded out by public investment, and (ii) on the Keynesian-classical boundary it should be a modified version of the weighted average rule, containing an extra term which represents the marginal opportunity cost of public investment through its impact on labour employment.     

DIMENSIONS,TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND COALITIONS IN LEGISLATIVE VOTING*

Dimensional studies of Congressional voting have found a single dominant “ideological” dimension, while regression estimates find that constituency variables and party are dominant. Koford (1989b) recalibrated the dimensional studies, and found that several dimensions are important. This study reviews those findings, and then considers additional reasons why dimensional studies might understate the number of dimensions. It then examines the regression estimates for biases that overstate the number of dimensions. Overall, fewer dimensions are found than seem consistent with the wide variety of constituents' preferences on issues. A model is developed in which the transactions costs of building coalitions reduces the number of dimensions visible on roll-call votes below the underlying dimensionality of preferences in the issue space. When legislative parties build internal coalitions to pass and defeat bills, voting on randomly drawn bills has a single party-oriented dimension. Natural ideological dimensions are reinforced when parties write bills and logroll along natural lines of cohesion. Numerical examples suggest that these effects could be important, and suggest lines for empirical investigation of the underlying issue space.     

货币政策组合规则

本文建议在泡沫高涨时将货币政策由利率规则转为货币量规则。在本文设定的CIA模型经济中,外生泡沫通过金融渠道对经济发生影响。本文证实,即使是遵循了泰勒原则的利率规则也会因为对融资活动的增长提供相应的货币支持而实际上起到助长泡沫经济的作用;而货币量规则由于对货币供应的控制而能起到缩短并稳定泡沫经济影响的效果。本文的模拟实验表明,在大型泡沫经济中将利率规则与货币量规则组合使用能取得更好的宏观经济成果。同时,将不同规则进行组合使用的思想在货币政策的研究中是新颖的,本文还发展了模型对接的技术处理方法。     

与中国经济共同成长专访恒生银行副董事长兼行政总裁柯清辉

从汇丰银行见习行政人员到恒生银行副董事长兼行政总裁,柯清辉走入了人生最辉煌的阶段。年少时的柯清辉加入汇丰银行成为见习行政人员时,并没有想到他在2005年能成为汇丰银行的18名高层管理人员之一。时至2005年5月25日,56岁的柯清辉接任汇丰集团成员恒生银行的副董事长兼行政总裁,成为这家拥有72年历史和7500名员工的银行领头人。     

UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH BARGAINING*

This paper develops a model which embeds the Nash-equilibrium version of McDonald and Solow's (1981) wage-bargaining model into an otherwise standard static equilibrium macro model. Equilibrium unemployment is possible. Real shocks to demand result in pro-cyclical employment and anti-cyclical real wage movements while money shocks are neutral. This is in some contrast to the results obtained by McDonald and Solow.     

MANAGING SWITCHING COSTS IN MULTIPERIOD PROCUREMENTS WITH STRATEGIC BUYERS*

This article examines the use of switching costs by long‐lived strategic buyers to manage dynamic competition between rival suppliers. The analysis reveals how buyers may employ switching costs to their advantage. We show that when switching costs are high, a buyer may induce suppliers to price more competitively by credibly threatening to replace the incumbent supplier with his rivals. The implications of this finding for adoption of technology and firm organization are explored in settings in which the buyer is integrated with the suppliers and where the buyer is an outsourcer.     

THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

The existence of a pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect equilibrium in qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable cost and network externalities operate. We show that there exists a parameter region where the incentive to predate at the quality stage prevents firms from reaching a pure‐strategy non‐cooperative equilibrium with prices above marginal costs. If network externalities are sufficiently large, a Bertrand equilibrium with zero profits may arise, although the amount of product differentiation is strictly positive.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION IN A MULTI‐SECTOR OPEN‐ECONOMY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

The paper analyzes monetary and fiscal stabilization and coordination in a multi‐sector stochastic new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model. It first aims to assess the capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to reduce or eliminate the negative welfare effects of an unanticipated productivity shock affecting some or all of the sectors in each country. Second, it evaluates the possible gains from international monetary cooperation as well as the impact of active fiscal policy on the welfare performance of monetary policy. The setup also allows for international asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks. The results show that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization and under several conditions they can replicate the flexible‐price equilibrium. However, their welfare performance is not necessarily increased when both monetary and fiscal policies react to shocks at the national level. The existence of bilateral gains from monetary cooperation depends on the degree of asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks.     

MONETARY EXPANSION AND PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN A CASH‐IN‐ADVANCE ECONOMY*

Using a dynamic optimization model that incorporates a cash‐in‐advance constraint on both consumption and investment and productive public capital financed by a lump‐sum tax and seigniorage, this paper analyses the steady‐state effects of an increase in the inflation rate (the money growth rate) on output, private capital and welfare. The effects are negative at high inflation rates. However, at low inflation rates, the effects depend on the amount of lump‐sum tax revenue collected and therefore are either positive or negative.     

中国特色社会主义市场经济货币政策体系的形成及演变

伴随中国特色社会主义基本经济制度的发展,与之相适应的宏观调控机制不断完善。货币政策体系作为其中重要组成部分,在持续深化改革的进程中逐渐演进,成为构建更加系统完备、更加成熟定型的高水平社会主义市场经济体制的重要内容。在货币政策最终目标及中间目标、货币政策工具、货币政策传导机制等方面正在形成与中国特色社会主义基本经济制度相适应的政策体系,并且具有鲜明的中国特色。本文讨论改革开放以来中国货币政策体系的形成、演变过程及特点。     

中国特色社会主义市场经济货币政策体系的形成及演变*

伴随中国特色社会主义基本经济制度的发展，与之相适应的宏观调控机制不断完善。货币政策体系作为其中重要组成部分，在持续深化改革的进程中逐渐演进，成为构建更加系统完备、更加成熟定型的高水平社会主义市场经济体制的重要内容。在货币政策最终目标及中间目标、货币政策工具、货币政策传导机制等方面正在形成与中国特色社会主义基本经济制度相适应的政策体系，并且具有鲜明的中国特色。本文讨论改革开放以来中国货币政策体系的形成、演变过程及特点。     

ON THE INEFFICACY OF TEMPORARY POLICY IN A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH MONEY*

We construct a dynamic economy with many consumers with money in their utilities. Two main results—a turnpike theorem and inefficacy of temporary policy—are established in a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which price effects generated through markets are explicitly factored in. Turnpike, which is perfectly independent from wealth distribution among the heterogeneous consumers, will be globally attractive. Temporary policy is not effective not only for the future but for the current economy if the long‐run interest rate level is low. The inefficacy result coincides with an intuitive explanation by the standard permanent income hypothesis.