中国改革的新政治经济学

一个符合"卡尔多--希克斯改进"标准的改革方案,将可能因利益不一致性,而无法被采纳;解决这一困境的办法是做实"卡尔多补偿",使方案符合"帕累托改进";而要做实"卡尔多补偿",改革受益者的事前承诺并不可信,只能依赖于国家承诺.中国改革促进了经济增长,是符合"卡尔多--希克斯改进"标准的,但也遇到了利益不一致问题.在此背景下,由于利益相对受损者并没有及时得到补偿,加之贴现率太高,因而坚持后续改革的积极性下降;而既得利益者则由于预期后续改革将轮到他们分担更多成本,因而也变得保守起来.由此导致了所谓"改革冷漠症"出现.解决此问题的办法是国家及时关注社会公平正义的再分配政策,使改革成果为大众所共享.     

Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics and Liberalism

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