When bank loans are bad news: Evidence from market reactions to loan announcements under the risk of expropriation

In this paper we investigate whether inefficient bank loans can reduce the value of borrowing firms when expropriation of the stock of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is a major concern. Using data from Chinese banks, we find that bank loan announcements generate significantly negative abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. In line with this expropriation view, negative stock price reactions following bank loan announcements are concentrated in firms that are perceived to be more vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we find evidence that a negative relationship between market reactions and firm vulnerability to expropriation exists only when firms borrow from the least efficient banks.     

Wealth Effects of International Acquisitions by US Banks

The wealth effects of international acquisitions by US banks (USBs) are examined in this study. The results show that shareholders of USBs experience significant negative excess returns when banks make international acquisition announcements. Excess returns are significantly negative when banks announce acquisitions in developed countries. The excess returns are not different for first time versus subsequent acquisition announcements. However, excess returns are significantly negative for USBs that are frequent acquirers overseas. Sampling by time periods, negative excess returns are observed during the fixed exchange rate regime (1965–1973) and during the post Tax Reform Act of 1986 era. Cross‐sectional regressions indicate that profitability and efficiency measures are positively associated with excess returns.     

Does the response of competitors to privatization announcements reflect competitive or industry-wide information effects? International evidence

We examine the stock price reaction of rival firms to the announcement of the privatization of their industry counterparts to infer information about the intra-industry effects of privatization. We find that the rival firms reacted negatively to the privatization announcements, suggesting that the announcement effects reflect competitive rather than positive industry effects. The reaction is stronger for industry counterparts in low economic freedom countries than those in high economic freedom countries. Interestingly, we also find that full privatization announcements generate larger negative abnormal returns for rival firms than partial privatization announcements where the privatized firm gains only partial autonomy from the government. In this regard, we find that, as the proportion of government ownership reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcement elicits stronger market reaction from rival firms. The negative abnormal returns earned by shareholders of rival firms are not due to price pressure and portfolio rebalancing effects resulting from index composition changes. We conclude that the negative effects documented for the rival firms reflect investors' concern about the potential competitive effects resulting from privatization of the state enterprise.     

Cash holdings and bond returns around takeovers

Using a large sample of 2712 unique U.S. domestic takeovers over the period 1993 to 2014, we show a negative relation between the level of cash holdings and post-announcement corporate bond returns. Our findings support the agency cost of cash holdings view and show that bondholders and shareholders share the same interests with respect to cash policy around takeovers. We further find that cash holdings are viewed less negatively by bondholders in firms with strong shareholders. This paper is the first to document the role of cash holdings on bondholder wealth around takeover announcements.     

Understanding partial mergers in Japan

Since the late 1990s, Japan has witnessed a substantial increase of partial mergers where two or more firms spin off whole operations in the same business and combine them into a joint venture (JV). This paper provides the first academic evidence on this phenomenon. I find that partial mergers normally occur as a response to negative economic shocks by firms that are larger and more diversified than firms in total mergers. An event study identifies positive and significant returns to partial merger announcements. Unlike total mergers whose value accrues mostly to the shareholders of small (acquired) firms, large and small firms in partial mergers receive comparable returns, which are particularly large to firms forming an equally owned JV. This study also finds that partial mergers are often ex post transformed, with equity sale between partners being the main source of change.     

Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit From Corporate Acquisitions?

Using 947 acquisitions during 1970–1989, this article finds a relationship between the postacquisition returns and the mode of acquisition and form of payment. During a five-year period following the acquisition, on average, firms that complete stock mergers earn significantly negative excess returns of ?25.0 percent whereas firms that complete cash tender offers earn significantly positive excess returns of 61.7 percent. Over the combined preacquisition and postacquisition period, target shareholders who hold on to the acquirer stock received as payment in stock mergers do not earn significantly positive excess returns. In the top quartile of target to acquirer size ratio, they earn negative excess returns.     

Intra-Industry Reactions to Stock Split Announcements

We examine whether favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements transfers to nonsplitting firms within the same industry. On average, nonsplitting firms' shareholders experience positive and significant abnormal returns at the stock split announcements of their industry counterparts. In addition, industrywide and firm-specific characteristics are important determinants in explaining nonsplitting firms' stock returns. These firms' earnings increase significantly, and the earnings changes are positively related to the stock price reactions. Finally, we find no evidence that investors revise the value of nonsplitting firms because they anticipate a decline in earnings volatility.     

THE DAY-OF-THE-WEEK ANOMALY: THE TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE EXPERIENCE

This paper studies the day-of-the-week effect employing Canadian stock returns from January 1, 1975 to June 30, 1989. The study finds that, as opposed to large capitalization stocks, low capitalization (thinly-traded) stocks tend to have a larger negative return on Tuesday rather than on Monday - possibly due to lags in the price adjustment of these stocks following the release of negative information. Two main issues are investigated in an attempt to explain the day-of-the-week effect and its persistence over time: (a) the role of dividends, and (b) the role of information flows. The study finds that firms are much more likely to go ex-dividend on Monday than on any other day of the week; however, after correcting for the dividend effect, Monday's returns are still significantly negative. With respect to information flows, we find evidence consistent with an information-flows-related explanation of the day-of-the-week effect, particularly with the idea that macro announcements cause negative Monday returns.     

Investing in Bankrupt Firms

We examine the investment characteristics of firms electing to enter bankruptcy, between 1973 and 1982. Comparisons are made before and after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Our results indicate that the 1978 Act had no significant impact on bankruptcy decisions or resolutions for actively traded firms. Trading in bankrupt firms' securities is becoming more common, but no abnormal returns appear to be available. Systematic risk does not change significantly with the filing of bankruptcy, but there is a significant increase in return variance. The financial markets also react to various announcements of stages in the reorganization process.     

Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding firms: an Australian study

This study examines the importance of the self‐selection problem when evaluating returns to bidder firms around announcement events. Takeover announcements are not random because managers decide rationally whether to bid or not, which indicates announcements are timed; consequently, in the presence of the sample selection problem, standard ordinary least square estimates are biased. Using a conditional model, the results indicate that after controlling for the self‐selection bias effect, shareholders of bidder firms make normal returns. In sum, failing to account for sample selection bias may lead to erroneous conclusions about a bidder's true economic wealth effects around an announcement event.     

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN RETURN-GENERATING MODELS AROUND TENDER OFFERS: A NOTE

This note investigates the role of changes in the parameters of return-generating models in explaining the pattern of abnormal returns accruing to target and bidding firms around tender-offer announcements. Employing a varyingparameter modeling approach the study finds lower abnormal returns to target firms and increased abnormal returns to bidding firms, relative to standard approaches. However, use of this approach fails to refute the common findings that mean abnormal returns are large for target firms and negligible for bidding firms.     

The Impact of Illegal Business Practice on Shareholder Returns

Data regarding illegal firm behavior were obtained for the period 1980–1990. Using the single index market model, the study finds that public announcements of indictments for major corporate crimes have a significant and long-term negative impact upon shareholder wealth, particularly for firms found guilty of the indictment. The results indicate that indictments of larger firms have a proportionally smaller impact on excess returns. Furthermore, indictments handed down since the Levine/Boesky scandal appear to have had a more adverse impact.     

OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES: THE VALUE FROM BUYING SHARES AT A DISCOUNT

This article shows that share repurchase announcements create value for shareholders when the shares of the industrial firm sell at a discount from the value of the underlying assets, even when shareholders and managers share full information about the firm's prospects and the firm's operating performance is not expected to improve. The value created by capturing the discount on the repurchased shares is a function of only two variables: the percentage discount prior to the announcement and the proportion of shares to be repurchased.
For a sample of 100 companies selling below net asset value, the authors report that the excess stock returns surrounding their announcements of open market repurchases are (significantly) positively associated with the authors' estimates of the value captured from buying shares at a discount. Moreover, the stock market's response to repurchase announcements by companies that are selling at a discount is considerably more positive than to announcements by firms selling at a premium.     

Financial leverage and bargaining power with suppliers: Evidence from leveraged buyouts

This paper investigates whether leveraged buyouts (LBOs) increase the bargaining power of firms with their suppliers. We find that suppliers to LBO firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns at the announcements of downstream LBOs. We also find that suppliers who have likely made substantial relationship-specific investments are more negatively affected, both in terms of abnormal stock returns and reduced profit margins, than suppliers of commodity products or transitory suppliers. Interestingly, leveraged recapitalization announcements are not associated with negative returns to suppliers, suggesting that increased leverage without an accompanying change in organizational form does not, on average, lead to price concessions from suppliers.     

Payout policy in Brazil: Dividends versus interest on equity

We examine the impact of tax burden on cash distribution using a sample of Brazilian firms, which are allowed by law to distribute cash to shareholders in two forms: dividends and tax-advantaged interest on equity. The Brazilian institutional setting is superior to those used in prior studies that examine the choice between dividends and capital gains because, in some cases, dividends provide advantages that outweigh their negative tax consequences, leading firms to rationally choose payout policies that are not optimal when viewed only from the perspective of taxes. We find that taxes are a primary determinant of Brazilian firms’ payout policy decisions, as profitability and payout ratios (nonequity tax shields) are positively (negatively) related to the likelihood that a firm pays interest on equity. However, many firms continue to pay dividends despite the tax advantages of interest on equity payments. Abnormal returns around payout policy announcements suggest that these firms are, at least in part, catering to investor demand.     

It's Showtime: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meetings?

Annual shareholder meetings provide an opportunity for shareholders to express their concerns with corporate performance, pressuring managers to demonstrate good performance. We show that managers respond to the shareholder pressure by reporting positive corporate news before the annual shareholder meetings. Specifically, we find significantly positive average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the 40 days before the annual meeting date. The premeeting returns are significantly higher when shareholder discontent with managerial performance is likely to be stronger. The decile of companies with the worst past stock price performance exhibits average CARs of 3.4% and buy‐and‐hold returns of 7.0% during the 40‐day premeeting period. Companies with poor past performance exhibit even higher premeeting returns when shareholder pressure on management is greater, such as when institutional ownership is high, when CEO compensation is high, and when shareholders submit proxy proposals on corporate governance. We complement the evidence based on CARs by showing how managers of poorly performing firms manage the timing and content of earnings announcements and management forecast announcements before the annual shareholder meetings. Overall, the results suggest that managers attempt to influence shareholders before annual shareholder meetings through positive news.     

Returns to bidders and targets in the acquisition process: Evidence from the banking industry

This article examines the effects of acquisition announcements of publicly traded banks on stockholder wealth using event-study methodology and an updated and enlarged sample of such banking organizations. The findings imply that on average, acquisitions in the banking industry result in a wealth transfer from the shareholders of bidding firms to the shareholders of target firms, with no overall gain to the shareholders of the two firms combined. Of the characteristics examined, only capitalization of the target firm is found to distinguish between combinations with positive and negative combined wealth effects.     

Tunneling,propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong

We examine a sample of connected transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which firms are more likely to expropriate? Does the market anticipate the expropriation by firms? On average, firms announcing connected transactions earn significant negative excess returns, significantly lower than firms announcing similar arm's length transactions. We find limited evidence that firms undertaking connected transactions trade at discounted valuations prior to the expropriation, suggesting that investors cannot predict expropriation and revalue firms only when expropriation does occur.     

Corporate social responsibility and the wealth gains from dividend increases

This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) influences the stock price response to dividend increase announcements and changes in subsequent operating performance. We find that dividend increasing firms with lower CSR scores elicit higher abnormal announcement returns and greater improvements in industry‐adjusted operating performance. These findings support the argument in the literature that socially responsible firms are more transparent and commit to higher ethical standards than other firms, suggesting that they suffer fewer agency and informational problems (Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012). Consequently, larger dividend payouts reduce agency costs in firms with lower CSR commitments, thereby generating higher wealth gains for shareholders.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.