城际战略产业链与城市群发展战略

随着经济全球化、信息化、网络化的加速,打造城市群,已经成为许多国家或地方政府发展经济的主体战略.城市群的发展最终还是体现在城市群整体的产业发展,城际战略产业链是构筑城市群产业体系的关键,也是制订城市群发展战略的重要支点.文章探讨了城市群概念与城市群的竞争特征,分析了城市群产业分工发展新趋势,提出了构建的基本方略.     

STRATEGIC CANDIDACY AND SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS*

In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001 ) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters’ preferences. When voters’ preferences are single‐peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non‐dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m‐th peak from the left among the peaks of voters’ preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m‐th leftmost peak rules.     

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY WITH INTERNATIONALLY OWNED FIRMS*

The consequences of international firm ownership for strategic trade policy are examined both in a general and in a simple linear model of an international duopoly with two governments using production subsidies as policy instruments. At first sight, the case for strategic trade policy seems to be weakened, because international ownership reduces a government's incentive for rent-shifting. Closer inspection shows, however, that there are ownership structures leading to optimal policies which induce the duopolists to behave more collusively. This tends to resolve the conflict between national and international rationality in a policy game with retaliation and makes strategic trade policy look more attractive.     

我国海洋产业吸纳劳动力潜力研究

我国目前面临着巨大的就业压力,积极寻找新的就业增长点已成为政府、公众关注的热点之一。本文以海洋产业系统为研究样本,选取陆域产业为参照系,从发展速度、劳动生产率、比较劳动生产率、产业间的关联强度等多方面论证了海洋产业在吸纳劳动力方面所具有的独特优势。在优势分析的基础上,计算出海洋产业在吸纳劳动力方面对陆域产业的拉动效应,指出海洋产业已经成为了我国新的劳动力吸引磁场,大力发展海洋产业是解决我国就业问题的有效途径之一。我们研究的结论是：海洋产业增加值每提高—个百分点,将创造直接就业机会3．7万人,可相应为陆域创造4．7万人的间接就业机会。研究成果对制定海洋经济发展规划和国民经济总体发展规划有重要参考价值。     

江苏旅游经济结构调整战略构想

本文在总结近几年江苏旅游发展成绩的同时,分析了其存在的结构性矛盾。在此基础上,从旅游产品的开发、旅游配套设施建设、旅游市场开发等三个方面提出了江苏旅游结构调整的战略重点,并有针对性地提出了一些调整的政策措施。     

基于产业变化的江苏海洋经济发展战略思考

从江苏海洋产业发展现状出发,利用主成分分析法和集聚法对江苏海岸带产业进行了分类.研究发现,江苏海洋经济产业严重依赖第一产业,第二产业和第三产业严重滞后且熵度指数低,产业同构现象严重,港口、高新海洋产业制约了江苏海洋发展的速度,成为影响江苏海洋经济发展的深层矛盾和制约因素.探讨了江苏海洋经济发展战略的选择,提出了南北并进、江海联动,海陆互补、东进西联的海洋战略,突出港口核心作用,以"港口-工业区-海岸城市-沿海经济带"为发展主线的点轴发展思路.指出将港口业、海洋化工、海洋医药三大产业作为江苏海洋经济的主导产业.     

COST‐SAVING PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIC DELEGATION*

This work analyses a managerial delegation model in which firms choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the later. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost‐saving technology than the strict profit maximisation case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. If the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost‐saving technology is larger under strict profit maximisation (strategic delegation).     

ESTIMATES OF INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN JAPAN

In estimating intangible investment in Japan at the industry level, we find a high intangible investment/gross value added ratio in the information technology (IT) sector and negative growth rates in intangible capital in 13 industries over the decade from 2000. When we examine the impacts of intangible investment on total factor productivity growth, we find a significant and positive effect on total factor productivity growth in the market economy. In a revised estimation that considers intertemporal knowledge spillovers, the estimated rate of return on intangibles in the IT sector is quite high after the IT revolution. The results imply that intangible assets have been underinvested in the IT sector.     

THE SCOPE FOR COLLUSION AND COMPETITION IN A REGULATED VERTICALLY INTEGRATED INDUSTRY*

This paper investigates the competitive implications of input price controls in a partially regulated industry where a vertically integrated firm has exclusive control over an input with natural monopoly characteristics. Such industry structures are commonly encountered in activities such as telecommunications, railways, electricity and water supply. It is shown that in a Cournot game such input price controls are unambiguously benefical to consumers. However, it is further demonstrated that there exist circumstances in which these controls may make the non-integrated firm worse off. Thus if the objective of input price regulation is to protect the non-integrated firm, such controls may prove to be counterproductive.