Economic planning must be polycentric,not monocentric: Introduction to a symposium on Mises and Hayek on socialism and knowledge

The roaring (20-) 20s are a decade of anniversaries and milestones. 2020 was the 100th anniversary of Ludwig von Mises's seminal article “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” and the 75th anniversary of F.A. Hayek's seminal article “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” 2022 brought a series of significant anniversaries: the 100th anniversary of Mises's Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis as well as the 60th anniversary of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom, and Murray Rothbard's Man, Economy, and State. It was also the 20th anniversary of Vernon Smith's Nobel Prize. The works and milestones celebrating anniversaries in 2022 owe much to Mises's and Hayek's pathbreaking contributions. This paper summarizes and contextualizes Mises's and Hayek's arguments about socialism and knowledge and introduces a Southern Economic Journal symposium on the anniversaries of “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” and “The Use of Knowledge in Society.”     

Vent for Surplus: A Case of Mistaken Identity

Adam Smith's theory of the gains from trade has caused a great deal of controversy among economic theorists. Throughout much of his work Smith argues that markets efficiently allocate resources. Smith's treatment of the gains from trade, however, is considered inconsistent with his system of natural liberty. This paper offers a new interpretation of the vent-for-surplus model. It is argued that Smith's theory of trade should be considered as an extension of his domestic theory of markets and his theory of productive and unproductive labor. Once interpreted in this light, no inconsistency is found between Smith's theory of trade and his system of natural liberty.     

Adam Smith and Glasgow

Summary In spite of the links between Smith and Glasgow where he started his career as a scholar and lectured from 1751 till 1764, Glasgow barely dwelt on this connexion for a century and a half. Only since Scott's biography of Smith (1937) Glasgow has established a new tradition as authorative centre for Smith-research. The new WN-edition by Campbell and Skinner, part of a complete and definitive edition of Smith's Works represents this tradition in the jubilee year 1976. Baudet discusses its character and qualities. He motivates La. his supposition, published elsewhere, that the 1st edition consisted of 2000 copies.Adam Smith,An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith), Edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, Textual Editor W. B. Todd, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976. 2 Vols.     

BOOK REVIEWS

Book Review in this article: Development Economics: From the Poverty to the Wealth of Nations by Yujiro Hayami State and Community in Rural Resource Management: The Asian Experience edited by S. Hirashima and W. Gooneratne     

Conduct in narrativized trust games

We “narrativize” a basic extensive form trust game by placing participants in a story that contextualizes the interaction with an unforeseeable future. In our narrative experiment, participants consider each decision as a character, advancing the story with their choices for salient payoffs. Our interest is in understanding how participants apply Adam Smith's rules of beneficent and just conduct in our narrativized games with epistemic conditions of an unknown future, conditions which aren't possible in extensive form. We invite our readers to participate in the story of the results, making meaning as participants in a narrative that unfolds with their choices.     

Model Uncertainty,Political Learning,and Institutions: A Broader View on Mancur Olson's Theory of Institutional Sclerosis

In his Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson argues that politically stable countries suffer from declining growth rates caused by the growing influence of distributional coalitions that accumulate over time. The empirical literature supports the notion of a negative relationship between a country's duration of political stability and its growth rates but finds only weak support for a negative influence of distributional coalitions on growth. This paper sketches a simple model of party competition under model uncertainty, which may explain this mixed empirical picture. It shows that politically stable democracies are less well equipped to adjust to shifts in their economic environment than democracies with a shorter history of political stability. In a further step, the paper relates the major theme of this theory and Olson's theory to the more recent literature on institutions and growth. Directions for further research are discussed.     

The Rise and Decline of Mancur Olson's View of The Rise and Decline of Nations

The evolution of Mancur Olson's views regarding The Rise and Decline of Nations, the second of his three main books, is examined. It expands and extends to history and to the world the arguments presented in his earlier work, The Logic of Collective Action. Although Olson never abandons the idea that the accumulation of interest groups in a democratic society can lead to its economic stagnation, how this comes about and can be overcome changes somewhat by the time of his final book, Power and Prosperity, which focuses on the problems of transition economies and proper political governance. A sign of the greater complexity of his later views emerges in his analysis of the U.S. South, presented in his 1983 presidential address to the Southern Economic Association.     

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION/DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS AND INDONESIA

This study examines the industrialization performance of Indonesia through a comparative evaluation with other East Asian economies. While neighboring countries actively formulated international production/distribution networks, Indonesia fell behind in utilizing the benefits of globalizing corporate activities. International production/distribution networks are supported by new economic thought such as fragmentation, agglomeration, and theories about corporate firm; and a policy package of development strategies should be designed to utilize such opportunities. The design of Indonesia's development strategies and “institutions”, however, does not conform to the globalizing world because the presence of network‐forming foreign companies is not large enough to make them influential “actors”. This author argues that the traditional comparative advantage argument for Indonesia's economic development is possibly misleading. Rather, Indonesia must learn the experience of its neighboring countries and introduce foreign companies as new actors to break the old “structure”.     

Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers

This paper develops a noncooperative Nash model in which two siblings compete for their parents' financial transfers. Treating sibling rivalry as a “rent-seeking contest” and using a Tullock-Skaperdas contest success function, we derive the conditions under which more financial resources are transferred to the sibling with lower earnings. We find that parental transfers are compensatory and that the family as an institution serves as an “income equalizer.” Within a sequential game framework, we characterize the endogeneity of parental transfers and link it to parents' income, altruism, and children's supply of merit goods (e.g., parent-child companionship or child services). We show that merit goods are subject to a “moral hazard” problem from the parents' perspective.     

Eli Heckscher and natural monopoly: The nightmare that never came true

Abstract

In Eli F. Heckscher's conception of the world, what he called “distributary systems” (ledningssystem) played a dangerously crucial role. He used this term to denote the means of transport, communications and power transmission, that is, in substance those activities which are commonly termed natural monopolies. Until the 1920s he believed that these monopolies could be held in check by potential competition and technological change. During the 1930s and 1940s he feared that the state would seize control of the distributary systems and develop a power unparalleled in history. He was afraid that the state in fact would be able to strangle technological progress and so eliminate any change that might conceivably threaten its power. Heckscher's nightmare was one of total dictatorship and utter stagnation.     

Ranking Economics Journals,Economics Departments,and Economists Using Teaching-Focused Research Productivity

This paper constructs new rankings of economics journals, economics departments, and economists that employ a measure of teaching-focused research productivity, an area of growing importance in recent years. The ranking methodologies presented here use information from articles that were published from 1991 through the early part of 2005 within the Journal of Economic Literature's “economic education” classifications (A200-A290). The Journal of Economic Literature tops the list of journals, followed by the Review of Economics and Statistics and the American Economic Review. Among the top institutions are Vanderbilt University, Indiana University, and the University of Wisconsin. Others that rank high here, such as Oberlin College and Denison University, do not often fare as well using methodologies that evaluate more traditional types of economics research. Finally, among the economists we find that John Siegfried, William Becker, and Michael Watts are ranked above other economists.     

Moving the Conceptual Framework Forward: Accounting for Uncertainty

To meet the objectives of financial reporting in the IASB's Conceptual Framework, the “balance-sheet approach” embraced by the Framework is necessary but not sufficient. Critical, but largely overlooked, is the role of uncertainty, which we argue defines the role of accrual accounting as a distinctive source of information for investors when investment outcomes are uncertain. This role is in some sense paradoxical: on the one hand, uncertainty undermines both the balance sheet (because uncertain assets are unrecognized) and the income statement (because mismatching is unavoidable). However, these inevitable accounting effects can be exploited to provide information about uncertainty, though not by a balance-sheet approach alone. Rather, balance sheet recognition and measurement criteria are established by consideration of the impact of uncertainty on matching and mismatching in the income statement. This combination of balance-sheet and income-statement approaches enhances the communication of information to investors under conditions of uncertainty, thereby giving greater clarity and purpose in satisfying the objective of the Framework to provide information about “the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows.”     

Economics: The Sexy Social Science?

Michael Watts of Purdue University organized this symposium as a session at the 2002 Southern Economic Association Meetings in New Orleans. He invited five economists, who are specialists in economic education and other areas, to comment on William Becker's paper, “How to make economics the sexy social science.” which first appeared in the Chronicle of Higher Education (December 7, 2001). Their comments and Professor Becker's response appear below.     

A Re-Examination of Financial Analysts' Differential Earnings Forecast Accuracy*

Abstract. This research re-examines whether there are differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts through a comparison of their annual earnings per share forecasts. The comparison of analyst forecast accuracy is made on both an ex post (within sample) and an ex ante (out of sample) basis. Early examinations of this issue by Richards (1976), Brown and Rozeff (1980), O'Brien (1987), Coggin and Hunter (1989), O'Brien (1990), and Butler and Lang (1991) were ex post and suggest the absence of analysts who can provide relatively more accurate forecasts over multiple years. Contrary to the results of prior research and consistent with the belief in the popular press, we document that differences do exist in financial analysts' ex post forecast accuracy. We show that the previous studies failed to find differences in forecast accuracy due to inadequate (or no) control for differences in the recency of forecasts issued by the analysts. It has been well documented in the literature that forecast recency is positively related to forecast accuracy (Crichfield, Dyckman, and Lakonishok 1978; O'Brien 1988; Brown 1991). Thus, failure to control for forecast recency may reduce the power of tests, making it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no differences in forecast accuracy even if they do exist. In our analysis, we control for the differences in recency of analysts' forecasts using two different approaches. First, we use an estimated generalized least squares estimation procedure that captures the recency-induced effects in the residuals of the model. Second, we use a matched-pair design whereby we measure the relative forecast accuracy of an analyst by comparing his/her forecast error to the forecast error of another randomly selected analyst making forecasts for the same firm in the same year on or around the same date. Using both approaches, we find that differential forecast accuracy does exist amongst analysts, especially in samples with minimum forecast horizons of five and 60 trading days. We show that these differences are not attributable to differences in the forecast issuance frequency of the financial analysts. In sum, after controlling for firm, year, forecast recency, and forecast issuance frequency of individual analysts, the analyst effect persists. To validate our findings, we examine whether the differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts persist in holdout periods. Analysts were assigned a “superior” (“inferior”) status for a firm-year in the estimation sample using percentile rankings on the distribution of absolute forecast errors for that firm-year. We use estimation samples of one- to four-year duration, and consider two different definitions of analyst forecast superiority. Analysts were classified as firm-specific “superior” if they maintained a “superior” status in every year of the estimation sample. Furthermore, they were classified as industry-specific “superior” if they were deemed firm-specific “superior” with respect to at least two firms and firm-specific “inferior” with respect to no firm in that industry. Using either definition, we find that analysts classified as “superior” in estimation samples generally remain superior in holdout periods. In contrast, we find that analysts identified as “inferior” in estimation samples do not remain inferior in holdout periods. Our results suggest that some analysts' earnings forecasts should be weighted higher than others when formulating composite earnings expectations. This suggestion is predicated on the assumption that capital markets distinguish between analysts who are ex ante superior, and that they utilize this information when formulating stock prices. Our study provides an ex ante framework for identifying those analysts who appear to be superior. When constructing weighted forecasts, a one-year estimation period should be used because we obtain the strongest results of persistence in this case.     

SOME COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR RÄDEL'S “PROFIT MAXIMIZATION—CAN IT BE JUSTIFIED?”*

In the confrontation of the principle of acquisition with the principle of self-sufficiency, Professor Rädel's suggestive and penetrating paper condenses Werner Sombart's work on modern capitalism. As is well known, Sombart characterized the economic objective of medieval man, as one of meeting needs, and that of modern man as one of seeking profits. To quote Rädel: “The principle of self-sufficiency (‘Bedarfsdeckungsprinzip’), the characteristic basic objective of economic activity of the middle ages, is replaced by the principle of acquisition, as much as ‘traditionalism’ is replaced by ‘rationality’ as formal principles of economic operations. It is the essential characteristic of the principle of acquisition that the primary aim of economic activity is no longer the satisfaction of the requirements of man, which are relatively limited and personal in nature, but rather the acquisition of wealth represented by a sum of money, which is entirely unlimited and of a more impersonal anonymous nature.”¹ Rädel also mentions the linkage, drawn by Sombart, between the “development of the modern democratic state, modern technology and the discovery of new continents” and the growth of capitalism, together with the formation of a “spirit of wordliness… and of lust for power.”²     

Employee Movements from Audit Firms to Audit Clients

Regulators have expressed concerns about the “revolving door” between auditors and clients, whereby audit employees move directly from audit firms to audit clients (i.e., “direct alumni hires”). Regulators are concerned that these direct hires could compromise audit quality, partly because these employees could have previously audited their hiring company's financial statements. In contrast, we examine accounting and finance executives who move indirectly from audit firms to audit clients and who could not have previously audited the hiring company's financial statements (i.e., “indirect alumni hires”). We show that indirect hires occur more often than the direct hires that have concerned regulators. We predict and find that both direct and indirect alumni hires are associated with lower rates of executive turnover and audit firm turnover. However, there is no evidence that the reduced rates of executive turnover are explained by managerial entrenchment or that these hires are associated with lower audit quality. Overall, our findings suggest that direct and indirect employee movements from audit firms to audit clients are beneficial to executives, audit clients, and audit firms because they reduce the incidence of costly turnover.     

MANAGERIAL STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS GROUPS IN TAIWAN: THE INNER CIRCLE SYSTEM AND ITS SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

This paper examined the management structure of Taiwan's business groups. The objective was to determine how independent group firms coordinate their business. Employing longitudinal data of the top 100 groups, I investigated the “inner circle” system and its evolution. I found that group leaders occupied overlapped positions at the director rather than at the manager level, which implied a separation of strategic planning and routine administration. Secondly, the dynamics of inner circle management did not hinge upon the group president as in the Korean chaebol, nor on the norm of corporate community as in the Japanese keiretsu, but on the social ties in the inner circle. Analyzing the background of the leaders indicated that family never dominated the scene even in the early years, and their significance decreased along with environmental changes. The transition in Taiwan in the late 1980s motivated business groups to introduce more “outside” talent into decision‐making.     

Book Reviews

Radius Prawiro (1998), Indonesia's Struggle for Economic Development: Pragmatism in Action, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, pp. xxvi + 374.

Yujiro Hayami (1997), Development Economics: From the Poverty to the Wealth of nations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. xx + 316. A$160.00.     

Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity Cost When They See One? A Dismal Performance or an Arbitrary Concept?

2005 asked 199 professional economists a multiple‐choice question about opportunity cost. Given that only 21.6% answered “correctly,” they conclude that professional understanding of the concept is “dismal.” We challenge this critique of the profession. Specifically, we allow for alternative opportunity cost accounting methodologies—one of which is derived from the term's definition as found in Ferraro and Taylor— and rely on the conventional relationship between willingness to pay and substitute goods to demonstrate that every answer to the multiple‐choice question is defensible. The Ferraro and Taylor survey question suggests difficulties in framing an opportunity cost accounting question, as well as a lack of coordination in opportunity cost accounting methodology. In scope and logic, we conclude that the survey question does not, however, succeed in measuring professional understanding of opportunity cost. A discussion follows as to the concept's appropriate role in the classroom.