Choice of flexible production technologies under strategic delegation

This paper analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.     

State‐Owned Enterprises,Competition, and Disclosure

We develop a mixed‐duopoly model in which a private firm competes against a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) who cares about social welfare and is privately informed about market demand. When the SOE's social concerns are sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low, the SOE commits to fully disclose its private information. Otherwise, the SOE commits to withhold its private information. When the disclosure equilibrium prevails, the private firm can be more profitable competing against an SOE than against another private firm. In this mixed‐duopoly setting, the equilibrium social welfare is maximized when the SOE puts a positive weight on both social welfare and its own profit. Our analysis has further implications for both mandatory disclosure and market entry.     

Mixed duopoly,location choice,and shadow cost of public funds

We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare.     

Technology licensing in a vertically differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we develop a vertically differentiated duopoly model where a high-quality producer competes against a low-quality producer, a la Cournot competition. The high-quality firm has both a new technology and an obsolescent technology. After first deciding whether to license, the firm then chooses which of the two technologies to license. We show that, irrespective of the licensing contract, licensing the new technology is always superior to licensing the obsolescent technology. This finding poses a sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom.     

R&D Subsidies,Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.     

Spatial Cournot Competition among Multi-Plant Firms in a Circular City

We characterize equilibrium plant locations for a spatial multi-plant Cournot oligopoly in a circular city. Previous work demonstrates that for a two-plant duopoly, all four plants are equally spaced. We establish that the equilibrium location pattern is unique if there are two firms with an equal number of plants. In most other scenarios, multiple equilibria arise. Next, we endogenously determine both the number of plants per firm and plant locations for a duopoly. It is shown that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may not be unique, and for identical set-up costs, the firms may choose different numbers of plants.     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

Mixed oligopoly,endogenous timing and mergers

The present paper discusses endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly model, comprising one public firm and two private firms, assuming both a merger between the two private firms and between one private and one public firm. The paper proves that although a merger between the two private firms does not change the timing of the game, a merger between the public firm and the private firm into a mixed firm could change the market structure from Stackelberg to Cournot competition.     

Discriminatory Procurement Policy with Cash Limits

This paper presents a counterexample to the Miyagiwa ((1991) American Economic Review 81, 1320–1328) claim that discriminatory government procurement policy is ineffective as a protectionist device, when the goods are also consumed by the private sector. The procurement sector is a homogeneous product Cournot–Nash duopoly, with a home and a foreign firm. The procurement policy takes the form of an ad valorem premium over the import price. If both the firms play the output game in strategic complements, procurement policy can lower imports. This possibility arises when the product demand is unit elastic, corresponding to cash limits to public expenditure, and providing the home firm is smaller than the foreign firm. By adding a competitive export sector, the paper also derives sufficient conditions for macroeconomic coordination failures to occur.     

Investment in transport and communication technology in a Cournot duopoly with trade

We investigate the role of R&D investment in transport and communication (TCRD) in a Cournot duopoly with trade. We consider countries of different size and show that the firm located in the smaller country has a higher incentive to invest than the rival in the larger country. We also prove that social incentives are aligned with private ones. As for the terms of trade, any improvement of TC technology favours the smaller country, all else equal.     

组织学习对技术创新绩效的调节效应——基于江苏民营制造企业的实证研究

文章以201家江苏民营制造企业为研究样本,探讨组织学习对技术创新与企业绩效关系的调节效应.研究发现:(1)工艺创新和产品创新对企业绩效均有显著正向影响,而且工艺创新对企业绩效的影响强度要高于产品创新,表明江苏民营制造企业技术创新是以工艺创新为主导;(2)组织学习对工艺创新与企业绩效关系有显著正向调节效应,对产品创新与企业绩效关系的调节效应不显著,表明江苏民营制造企业的组织学习是以工艺创新为主要目的.研究发现为推进江苏创新驱动战略提供了指导,要实现从“江苏制造”向“江苏创造”转变,关键在于营造以实现产品创新为主要目的的组织学习氛围,走以产品创新为主导的技术创新之路.     

Do Market Pressures Induce Economic Efficiency? The Case of Slovenian Manufacturing, 1994–2001

Using a unique longitudinal data set on all manufacturing firms in Slovenia from 1994 to 2001, this article analyzes how firm efficiency changed in response to changing competitive pressures associated with the transition to market. Results show that the period was one of atypically rapid growth of total factor productivity (TFP). The rise in firm efficiency occurs across almost all industries and firm types: large or small, state or private, domestic or foreign owned. Changes in firm ownership type have no direct impact on firm efficiency. However, increased market competition related to rising market share of private firms, new market entrants, foreign‐owned firms, and international trade raises TFP across all firms in an industry, whether private or state owned. In addition, competitive pressures that sort out inefficient firms of all types and retain the most efficient, coupled with the entry of new private firms that are at least as efficient as surviving firms, prove to be the major source of TFP gains. Results strongly confirm that market competition fosters efficiency.     

Impact of the Information Asymmetry Between Managers and Owners Under Oligopoly

We show, using a Hotelling (1929) model with Laffont and Tirole (1986) firms, that under duopoly, the information asymmetry caused by the separation of ownership and control has two effects on owners’ incentives to induce effort. Information asymmetry raises the marginal cost of inducing effort, which decreases efforts and increases prices. Since all firms’ prices increase, this leads to a change in the expected demand of each firm, and thus in the marginal benefit of inducing effort, which may amplify or mitigate the initial impact. As a consequence, information asymmetry may induce some firms to increase efforts and lower prices. More surprisingly, it may increase both ex post and ex ante social welfare.     

Quality and Quantity Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly

This article proposes a Cournot model of two‐stage competition to examine the patterns of vertical product differentiation in a multiproduct duopoly. Firms simultaneously choose the number of products and their qualities at the first stage and compete in quantities at the second stage. We show that when the fixed setup cost of a product is high enough to result in a monopoly outcome, the monopolist always sells a single product. Moreover, in any equilibrium of a multiproduct duopoly, quality differentiation between them will develop into a nonsegmented pattern because each firm desires to avoid a strong effect of cannibalization. The set of equilibria reveals the properties of quality differentiation between multiproduct firms. In a multiproduct duopoly, the profit from a high‐quality product can be lower than that from a low‐quality product. This finding sharply contrasts with the literature on single‐product firms, which finds the high‐quality advantage.     

IPO relative difficulty,M&A option and size effect

Size effect in the Chinese stock market is huge from 2012 to 2017. We empirically identify a driving force behind the effect: M&A option caused by IPO and M&A policies changes. We show that the M&A frequency increases and the acquirers' market value deceases as the IPO relative difficulty rises, small firm premium is positively related to both IPO relative difficulty and M&A frequency, and among the listed firms that have stronger tendency to merge or acquire a private firm, size effect is significantly larger. These results hold when controlling reverse merger probability. In sum, we reveal a new mechanism: Compared with a large public firm, a small one is more likely to acquire a private firm with discount since both the acquired and the acquirer benefit more, so the stock price of a small firm contains a larger part of M&A option. This option value increases as IPO relative difficulty rises.     

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and Exit Strategies of Private Firms

The costs and benefits of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) have been oft‐debated since the inception of the Act. Much of the extant literature has assessed the costs and benefits of SOX to publicly traded companies. We focus on the costs of SOX compliance for private firms wanting to exit the private market via either an acquisition by a public firm or an IPO. Consistent with our predictions we establish two principal findings. First, SOX appears to have shifted the preferences of private firms from going public to exiting the private market via acquisition by a public acquirer. Second, private target deal multiples are increasing in variables that proxy for a private target's level of pre‐acquisition SOX compliance. These findings suggest that SOX‐related costs have both restricted the action space of possible exit strategies for private firms and led to lower deal multiples for those private acquisition targets that are less likely to be SOX compliant prior to acquisition.     

Consumer discrimination,duopoly, and black firm entry: The welfare effect of subsidies

Consumer discrimination, to the extent that it lowers expected profit for black owned firms, discourages the entry of new black firms. From a social welfare perspective, consumer discrimination may be welfare reducing, since market output is lower than otherwise. If so, a policy intervention that subsidizes new black firms may improve social welfare. This article presents a simple model of duopoly where consumer discrimination exists with uncertainty, and the only cost of production is a “loss of sales” cost. Given the Nash equilibrium, in which a black and white firm must select a price to charge, conditions are derived for which a profit subsidy to a new black firm increases, decreases, or has no effect on social welfare.     

Sharing the Market or Getting Closer for a Fight? Strategic Reaction to Reduced Trade Costs

Electronic coordination links markets that have initially been separated by transport costs, which in turn raises competitive pressure and affects incentives to differentiate products. We analyze private and social incentives to invest in a repositioning of products in a heterogeneous goods duopoly with two spatially separated markets. We consider both price and quantity competition to be able to distinguish between digital and physical products, respectively. For low transport costs, firms want to enhance product differentiation as expected. However, if transport costs remain close to prohibitive levels, they have an incentive to reduce heterogeneity.     

An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases.     

Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market

In this article, we present a two‐period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross‐price elasticity of demand between the products sold in both markets, it limits its quantity supplied in the monopoly market in order to make its rival in the other market believe that entry into the monopolized market is unprofitable. As a result of this strategy, the average prices observed in both markets increase. This result suggests that the detrimental effects of entry deterrence on consumers' welfare are stronger than those predicted by previous literature.