Examining Agency Conflict in Horse Racing

We study UK horse racing for signs of conflict between horse owners (principals) and trainers (agents). Trainers often prepare their own horses for races in addition to having outsiders' horses in their care. Utilizing betting market data to infer the expected performance of a horse, we find that owner–trainer horses outperform outsider–trainer horses, indicating that this principal–agent relationship is characterized by agent shirking. If the owner holds a large proportion of the horses in the trainer's stable, the shirking effect may be mitigated but not eradicated. In a separate result, we find that outsider–trainer horses are more inconsistent than their owner–trainer peers. As inconsistency is a sign of betting market manipulation, this suggests that the agent in this setting extracts a second, informational rent from the principal.     

Adverse Selection,Seller Effort,and Selection Bias

Several studies (Genesove 1993; Chezum and Wimmer 1997) use evidence of a correlation between seller characteristics and prices as evidence of adverse selection. This approach ignores the effect seller effort might have on the quality of goods sold. We develop a theoretical framework that accounts for both adverse selection and seller effort and provide a set of conditions under which sellers, who more likely adversely select the goods they sell, produce higher quality goods. Empirically, adverse selection emerges as a special case of selection bias. To disentangle the effects of adverse selection from seller effort, we employ a unique data set that allows us to model the selection decision explicitly. The evidence suggests that both adverse selection and hidden effort play important roles in the market for thoroughbred racehorse prospects.     

Injury Investigations in Antidumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation

Empirical evidence shows that in injury investigations in antidumping cases conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, the probability of a positive finding is higher when the number of defendant firms is larger, holding constant their total market share. In the paper we offer a theoretical explanation of this finding. We show that the presence of many exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem, which leads every firm to invest less on defense. Thus for the same market share, injury finding is more likely to be positive for many small sellers than a few large sellers. JEL no. F13, L13     

The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.     

The market for corporate subsidiaries in Japan: An empirical study of trades among listed firms

We investigate trades of wholly- or partially-owned subsidiaries between firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) for the years 1996–2010, to explore the economic impact in terms of strategic refocusing, stock market valuation and performance effects. By pairing both sides to each deal, we show differences in firm characteristics, returns, and subsequent performance of buying and selling firms. Unlike mergers between whole firms, most subsidiary deals straddled different industries. Most sellers were larger, more diversified and less profitable than buyers. Our event study reveals that abnormal returns were positive for buyers yet insignificantly different from zero for sellers. However, subsidiary sales in the core business earned negative returns, the more so the larger the deal. An analysis of ex-post operating results shows that the performance of sellers often declined after the trade, in particular for firms that divested a core-related subsidiary. We conclude that subsidiary trades in Japan in this period contributed importantly to strategic repositioning and a more efficient use of corporate assets.     

Market Interaction and Pro-Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

When actions generate negative externalities for third parties, incentives exist to pass these “morally costly” decisions to others. In laboratory experiments, we investigate how market interaction affects allocations when the right to divide a sum of money between oneself and a passive recipient is commoditized. Allocation to recipients is reduced by more than half when determined by subjects who purchase or keep the right to make the division as compared to a control where subjects are directly assigned the right. Sellers report accurate beliefs about recipient allocations and do not report feeling less responsible the more often they sell the allocation right. The market allocates the right to make divisions more frequently to buyers who allocate more to recipients, but sellers who allocate less to recipients tend to sell less often. Selection cannot solely explain the results, suggesting market interaction itself may directly impact behavior.     

Product quality, lender liability, and consumer credit

Under ‘linked credit’ (also known as ‘connectedlending’), the buyer obtains a loan from a lender withthe specific purpose of purchasing a certain product. Creditis arranged directly by the seller, who acts as an intermediaryfor the finance company. Within this form of financing, thelender often accepts a measure of liability for defective products.We show that ‘connected-lender liability’ can workas a signalling device for the reliability of sellers, so asto alleviate the market failure that arises when sellers arebetter informed than consumers about the quality of their products.     

Costly Buyer Search in a Differentiated Products Model: An Experimental Study

This study examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affects seller market power. We construct laboratory markets with differentiated goods and costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. The experiment varies the information on price or product characteristics that buyers learn under different timing assumptions (pre‐ and postsearch), generating four information treatments. Theory predicts that price information lowers the equilibrium price, but information about product characteristics increases the equilibrium price. That is, contrary to intuition, the presence of informed buyers may impart a negative externality on other uninformed buyers. Data support the model's negative externality result when sellers face a large number of robot buyers that are programmed to search optimally. Observed prices conform to the model's comparative statics and are broadly consistent with predicted levels. With human buyers, however, excessive search instigates increased price competition, and sellers post prices that are significantly lower than predicted.     

Assessing Bettors' Ability to Process Dynamic Information: Policy Implications

Regulation is often employed to encourage the provision of readily interpretable, explicit information to betting markets in an effort to promote their efficiency. This approach is supported by a considerable volume of laboratory‐based research which suggests that individuals make poor judgments in the face of implicit, dynamic information. This article investigates to what extent horserace bettors, who have strong incentives to make good probability judgments, require the regulator's protection from such hostile information environments. In particular, we examine the accuracy of the subjective probabilities of bettors concerning 16,344 horses in 1671 races. We find that bettors are skilled in adopting effective heuristics to simplify their dynamic information environment and, even in the face of restricted information, develop well‐calibrated judgments using outcome feedback. A number of factors that help bettors to achieve good calibration are identified and the implications for market regulation are discussed.     

An experimental investigation of bilateral oligopoly in emissions trading markets

Market power in emissions trading has been extensively investigated because emerging markets for tradable emissions permits, such as the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), can be dominated by relatively few large sellers or buyers. Previous studies on market power in emissions trading have assumed the existence of a subset of competitive players. However, a key feature of emissions trading markets is that emissions permits are often traded by a small number of large sellers and buyers. Using a laboratory experiment, our objective in this paper is to test the performance of an emissions trading market utilizing a double auction in a bilateral oligopoly. Our results suggest that the theoretical bilateral oligopoly models can better describe market outcomes of emissions trading. The effects of the slope of the marginal abatement cost function on market power in laboratory experiments are found to be consistent with those predicted by the theoretical bilateral oligopoly model. How market power is exercised depends on the curvature of the abatement cost function. If the marginal abatement cost function of buyers (sellers) is less steep than that of sellers (buyers), the price of permits is lower (higher) than that under perfect competition. This is because the market power of buyers (sellers) exceeds that of sellers (buyers). The price of permits is close to the perfect competitive price when all traders have the sameslope of the marginal abatement cost function.     

Real financial market exchange rate volatility and portfolio flows

This paper studies the relationship between real financial market exchange rate volatility and US cross-border equity flows. We found strong evidence that causality goes from real financial market exchange rate volatility to equity flows. According to our results, real financial market exchange rate volatility negatively influences purchases of foreign equity. This finding is in line with the portfolio optimization theory. The impact of real financial market exchange rate volatility on sales of foreign equity is also negative. This result can be explained by the theory of behavioral finance which states that investors are reluctant to realize losses of their portfolios. This is why investors decrease sales of assets when riskiness of the assets increases. The impact of real financial market exchange rate on net purchases of foreign equity is positive. It follows from these results that sales of foreign equity decrease more strongly than purchases of foreign equity when riskiness of foreign assets increases.     

Expert Analysis and Insider Information in Horse Race Betting: Regulating Informed Market Behavior

We present a new model analyzing the effect of uncertainty faced by bookmakers. It is shown that bettors with inside information or expert analysis decrease the odds set by profit‐maximizing bookmakers. Data on previously unraced 2‐year‐old horses and those that have raced previously are used to examine the impact of the greater possibility of insider information on odds bias in relation to unraced horses. The probability of an unraced 2‐year‐old winning is found to be on average 16% higher than that of a raced 2‐year‐old horse with the same odds. This effect decreases as the probability of winning increases. The latter effect indicates a possible contribution to the favorite‐longshot bias, and the former shows the importance of insider information in the setting of market odds. The regulation of the use of insider information is discussed in light of the similar impact of insider information and expert analysis on bookmaker odds.     

Squeezing the bears: cornering risk and limits on arbitrage during the ‘British bicycle mania’, 1896–8

This article examines the extent to which Victorian investors were short‐sale constrained. While previous research suggests that there were relatively few limits on arbitrage, this article argues that short‐sales of stocks outside the Official List were indirectly constrained by the risk of being cornered. Evidence for this hypothesis comes from three corners in cycle company shares which occurred in 1896–7, two of which resulted in substantial losses for short‐sellers. Legal efforts to retrieve funds lost in a corner were unsuccessful, and the court proceedings reveal a widespread contempt for short‐sellers, or ‘bears’, among the general public. Consistent with the hypothesis that these episodes affected the market, this study's findings show that cycle companies for which cornering risk was greater experienced disproportionately lower returns during a subsequent crash in the market for cycle shares. This evidence suggests that, under certain circumstances, short‐selling shares in Britain prior to 1900 could have been much riskier than previously thought.     

When Is the Client King? Evidence from Affiliated-Analyst Recommendations in China's Split-Share Reform

China's split-share reform of 2005 (the Reform) converts the previously restricted shares held by founding shareholders to shares tradable on the open market. Against this backdrop, we study how underwriter-affiliated analysts and firms' large shareholders interact in the event of the latter's sales of restricted shares. We document that recommendations made by affiliated analysts are significantly more optimistic when firms' large shareholders plan to sell their restricted shares. This optimism, however, is associated with negative post-sale stock returns, suggesting large shareholders profit from share sales. Furthermore, large shareholders sell more restricted shares through the affiliated brokerages for which analysts have issued more optimistic recommendations and firms under their control are more likely to appoint such brokerages as lead underwriters when they refinance in the future. The affiliated analysts also conduct more site visits to the firms after the share sales, thereby improving their earnings-forecast accuracy. Our analysis shows how conflicts of interest by financial intermediaries arise following the Reform and lead to large shareholders' extraction of rents from public investors.     

Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets

In theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of the side of the market on which it is levied. This principle of liability-side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax payments. We use computerized experimental posted-offer markets to test liability-side equivalence. We find that market outcomes are essentially the same when the tax is levied on sellers as when it is levied on buyers. Thus, we cannot reject liability-side equivalence.     

Safety at the Racetrack: Results of Restrictor Plates in Superspeedway Competition

In 1988, in an effort to reduce risks at auto races, the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) implemented a provision requiring the installation of carburetor restrictor plates at its higher speed events. Restrictor plates make a car's engine less effective, thereby slowing the field. Many NASCAR drivers and fans alike question whether the reduction in speed has led to increased safety. This article investigates the empirical determinants of racetrack safety, paying particular attention to the results of restrictor-plate racing on driver safety. We conclude that whereas restrictor-plate races are characterized by more cars being wrecked, there is no systematic evidence that they have led to more driver injuries.     

Effect of COVID-19 lockdowns on city-center and suburban housing markets: Evidence from Hangzhou,China

In 2020, governments worldwide enforced lockdowns to contain the spread of COVID-19, severely impeding aspects of daily life such as work, school, and tourism. Consequently, numerous economic activities were affected. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, city-center housing markets in areas surrounding popular tourist attractions performed better than did suburban housing markets because of the output of the tourism industry. This study examines the changes in the performance of city-center and suburban housing markets in regions with popular tourist attractions after the lockdown. Specifically, the dynamics of city-center and suburban housing markets in Hangzhou, where West Lake is located, and the changes in the information transfer between these housing markets after the lockdown are explored. Transaction data from January 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020 are used to perform analysis, in which adjusted housing prices and asking prices are employed to measure market performance and sellers’ pricing strategies, and transaction volume and time on the market are used to measure market liquidity and transaction frequency. The results reveal that the effects of lockdowns differ between city-center and suburban housing markets. After the lockdown, a substantial structural change is observed in the suburban housing market; the volatility risk of housing prices decreases substantially, causing an increase in transaction premiums. Housing prices and transaction volume increase in the city-center housing market after the lockdown; this is possibly because of the influence from the overall housing market booms. In addition, because sellers raise their asking prices and the transaction time is extended, the sellers in the city-center housing market are particularly influenced by the disposition effect. This leads to a reversal in the lead–lag relationship between the city center and suburban housing markets in terms of informativeness. Specifically, before the lockdown, the city-center market transfers information to the suburban market, but after the lockdown, the suburban market transfers information to the city-center market. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world in many aspects; this paper finds that it will also change the development pattern of the real estate market in different locations.     

An Empirical Examination of the Parimutuel Sports Lottery Market versus the Bookmaker Market

A sports lottery in Korea presents a unique opportunity for comparing a parimutuel‐type sports lottery market against a bookmaker market outside the realm of horse racing. Using two‐ and three‐game soccer final‐score betting in the sports lottery market in Korea, which features matches in the English Premier League, we compare winning payoffs in this parimutuel‐type sports lottery against corresponding payoffs from an established bookmaker market in the United Kingdom. We find that for outcomes with relatively high payouts (that is, lower‐probability events), winning bets placed in the sports lottery market have greater payoffs than corresponding bets placed in the bookmaker‐based market. However, the opposite is true for outcomes with relatively low payouts (that is, higher‐probability events). Results suggest that participants in the sports lottery market tend to bet more toward high‐probability events than the amount implied by the bookmaker's odds. Results also suggest that the favorite‐longshot bias is still present in the bookmaker market, even when there is less threat of privately informed bettors than in horse racing.     

Illustrating Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets with a Classroom Game

This paper describes a classroom game that illustrates the effects of asymmetric information and adverse selection in health insurance markets. The first part of this game simulates a market in which buyers can purchase insurance from sellers; in some periods, government regulation prevents sellers from using information about buyer type to determine premiums. The results demonstrate the classic prediction that asymmetric information will result in adverse selection. Here, low-risk buyers will forego the purchase of insurance at a measurable loss of potential earnings. In the second part of the game, sellers and buyers can trade two different types of health insurance policies, one moderate and another generous. Under government-mandated community rating and limits on premium increases, no buyers will purchase the generous plan. Questions are provided to stimulate discussion of the causes and consequences of adverse selection for consumers and insurers and possible solutions for employer- and government-sponsored programs.     

Impact of Competition and Taxes on Responsibility Center Organization and Transfer Prices*

We show that a firm can use its decentralized organizational structure and transfer price as commitment devices to obtain strategic advantage in the product market only when there are nonstrategic reasons to decentralize and to distort transfer prices away from marginal costs, such as the sales office's local knowledge about market conditions and the presence of tax rate differentials across the two tax jurisdictions. Surprisingly, an increase in the sales office's tax rates may help a firm increase overall profits. An increase in the sales office's tax rates causes the firm to increase its transfer price, which in turn dampens the sales office's competition and may more than offset the effect of increased tax rates on the firm's overall profits.