An empirical analysis of contracting by Chinese firms

Why do firms use formal contracts or relational contracts with their business partners? The paper uses survey data based on a large number of Chinese firms to uncover some important factors for why and when formal contracts or relational contracts are used. This study identifies geographical location as an important factor in affecting Chinese firms' contracting decisions. We find that a firm is more likely to use formal contracts with its clients and suppliers if they are located in a city different from the firm's main business location. We also find that larger (smaller) firms tend to adopt formal (relational) contracts. However, while the number of clients has a negative impact on a firm's adoption of formal contracts with its clients, the number of suppliers has a positive impact on its adoption of formal contracts with the suppliers.     

Why Do Large Firms' Prices Anticipate Earnings Earlier than Small Firms' Prices?*

This paper presents evidence that the positive association between firm size and price leads of earnings is not solely a function of private search incentives for firm‐specific information. Specifically, we find that small‐firm prices also lag large‐firm prices with respect to industry‐wide information. Our empirical analysis extends Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn 1987 and Freeman 1987, who document that security‐price leads of earnings are positively associated with market capitalization. In particular, we examine the association between firm size and the timing of security returns for two components of annual earnings changes: the average change for a firm's industry and the firm's idiosyncratic change. We find that large firms' prices have a longer lead than small firms' prices with respect to both components. Large firms' early lead on industry‐wide earnings suggests that returns of large firms predict returns of same‐industry small firms. To test this implication, we construct a portfolio of long (short) positions in small firms when the prior month's returns of large firms in their industry are above (below) average for large firms in other industries. This zero investment portfolio earns 4.5 percent over 12 months.     

The Effects of Incentive Scheme and Task Difficulty on Employees' Altruistic Behavior Outside the Firm

Employer-sponsored opportunities for altruism outside the workplace can improve employee engagement and passion within the firm, enhance the firm's corporate visibility, and improve its recruitment. There is limited understanding of whether and how a firm's management control system on employees' daily tasks can influence employee willingness to engage in altruism outside the workplace. In this study, we investigate via an experiment how the incentive scheme (tournament vs. piece rate) on employees' daily tasks interacts with the difficulty level of these tasks (low vs. high) to affect employees' altruistic behavior outside the firm. Our results indicate that, compared to a piece-rate scheme, a tournament scheme leads to a greater decrease in non-winning participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm when the original, incentivized task is more difficult compared to when it is less difficult. Consistent with our theory, participants' feelings of excessive entitlement partially mediate the interaction effect of incentive scheme and task difficulty on participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm. This study informs firms about how the design of its incentive scheme on employees' daily task inside the firm and the nature of that task can influence employee willingness to act altruistically outside the firm.     

The minimum wage and the financialization of firms: Evidence from China

This paper utilizes China's A-listed firm data to investigate whether increasing the minimum wage promotes the financialization of firms. We apply instrumental variable estimation and various robustness tests to address measurement errors and potential endogeneity. We find robust and consistent evidence that exposure to higher minimum wages increases a firm's investment in financial assets. Furthermore, we explore the effects of moderators, such as increased employment stickiness, intensification of financial constraints, and reduced innovation activities as potential explanations for the positive effect of increasing minimum wages. Moreover, firms located in non-coastal cities with relatively higher equity concentration and lower market competition are substantially more incentivized to increase investment in financial assets. Overall, this paper provides new insights into understanding the effects of increasing labor costs on firms' asset allocation in emerging market economies.     

Strategic Intrafirm Innovation Adoption and Diffusion

A theory of oligopolistic innovation adoption is developed in which intrafirm diffusions occur because the marginal cost of adoption is increasing in the rate of adoption. The equilibrium intrafirm diffusion curve is S-shaped or concave, as are empirically observed ones. This diffusion curve is more likely to be S-shaped the more competitive the industry, the larger the marginal cost of adoption or the pre-innovation unit cost of production, or the smaller the demand. The diffusion is longer, and so the extent of adoption at any date is lower the more competitive the industry, the larger the marginal cost of adoption or the pre-innovation unit cost of production, or the smaller the demand. A surprising result is that an increase in the unit cost reduction from the innovation has an ambiguous effect on diffusion. Obviously, a larger cost reduction allows each firm to earn a larger flow profit at every date from the same rate of adoption. However, a more subtle effect is that it also allows the firm to earn the same flow of profit with a slower rate of adoption, and so lower adoption costs. That is, the firms also have an incentive to spread out the diffusion over a longer period of time to save on adoption costs.     

Spillover Effects of Internal Control Weakness Disclosures: The Role of Audit Committees and Board Connections

We find that firms are less likely to report an internal control material weakness (as mandated by the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act) in a given year if one of their audit committee members is concurrently on the board of a firm that disclosed a material weakness within the prior three years. We find a similar spillover effect for financial restatement disclosures. The spillover from material weakness disclosures is evident only if a shared director has more experience with the disclosing firm or can channel more information about the disclosed material weakness. Our findings suggest that prior director experiences outside the firm influence the work of audit committees inside the firm. One rationale is that a director's prior experience with an adverse disclosure helps diffuse important insights and serves as a catalyst for improvements in a firm's internal control and financial reporting practices. An alternative explanation, which we cannot dismiss, holds that a director's prior experience helps a firm to underreport material weaknesses and financial restatements without any attendant improvements in the underlying practices.     

Closure within multi-plant firms: evidence from Japan

In the literature there is substantial evidence that a plant is more likely to be closed down if it is owned by a firm with other plants or is owned by a multinational enterprise (MNE). But does ownership or multi-plant status matter for which plants are closed? Using Japanese data we study plant closure by multi-plant MNEs and non-MNEs. We show that both organisational forms raise the probability of plant exit and that plants that are relatively small and capital unintensive relative to the rest of the firm are significantly more likely to exit.     

The Impact of Regulation on Technical Change

This paper examines the impact of regulation on a firm's choice of innovations and on the rate of technical change. Using a 1977-1987 panel of 20 U.S. interstate natural gas pipeline companies, I find that regulation led firms to adopt a technology that augmented (i) noncapital more than capital and (ii) noncapital more than the technology the standard (unregulated) firm would have adopted. I also find that, while technical regress occurred over the sample period, regulation led to a small decline in the rate of technical change and a small increase in production cost on average.     

Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm‐level Evidence

Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1964–2007, we find that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crashes. This finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and is robust to controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm‐fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that conditional conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news from investors, which, in turn, reduces stock price crash risk.     

Process and product R&D by a multiproduct monopolist

It is shown that the claim in Lambertini that a multiproductmonopolist's incentive for process R&D declines with thenumber of products it offers is incorrect. This incentive isin fact an increasing function of the number of products inhis model. I further extend the model of Lambertini to showthat whether or not process R&D incentive and the numberof varieties are positively related depends on the degree ofscope economies in process R&D. Product innovation promotesprocess R&D if the degree of such scope economies is high(as in Lambertini), and discourages it if the degree of scopeeconomies is low.     

Auditor Liability and Business Investment*

We model a firm's investment decision, an auditor's effort‐rendering behavior, audit fees, and prices of the firms under two auditor liability rules: strict liability and negligence liability. We show that an auditor's effort level is socially optimal under strict liability, while it is not generally so under negligence liability. Furthermore, both the firm owner's expected benefit and the audit fee are higher under strict liability than under negligence liability. We define the legal error under negligence liability as the difference between the assessed audit effort (that is, the estimate of audit effort made by the court) and the actual audit effort and prove that the greater the variance of the legal error, the more incentive an auditor has to exert effort under negligence liability compared with strict liability. Finally, the number of investments being undertaken could be higher under strict liability because more firm owners are willing to hire auditors to go public.     

Designing Internal Controls: The Interaction between Efficiency Wages and Monitoring*

Abstract. I examine how an internal auditor, called the firm, designs a control system for a strategic employee who conditions his thefts on the amount and types of controls. Society sets minimum testing amounts and fines for detected theft, whereas the firm determines the employee's wages and the amount of monitoring above the minimum. The results fall into three separate cases. When society's minimum testing standards and fines are sufficiently high, the employee never steals in any period. In this case, the firm performs the minimum amount of testing and pays the lowest feasible wage. In the remaining two cases, the testing standard and fines are too low to prevent theft by themselves. In these two cases the firm's control system determines whether there will be theft in the first period. I show that if the firm chooses to prevent all first-period theft, then it uses only one type of control. She offers a wage premium and monitors the minimum amount. The wage premium substitutes for a tine large enough to prevent all theft. If the firm designs controls that do not prevent all theft, then the firm also uses only one control. In contrast to the no-theft case, the firm pays the lowest feasible wage and monitors above the minimum. This choice reflects the increasing returns to scale of monitoring in preventing theft.     

风险感知、认知偏差与激励合约的分选决策

基于行为经济学视角,通过现场实验观察了具有异质性偏好的代理人对不同激励合约的选择决策,旨在探讨风险感知、认知偏差与激励合约选择决策的关系.研究发现,在具有相同激励强度的两种可变激励合约下,个体生产力水平并没有显著差异,影响激励合约选择决策的重要因素是对风险的感知,激励合约用于调节不同主体间的主观感知风险配置.结果显示,感知自己是高生产力的代理人倾向于避免与搭便车者合作而带来的损失,而感知自己是低能力的代理人则倾向于选择与高能力者合作的激励合约而增加个体收益;而无论是高能力者还是低能力者,当面对环境的不确定性对收益的巨大扰动时,都不约而同的选择了团队激励合约,这种对合作的偏好会随着扰动的增大而增强.同时,实验进一步证明了,人们对搭便车风险的主观感知与真实的搭便车风险之间存在一定的认知偏差,且该对个人生产力抱持乐观态度的代理人更倾向于选择个体计件激励合约.当企业因面对绩效工具的准确性不高,或绩效结果不确定性较大而不得不采用团队计件时,可以通过调节认知偏差的方式来改变代理人的主观预期,从而强化激励合约的自选择.     

Impact of Competition and Taxes on Responsibility Center Organization and Transfer Prices*

We show that a firm can use its decentralized organizational structure and transfer price as commitment devices to obtain strategic advantage in the product market only when there are nonstrategic reasons to decentralize and to distort transfer prices away from marginal costs, such as the sales office's local knowledge about market conditions and the presence of tax rate differentials across the two tax jurisdictions. Surprisingly, an increase in the sales office's tax rates may help a firm increase overall profits. An increase in the sales office's tax rates causes the firm to increase its transfer price, which in turn dampens the sales office's competition and may more than offset the effect of increased tax rates on the firm's overall profits.     

The impact of technology identification policy on firm innovation: Evidence from China

Using firm-level data of companies listed on China's A-share market from 2006 to 2017, this research applies a difference-in-differences (DID) empirical method to test whether the state policy in China used for identifying firms as being “high-tech” enhances their innovative capabilities. This paper presents three main findings. First, multiple robustness tests confirm that the state technology identification policy does improve the total number of patent applications as well as the number of patent invention applications. Second, government subsidy is an important channel through which this policy affects a firm's innovation capabilities. Third, this policy has a more prominent and positive influence on the innovation capabilities of firms located in regions where there exist a higher rate of taxation in addition and relatively more developed products and factor markets. Fourth, we conduct a flexible back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis to demonstrate that the high-tech firm identification policy does improve the overall level of social welfare. The empirical results of this paper have far-reaching implications for China's innovation policies.     

How does outward foreign direct investment enhance firm productivity? A heterogeneous empirical analysis from Chinese manufacturing

Using an original linked firm-level panel data from Chinese manufacturing firms over the period 2002–2007, this paper examines how outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) led productivity increase of parent firms (known as the own-firm effect) changes over firm heterogeneity. Conducting propensity score matching (PSM) techniques and differences-in-differences (DID) analysis, we find strong and robust evidence that the first OFDI promotes parent firm's productivity and this effect varies substantially with the firms' characteristics. In particular, firm's absorptive capacity is essential for the own-firm effect, and the absorptive capacity related with the product innovation is more important than that of the process innovation for the own-firm effect. Also, OFDI strategies for obtaining advanced technology and investing in developed countries significantly strengthen the own-firm effect, whereas, government supports have no significant impacts on the own-firm effect.     

Express Yourself: Why Managers' Disclosure Tone Varies Across Time and What Investors Learn from It

We argue that volatility in a manager's disclosure tone across time should be a function of two components: (i) the firm's innate operating risk and (ii) the extent to which the manager's disclosure transparently reflects that risk. Consistent with this argument, we find that both operating risk and disclosure transparency are important determinants of disclosure tone volatility. We then examine whether investors incorporate the incremental information provided by disclosure tone volatility into their assessments of firm risk. If disclosure tone volatility primarily provides investors with incremental information about a firm's operating risk, we should find a positive association between tone volatility and market-based assessments of risk. On the other hand, if disclosure tone volatility primarily provides investors with incremental information about a manager's disclosure transparency, we should find a negative association between tone volatility and market-based assessments of risk. Consistent with an operating risk explanation, we find a positive association between disclosure tone volatility and market-based assessments of firm risk after controlling for a comprehensive set of proxies for operating risk and transparency. We find little support for an information risk explanation, even when we examine multiple measures specifically designed to capture information risk. Taken together, our results suggest that although disclosure tone volatility is a function of both a firm's operating risk and a manager's disclosure transparency, investors appear to respond as if disclosure tone volatility only provides incremental information about a firm's operating risk.     

CEO Compensation and Stakeholders' Claims*

The traditional view that a corporation exists solely to serve the interests of the firm's shareholders has given way to a changing view that recognizes the importance of corporate constituents in addition to shareholders. Prior studies demonstrate a significant association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation and a firm's stock prices. However, the association between CEO compensation and the claim of other primary stakeholders (customers, employees, suppliers) has not been examined. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the adoption of long‐term incentive plans aligns the interest of the CEO with the interest of the primary stakeholders in the firm. Using the fixed‐effect regression, our results indicate a significant association between the change in CEO compensation and the claims of the customers, shareholders, and employees. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the managers are accountable not only to the shareholders but also to primary stakeholders.     

Does participating in the standards-setting process promote innovation? Evidence from China

This paper provides novel empirical evidence on the positive effect of standards-setting involvements on corporate innovation in China, reflecting in improving the patent quantity and patent quality. This kind of positive effect increases as the firm's top management team quality increases. We also show that the positive effect of standards-setting involvements is more evident for state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises due to the unique features of state-owned enterprises. Our results are robust to a battery of tests, including the use of alternative model specifications, firm fixed effects, the instrumental variable approach, potential omitted variables, and propensity score matching procedure. Further analysis reveals that standards-setting involvements foster innovation mainly through improving firms' R&D efficiency, reducing financial constraints, and inducing collaborative innovation. Overall, our findings suggest that standards-setting involvements matter for corporate innovation in China.     

Cost Economies: A Driving Force for Consolidation and Concentration?

Expanding concentration in many industries has generated concern about the determinants of these market structure patterns. Understanding such trends requires information on technological characteristics underlying cost efficiency. However, market structure and power analyses are typically based on restrictive models that limit the representation of cost drivers. In this paper, I model and estimate a comprehensive cost specification allowing for utilization, scale, scope, and multiplant economies using U.S. beef packing plant data. My evidence of substantive cost economies implies economic motivations for observed concentration, consolidation, and diversification and facilitates the interpretation and use of market structure measures for policy guidance.