The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal''s Agricultural and Industrial Programs

The Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) were cornerstones of the early New Deal, designed to cartelize agriculture and industry. When the Supreme Court annulled both acts, agricultural regulation was reinstalled within 6 weeks, following organized lobbying by farming interests, but broad industrial regulation was not reinstated. There was no corresponding lobby effort by industry to return the NIRA. To explain these differences we analyze the effect of farm/firm cost heterogeneities within commodity programs and industries on the ability of the parties to agree to and adhere to collusive regulations. We find that in the case of agriculture, because agricultural pricing and production policies were designed and implemented by low-cost producers, they were relatively self-enforcing and long-lasting. In contrast, high-cost firms in industry played a major role in setting prices and output within many of the NRA industrial codes. Consequently, these collusive policies were not self-enforcing and failed to create an effective lobby for their reinstatement.     

The Short‐Term Economic Impact of Levying E‐Tolls on Industries

TERM is used to analyse the short‐term regional economic impact of an increase in industries' transport costs when paying E‐Tolls. Market‐clearing and accounting equations allow regional economies to be represented as an integrated framework, labour adjusts to accommodate increasing transportation costs, and investments change to accommodate capital that is fixed. 1 1 TERM is a bottom‐up CGE model designed for highly disaggregated regional data. The Enormous Regional Model's originate from Horridge et al. ( 2005 ) and are better explained in Horridge ( 2011 ).
We concluded that costs from levying E‐Tolls on industries are small in comparison to total transport costs, and the impact on economic aggregates and most industries are marginal: investments (?0.404%), gross domestic product (GDP) (?0.01) and consumer price inflation (?0.10%). This is true even when considering costs and benefits on industries as well as consumers. Industries that experienced the greatest decline in output were transport, construction and gold. Provinces that are closer to Gauteng and have a greater share of severely impacted industries experienced larger GDP and real income reductions. Mpumalanga's decrease in GDP was 17% greater than Gauteng's.     

Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?

We examine the relation between a firm’s campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures and its Tobin’s q. We follow other studies that use q to measure the value of the firm’s intangible capital (e.g., the value of advertising, R&D, or environmental performance). Researchers have found a positive and significant relation between intangible assets and q. If political capital exists, it is an intangible asset. However, we find little relation between q and political contributions, suggesting that campaign contributions may not have long term effects on political markets. This is consistent with the view that contributions are done by firms as a response to a short term opportunity not as a way of building long-term political capital.

Incorporating Policymaker Costs and Political Competition into Rent-Seeking Games

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, if the value of the rent is sufficiently high relative to policymakers' costs, an increase in the intensity of political competition will increase lobbying expenditures; otherwise, expenditures fall as competitive intensity increases. In addition, the model establishes pure-strategy equilibria with underdissipation where only mixed-strategy equilibria exist in the standard model.     

Industry‐specific Exchange Rate Fluctuations,Japanese Exports and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Panel Vector Autoregressive Analysis

Using a panel vector autoregression approach and industry breakdown data for financial constraints obtained from the Bank of Japan's Tankan (Short‐Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan) database, this study empirically investigates whether and how Japanese firms' financial constraints (internal and external) influence the response of Japanese sectoral exports to an exchange rate shock. Furthermore, we use the industry‐specific real effective exchange rate data developed by to allow for different movements of real effective exchange rates across industries. It is found that financial constraints have a significant influence on Japanese exports in response to exchange rate shocks. Japanese exporters with either lower internal financial constraints or external financial constraints are less affected by the yen's appreciation. In addition, if firms face high external financial constraints, only reducing the internal financial constraints cannot help them mitigate the impact of the yen's appreciation on their exports. Thus, an accommodative financial environment also plays an important role in alleviating the impact that the yen's appreciation has on Japanese exports.     

Social security and trust fund management

In this paper we investigate why and to what extent the government should have a social security trust fund, and how it should manage the fund in the face of demographic shocks, based on a simple overlapping-generations model. We show that, given an aging population, a trust fund in some form could achieve the (modified) golden rule or to offset the negative income effect of a PAYGO system. Besides, in a closed economy where factor-prices effects dominate, using the trust fund as a buffer for demographic shocks could lead to a widening of intergenerational inequality. We also the discuss policy implications of our analysis on the social security reform debate in Japan, including the fixed tax method and the use of the trust fund in the face of a rapidly aging population. J. Japanese Int. Economies 18 (4) (2004) 528–550.     

Trade,Geography, and Industry Growth in U.S. Manufacturing

Much of the recent empirical literature examining the New Economic Geography has focused on how access to markets impacts wages. In this article, we consider an alternative aspect of the theory by examining how access to markets affects industry growth. We develop a model relating the growth of two key measures of market size—market access and supplier access—to growth in industry employment and the real value of industry shipments. We estimate the model using data on U.S. manufacturing industries between 1984 and 1996. We find strong evidence to suggest that access to markets positively affects industry growth.     

The Effects of Outward Foreign Direct Investment on Fixed-Capital Formation at Home: The Roles of Host Location and Industry Characteristics

Abstract

This paper pursues the idea that the relationship between foreign and domestic investments may be not as uniform as many studies suggest. By examining the case of Taiwanese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), this paper is marked out from existing studies in the following three respects. First, it examines the extent to which the relationship between OFDI and domestic investment varies with the location of investment. Second, this research allows the results to vary between Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) industries and Schumpeter industries. Finally, its breakdown of data will reveal sub-relationships in the data that up to now have remained hidden within the aggregate relationships reported in most studies. This study suggests that OFDI in China has a positive impact on domestic investment in H–O industries, while OFDI in other countries (OFDIO) has a negative impact on domestic investment in the same industries. These findings are in marked contrast to Schumpeter industries where a positive effect is observed only for OFDIO. Our findings also suggest that the Taiwanese government should design policies to adjust the level of liberalisation for overseas investment through legislation on an industry-by-industry basis in order that OFDI stimulates domestic investment in relevant industries more effectively.     

The political economy of exchange rates: The case of the Japanese yen

This paper sets out a political economy model of strategic exchange rates, focusing on the importance of external pressures. In our approach, an exchange rate depreciation is shown to be analytically equivalent to an export subsidy and an import tax. Thus lobbying for exchange rate policy is akin to lobbying for trade policies. Applying our model to the recent history of the Japanese yen, we show that pressures from the US government can theoretically contribute to an appreciation of the Japanese yen. In addition, the yen will still appreciate even if we assume that the Japanese international firms are Aoki-type J-firms.     

The Worth of Fair Value Accounting: Dissonance between Users and Standard Setters

Investors and analysts are designated as the primary users of financial reports by standard setters, yet we know very little about their use of accounting information and about their relationship with standard setters. This paper explores how investors and analysts evaluate the usefulness of fair values to their work. Standard setters typically presume that investors and analysts view accounting as a practice of valuation and, therefore, favor the greater use of fair value measurement. However, using interview evidence, it is shown here that investors and analysts expect accounting to provide them with insights into the performance of a business, and are quite cautious about the limits of using fair values in financial reports. Overall, the paper contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between accounting and its users. It adds specifically to research which has analyzed the disconnect between users and standard setters in terms of standard setters ignoring user needs (Young 2006 ), and in terms of users being indifferent about, or uncritical of, outcomes of standard‐setting processes (Durocher, Fortin, and Cote 2007 ; Durocher and Gendron 2011 ). The paper suggests a re‐theorization of the disconnect between the two groups that involves thinking away from tension, or blame. Drawing on the work of David Stark ( 2009 ), the situation observed is conceptualized as one of “dissonance,” where the different ways of evaluating fair values coexist without being involved in a fierce contest. That is, even though the principles of valuation and performance differ, this difference does not lead to open disagreement and political lobbying from investors and analysts. Consequences of this dissonance to our understandings of the (absence of) worth of fair values in capital markets are discussed.     

The industry origins of Japanese economic growth

This paper presents new data on the sources of growth for the Japanese economy over the period 1960–2000. The principal innovation is the incorporation of detailed information for individual industries, including those involved in the production of computers, communications equipment, and electronic components as information technology equipment. We show that economic growth is dominated by investments and productivity growth in information technology, both for individual industries and the economy as a whole. We also show that the revival of total factor productivity growth accounts for the modest resurgence of the Japanese economy since 1995. J. Japanese Int. Economies 19 (4) (2005) 482–542.     

The Swedish iron industry during the First World War and the Post-War depression

Abstract

In a paper read at the annual meeting of Jernkontoret (The Swedish Ironmasters' Association) in 1912 Professor E. F. Heckscher gave an estimate of the proportion of the total annual outpout of the Swedish iron industry which was exported. Including material entering into the exports of steelusing industries, it was estimated at 65–70 %. Assuming this to be correct, then only the saw-milling and paper- and pulp-making industries were at that time more dependent upon foreign markets than the iron industry. ¹ Jernkontorets Annaler (hereafter cited JKA) 1912. p. 183 ff. Cf. E. F. Heckscher, Svenska produktionsproblem, p. 107 and JKA 1919, pp. 181–202.      

The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy

A pressure group model where environmental and industry lobby groups offer political support in return for favorable pollution tax policies is used to explain and predict the equilibrium pollution tax in sectors protected by tariffs. The political economy effects of trade liberalization are investigated. The pollution tax is shown to decrease if the lobbying effort by the environmental lobby decreases more rapidly than by the industry lobby ceteris paribus. The level of political conflict falls with trade liberalization. Pollution may increase because of a reduction of the pollution tax, and tax revenues may fall simultaneously as pollution increases.     

Lobbying paradox of strategic export policy in a differentiated duopoly

This paper presents an analysis of lobbying based on imperfect competition by using three-stage game. It seeks to explain why lobbying efforts might be influenced by a home government’s viewpoint. Endogenously determined lobbying may distort the outcomes of strategic export policy, so that the results would differ from that generated by exogenously set lobbying. The lobbying paradox results in the domestic firm being worse off than if it could credibly commit to not engage in lobbying. Moreover, in the presence of foreign firm lobbying, the desired tax level is as the same as that of the benchmark case without lobbying.     

A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd‐Frank Reform Act of 2010

We evaluate the net costs and benefits of the whistleblower (WB) provisions adopted under the Dodd‐Frank Reform Act of 2010 by examining investor responses to events related to the proposed regulations. We focus our main analysis on a sample of firms that lobbied against implementation of the WB provisions by submitting a comment letter to the SEC. Lobbying firms are characterized by weaker existing WB programs and greater degrees of managerial entrenchment than a matched control sample of similar non‐lobbying firms. Short‐window excess stock returns around events related to implementation of the WB rules are significantly more positive for the portfolio of lobbying firms than for their matched controls; this effect is also more pronounced for lobbying firms with weaker existing WB programs. These results suggest that investors expect the new WB provisions to provide net benefits by improving shareholder protection.     

Market structure and the pattern of black-owned firms

This article discusses the relationship between industrial concentration and the presence of black-owned firms. Strong evidence is found that more monopolistic industries have a smaller black presence. This demonstrates that the monopolistic industries in which black workers are known to face the worst discrimination are also the industries in which blacks face the highest structural entry barriers as entrepreneurs. Indeed, entry barriers may cause the monopolistic conditions which allow discrimination while simultaneously frustrating the entry of black entrepreneurs.     

Structural Change and Industrial Relations During the Soeharto Period an Approaching Crisis?

This paper examines the evolution of the Indonesian industrial relations system and labour welfare in the New Order period, giving special attention to labour policies and unrest in the 1980s and early 1990s. The tightly controlled industrial relations system which emerged after 1965 is contrasted with the labour activism of the Sukarno era. It is argued that the greater de facto freedoms granted to industrial labour in recent years are an inevitable outcome of growing political openness, concentration of industrial labour around Jakarta and the vulnerability of new industries to domestic and international criticism of labour conditions. It is also contended that intensified labour action is unlikely to bring about a general improvement in worker welfare, although it can overcome some of the worst abuses of labour laws.     

M&As AND THE GLOBAL STRATEGIES OF TNCs

Most of the motivations for M&As that feature in the global strategies of transnational corporations (TNCs) are a means of reshaping competitive advantages within their respective industries. They have some effect on the TNCs of all or most industries and so to that extent they are not necessarily sector‐specific. However, it may be that some of the motives which we outline affect some industries more than others, and in that sense they can be expected to be associated with a greater intensity of M&As in certain sectors than others. We identify the likelihood of M&As across industries, and discuss how the general factors that have promoted the recent M&A wave have had a bigger impact on the global strategies of TNCs in the industries in which the propensity to engage in M&As has been the highest. The regional dimension is also considered.     

Trade Verticality and Structural Change in Industries:The Cases of Taiwan and South Korea

This paper documents that a significant portion of trade for Taiwan and Korea follows the trend of world trade in moving toward a pattern of vertical specialization (VS). Noteworthy is the manufacturing sector, whose VS shares of exports has been steadily increasing and has accounted for more than 90% of the total VS shares of manufactured exports. For Taiwan, nearly 57% of the growth in exports is contributed by the growth in VS-based trade; for Korea, it is as high as 64%. In the analysis, we compare VS shares of exports with or without input-output circulation among domestic industries in an open economy. Using Taiwan as a case study, we further discuss the implications of trade liberalization through tariff reductions for trade verticality. JEL Classification Numbers: F1, F14     

Elasticities of derived demand under different objectives of the firm

Conclusions We have reconciled and generalized earlier comparisons of input demand elasticities under different objective functions of the firm. In general little can be said of the relative magnitudes of the elasticities under different objectives, since different goals usually imply different levels of production and input demand. With some simplifying assumptions about the technology we can conclude that a profit-constrained, utility-maximizing firm tends to have higher input demand elasticities than a profit-maximizing firm facing the same cost and demand functions. This tendency is reinforced by a high profit requirement, decreasing returns to scale and slowly falling demand elasticity for the output. The results may help to explain differences in the stability of employment between industries,. Scherer [1980, pp. 365–67] reports that some studies have found an inverse relation between market concentration and stability of employment, which is contrary to the expected result. One may argue that in concentrated industries the firms are likely to have organizational slack or to face an inelastic product demand curve. Hence demand for factors of production should be less elastic than in more competitive industries. We have shown, however, that deviations from profit maximization may lead to higher input demand elasticities. Since non-profit-maximizing goals are likely to be more common in concentrated industries, the observed instability of employment may be partly due to the high elasticity of derived demand. Although the type of alternative goals studied in this paper may not be realistic in practice, the analysis shows nevertheless that goals of the firm may be one factor in explaining differences in the stability of employment.