中国工业贸易保护结构政治经济学的实证分析

贸易的政治经济学将公共选择的分析范式引入传统贸易理论,从收入分配而非经济效率的角度出发,从政策决策过程的视角来探究贸易干预的水平和结构。本文将这一贸易保护的"内生化"理论应用于中国的实证分析,在文献研究的基础上发展了一种适用于中国"国家战略主义"体制下的贸易保护的政治经济模型,并通过计量回归的实证研究来验证若干理论假说的真实性和显著性,从而说明中国工业不同时期跨部门的贸易保护结构的政治经济决定因素。     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE DOHA ROUND*

Abstract.   In this paper we examine political economic issues of service trade liberalization of a developing country in the context of the Doha Round negotiations. We first discuss the various unique characteristics of the service industries. Then we incorporate these features in a Grossman-Helpman style political economy model and solve for the politically-determined service sector protection. We then examine how various factors such as increased cross-cutting lobbying, the reduction of state-owned service providers and linking negotiation on agricultural protection with negotiation on service sector liberalization can help reduce the political constraints on liberalizing the service sectors.     

重复建设的政治经济学分析:一个基于委托代理框架的模型

本文首先定义了重复建设,认为只有是政府主导的投资才有可能是重复建设。接着,我们分析了在信息对称和不对称情况下,寻租存在与否对投资量的影响。我们的结论是投资量低于社会最优量,尤其是在信息不对称的情形下。从中我们还得出了一个有意思的结论,认为重复建设并不等同于过度投资。重复建设完全可以在总投资不足的情况下发生。     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DISAPPOINTING DOHA ROUND OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

Abstract.  This paper stresses the importance of political as well as economic factors for understanding negotiating outcomes in multilateral trade negotiations such as the Doha Round. In particular, it is argued that economic factors of the type traditionally emphasized by economists in their classrooms are by themselves inadequate for analysing the negotiating process. A variety of political economy factors are discussed as explanations for the disappointing results of the Doha Round.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY*

This paper investigates the effect of a home firm's lobbying on a strategic export policy in a third market with a differentiated duopoly. We focus on its effect on domestic welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic export policy cannot improve domestic welfare in the presence of lobbying if the degree of product differentiation is high or the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. Moreover, for the same degree of product differentiation, the lobbying‐induced export policy is more likely to deteriorate domestic welfare relative to free trade under Cournot competition.     

DYNAMIC PROCESS ANALYSIS AND A MODEL OF THE TRADE CYCLE

In a recent article H. R. Hudson has merged real and monetary-factors to produce a comparative statics trade cycle model.¹ The present paper introduces specific dynamic relationships into the model, shows that as a result the system need not behave in the fashion described by Hudson, and argues that the model thus amended provides a more suitable explanation of post-war fluctuations.     

INFANT INDUSTRY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE PROTECTION

Abstract.  This paper introduces infant-industry considerations in political economy determination of trade protection. I build a model where the government cares about both political contributions and national welfare. A potentially beneficial high-tech industry is not viable in the country whose initial human capital is low. In the political economy equilibrium, we find that the tariff schedule will be V-shaped: it decreases initially to maintain the viability of the industry but increases thereafter as the industry expands and gains political power. We use the model to explain both China's tariff offers in WTO negotiations and GATT/WTO rules regarding developing countries.     

CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PROPERTY CLAIMS IN A DYNAMIC WORLD

Constitutional political economy concerns the legal foundations of the market. One central component of that legal infrastructure relates to property rights over objects and circumstances. The idea of "takings" causes one to focus on the conditions under which regulatory actions call for compensation to those who imagine that their property rights have been taken. A dynamic economy is alleged here to be one in which legal processes must carry the burden of discovering when particular parties have an interest that can be said to constitute a property right requiring compensation. That is, objects and circumstances are not protected because they are "property." Rather, those objects and circumstances that are protected become, by virtue of that protection, "property." The task for the economist is to understand the perverse incentives to flow from a compensation requirement on all instances of institutional change concerning landed property. A further task is to incorporate a dynamic concept of property rights into general equilibrium models of economic systems.     

ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION*

In this article, we analyze an economy in which agents vote over immigration policy and redistributive tax policy. We show that natives' preferences over immigration are influenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting over future tax policy. We also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobility, the distribution of initial capital among natives, the wealth or poverty of the immigrant pool, and the future voting rights and entitlements of immigrants can have dramatic effects on equilibrium immigration and tax policies. Finally, we provide some empirical support for the model's predictions.     

PROBLEMS IN MODELING COMPLEX DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS: THE POLITICAL REALIGNMENT OF THE 1850s*

This paper argues that a model of sequential choice is superior to the standard rational choice model in explaining a process as complex and dynamic as the political realignment of the 1850s. Part 1 sketches the facts and processes that need to be encompassed by a model and identifies key branching points. Part 2 describes an appropriate model of sequential choice and discusses procedures for estimating transition probabilities and the impact of key variables on these transition probabilities. Part 3 identifies implicit assumptions of rational choice theory that limit its usefulness.