Minimum Quality Standards and International Trade

This paper investigates the impact of a non‐discriminating minimum quality standard (MQS) on trade and welfare when the market is characterized by imperfect competition and asymmetric information. A simple partial equilibrium model of an international Cournot duopoly is presented in which a domestic and a foreign firm are identical except that the foreign firm faces positive transport costs. Asymmetric information generates a market failure, which the government attempts to alleviate with a MQS. It is found that although firms face the exact same costs of compliance, they will generally prefer different levels of regulation. As a result, international trade disputes are likely to arise even when regulation is non‐discriminating.     

Foreign direct investment as a signal

This paper models oligopolistic competition among potential multinational firms in an environment of firm heterogeneity, incomplete information on costs, and strategic interactions. We show that foreign direct investment is more likely if it can serve as a signal of productivity in an environment of incomplete information as firms would like to avoid sending a low productivity signal. Our model shows that this effect is strong enough such that foreign direct investment can be an optimal foreign entry mode even if trade costs are zero.     

Product market competition,incentives and fraudulent behavior

The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm's stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders' trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.     

Antidumping Regulations: Anti‐Competitive and Anti‐Export

In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an antidumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the home firm to reduce the degree of competition in the home market. The home firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the home firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the home market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.     

Optimal Regulation of Auditing

We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model whereaudit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly.The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best auditquality, and it is increasing in the riskiness of firms andin the amount of funding they seek. The model can encompasscollusion between clients and auditors, arising from the jointprovision of auditing and consulting services: deflecting collusionrequires less ambitious standards. Finally, banning the provisionof consulting services by auditors eliminates collusion butmay not be optimal in the presence of economies of scope. (JELClassification: G28, K22, M42).     

Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly with foreign penetration

We characterize the endogenous competition structure (in prices or quantities) in a differentiated duopoly between a public firm that maximizes domestic welfare and a private firm that can be owned by domestic or foreign investors. The market for which they compete can be domestic or integrated: in the first case Bertrand competition emerges endogenously and in the second case Cournot competition can emerge if the fraction of domestic consumers in the integrated market is low enough. We also determine the optimal degree of foreign penetration showing the optimality of a partial foreign ownership. Finally, we extend the model to increasing marginal cost confirming the robustness of the results.     

Retailers as agents and the limits of parallel trade

The volume of retail-level parallel trade is surprisingly small despite persistent international price differences. We offer an agency-based explanation by considering competition between an original home manufacturer and a foreign retailer. The model endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent with private information on the perceived quality of the good in its own market. The manufacturer cannot control the retailer once the latter has ordered its sales quantity but it can limit the initial offer. If parallel trade is permitted, this offer will fall if there is incomplete information, resulting in a small, or zero, volume of parallel trade. This outcome makes both the original producer and foreign consumers worse off, while offering little benefit to home consumers, compared to the case where such trade is banned.     

中外银行业有效竞争的外部性比较

从银行业竞争的沿革、监管体制、稳定性等方面比较分析我国银行业和外国银行业的竞争格局的外部性特征，对中国银行业国内银行与外资银行竞争格局态势作对比分析，由此提出优化银行业竞争环境的政策建议。     

Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice

We consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer's need. In our model, experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions. We explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort. In particular, the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum. An intervention, that limits price competition via price control, increases welfare.     

Modes of foreign bank entry and effects on lending rates: Theory and evidence

Policy makers who decide to liberalize foreign bank entry frequently put limitations on the mode of entry. We study how different entry modes affect the lending rates of foreign and domestic banks. In our model, the mode of entry determines whether a foreign bank inherits a customer base. This, in turn, affects how information is distributed between foreign and domestic banks. We show that this distribution of information about incumbent customers leads to stronger competition if foreign entry occurs through a greenfield investment. As a result, domestic bank lending rates are lower after greenfield entry. We find empirical support for this prediction for a sample of banks from 10 Eastern European countries for the period 1995–2003.     

Regulation,Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition

Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for firms and output distribution across consumers in each firm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to firms, a relatively more efficient firm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in firm structure.     

LOCATION OF PUBLIC FIRM IN THE PRESENCE OF MULTINATIONAL FIRM: A MIXED DUOPOLY APPROACH*

By incorporating a multinational private firm into the mixed duopoly model with Hotelling‐type spatial competition, we show that the private firm's nationality is a matter of the public firm's location. As the share of foreign capital increases in the private (multinational) firm, the public firm moves to a central place. The effects of price regulation and sequential location choice are also discussed.     

信息不对称条件下企业跨国并购的动因探析

信息不对称是促使企业跨国并购的重要原因。跨国Cournot垄断竞争模型考虑产出协调和信息分享两方面。非对称信息下并购发生的可能性超过对称信息情形,外国企业总倾向于与一国内企业分享信息,并购的发生取决于需求波动程度及产品异质性程度。     

Agglomeration Effects in Foreign Direct Investment and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis

Does environmental regulation impair international competitiveness of pollution-intensive industries to the extent that they relocate to countries with less stringent regulation, turning those countries into “pollution havens”? We test this hypothesis using panel data on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows of various industries in the German manufacturing sector and account for several econometric issues that have been ignored in previous studies. Most importantly, we demonstrate that externalities associated with FDI agglomeration can bias estimates away from finding a pollution haven effect if omitted from the analysis. We include the stock of inward FDI as a proxy for agglomeration and employ a GMM estimator to control for endogenous time-varying determinants of FDI flows. Furthermore, we propose a difference estimator based on the least polluting industry to break the possible correlation between environmental regulatory stringency and unobservable attributes of FDI recipients in the cross-section. When accounting for these issues we find robust evidence of a pollution haven effect for the chemical industry.     

Labour mobility and wage inequality in the presence of endogenous foreign investment

This paper examines the impact of labour mobility and increased competition on skilled–unskilled wage inequality and foreign investment. Unlike the existing literature this paper considers a model where foreign investment is endogenously determined. The paper shows that in the shortrun, inflow of either skilled or unskilled labour has no effect on wage inequality but increased competition increases wage inequality. Inflow of either type of labour increases foreign investment but the impact of increased competition on foreign investment cannot be unambiguously determined. Inflow of skilled labour increases wage inequality in the longrun and its effect on foreign investment is positive. Increased competition in the longrun increases wage inequality, foreign investment and welfare.     

基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析

文章在贸易主体间成本信息缺失的基础上,重新探讨了VER的政策含义。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商成本信息缺失的情境下,若产品市场为Cournot竞争,则VER将对两国产生实质的影响:对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商的类型而定。而在Bertrand竞争下,VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。     

Economic Integration and Public Provision of Education

This paper develops a model of fiscal competition in public provision of a private good: education. In this framework, the welfare enhancing effects of public education provision are shown to be reduced by increased student mobility when, like in the EU, countries are unable to set differentiated fees to foreign students. Indeed, the threat of attraction of foreigners who free-ride on the national education system may induce suboptimal levels of public education provision when (price) discrimination is forbidden. Alternatively, countries may try to escape regulation and avoid equal treatment of foreign students. The paper provides some empirical evidence of the existence of a fiscal externality in education at the EU level.     

Regulation, market structure and service trade liberalization

In this paper, we develop a theoretical method to quantify the importance of regulation and market structure on the success of service trade liberalization. For this purpose, we incorporate a single imperfectly competitive service sector that can take on various market structures into a standard computational general equilibrium model. We apply our framework to analyze the impact of partial telecom liberalization in Tunisia. We show that if the regulatory environment guarantees competition, Tunisia's welfare can improve up to 0.65%. If a cartel is formed between the domestic incumbent and foreign entrant, however, Tunisia's welfare can drop up to 0.25%. Our results thus call for Tunisia among other developing countries to step up its pro-competitive regulatory reforms while liberalizing its telecom sector.     

SAVING DOLPHINS: BOYCOTTS,TRADE SANCTIONS,AND UNOBSERVABLE TECHNOLOGY*

Consumers boycott some goods because they do not approve the ways they are manufactured. I examine the efficacy of boycotts and the role of trade policy in influencing the foreign exporter's technology choice. Even when its technology choice is unobservable, boycott threats can prompt the foreign firm to adopt the technology consumers prefer. Import policy can augment this effect, but when boycotts can have a substantial impact on demand, a use of ad valorem tariffs yields the unintended result. Specific tariffs and quotas are free of this defect, but specific tariffs are more effective than quotas in addressing consumers' concern.