Globalisation,poverty and corruption: Retarding progress in South Africa

ABSTRACT

Poverty and corruption can both immiserate a nation. Globalisation through open trade can potentially increase economic growth, providing employment and increased incomes to the poor. Corruption can dampen or even reduce these positive developments. Although globalisation is considered instrumental in development strategies, theoretically, the impact of globalisation on poverty reduction is ambiguous, an ambiguity that is also reflected in the empirical literature. The corruption-poverty literature clearly reveals that empirical findings on such association are at best heterogeneous. This article examines the effects of globalisation and corruption on poverty using time series data for South Africa for the period 1991–2016. Three indicators of poverty and recently developed measures of globalisation and corruption were employed in the logistic regression model used for estimation. The results confirm that globalisation reduces poverty while corruption intensifies it. The globalisation findings are robust across the different measures of poverty while unidirectional results show corruption increases poverty.     

Employment,welfare and reserve effects of global protection

Summary In this article it is shown that expenditure-switching policies, like exchange rate protection, tariff protection and export subsidizing, might increase the level of employment and welfare in the short run (when indexation of factor prices is absent). Complete indexation of factor prices, however, makes exchange rate protection senseless. In the case of tariff protection, complete indexation will even worsen employment and welfare (protection becomes impoverishing). Only a policy of export subsidies makes sense if employment is to be improved in an indexed economy. This additional employment, however, is paid for with a deterioration of the terms of trade and the risk of retaliation. Therefore, taking the long run view, expenditure switching policies should be rejected for macro-economic purposes. The author is professor of international economics at Tilburg University. He would like to thank Dr. G. van Roij of the department of economics at Tilburg University and an unknown referee for their remarks, which led to an improvement of this article. The author is professor of international economics at Tilburg University. He would like to thank Dr. G. van Roij of the department of economics at Tilburg University and an unknown referee for their remarks, which led to an improvement of this article.     

The link between unemployment and labor force participation rates in Japan: A regional perspective

This paper explores the co-integrating relationship between unemployment and the labor force participation rate in Japan from a regional perspective. The univariate co-integration tests indicate that the “no co-integration” hypothesis cannot be rejected in Northern-Kanto, Hokuriku and Kyusyu. Because the univariate co-integration approach might suffer from low power we employed a panel version of the co-integration test recently developed by Westerlund (2006) that also considers the possibility of multiple structural breaks in the level of individual co-integrating equations. The test results lend support for an overwhelmingly long-run relationship between the two variables across regions. Accordingly, this finding is not in line with the unemployment invariance hypothesis. As a result a nationally orientated employment policy aimed at improving the unemployment and labor force participation rates might be preferred over a region-specific employment policy in Japan.     

Deferred Executive Compensation Policies in Chinese State-owned Enterprises

Since the commencement of industrial reform in China, most Chinese state‐owned enterprises have adopted a deferred executive compensation policy to provide incentives for their management teams. However, the effectiveness of such a policy needs to be evaluated. In this paper, we specify a model of deferred executive compensation policy, in which the compensation for executives is contingent on firms' future revenue. The model suggests that under deferred executive compensation policies, managers exhibit an increasing level of effort in every period. Furthermore, the deferred compensation policy encourages managers to make long‐term investments, which might generate revenue even after the termination of managerial contracts.     

Corruption as an Occupational Choice: Endogenous Corruption and Tax Policy

Corruption is endemic in many countries, and empirical studies have demonstrated how it impacts on macroeconomic indicators. Theoretical studies have generally assumed an exogenously given proportion of the population are corrupt or that the public sector is fixed in size; far fewer explore how corruption emerges endogenously. We endogenize corruption as an occupational choice. Workers choose private or public employment; public employees can be honest or corrupt. Corruption is subject to a social sanction that results in a loss of self-esteem. Those who care little about the social sanction choose to be corrupt. When a firm meets a corrupt public employee it pays a bribe to secure a reduction in the tax rate. The economy has two self-sustaining equilibria with different levels of corruption. Corruption reduces tax revenue and the tax rate that maximizes revenue. An increase in the social sanction reduces corruption but also reduces tax revenues if the economy is in a high-corruption equilibrium. Paying a wage premium to public sector workers can result in all public sector workers being corrupt. Public sector audits to detect corrupt workers always reduce corruption but can only increase welfare when they are cheap to conduct and the economy is in a low-corruption equilibrium.     

创业及融资中的行政官僚腐败研究

文章利用一个善于生产个体项目选择、政府机构进入管制和不完善金融市场的模型研究了官僚作风和腐败对创业企业融资的影响,指出官僚作风和行政腐败是内生的,政府官僚作风滋生了行政腐败,揭示了官僚作风和腐败都阻止企业的活动,它们的存在恶化了金融市场的低效率和不完善性。影响金融市场的产出,这样也反过来强化了官僚作风和官僚腐败的负面效应,从而增加创业企业融资的成本,打击个体参与经济活动的积极性,影响企业创业融资的效率,阻碍创业企业的发展,破坏社会经济绩效。     

Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co‐opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.     

‘The city has been wronged and abused!’: institutional corruption in the eighteenth century

Corruption by office holders in eighteenth‐century British institutions, from state to local level, played an instrumental role in the emergence of modern bureaucracy, and the development of accountable, professionalized systems of administration. Due to the similarities between the institutional culture of eighteenth‐century Britain and those within many contemporary developing societies, social scientists have also sought to draw lessons from Britain's historical experience of corruption. Yet little is known about the extent, impact, and causes of corruption by eighteenth‐century office holders. This article presents the first detailed research into the topic. It utilises the rich administrative and financial records associated with the institution charged with funding and undertaking the maintenance of London Bridge—the Bridge House—to conduct a systematic qualitative and quantitative study of corruption by office holders. The article identifies an ingrained culture of corruption amongst Bridge House officers, and provides quantitative evidence of the substantial impact corruption had on the organization's finances. However, contrary to existing studies on corruption, this article concludes that, although extensive and significant, corruption did not perform a functional role in the context of this institution. The article also provides a methodology and comparator for future studies into this topic.     

Ethnic Diversity,Political Stability and Productive Efficiency: Empirical Evidence from the African Countries

While ethnic diversity has been shown to produce numerous negative effects on the economic performance due to disagreement on the production of the public good, nepotism in making employment decisions, increased corruption and rent‐seeking behaviour, its positive effects appear to have received much less attention. We hypothesise and test several explanations why higher levels of ethnic diversity may be associated with better socio‐economic outcomes. We find that productive efficiency will be higher in the societies where ethnicities can benefit from the complementarity of skills. Incentives to engage in an ethnic conflict will be lower and the extent of political stability higher in those countries where the opportunity costs of ethnic conflict are more substantial. We also find some evidence in support of the political aspirations hypothesis that attributes the negative effects of ethnic diversity to the strife by ethnic groups for more political influence.     

Extralegal payments to state officials in Russia, 1750s–1830s: assessing the burden of corruption

This article uses the records of expenditures from a set of estates that belonged to the Golitsyn family to assess the level of ‘routine corruption’ in Imperial Russia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The data from these books allow us to identify individual cases of unofficial facilitation payments made by the estates and by peasant communes to district‐level officials; to delimit key types of payment situations; and to calculate the sums expended for payments by a given estate in a given year. The resulting numbers are compared to the overall volume of obligations borne by the serfs to the state and to their landlords. Our conclusion is that while the facilitation payments were ubiquitous and accompanied any interaction with the state, the volume of these ‘routine’ payments (as opposed to other forms of extraction) was quite low and they did not put a significant burden on the peasants, while at the same time securing hefty extra incomes for top district officials. Rather, by the last decades of the eighteenth century Russian Imperial officials at the district level might have switched from a tribute‐like extortion from the population at large to acquiring vast sums by collecting unofficial payments in more targeted ways.     

Is It Worthwhile to Pay Referees?

There are puzzles in refereeing scholarly articles: Why are referees willing to review a paper without payment, and is it worthwhile to pay referees in order to raise the review rate? Two interesting results are found in this article. First, when reviewing services are driven by reciprocity, the equilibrium participation of referees may exhibit the so-called self-fulfilling feature. Second, the optimal payment may not be zero if the referee receives the benefit of reputation gained by refereeing an article. In particular, this article will show that those journals whose status quo review rate is lower tend to pay reviewers more while journals whose status quo review rate is higher do not find it worthwhile to pay referees enough. This result implies that, in order to raise its quality, a journal with a low review rate is more likely to adopt a strategy to increase pay and attract a critical mass of referees.     

Environmental Depletion,Governance, and Conflict

While the link between natural resource dependence and internal conflict has been approached from a variety of angles in a large and growing interdisciplinary literature, the feasibility‐discontent dichotomy still frames a fluid research agenda in both economics and political science. This article attempts to help bridge the gap by allowing for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of potential rebels. Simple non‐cooperative bargaining yields a nonlinear impact of regulatory quality on the likelihood of conflict and shows that corruption and resource depletion jointly affect the outcome. The empirical analysis that follows looks at the effect of environmental depletion and government corruption on the emergence of civil conflicts using a large panel data set. Resource depletion, the quality of governance, and their interaction are found to be significant determinants of civil conflict incidence. Results are robust to model and specification as well as to several steps taken to address potential endogeneity concerns.     

Corruption and Technological Progress: A Takeoff Theory of Good Governance

Corruption is known to be a function of its return relative to productive activity. But the idea that corruption might itself respond to technological progress has not been emphasized. This paper presents an approach for thinking about institutional features that lower corruption by lowering its relative return. Policies that promote productivity growth in market exchange may cause the relative reward to rent-seeking to decline. The evolutionary development of anti-corruption efforts may be a normal part of modernization, much as changes in income distribution and urbanization.     

A Eurasian Economic Vision for the Twenty-first Century

Widespread corruption in mainland China adversely affects the overall economy in general and international business in particular. Prior to the establishment of the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974, corruption was also rampant in Hong Kong. The ICAC effectively cleaned corruption in Hong Kong within a short period of time. Hong Kong's success in this area has prompted the Chinese government to learn from Hong Kong's experience. This article reviews the factors that contributed to Hong Kong's success in fighting corruption and discusses whether China can learn from the Hong Kong experience. From this, we can conclude that, first, Hong Kong's experience demonstrates that a corruption‐prone culture can be changed in a relatively short period of time; second, in order for China to learn from Hong Kong's experience, there must be substantial changes in China's political and economic institutions.     

The Impact of FDI on Developing Countries

I. IntroductionForeign direct investment (FDI) has been one of the defining features of the world economyover the last two decades. It has grown at an unprecedented pace for more than ten years,with only a slight interruption during the recession of the early 1990s. Almost all economiesnow are competing to attract multinational corporations (MNCs). Inward FDI flows havebeen far exceeding private debt flows until recently in some emerging market economies. Interms of geographic distributio…     

Bribery,corruption and bureaucratic hassle: Evidence from Myanmar

Corruption has been found to be the most severe obstacle to business operations, according to a recent survey of over 3000 firms in Myanmar. This paper sets out to understand the structure of corruption through an econometric analysis of this survey. It finds that firms with higher ‘ability to pay’ (proxied by sales revenue and employee growth) are more likely to pay bribes. While firms with lower ‘refusal power’ (i.e. those dependent on bureaucratic permissions to export and import) are more likely to find corruption to be an obstacle. A distinct but related question is whether bribes act as ‘efficiency grease’ by allowing firms to circumvent red tape. No evidence is found to support this hypothesis; in fact, firms that pay bribes report greater bureaucratic hassle compared to firms that do not. This result fits in more closely with the view that red tape could be used to extract bribes from firms.     

Retirement of Older Workers and Employment of the Young

Policy makers have often argued that an additional benefit of facilitating early retirement is that it creates employment for the young. This may happen if older and younger workers are substitutes. Nowadays policies are aimed at increasing employment of older people to counter the economic consequences of an aging population. Opponents of such policies argue that these will adversely affect youth employment. This paper revisits the nexus between employment of older and younger workers, if only to put any concerns for adverse effects of later retirement on youth employment to rest. To empirically investigate this issue we estimate a dynamic model of employment of the young, prime age and old people using panel data of 22 OECD countries over the time period 1960–2008. Our empirical analysis does not support the hypothesis that employment of the young and old are substitutes and finds some minor complementarities. This suggests that encouraging later retirement will have no adverse effect on youth employment.     

Local politics and the local authority labour market

The 1979 election heralded a new approach to public sector finance and employment. For local government, this has involved a new regulatory framework, which attempts to reproduce private sector financial and labour market structures. This article examines the effect of this new regulatory framework on the labour markets of three case study local authorities and the manner in which those effects have been mediated by local politics over the period 1979-1984     

我国失业保险金标准及支付研究——基于北京市的实证

失业保险制度具有保障失业者基本生活、促进就业和预防失业的基本功能。通过对北京市失业保险金水平及支付的研究发现,目前北京市失业保险金存在水平较低、保险基金支出相对较窄和失业保险金支付模式单一等问题。因此,本文主张以需要和激励为基本原则,构建起与社平工资、最低工资及城镇居民基本生活费用价格指数相关联的失业保险金标准决定机制,并建议采用失业保险金递减支付模式,进一步扩大失业保险基金支出范围,从而促进我国失业保险制度更好更快地发展。