Macroeconomic Consequences of Outsourcing: An Analysis of Growth, Welfare, and Product Variety

Outsourcing of non-core activities is nowadays a common business strategy. Declining transaction and transportation costs caused by the advent of Information and Communication Technology are a potentially important driving force behind this development. This paper provides a theoretical framework for analysing a firm's incentive to follow such a strategy of outsourcing and its consequences for macroeconomic variables like growth and product variety. We divide production activities into core and non-core activities. Non-core activities can be performed within the firm or can be mediated by the market. We derive conditions under which outsourcing occurs, and under which outsourcing is socially desirable. These conditions do not necessarily coincide. Outsourcing may hence be a profitable strategy for firms, while it is socially suboptimal. Crucial parameters in the model are the relative scale of core versus non-core activities, management costs, transaction costs and love for variety of consumers.     

Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.     

R&D Subsidies,Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.     

FISCAL POLICY, ADJUSTMENT COSTS, AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH

This paper develops a one-sector endogenous growth model inwhich investment incurs convex adjustment costs. Conditionsfor the existence of a balanced growth path are discussed. Fiscalissues are analyzed in a circumstance in which the governmentuses tax revenues to finance public expenditures that impacton both the productivity of the existing capital stock, andadjustments costs. The effect of these costs on the equilibriumgrowth rate and on the effectiveness of fiscal policy is discussed.Optimal fiscal policy is derived and the role of adjustmentcosts and congestion in determining the trade-off between differenttaxes is considered.     

Nominal Wage Contracts, Adjustment Costs and Real Persistence of Monetary Shocks

This paper describes a model in which monetary shocks have persistent real effects. Starting from the limited participation model of Christiano (1991) with capital adjustment costs as suggested by Dow (1995) it is confirmed that costs of equipment installation and restrictions on consumer portfolio choices alone cannot account for the observed effects of monetary policy. However, after introducing nominal wage contracts as a third friction, the model generates real effects of monetary shocks. It is shown that these real effects are highly persistent for a realistic size of adjustment costs and strongly autocorrelated money growth shocks which are typical for Europe.     

The Life Cycle of the U.S. Tire Industry

We introduce a new theory of industry evolution. According to our model, the nonmonotonicity in firm numbers found in many young industries is a consequence of the gradual decline in unit costs. Early stages of the industry life cycle, when unit costs and profit margins are high, display positive net entry rates. In later stages, declining unit costs and increasing competition limit the market room for (fringe) firms accumulating in a shakeout. The model explains paths of output, price level, and firm numbers using a recursive system of equations. We apply the model to the U.S. tire industry.     

Mixed duopoly,location choice,and shadow cost of public funds

We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare.     

International relocation,difference in production costs,and welfare: An analysis based on a two-country model

This paper examines whether or not the globalization of Japanese companies is a problem for the Japanese economy. To examine this, using the theoretical model, the paper examines whether the globalization of home-located tradable goods firms provides a benefit to the home country from the perspective of welfare. Specifically, since globalization is thought to have begun based on the difference in production costs of the home and the foreign country, we examine how an increase of productivity in the foreign non-tradable goods sector, which is the principal factor in the difference in production costs between the two countries, affects the welfare of the home country. We show that such an increase of productivity not only induces enterprise relocation, but also improves the welfare of the home country. In particular, the latter is demonstrated by an increase in the real flow of dividends that results from holding equities in tradable goods firms located abroad, i.e., the improvement in the income account. Hence, since the prediction of the model indicates that the globalization of firms is not a problem, it can be said that the globalization of Japanese firms is not a problem for the Japanese economy.     

Dynamic Portfolio Adjustment and Capital Controls: A Euler Equation Approach

We present a multiasset dynamic portfolio balance model that is based on the maximization of an intertemporal utility function in consumption when investors operate under uncertainty, quadratic adjustment costs, and capital market regulations. We estimate the model's structural parameters on quarterly portfolio data of the German private sector. Asset demand is insensitive to return changes, although the coefficients are significant. Adjustment costs are low but highly significant, giving rise to moderate lags of adjustment. Still, existing capital controls and adjustment costs cannot explain the currently observed “home bias” in the portfolio. Overall, our results imply a strong rejection of the portfolio model.     

Monopolistic competition with cross-country technological differences and international trade

We develop a two-factor, three-sector model of international trade in which there are cross-country technological differences in the monopolistically competitive sector. Firms in one country have a technology with high fixed costs and low marginal costs; firms in the other country have a technology with low fixed but high marginal costs. Under this model, although not under the monopolistically competitive model with identical technologies, trade patterns are determined by the interaction between the distribution of factor endowments (i.e., the Heckscher–Ohlin aspect) and technological differences in the monopolistically competitive sector (i.e., the Chamberlinian–Ricardian aspect). Furthermore, we show that autarky commodity prices are not very useful for predicting trade patterns, which is counterintuitive and again contrary to findings under the monopolistically competitive model with identical technologies.     

Search,migration, and social connections: Solving the migration puzzle to Beijing

We provide a plausible explanation for the phenomenon of migration to big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. This process can be observed particularly among students who migrate to these cities and prefer to look for their first jobs upon completion of their studies, instead of going back to their hometowns. Despite the slightly higher wages offered in big cities, it is unclear why recently graduated students feel attracted to remain in big cities, where the living costs are much higher and the job market is more competitive compared to small cities. We develop a search and matching model in which we consider that the social connections created by the agents during their studies are used as a tool to get jobs. We solve for the optimal investment in social connections, and for the level of social capital that makes agents indifferent between migrating and staying in their current locations. We use a computational model and show that for agents with a sufficiently large social network, the value of social capital is large enough to overcome the value of going back to their hometowns, where they would face lower competition and living expenses, but they would lack the advantages that a social network represents.     

Multi‐Market Competition,R&D,and Welfare in Oligopoly

We investigate a multi‐market Cournot model with strategic process research and development (R&D) investments wherein a multi‐market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets. We show that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditures of the multi‐market firm. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. Our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms.     

The multi-market firm, transportation costs, and the separation of the output and allocation decisions

Despite the documented importance of transport costs for firmswith sales in geographically separated markets, theoreticalanalyses typically ignore such costs. This paper analyzes theeffects of transport costs for a risk averse, competitive firmselling a single good in a domestic (certain) and a foreign(uncertain) market, and shows that these effects are asymmetric.The effects on total output and the inter-market allocationof output depend on the behavior of marginal domestic transportcosts, but are largely independent of the form of the foreigntransport cost function. Moreover, regardless of the latter,if marginal transport costs in the domestic market are constant,the firm's total output is independent of its attitude towardsrisk and the parameters of the risky market. This suggests thatthe firm's activity can be insulated from foreign uncertaintiesby government policies that focus on the shape of the domestictransportation cost function.     

Advertising, in-house R&D, and growth

This paper develops a quality-ladder model of endogenous growthto study the interplay between in-house R&D and combativeadvertising expenditure, and its implications for economic growth,firm size, and welfare. The analysis shows that, somewhat surprisingly,higher incentives to engage in advertising, although combative,unambiguously foster innovation activity of firms. This, possibly,leads to faster growth and even higher welfare. These resultsrest on two features of the model which are well-supported byempirical evidence. First, if firms incur higher sunk costsfor marketing, concentration and firm size rise. Second, firmsize and R&D expenditure are positively related as largerfirms are able to spread R&D costs over higher sales. Theanalysis also suggests that R&D subsidies are conduciveto R&D and growth without inducing firms to raise advertisingoutlays.     

Swiss Exchange Rate Policy in the 1930s. Was the Delay in Devaluation Too High a Price to Pay for Conservatism?

In this paper we examine the experience of Switzerland’s devaluation in 1936. We ask the following questions: what were the issues at stake in the political debate? What was the cost to Switzerland of the delay in the franc devaluation? What would have been the costs and benefits of an earlier exchange rate policy? To answer these questions we construct a simple open economy macro model of the interwar Swiss economy. We then posit counterfactual scenarios of alternative exchange rate pegs in 1931 and 1933. Our simulations clearly show a significant and large increase in real economic activity.     

Globalization and labour-market adjustment: how fast and at what cost?

In this paper we argue that the flexibility of an economy'slabour market plays a role in determining the gains from tradeliberalization, the level of short-run adjustment costs, andthe relative value of these two measures. To do so, we describethe model introduced in Davidson and Matusz (2000) which allowsus to solve for adjustment costs when workers vary accordingto ability and jobs differ in terms of the skills that theyrequire. We then report results based on simulations of thismodel. We find that economies with sluggish labour markets havethe least to gain from liberalization. The reason is that whilethe removal of trade barriers creates large benefits, they arealmost completely offset by large short-run adjustment costs.In contrast, we find that with either very flexible or veryslothful labour market gains from liberalization are alwayssignificantly larger than the short-run adjustment costs.     

Trade costs in the first wave of globalization

What factors drove globalization in the late 19th century? We employ a new micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs based on a standard model of trade in differentiated goods to address this question. These trade costs gauge the difference between observed bilateral trade and frictionless trade. They comprise tariffs, transportation costs, and all other factors that impede international trade but which are inherently difficult to observe. Trade costs fell on average by 10-16 percent between 1870 and 1913. We also use this measure to decompose the growth of trade over that period and find that roughly 44 percent of the rise in trade within our sample can be explained by reductions in trade costs; the remaining 56 percent is attributable to economic expansion.     

Incorporating Policymaker Costs and Political Competition into Rent-Seeking Games

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, if the value of the rent is sufficiently high relative to policymakers' costs, an increase in the intensity of political competition will increase lobbying expenditures; otherwise, expenditures fall as competitive intensity increases. In addition, the model establishes pure-strategy equilibria with underdissipation where only mixed-strategy equilibria exist in the standard model.     

货币政策透明度、通胀偏差与预期成本

由于预期的形成是需要成本的，本文通过建立一个引入预期成本的简单模型，分析可得信息的开发和处理信息成本之间的权衡关系对货币政策博弈的影响。模型得到两个结论：一是提高货币政策的透明度可以降低通货膨胀率；二是在特定的情况下，越“保守的”中央银行可能会导致更高的通货膨胀。因此，为了减少由动态不一致所导致的通胀偏差，中央银行越保守，就应该越透明。     

International environmental outsourcing

In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of firms shifting stages of their production processes overseas. In this paper we investigate whether firms outsource the dirtier stages of production to minimise domestic environmental regulation costs—a process broadly consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis. We develop a theoretical model of international environmental outsourcing that focuses on the roles played by firm size and productivity, transport costs and environmental regulations. We test the model’s predictions using a firm-level dataset for Japan and do find evidence of an ‘environmental outsourcing’ effect.