Endogenous fluctuations in a cournotian monopolistic competition model with free entry and market power variability

The purpose of this article is to show that there is a link between imperfections of competition and occurrence of endogenous fluctuations. We consider a two-sector model in which a perfectly competitive final good sector uses inputs that are produced in a Cournot monopolistic competition market. We show that when inputs are not perfect substitutes, and the depreciation rate of capital is sufficiently small, Neimark bifurcations are susceptible to emerge. This is a consequence of additional variability in the dynamical system generated by the dependence of the markup on the number of firms. This number changes over time because firms can enter and exit the market without costs. Moreover, a fixed cost in the technology ensures that the number of active firms at a given date is finite provided that the elasticity of substitution between inputs is bounded from above.     

Consumption taxes in monopolistic competition: a comment

We show that an ad valorem tax is better than an equal-revenue unit tax when consumers spend some fixed proportion of income on taxed goods, when firms use constant mark-up pricing, and entry and exit drive per-firm profit to zero. These key assumptions implies that ad valorem taxes are superior in oligopoly as well as monopolistic competition, showing that earlier results on taxes in monopolistic competition (Schröder in J Econ 83(3):281–292, 2004) are not due to the mode of competition, but rather are due to the functional forms used.     

Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

Abstract. In this paper we investigate the trade‐off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second‐best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost. JEL Classification: D42, D61, D92, O38 Régulation du prix optimal dans un modèle de croissance où existent des fournisseurs monopolistes de biens intermédiaires. Dans ce mémoire, on enquête sur la relation d’équivalence à laquelle les régulateurs doivent faire face au moment de définir le prix quelque part entre le niveau du coût marginal et le niveau du prix de monopole. On utilise un modèle de croissance dans le cas où existent des fournisseurs monopolistes de biens intermédiaires. Des investissements dans l’innovation sont nécessaires pour produire un nouveau produit intermédiaire. La tarification au coût marginal décourage l’innovation alors que la tarification au niveau du prix de monopole maximise l’innovation et la croissance au prix d’une certaine inefficacité statique. On montre que l’existence d’un prix qui est un optimum de second ordre et se situe au‐dessus du coût marginal mais au dessous du prix de monopole maximise le niveau de bien‐être des consommateurs. Des résultats de simulation suggèrent que des réductions substantielles dans la consommation, la production, la croissance, et le niveau de bien‐être se produisent quand les régulateurs sont focalisés sur les problèmes d’efficacité statique et fixent les prix au niveau (ou près du niveau) du coût marginal.     

A simple model of foreign brand penetration under monopolistic competition

The main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple monopolistic competition trade model, how trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade costs) can affect domestic entrepreneurs’ decision between providing domestic or foreign brands, and thus the degree of foreign brand penetration. It is shown that, as trade costs decrease, more entrepreneurs choose to provide foreign brands. Furthermore, the shift to foreign brands is shown to magnify the negative impact of trade liberalization on the profits of firms selling domestic brands.     

Multiple equilibria and global indeterminacy in an endogenous growth model with congestible public goods

This paper extends the findings in Chen and Lee (2007) to show that the use of congestible public goods can produce both local and global indeterminacy in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with productive public services financed by income taxation. Basically, we observe the effects on growth rates by changing parameters, and compare the case of a single steady‐state with the emergence of dual steady‐states, identifying the feasible ways to avoid a possible low‐growth poverty trap. The novelty of our analysis is to detect the presence of global indeterminacy by making use of the Bogdanov‐Takens bifurcation theorem. Some examples are also provided to achieve concrete policy implications.     

Union bargaining power, employment, and output in a model of monopolistic competition with wage bargaining

This paper examines the implications of a rise in the bargaining power of workers on the real wage, income distribution, and the levels of employment and output using a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition and worker-owner Nash bargaining at the firm level. It thereby provides optimizing microfoundations to Kalecki's macroeconomic analysis of the positive effect on output of a rise in trade-union power, and contrasts it with the neoclassical view based on the diminishing marginal productivity of labor.     

Spatial monopolistic competition versus spatial monopoly

This paper compares the equilibrium firm output, market area, price of services, and level of net benefits in monopolistically competitive spatial equilibrium versus the multiplant monopolists spatial equilibrium. Through a computer simulation, it is found that the welfare comparisons depend on population density—the monopolists equilibrium is superior to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium in high density areas and vice versa, contrary to traditional economic theory in which distance is assumed costless.     

Optimal fiscal policy under monopolistic competition with firm heterogeneity

Government spending is a policy instrument used to sustain economic development and improve social welfare. Empirical observations, however, reveal a significant decrease in the government spending to GDP ratio for the United States. In addition, the United States has been observed to exhibit a rise in firm heterogeneity in productivity in recent decades. This paper shows that the optimal size of government expenditure will decrease as firm heterogeneity increases. We thus indicate that the rise in firm heterogeneity in productivity may serve as a plausible vehicle to explain the decline in the share of government spending in GDP for the United States.     

Intergenerational welfare effects of a tariff under monopolistic competition

A dynamic overlapping-generations model of a semi-small open economy with monopolistic competition in the goods market is constructed. A tariff increase reduces real output and employment and improves the terms of trade, both in the impact period and in the new steady state. The tariff shock has significant intergenerational distribution effects which are different for creditor and debtor nations. Bond policy neutralizes the intergenerational inequities and allows the computation of first-best and second-best optimal tariff rates. The first-best tariff exploits national market power, but the second-best tariff contains a correction to account for the existence of a potentially suboptimal product subsidy.     

GDP steady-state multipliers under monopolistic competition revisited

New Keynesian general-equilibrium static models showed the fiscal multiplier is an increasing function of the degree of monopoly. Here, I develop a simple intertemporal model allowing us to study the steady-state role of optimal capital stock (and depreciation) in the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. The GDP multiplier may be locally decreasing in the degree of monopoly when the number of firms is fixed, but results depend strongly on the set of parameter values chosen. Using a net-output definition or allowing for free entry leads to unambiguous dominance of the long-run monopolistic multiplier over the Walrasian one.

The welfare cost of monopolistic competition: a quantitative assessment

This paper quantifies the welfare cost of monopolistic competition in a simple parametric class of endogenous growth models, embedding the neoclassical growth framework as a special case. We put particular emphasis on taking transitional dynamics into account. In doing so, we develop an original two-step numerical procedure to compute the value function. We find for conservative calibrations that the welfare cost of monopolistic competition can be anywhere between 0.4 and 1.2% of consumption, depending on whether labor is elastically or inelastically supplied.     

Measuring the gains from trade under monopolistic competition

Abstract .  Three sources of gains from trade under monopolistic competition are (i) new import varieties available to consumers; (ii) enhanced efficiency as more productive firms begin exporting and less productive firms exit; (iii) reduced markups charged by firms due to import competition. The first source of gains can be measured as new goods in a CES utility function for consumers. We argue that the second source is formally analogous to the producer gain from new goods, with a constant-elasticity transformation curve for the economy. We suggest that the third source of gain can be measured using a translog expenditure function for consumers, which, in contrast to the CES case, allows for finite reservation prices for new goods and endogenous markups.     

The rise and fall of monopolistic competition revolution

The widespread idea among economists is that monopolistic or imperfect competition is a set of realistic models that were invented in the 1930s and their purpose was to fill the gap between the polar and, at the same time, hypothetical models of perfect competition and pure monopoly. The main argument of this paper is that the monopolistic competition revolution set in motion a reaction—partly driven by methodological considerations, partly ideological—that ultimately led to the restoration of perfect competition, as the benchmark for evaluating market outcomes. In the end, monopolistic competition eclipsed, and perfect competition from the fridges of economic analysis that was up until the 1920s was placed to the very core of microeconomic model-building.

Irrationality and monopolistic competition: An evolutionary approach

This paper shows that a monopolistically competitive equilibrium can evolve without purposive profit maximization. Specifically, this paper formulates a precise evolutionary dynamic model of an industry where there is continuous entry of firms that randomly select their output levels on entry and fix their output levels thereafter. Firms exit the industry if they fail to pass the survival test of making nonnegative wealth. This paper shows that the industry converges in probability to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium as the size of each firm becomes infinitesimally small relative to the market, as the entry cost becomes sufficiently small, and as time gets sufficiently large. Consequently, in the limit, the only surviving firms are those producing at the tangency of the demand curve to the average cost curve and no potential entrant can make a positive profit by entry.