共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 48 毫秒
1.
Henrik Vetter 《Journal of Economics》2013,110(3):287-295
We show that an ad valorem tax is better than an equal-revenue unit tax when consumers spend some fixed proportion of income on taxed goods, when firms use constant mark-up pricing, and entry and exit drive per-firm profit to zero. These key assumptions implies that ad valorem taxes are superior in oligopoly as well as monopolistic competition, showing that earlier results on taxes in monopolistic competition (Schröder in J Econ 83(3):281–292, 2004) are not due to the mode of competition, but rather are due to the functional forms used. 相似文献
2.
Toru Kikuchi 《Journal of Economics》2010,100(3):235-245
The main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple monopolistic competition trade model, how trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade costs) can affect domestic entrepreneurs’ decision between providing domestic or foreign brands, and thus the degree of foreign brand penetration. It is shown that, as trade costs decrease, more entrepreneurs choose to provide foreign brands. Furthermore, the shift to foreign brands is shown to magnify the negative impact of trade liberalization on the profits of firms selling domestic brands. 相似文献
3.
This paper examines the implications of a rise in the bargaining power of workers on the real wage, income distribution, and the levels of employment and output using a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition and worker-owner Nash bargaining at the firm level. It thereby provides optimizing microfoundations to Kalecki's macroeconomic analysis of the positive effect on output of a rise in trade-union power, and contrasts it with the neoclassical view based on the diminishing marginal productivity of labor. 相似文献
4.
Luís F. Costa 《Portuguese Economic Journal》2007,6(3):181-204
New Keynesian general-equilibrium static models showed the fiscal multiplier is an increasing function of the degree of monopoly.
Here, I develop a simple intertemporal model allowing us to study the steady-state role of optimal capital stock (and depreciation)
in the fiscal policy transmission mechanism. The GDP multiplier may be locally decreasing in the degree of monopoly when the
number of firms is fixed, but results depend strongly on the set of parameter values chosen. Using a net-output definition
or allowing for free entry leads to unambiguous dominance of the long-run monopolistic multiplier over the Walrasian one.
相似文献
Luís F. CostaEmail: URL: http://www.iseg.utl.pt/~lukosta/ |
5.
Robert C. Feenstra 《The Canadian journal of economics》2010,43(1):1-28
Abstract . Three sources of gains from trade under monopolistic competition are (i) new import varieties available to consumers; (ii) enhanced efficiency as more productive firms begin exporting and less productive firms exit; (iii) reduced markups charged by firms due to import competition. The first source of gains can be measured as new goods in a CES utility function for consumers. We argue that the second source is formally analogous to the producer gain from new goods, with a constant-elasticity transformation curve for the economy. We suggest that the third source of gain can be measured using a translog expenditure function for consumers, which, in contrast to the CES case, allows for finite reservation prices for new goods and endogenous markups. 相似文献
6.
Guo Ying Luo 《European Economic Review》2009,53(5):512-526
This paper shows that a monopolistically competitive equilibrium can evolve without purposive profit maximization. Specifically, this paper formulates a precise evolutionary dynamic model of an industry where there is continuous entry of firms that randomly select their output levels on entry and fix their output levels thereafter. Firms exit the industry if they fail to pass the survival test of making nonnegative wealth. This paper shows that the industry converges in probability to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium as the size of each firm becomes infinitesimally small relative to the market, as the entry cost becomes sufficiently small, and as time gets sufficiently large. Consequently, in the limit, the only surviving firms are those producing at the tangency of the demand curve to the average cost curve and no potential entrant can make a positive profit by entry. 相似文献
7.
We study a small open economy with two sectors and two factors of production. In one of the sectors, external economies of scale are generated through the industry-level capital input. This leads to a divergence between private and social production possibility frontiers as well as to multiple equilibria. The equilibrium selection problem that arises is solved by agents who follow a simple trial-and-error learning rule. The growth path of the economy as agents learn lies below the production possibility frontier and may display cyclical transitional dynamics. We also show that coordination problems which may prevent the economy from attaining the “good” equilibrium may be alleviated by the temporary use of policy instruments that shape the allocation of resources. 相似文献
8.
Prof. Dr. Yasunori Ishii 《Journal of Economics》1991,54(1):21-32
Establishing a model of a monopolistically competitive industry in which risk-averse Cournot firms act under demand uncertainty and in which the output of individual firms and the number of firms in the industry are both endogenously determined by free entry and exit, this paper attempts to investigate the effects of demand uncertainty on the market equilibrium of a monopolistically competitive industry. It is assumed, for calculus simplification, that the firms are identical in the sense that they have the same monopolistic power and the same production technology. The paper presents some interesting and useful comparative statics results which are contrary to those proposed in the existing papers.This is a revised version of my paper which was firstly presented to the annual meeting of the Japanese Association of International Economics held in 1988 and then included partially in my book published in 1989. I am indebted to professors D. Bös, S. Fujino, M. Ohyama, M. Nishijima, to the members of the Public Economics Research Seminar in Bonn, and to two anonymous referees for their helpful discussions and useful suggestions. Any remaining errors, however, are my responsibility. 相似文献
9.
Pere Gomis-Porqueras 《Economic Theory》2002,19(4):791-810
Summary. This paper considers a monetary growth model in which banks provide liquidity, and in which a government finances a deficit
by printing money and selling bonds. In this context, I examine the possibility that the government may want to impose binding
reserve requirements on banks' holdings of both money and government bonds. Conditions are established under which doing so
increases steady state welfare and reduces the scope for indeterminacies. Furthermore, under a binding system of multiple
reserve requirements we have that money is superneutral. On the other hand, if reserve requirements are imposed on cash holdings
alone, increases in the steady state inflation rate adversely affect capital accumulation and long run real activity. Thus
systems of multiple binding reserve requirements can insulate real activity from the consequences of inflationary taxation.
Received: June 30, 2000; revised version: January 31, 2001 相似文献
10.
Sajid Anwar 《Journal of Economics》2001,74(3):259-281
This paper utilizes a well-known specification of returns to specialization (a variation of the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model) to explore the implications of local agglomeration effects for commercial policy and restricted factor mobility. The paper initially considers a small open economy where it is shown that a tariff reduces the degree of specialization and hence the size of the external economies to the producers. An inflow of labor increases the degree of specialization while a capital inflow decreases it. The paper then considers a two-country world where both countries are large and deals with the pattern of trade and factor mobility. 相似文献
11.
12.
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions. 相似文献
13.
Summary We analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth plans occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. We find that the ability commit to multiperiod economic policy leads to less political stability of economic plans.Support for this research was provided in part by NSF grant #SES-9022932 to the California Institute of Technology. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that our results could be extended to supra majority rules, as in Proposition 1. 相似文献
14.
Abstract . In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, entry of firms is socially too small. Other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity. We show that workers' rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism. Larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits, which entices too many firms to enter. We discuss the possibility of over-provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled. 相似文献
15.
Abstract. Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs. Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition, realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generate more consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valorem tariff. JEL classification: F12 相似文献
16.
Claus Weddepohl 《Journal of Economic Theory》1983,29(1):95-108
In a simple temperary equilibrium model with three commodities (labour, goods and money) and two sectors, there are different firms, each having its own production function. There now exist four types of fixed price equilibria (Keynesian, classical, repressed inflation, undercounsumption). In the last type, consumers are not rationed, some producers are rationed on the goods market, and other producers on the labour market. There exist three different aggregate production functions, that have to be applied in Keynesian, classical, and repressed inflation situations respectively. For the fourth case no aggregate production function exists. 相似文献
17.
Christian Müller 《Empirical Economics》2006,31(3):755-776
This paper investigates how firms’ market power affects the price level. Based on a small macro-model it is shown empirically that firms have structural markup pricing power and take advantage of favourable business cycle fluctuations. To this aim, a multivariate time series model with double integrated variables is estimated. Thereby a model-based business cycle indicator can be derived. Its information content is confronted with survey data giving rise to what is going to be called semantic cross validation approach.
相似文献
Christian MüllerEmail: Phone: +41-44-6324624Fax: +41-44-6321218 |
18.
Summary. The paper studies creditworthiness in a model with endogenous credit cost and debt constraints. Such a model can give rise to multiple candidates for steady state equilibria. We use new analytical techniques such as dynamic programming (DP) with flexible grid size to find solutions and to locate thresholds that separate different domains of attraction. More specifically, we (1) compute present value borrowing constraints and thus creditworthiness, (2) locate thresholds where the dynamics separate to different domains of attraction, (3) show jumps in the decision variable, (4) distinguish between optimal and non-optimal steady states, (5) demonstrate how creditworthiness and thresholds change with change of the credit cost function of the debtor and (6) explore the impact of debt ceilings and consumption paths on creditworthiness.JEL Classification Numbers:
C61, C63, D91, D92, E51, G12, G32.An earlier version of this paper has been prepared for the 1998 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, January 1998, Chicago. We want to thank Jess Benhabib, Buz Brock, Gustav Feichtinger, Franz Wirl, Michael Woodford, Wolf-Jürgen Beyn and Thorsten Pampel for helpful discussions and comments on various versions of the paper. We also want to thank participants in a workshop at the University of Technology, Vienna, the Macroeconomic Workshop at Columbia University, and the SCE conference, at Yale University, June 2001. We are also grateful for comments from a referee of the journal. 相似文献
19.
Abstract. We analyze the Nash equilibria of a standard Bertrand model. We show that in addition to the marginal-cost pricing equilibrium there is a possibility for mixed-strategy equilibria yielding positive profit levels. We characterize these equilibria and find that having unbounded revenues is the necessary and sufficient condition for their existence. Hence, we demonstrate that under realistic assumptions the only equilibrium is marginal-cost pricing. 相似文献
20.
《Review of Economic Dynamics》2014,17(3):474-483
Counter-cyclical fluctuations in the price of investment in consumption units are often attributed to investment-specific technology shocks. This paper looks at an additional source for such fluctuations: sector-specific markup variations, the idea being that pro-cyclical competition and the higher variability of investment compared to consumption pushes down the relative price of investment during expansions. I find that such endogenous movements in sector-specific markups can account for up to about one quarter of the observed fluctuations in the price of investment. 相似文献