A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency

In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility, the three notions of consistency, bilateral consistency, and converse consistency are frequently used to provide axiomatic characterizations of a particular solution (like the core, prekernel, prenucleolus, Shapley value). Our main equivalence theorem claims that a solution satisfies consistency (with respect to an arbitrary reduced game) if and only if the solution satisfies both bilateral consistency and converse consistency (with respect to the same reduced game). The equivalence theorem presumes transitivity of the reduced game technique as well as difference independence on payoff vectors for two-person reduced games.     

A note on incomplete factor taxation

Optimal capital taxes may be positive in the steady state in Ramsey models with an incomplete set of factor taxes. I show this possibility crucially depends on how fiscal policy is constrained at date t = 0. If the government is barred from manipulating the value of initial assets, the Chamley–Judd result reappears: the optimal capital tax is always zero in the steady state.     

A note on repeated-offers bargaining with one-sided incomplete information

Summary This note analyzes a modified version of the standard repeated-offers bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information studied in Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989). The modification, which is introduced in the extensive form, is that the (uninformed) seller can choose to withdraw her offer immediately after the (informed) buyer accepts it. This modification is important because it removes the (implicit) commitment assumption built into the standard model that the seller is committed not to withdraw her price offer. A main result obtained is, that whether or not there is a gap between the seller's valuation and the lowest possible buyer's valuation, any seller payoff between zero and the static monopoly profit can be supported by sequential equilibria. Thus, even in the gap case there exist equilibria that completely reverse the Coase conjecture.I thank Ian Jewitt and an anonymous referee for their helpful advice and comments.     

A note on one-shot public mediated talk

Lehrer and Sorin (1997, Games Econ. Behav. 20, 131–148) use a one-shot public mediated talk model to show that, given any probability distribution on the outcomes of a finite normal-form game, there exists a public mediated talk mechanism that simulates that distribution, provided the probabilities on outcomes are rational numbers. It is shown here that a minor amendment of the very same model allows a much stronger conclusion: any distribution on the outcomes, whether the probabilities are rational numbers or not, can be obtained as the outcome of a one-shot public mediated talk mechanism.     

A note on S in a spatially correlated error components regression model for panel data

The ordinary least squares based estimator of the disturbance variance in a panel regression model with spatially correlated error component is shown to be asymptotically unbiased and weakly consistent without any restrictions on the regressor matrix.     

A note on ‘trying to value a life’

Broome's alleged paradox that application of the usual compensation test to the valuation of life would produce an infinite monetary value is shown to be false because it is based on illegitimate generalisation from a special case in which no effective compensation is possible. In the general case, relevant to public sector project appraisal, such compensation is possible, and finite values are to be expected, judging by people's ordinary behaviour.     

A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme

A vector of balanced weights infers an inequality that games with a nonempty core obey. This paper gives a generalization of the notion ‘vector of balanced weights.’ Herewith, it provides necessary and sufficient conditions to determine whether a TU-game has a population monotonic allocation scheme or not. Furthermore, it shows that every four-person integer valued game with a population monotonic allocation scheme has an integer valued population monotonic allocation scheme and it gives an example of a seven-person integer valued game that has only noninteger valued population monotonic allocation schemes.     

Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information

We study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and incomplete information. We characterize S^U(G), the set of outcomes of a game G, that are induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions. A cheap talk extension of G is an extensive-form game in which players communicate before playing G. A reliable mediator is not available and players exchange private or public messages that do not affect directly their payoffs. We first show that if G is a game of complete information with five or more players and rational parameters, then S^U(G) coincides with the set of correlated equilibria of G. Next, we demonstrate that if G is a game of incomplete information with at least five players, rational parameters and full support (i.e., all profiles of types have positive probability), then S^U(G) is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G.     

A note on public debt, tax-exempt bonds, and Ponzi games

By issuing tax-exempt bonds, the government can incur debt and never pay back any principal or interest, even if the economy without public debt evolves on a dynamically efficient growth path. The welfare effects of such a Ponzi type borrowing scheme are mixed. The current young will unambiguously benefit. Depending on preferences and the aggregate technology, a finite number of subsequent generations may also benefit. However, the welfare of all generations thereafter will be lower than in the economy without public debt.     

Voice matters in a dictator game

We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

A note on the value of public information in monopoly

The paper shows that in the standard model of monopoly with asymmetric information and second-degree price discrimination, the monopolist prefers to reveal public information under a form of stochastic dependence that is weaker than the affiliation of private values, private signals, and public signals.      

A note on value maximization for consumption sets in l

A new technique is provided for showing the necessity of the transversality condition in a class of models for which all consumption paths are summable.     

Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67–81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.     

高新技术企业研发团队沟通行为对自主创新绩效的影响——以知识吸收能力为中介变量

在知识经济时代,知识是企业发展和创新的源泉与重要资源。研发团队沟通行为是影响高新技术企业自主创新绩效的重要因素,探究其对自主创新绩效的影响机制具有重要意义。以社会认同、知识共享等理论为基础,以知识吸收能力为中介变量,分析高新技术企业研发团队沟通行为与自主创新绩效的关系,运用逐步回归分析法对288份有效样本进行实证分析。研究发现：研发团队合作性沟通对团队产品创新绩效和工艺创新绩效有正向影响;研发团队竞争性沟通和回避性沟通对团队产品创新绩效和工艺创新绩效有负向影响;知识吸收能力在研发团队合作性沟通、竞争性沟通与自主创新绩效的影响中起显著中介作用,但是在研发团队回避性沟通对自主创新绩效影响的中介作用不显著。结论为提升高新技术企业研发团队自主创新绩效提供了新的方法与路径,对企业提高知识共享与创新能力,开展创新活动具有重要启示。     

The monoclus of a coalitional game

The analysis of single-valued solution concepts, providing payoffs to players for the grand coalition only, has a long tradition. Opposed to most of this literature we analyze allocation scheme rules, which assign payoffs to all players in all coalitions. We introduce several closely related allocation scheme rules, each resulting in a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) whenever the underlying coalitional game with transferable utilities has a PMAS. Monotonicities, which measure the payoff difference for a player between two nested coalitions, are the driving force. These monotonicities can best be compared with the excesses in the definition of the (pre-)nucleolus. Variants are obtained by considering different domains and/or different collections of monotonicities. We deal with nonemptiness, uniqueness, and continuity, followed by an analysis of conditions for (some of) the rules to coincide. We then focus on characterizing the rules in terms of subbalanced weights. Finally, we deal with computational issues.     

Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

Summary. In this paper we introduce a new model of ex ante contracting for economies with asymmetric information to examine endogenously determined communication plans for information sharing in the interim stage. In contrast to the models used in previous research, in the present model agents negotiate not only on a contract of state contingent allocations but also on a communication plan, a set of rules describing how agents will reveal part of their private information at the interim stage to execute the trade contracts. We prove a result about the nested structure of the set of allocations implementable by various communication plans and establish the existence of core strategies for this cooperative game under various regularity conditions. Received: 4 March 1998; revised version: 17 September 1999     

Letting third parties who suffer from petty corruption talk: Evidence from a collusive bribery experiment

Following a recommendation by Transparency International, we conduct a laboratory experiment to gauge the impact of a specific type of grassroots participation on petty corruption. Participants play a one-shot, three-person sequential bribery game that, depending on the treatment, either gives or does not give passive third parties suffering from corruption the opportunity to send a publicly visible message to potential bribers and bribees. We find that messaging opportunities deter bribe offers (i.e., the extensive margin of bribe), but affect neither the size of the offered bribe (i.e., the intensive margin) nor bribe acceptances. We conjecture that the different impact of the treatment on bribe-givers and bribe-takers may be due to the order of play.