次贷危机、资信评级与评级质量改进

美国次贷危机的爆发有其特殊的背景,而评级机构因表现不佳而受到市场参与者的广泛批评。本文回顾了次贷危机的背景,在此基础上分析了评级机构的角色及结构性融资产品评级的程序、方法和内容,并结合证监会国际组织、美国证监会的监管提议,提出了改进评级质量的建议。     

次贷危机中的资信评级研究

次贷危机引发的金融风暴导致全球经济增长放缓。人们在反思危机的过程中,也将更多的批评目光投向了资信评级机构,尤其是国际三大信用评级机构。本文在阐述了现行资信评级体系的基础上,深入剖析了资信评级机构在次贷危机中所扮演的角色和负面作用,并研究分析了SEC对三大评级公司的调查及监管建议,最后提出了促进我国征信业健康、有序发展的政策建议。     

证券信用评级行业的发展及监管研究

证券信用评级机构是独立于发行人和投资人之间第三方中介机构,为投资人作出投资决策提供信用信息,降低信息不对称和发行人的融资成本,解决资本市场的逆向选择问题。针对我国证券市场的非市场特性,尤其是“政策市”、“消息市”的特征,评级机构对市场参与主体实施广泛的检查评价,有利于提高监管效率、降低监管成本,大力发展证券信用评级行业,对减少行政手段干预市场、利用市场力量来监督市场主体能够起到关键作用。     

当前我国资信评级业的现状及发展

资信评级机构的评级,往往直接影响到社会对某一经济体的信心。目前,资信评级机构已经成为国际金融领域的“超级警察”。由于众多原因,中国资信评级业的状况不容乐观,这不仅表现在官方和民间对资信评级业的重要性认识不够,评级业主法滞后,还表现在评级机构不能做到“利益中立”,评级程序缺乏科学性,严密性,在我国即将加入ＷＴＯ的前提下,评级业的规范发展已成为亟待解决的问题。     

信用评级行业竞争和规制:美国的经验和启示

美国信用评级行业高度集中,标普、穆迪是评级市场的统治者。美国证券交易委员会对国家认可的统计评级机构(NRSROs)的指定以及基于监管目的广泛使用NRSROs概念导致评级行业的准入壁垒。声誉资本、网络效应以及评级透明也是影响信用评级行业竞争状况的因素。为了增进评级行业竞争,美国已经加强对信用评级机构的法律监管,并正在酝酿新一轮的竞争规制措施和改革方案。美国的经验和做法对于我国刚刚起步的信用评级行业的发展具有借鉴意义。     

美国和欧盟信用评级监管制度改革比较及其启示

"次贷危机"的爆发促使美国和欧盟加快了信用评级监管制度改革的步伐。2009年4月10日,美国证监会(SEC)修改了相关信用评级监管法规;同年4月23日欧盟议会和欧盟理事会通过了立法,授权欧盟证券监管委员会(CESR)对欧盟范围内的信用评级机构进行监管。本文通过简要比较美国和欧盟此次改革的主要内容,探讨他们改革思路的差异,并结合我国实际提出相关建议。     

资信评级行业发展对策的博弈分析

针对我国市场经济中存在的信用缺失问题,文章探讨了资信评级公司与被评级公司之间、资信评级行业与外部监管机构之间的博弈关系,并提出了提高资信评级行业效率的相关对策。     

资信评级行业发展对策的博弈分析

针对我国市场经济中存在的信用缺失问题,文章探讨了资信评级公司与被评级公司之间、资信评级行业与外部监管机构之间的博弈关系,并提出了提高资信评级行业效率的相关对策.     

次贷危机后对信用评级业的反思

信用评级业经过一个世纪的发展,在缓解市场信息不对称、降低企业筹资成本、促进资本市场发展等方面积极作用明显。但是近年来,特别是在次贷危机中,信用评级机构暴露出许多缺陷和不足,饱受社会质疑。本文深入剖析了信用评级机构在次贷危机中表现欠佳的原因,介绍了欧美国家对信用评级机构监管的最新发展动态,并从中得出了对我国的借鉴和启示。     

信用评级的危机——近期美国信用评级监管措施及对我国的启示

本文力求从相关研究中摘取关键性数据展示关于信用评级的失败,同时收集整理了与研究成果相关的美国监管机构加强信用评级监管的最新措施,并结合当前正处在征求意见阶段的《征信管理条例》的制订,对我国信用评级业发展讲行了深入思考。     

Regulation of credit rating agencies

Financial regulators recognize certain credit rating agencies for regulatory purposes. However, it is often argued that credit rating agencies have an incentive to assign inflated ratings. This paper studies a repeated principal-agent problem in which a regulator approves credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies may collude to assign inflated ratings. Yet we show that there exists an approval scheme which induces credit rating agencies to assign correct ratings.     

信用评级标准的要点及国内外相关比较

2003年以来，在中央加快建立社会信用体系的政策指导下，信用评级业得到了政府的高度重视。中国人民银行设立了征信管理局，陆续出台了有关信用评级的政策规章？中国人民银行日前发布了金融行业标准《信贷市场和银行间债券市场信用评级规范》（JR／T0030—2006），包括信用评级主体规范、信用评级业务规范、信用评级业务管理规范等三方面的内容。这是继2006年3月国内第一部规范评级机构业务行为的部门规章《中国人民银行信用评级管理指导意见》（银发[2006]95号，以下简称“指导意见”）后又一管理信用评级业的重要件，是对“指导意见”的深化和细化，必将对中国信用评级业的规范发展起到里程碑意义的作用。[第一段]     

Corporate financing and anticipated credit rating changes

Firm circumstances change but rating agencies may not make timely revisions to their ratings, thereby increasing information asymmetry between firms and the market. We examine whether firms time the securities market before a credit rating agency publicly reveals its decision to change a firm’s credit rating. Using quarterly data, we show that firms adjust their financing structures before credit rating downgrades are publicly revealed. Specifically, firms on average increase their debt financing by 1.29 % before the disclosure of a rating downgrade, and this increase is due to the issuance of debt rather than the repurchase of equity. In contrast, firms do not take significant financing actions before credit rating upgrades.     

国际信用评级体系改革与中国评级业发展展望

国际金融危机和欧洲主权债务危机的爆发,凸显出现行国际信用评级体系存在的种种弊端。该文指出,现行国际信用评级体系的根本缺陷在于高度垄断,为此应通过加强内部治理和外部监管推动现有评级行业的改革,并推动国际信用评级行业新秩序的建立。中国应从宏观政策层面出台措施,扶持和推动本国自主信用评级体系的做大做强,并参与到国际信用评级体系的重建中。     

The impact of credit rating announcements on credit default swap spreads

We document the ability of the credit default swap (CDS) market to anticipate favorable as well as unfavorable credit rating change (RC) announcements based on more extensive samples of credit rating events and CDS spreads than previous studies. We obtain four new results. In contrast to prior published studies, we find that corporate RC upgrades do have a significant impact on CDS spreads even though they are still not as well anticipated as downgrades. Second, CreditWatch (CW) and Outlook (OL) announcements, after controlling for prior credit rating events, lead to significant CARs at the time positive CW and OL credit rating events are announced. Third, we extend prior results by showing that changes in CDS spreads for non-investment-grade credits contain information useful for estimating the probability of negative credit rating events. Fourth, we find that the CDS spread impact of upgrades but not downgrades is magnified during recessions and that upgrades and downgrades also differ as to the impact of simultaneous CW/OL announcements, investment-grade/speculative-grade crossovers, current credit rating, market volatility, and industry effects.     

Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and credit rating

This paper shows that the puzzling negative cross-sectional relation between dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and future stock returns may be explained by financial distress, as proxied by credit rating downgrades. Focusing on a sample of firms rated by Standard & Poor's (S&P), we show that the profitability of dispersion-based trading strategies concentrates in a small number of the worst-rated firms and is significant only during periods of deteriorating credit conditions. In such periods, the negative dispersion–return relation emerges as low-rated firms experience substantial price drop along with considerable increase in forecast dispersion. Moreover, even for this small universe of worst-rated firms, the dispersion–return relation is non-existent when either the dispersion measure or return is adjusted by credit risk. The results are robust to previously proposed explanations for the dispersion effect such as short-sale constraints and leverage.     

Modelling the economic value of credit rating systems

In this paper we develop a model of the economic value of credit rating systems. Increasing international competition and changes in the regulatory framework driven by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II) called forth incentives for banks to improve their credit rating systems. An improvement of the statistical power of a rating system decreases the potential effects of adverse selection, and, combined with meeting several qualitative standards, decreases the amount of regulatory capital requirements. As a consequence, many banks have to make investment decisions where they have to consider the costs and the potential benefits of improving their rating systems. In our model the quality of a rating system depends on several parameters such as the accuracy of forecasting individual default probabilities and the rating class structure. We measure effects of adverse selection in a competitive one-period framework by parameterizing customer elasticity. Capital requirements are obtained by applying the current framework released by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Results of a numerical analysis indicate that improving a rating system with low accuracy to medium accuracy can increase the annual rate of return on a portfolio by 30–40 bp. This effect is even stronger for banks operating in markets with high customer elasticity and high loss rates. Compared to the estimated implementation costs banks could have a strong incentive to invest in their rating systems. The potential of reduced capital requirements on the portfolio return is rather weak compared to the effect of adverse selection.     

揭秘信用评级机构背后的盈利模式

20世纪90年代,美国三大评级巨头格局成型,评级成了任何金融产品都必不可少的部分东西,而其中的盈利模式是怎样的呢？     

The reaction of emerging market credit default swap spreads to sovereign credit rating changes

This paper examines the effect of sovereign credit rating change announcements on the CDS spreads of the event countries, and their spillover effects on other emerging economies’ CDS premiums. We find that positive events have a greater impact on CDS markets in the two-day period surrounding the event, and are more likely to spill over to other emerging countries. Alternatively, CDS markets anticipate negative events, and previous changes in CDS premiums can be used to estimate the probability of a negative credit event. The transmission mechanisms for positive events are the common creditor and competition in trade markets.     

Variations in sovereign credit quality assessments across rating agencies

We investigate agency variation in credit quality assessment (Standard and Poor’s vs. Moody’s vs. Fitch) employing sovereign ratings data for 129 countries, spanning the period 1990–2006. While we find that the credit rating agencies often disagree about credit quality, it is usually confined to one or two notches on the finer scale. We find that several variables have varying importance in explaining ratings across agencies which leads us to conclude that material heterogeneity exists between them. Also, while watch and outlook procedures are generally strong predictors of rating changes relative to other public data, additional significant variables suggest that it might be possible to augment these agency data to provide better forecasts of future rating changes.