欧洲银行业联盟筹建步伐加速

银行业单一监管机制、清算机制以及存款担保制度，将构成欧洲银行业联盟的三大支柱。其中，银行业单一监管机制已经获批，单一清算机制和存款担保机制协议也已“出炉”。     

欧洲银行业联盟渐行渐近

银行业单一监管机制(SSM)、清算机制以及存款保险制度构成了欧洲银行业联盟的三大支柱。欧洲银行业监管自2012年6月欧洲首脑会议起,银行业联盟这一概念就一直居于欧洲政治议题的首位,被认为是保证欧洲货币联盟(EMU)稳定性的关键一环。2012年10月,欧洲理事会会议进     

欧洲金融一体化波折与单一银行监管机制的构建

文章以翔实的数据比较分析了金融危机前后（包括欧债危机以来）欧元区金融运行格局的变化,探讨欧盟推动建立单一监管机制的原因及前景。文章指出2008年以前,欧洲的金融一体化进程快速推进,银行业市场和金融市场不断融合。金融危机爆发后,监管制度缺位的问题暴露出来,欧洲银行业面临巨大的信心危机,金融一体化进程停滞,货币政策传导遇阻。欧盟反思危机教训,推动建立单一监管机制,重塑银行业信心,重启一体化进程,但实现这一目标任重而道远。     

欧盟宏观审慎政策框架研究

次贷危机和欧债危机对欧洲经济金融体系造成重创.在危机推动下,2010年以来,欧盟逐步建立起由欧央行主导,涵盖单一监管机制、单一处置机制以及存款保险制度的宏观审慎政策框架.2016年3月,欧央行发布首期宏观审慎报告,介绍了新框架下欧央行的宏观审慎职责.本文对欧盟宏观审慎政策的目标、框架、工具以及分析模型进行了全面研究,并作简要述评和展望,为构建有效的宏观审慎政策框架提供镜鉴.     

近期国际银行业危机教训与启示

<正>包括硅谷银行在内的近期所有银行的失败,均暴露出银行自身风险合规管理与内部控制的失败以及背后的监管漏洞。从本轮美欧银行业风险处置过程看,失败机构的自救（bail-in）与处置（resolution）机制、存款保险激励机制,以及中央银行紧急流动性提供机制仍有待进一步健全和完善。     

欧盟推动建立单一监管机制原因及前景探析

2008年以前,欧洲的金融一体化进程快速推进,银行业金融机构和金融市场不断融合。金融危机爆发后,监管制度缺陷暴露,欧洲银行业面临巨大的信心危机,金融一体化进程停滞,货币政策传导遇阻。欧盟反思危机教训,推动建立单一监管机制,重塑银行业信心,重启一体化进程,但任重而道远。     

建立单一的监管机制

银行业联盟的建立,堪比欧元创设,是一项影响更为深远的改革这场危机已确切表明,诸如欧元区这样一个高度关联、一体化的区域(且是一个真实的经济与货币联盟),势必需要一个更强健的制度框架。而增强此框架的一个重要的元素,是以单一监管机制下的银行联盟,此为第一支柱。银行业联盟的关键组成要素银行业联盟旨在构建一体化的金融框架,以维护金融稳定并使银行倒闭成本的降到最低。此单一监管机制的银行业联盟,是由四个互补的组成要素构成的一个整体。欧洲监管框架的建立,是银行联盟的第一支柱。正如其言,     

欧洲银行联盟的设想、争论及前景

2012年以来,欧洲银行联盟作为欧洲应对欧债危机的重要举措被提出,并在几个月内取得显著进展,但目前,围绕欧洲银行联盟作用及相关制度设计还存在较多争论与分歧。文章详细回顾了欧洲银行联盟设想的细化与改进过程,以及各方对重大争议问题的相关看法,指出欧盟各国将会努力推动银行联盟建设,但由于涉及问题的复杂性和艰巨性,银行联盟建设只能分步进行,其长期作用有待观察。     

欧盟银行一体化与单一监管机制的创建

欧盟自20世纪70年代开始,以放松对银行的管制、强化银行业竞争、鼓励银行并购和开展综合经营等政策推进银行一体化。在此期间,银行业出现了高风险业务增加、系统性风险增大、风险扩散加快等问题。全球金融危机后,欧盟加快了金融监管体系改革的步伐,旨在加强对系统性风险的防范。而欧债危机的爆发,促使欧盟创立银行单一监管机制,以强化欧洲中央银行监管权限,明确欧洲中央银行和成员国监管部门的权责。欧盟银行单一监管机制虽然已经创建,但这一机制的有效运行,还有若干制度和技术等方面的问题需要逐一解决。     

欧盟就银行业单一监管机制达成协议

欧洲理事会主席范龙佩19日凌晨在欧盟峰会第一天会议后的新闻发布会上宣布,欧盟领导人同意欧元区单一银行业监管机制将于明年开始实施。范龙佩表示,当晚峰会的进展主要在银行联盟议题上。欧盟首脑们同意在2013年1月1日建成银行业单一监管机制的法律框架,并且这一机制将在2013年逐步开始实施。范龙佩介绍说,欧洲央行将在银行业单一监管机制中扮演核心角色,不过     

European Banking Union and bank risk disclosure: the effects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk...     

The Comprehensive Assessment: What lessons can be learned?

Analysing the database made available by the European Central Bank and by the European Banking Authority, we evaluate the Comprehensive Assessment (CA) (Asset Quality Review and Stress Test (ST)) of banks carried out in 2014. In a nutshell, the main results are: (i) risk-adjusted capital ratios are negatively related to the Asset Quality Review shortfall, but not to the ST shortfall, whereas the leverage ratio plays a significant role in both cases; (ii) the CA predominantly concentrated on traditional credit activity rather than on banks’ financial assets and (iii) the CA seems to be characterized by double standards. The Asset Quality Review was severe with banks operating in non-core countries, while medium-sized banks were either riskier or were treated severely in both exercises. The analysis leads to a puzzle: comparatively, the assessment per se led to significant adjustments for solid banks and large shortfalls for weak banks. The puzzle can be resolved by referring to the legacy of the country’s former supervisory activity and to the low level of capitalization of weak banks mostly in peripheral countries.

Abbreviations: ADJ_AQR: adjustment due to the AQR; ADJ_ST: adjustment due to the ST adverse scenario; AQR: asset quality review; bps: basis points (1?bp is equal to 0.01%); bn: billion; CA: comprehensive assessment; CET1: common equity tier 1; CR: coverage ratio; CRD/CRR: capital requirements directive/capital requirements regulation; CVA: credit valuation adjustment; EBA: European Banking Authority; ECB: European Central Bank; LM test: Lagrange-multiplier test; NPE: Non-performing exposure; RWA: risk-weighted asset; SF_AQR: shortfall due to the AQR; SF_ST: shortfall due to the ST adverse scenario; SREP: supervisory review and evaluation process; SSM: single supervisory mechanism; ST: stress test; tr: trillion (one thousand of billions)     

Banking deregulation and credit risk: Evidence from the EU

This paper studies the effect of banking deregulation on credit risk. Its theoretical model shows that a bank is willing to invest more resources in screening borrowers when there is an entry threat, even though loan rates are driven lower. Thus, deregulation may result in improved loan quality and lower credit risk. This result is tested using bank-level balance sheet data and macroeconomic data for the European Union. The data reveal that competition intensified after the completion of the Second Banking Directive, while loan quality improved in most markets. Evidence is found that the loan quality improvement is associated with lower interest margin.     

Monetary transmission and bank competition in the EMU

The introduction of the euro has led to renewed attention for monetary transmission in the European Union. This special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance includes papers that contribute to the development of both the theory and empirical applications of the monetary transmission channel that assumes various types of imperfections. The issue includes papers that can best be described by the credit view and studies on concentration and competition in the European banking industry. This introduction positions the papers in this active field of research.     

Legitimationsdefizite und Kompetenzen der EIOPA im Lichte der Meroni-Rechtsprechung

The establishment of the European (Financial) Supervisory Authorities (ESA) represents a new peak in the process of agencification of the administration of the European Union. The European legislator has granted the newly founded European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) numerous far-reaching powers in relation to national supervisory authorities and market participants. In this regard the question arises if the European Union was duly empowered by primary law to found this supervisory authority. It has, hitherto, also remained unclear if the extent of the powers entrusted to EIOPA is in conformity with other founding principles of European primary law and the case law of the ECJ.     

The efficiency and the conduct of European banks: Developments after 1992

We assess the efficiency of the European banking sector in the 5-year period following the implementation of the Second Banking Directive of the European Union (EU). We first determine the degree of cost efficiency of EU banks in 1993-1997. After that, we explore to what extent efficient European banks are managed differently than their inefficient peers. Our datasets comprise 5 years of observations on 1347 savings and 873 commercial banks. We use the new recursive thick frontier approach (RTFA) method to establish our results. We find that structural factors, such as technological progress or increased bank competition, have lowered the cost base of banks by about 5% annually during the sample period. Managerial inability to control costs (X-inefficiency) is with 17-25% the main source of bank inefficiency in the EU. Managerial efficiency varies a great deal within Europe, and there seems to be no tendency towards convergence. We find that small savings banks can exploit economies of scale. The EU savings bank sector would cut costs by about 3% if small savings banks merged.     

Surprised or not surprised? The investors’ reaction to the comprehensive assessment preceding the launch of the banking union

Did the Comprehensive Assessment (CA), preceding the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) launch in Europe, achieve its aims of producing new valuable information for the market? We show that the CA achieved the goal of increasing transparency: investors were able to detect weak banks at the announcement of the procedure (23rd October 2013), but gained full information on the amount of the capital shortfall only at the disclosure of the results (26th October 2014). Furthermore, at the official launch of the SSM (4th November 2014), banks under direct European Central Bank (ECB) supervision registered a more negative market reaction with respect to banks maintaining their national supervisors. Using a regression model including possible confounders and allowing for treatment effect heterogeneity, this negative reaction is confirmed. These findings suggest that, at least in the short run, investors penalized banks subject to direct ECB supervision, probably because of the fear of regulatory inconsistencies.     

Carbon emissions and stock returns: Evidence from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effect of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme on German stock returns. We find that, during the first few years of the scheme, firms that received free carbon emission allowances on average significantly outperformed firms that did not. This suggests the presence of a large and statistically significant “carbon premium,” which is mainly explained by the higher cash flows due to the free allocation of carbon emission allowances. A carbon risk factor can also explain part of the cross-sectional variation of stock returns as firms with high carbon emissions have higher exposure to carbon risk and exhibit higher expected returns.     

Drivers of systemic risk: Do national and European perspectives differ?

With the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Central Bank has been granted the power to impose stricter regulations than the national regulator if systemic risks are not adequately addressed at the national level. We ask whether there is a cross-border externality in the sense that a bank’s systemic risk differs when applying a national versus a European perspective. On average, banks’ contribution to systemic risk is similar at the two regional levels, and so is the ranking of banks. Generally, larger banks and banks with a lower share of loans are more systemically important. The effects of these variables are qualitatively but not quantitatively similar at the national versus the European level.