宏观调控、金融创新与流动性管理

流动性管理的要点在于流动性与实体经济发展相匹配。文章刻画了流动性管理的目标函数,阐述和梳理了流动性管理的基本原理和基本方法,检验了主要流动性管理工具的实际效果。经验研究结果表明,在流动性充裕情况下,通过实施紧缩性货币政策、人民币升值、积极的财政政策对流动性管理可能无效,而通过金融创新,调整银证结构、信贷结构和投资结构,有助于进行流动性管理。     

我国货币流动性过剩的价格效应研究

本文通过实证方法研究了我国流动性过剩的实物资产价格效应和金融资产价格效应,发现我国的流动性过剩与一般物价、房地产价格股票价格具有很强的正相关关系,且对一般物价的影响具有滞后效应.同时,过剩的流动性对金融资产价格的影响要大于对实物资产价格的影响.     

我国货币流动性过剩的价格效应研究

本文通过实证方法研究了我国流动性过剩的实物资产价格效应和金融资产价格效应,发现我国的流动性过剩与一般物价、房地产价格和股票价格具有很强的正相关关系,且对一般物价的影响具有滞后效应。同时,过剩的流动性对金融资产价格的影响要大于对实物资产价格的影响。     

同业拆借市场行为效应与流动性风险的宏微观审慎管理

本文从同业拆借市场的行为主体、监管主体出发,分析并检验同业拆借市场的三种行为效应———旬相关效应、收益非对称效应、月内与月份效应。同业拆借利率存在旬相关效应,由存款准备金按旬考核引起,随同业业务多元化而减弱;同业拆借利率收益存在非对称效应,四大国有商业银行及邮储银行拥有资金优势,可从同业交易中获得更多的利益;同业拆借利率存在月内效应与月份效应,存贷比的时点考核导致下半月同业拆借利率较高,由于基础货币的投放与回收、银行信贷投放等导致同业拆借利率的月份效应。结合行为效应,本文从宏微观审慎管理角度,对同业拆借市场流动性风险管理提出相关建议。     

银行业务的流动性衡量与控制

银行业务的流动性有现金形式和非现金形式。影响流动性的银行业务的发生不仅会产生流动性需求,而且可能会同时产生流动性供给。由于流动性风险与净流动性需求和净流动性供给之间有着密不可分的关系,所以当净流动性需求与净流动性供给可以量化时,流动性风险就有了衡量的可能性。本文先从银行业务产生的流动性需求与流动性供给入手,再从现金形式和非现金形式的流动性平衡出发,预测未来即期流动性需求,旨在为流动性风险控制,流动性管理带来新的思路。     

金融市场中的流动性风险与成本

对"流动性"(liquidity)进行精确定义相当困难,其原因在于流动性包含了许多方面的市场特征.许多研究金融市场流动性的论文都用"难以捉摸"来形容流动性这个概念.Kenneth Boulding指出:流动性是资产的一种属性,既不清晰也不易衡量.凯恩斯认为:什么带来流动性是很模糊的概念,且不同时期会发生变化,依赖于社会习惯和制度.     

商业银行流动性过剩的经济效应分析

流动性过剩是我国商业银行当前面临的突出问题。流动性过剩在提高商业银行支付能力的同时,也削弱了商业银行的盈利能力,降低了金融资源配置效率,抑制了货币政策传导效力,同时还可能引发我国商业银行不良贷款反弹,产能过剩问题进一步激化,资本市场面临冲击。     

金融市场流动性波动溢出效应的实证分析

金融资产流动性是影响其收益率的重要因素.本文在设计债券市场连续的综合流动性指标和股票市场波动调整的流动性指标的基础上,利用允许均值系统方程间互相关的AVAR-TVGARcH模型,并结合wald检验和LR检验对于股票、债券和人民币汇率市场间的流动性波动溢出效应进行检验.研究发现:三个市场间存在较为显著的流动性波动溢出效应.回归系数显示市场流动性间的波动溢出效应较小.同时,本文发现外汇和股票市场流动性序列间的条件协方差都存在明显的时变特征和程度不一的聚类现象.     

创新流动性管理:谨防由“过剩”掉入“黑洞”

本文针对当前流动性过剩问题,运用流动性黑洞理论,分析流动性过剩状况以及掉入流动性黑洞的潜在威胁,提出流动性管理应树立一种辩证管理的理念,不断创新和改革流动性管理方式和体制,以解决流动性过剩问题和防范流动性黑洞风险。     

流动性过剩的新特点与治理创新

流动性过剩新特点表现在被动增量不断且数额大、增量新增渠道多、存量活跃。控制的难点是流量过强。本文针对外汇占款渠道新增流动性、银行体系流动性过剩、存量转化型流动性过剩、国际套利热钱渠道流动性过剩提出了创新治理建议。     

Interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention

We develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term, safe asset. When there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks, the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility. In such a situation, a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate. It can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand.     

Optimal allotment policy in central bank open market operations1

This article derives a central bank's optimal liquidity supply towards a money market with an unrestricted lending facility. We show that when the effect of liquidity on market rates is not too small, and the monetary authority is concerned with both interest rates and liquidity conditions, then the optimal allotment policy may entail a ‘discontinuous’ reaction to initial conditions. In particular, the model predicts a threshold level of liquidity below which the central bank will not bail out the banking system. An estimation of the liquidity effect for the euro area suggests that the discontinuity might have contributed to the Eurosystem's tight response to occurrences of underbidding during the period June 2000 through March 2004.     

How investor demands for safety influence bank capital and liquidity trade-offs

We construct a model of a bank’s optimal funding choice, where the bank negotiates with both safety-driven short-term bondholders and (mostly) risk-taking long-term bondholders. We establish that investor demands for safety create a negative relationship between the bank’s capital choices and short-term funding, as well as negative relationships between capital and common measures of bank liquidity. Short-term investors’ demands for safety force the bank to hold more collateral, which diminishes the demands by long-term bondholders for higher holdings of bank capital. Consistent with our model, our bank-level empirical analysis of these capital–liquidity trade-offs shows that bank liquidity measures have a strong and negative relationship to the capital ratio. Furthermore, we show that this trade-off does not appear to be regulation related and has diminished in size over time.     

Commonality in equity options liquidity: evidence from European Markets

This paper examines commonality in liquidity for individual equity options trading in European markets. We use high-frequency data to construct a novel index of liquidity commonality. The approach is able to explain a substantial proportion of the liquidity variation across individual options. The explanatory power of the common liquidity factor is more pronounced during periods of higher market-wide implied volatility. The common factor's impact on individual options' liquidity depends on options' idiosyncratic characteristics. There is some evidence of systematic liquidity spillover effects across these European exchanges.     

Environmental reputation and bank liquidity: Evidence from climate transition

This study empirically investigates how a bank's nonfinancial signals of environmental reputation affect its deposits and credit provision in US counties with severe climate transition risks. We find that banks with higher reputational risks associated with environmental issues tend to experience declining deposits in counties exposed to severe climate change risks. Banks with a poor environmental reputation also reduce mortgage origination in such counties and diminish liquidity creation if they have high deposit shares in counties sensitive to climate transition. This study suggests that a bank's reputation regarding environmental, social and governance practices is an important underlying cause of bank liquidity in areas sensitive to climate change.     

关于完善我国宏观经济流动性管理的思考

随着全球货币条件的持续宽松,加强流动性管理已成为全球宏观经济管理中的一个突出问题。文章从多个角度衡量了我国宏观经济的流动性状况,从国内外两个背景分析了我国宏观经济流动性增加的原因,并从完善央行与公众沟通策略、利用数量型货币政策工具回收流动性、拓宽直接融资渠道等角度,提出加强流动性管理的政策建议。     

Examining the relationship between earning management and market liquidity

The main purpose of this paper is to argue the extent that earnings management lowers liquidity. It should increase information asymmetry and impair trading liquidity. Using a sample of French firms from 2008 to 2011, we find that firms that manage earnings have wider bid-ask spreads. Our results are robust for both of two well-established measures of market liquidity. Therefore, the empirical results indicate that firms that exhibit greater earnings management are associated with lower market liquidity. These findings are in line with adverse selection and shed light on the role corporate governance devices can play in the consideration of shareholder interest’s protection, which leads to improved stock market liquidity levels.     

Perverse liquidity effect of monetary policy: some evidence for India

The liquidity effect of money supply increases, as policy-oriented measures, would generally lead to a decline in interest rates. This is the direct effect. However, such money supply increases lead to a sum of the direct effect plus the positive indirect price and income effects. In sum, the net effect may be positive leading to a net increase and not a decrease in the interest rate. The regular money demand function is suitably modified to capture the structural changes of the Indian economy to verify the net effect of monetary policy-induced money supply movements. The empirical evidence indicates the presence of a perverse liquidity effect.     

The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management

This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.