劳动分工的起源和制约-从斯密困境到广义斯密原理

"斯密困境"指斯密理论(看不见的手)与斯密定理(劳动分工受到市场规模的限制)的不能兼容。本文用生态文化的非线性动力学模型描写市场竞争和劳动分工。斯密困境可以用稳定性和复杂性之间的消长关系来解释。"广义斯密原理"即劳动分工受市场规、资源种类和环境涨落的三重限制,可解释历史上劳动分工发展的多样性。     

劳动分工的起源和制约-从斯密困境到广义斯密原理

斯密困境指斯密理论(看不见的手)与斯密定理(劳动分工受到市场规模的限制)的不能兼容.该文用生态文化的非线性动力学模型描写市场竞争和劳动分工.斯密困境可以用稳定性和复杂性之间的消长关系来解释.广义斯密原理即劳动分工受市场规、资源种类和环境涨落的三重限制,可解释历史上劳动分工发展的多样性.     

TWO POLITICIANS,A PAC,AND HOW THEY INTERACT: TWO EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES*

Two sequential games of the interactions among a PAC and two politicians contesting the same office are developed, and their subgame perfect equilibria are characterized. The politicians have distinct ideal points in policy space, and this drives the result that the policy platforms they campaign on are not identical. The PAC always contributes only to the politician whose platform is closest to the PAC's ideal point, who is the politician whose ideal point is closest to the PAC's ideal point; as a result, both politicians’policy platforms are closer to the PAC's ideal point. The sequence of play does not qualitatively affect the outcome, but the PAC has a second mover advantage. Exogenous shocks to the probabilities of winning only modify the basic outcome.