How does monetary policy transmission mechanism work in Fiji?

The study aims to examine the impact of changes in policy variables namely, monetary aggregate (M1), exchange rate and interest rate on two monetary goal variables, namely output and price level in Fiji from 1970 to 2006 by applying the procedures of variance decomposition and impulse response functions. We conclude that the money channel is the most effective channel of transmission mechanism among the three channels.

How does economic policy uncertainty drive gold–stock correlations? Evidence from the UK

In this article, we investigate the effects of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on correlations between the UK stock market and gold market. We find that less certain economic policies result in lower correlations, while more certain economic policies result in higher correlations. The correlations are symmetric and show no structural breaks caused by the recent financial crisis. The recent financial crisis has not changed EPU effects on the correlations. The effects of one positive one-standard-deviation shock of the logarithmic change rate of the EPU on the correlations last approximately 19 months.     

How does petty corruption affect tax morale in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Revenues from taxation gain in importance to finance economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. One obstacle to enhancing the willingness to remit taxes can be the extortion of bribes by public officials. Using micro-level data from the Afrobarometer, we show that petty corruption erodes tax morale. The effect on tax morale is more severe in countries and regions where fewer people are affected by petty corruption and becomes insignificant if extortion of bribes is particularly prevalent. Differing levels of civic participation and potential access to tax funded services are also found to induce heterogeneous reactions to corruption experience. Applying a mediation analysis, we demonstrate that petty corruption not only has a direct effect on tax morale but also diminishes confidence in tax authorities and therefore affects tax morale indirectly. The harmful effects of corruption experience, however, operate mainly through a generally lowered inclination to uphold high levels of tax morale.     

How does economic transition breed corruption?

Based on the existing literature, this paper discusses the relationship between economic transition and corruption, and argues that economic transition is one of the main roots of the spread of corruption in transitional China. It divides economic transition into four parts, and examines various channels by which economic transition breeds corruption opportunities. By applying the case statistical analysis method to analyze 594 major corruption cases, it finds the most corruption-prone areas, and provides some empirical evidence on the existence of such channels.     

Does integration and economic policy coordination promote business cycle synchronization in the EU?

Previous studies have discounted important factors and indirect channels that might contribute to business cycle synchronization (BCS) in the EU. We estimate the effects of market integration and economic policy coordination on bilateral business cycle correlations over the period 1995–2012 using a simultaneous equations model that takes into accounts both the endogenous relationships and unveils direct and indirect effects. The results suggest that (1) trade and FDI have a pronounced positive effect on BCS, particularly between incumbent and new EU members. (2) Rising specialization does not decouple business cycles. (3) The decline of income disparities in EU27 contributes to BCS, as converging countries develop stronger trade and FDI linkages. (4) There is strong evidence that poor fiscal discipline of EU members is a major impediment of business cycle synchronization. (5) The same argument holds true for exchange rate fluctuations that hinder BCS, particularly in EU15. Since BCS is a fundamental prerequisite and objective in an effective monetary union, the EU has to promote market integration and strengthen the common setting of economic policies.     

How important is the credit channel in the transmission of monetary policy in Mexico?

This article empirically examines the importance of the credit channel of monetary policy in Mexico for the period 2004–2013. We estimate a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to analyse the effects of a monetary policy shock on real output, and we also use a threshold VAR model to investigate asymmetric effects of contractionary and expansionary policies. The empirical results suggest that a contractionary monetary policy results in a fall in the supply of loans together with an increase in the spread between the lending and deposit rate. To the extent that some borrowers are dependent on bank loans for credit, the reduced supply of loans amplifies the effects of monetary policy on output associated with the traditional interest rate channel. Our results also suggest that the importance of the credit channel is larger for contractionary shocks than for expansionary shocks.     

How do business startup modes affect economic growth?

This paper examines researchers’ choices between either collaborating with venture capitalists or going independent when investing in research (e.g., labs, scientists, equipment, perishable materials, etc.) and how their interaction affects long‐run growth in an economy characterized by incomplete contracts and financial market imperfections. We find that venture capital is more likely to be selected by entrepreneurs when startup risks are median to high. A ranking of the welfares associated with each startup mode under different legal and financial environments shows that economic policy and research incentives may not always align as entrepreneurs may not select the mode that provides the highest welfare level.     

Institutions and the financial development–economic growth nexus in sub-Saharan Africa

Using a sample splitting approach that does not impose an exogenous quadratic term, we examine the effect of financial development on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa by allowing the link to be mediated by the level of institutions. Our findings reveal a disproportionate growth-enhancing effect of finance, given countries’ distinct level of institutional quality. More specifically, when the International Country Risk Guide-based measure of institutions is used as the threshold variable, below the optimal level of institutional quality, financial development does not significantly promote economic growth. For countries with institutional quality above the threshold, higher finance is associated with growth. However, when institutions are measured by World Governance Indicators proxy, we find a significant effect of financial development, irrespective of whether a country is below or above the threshold. Interestingly, the growth-enhancing effect of finance is greater for low-institution countries relative to high-institution countries. Thus, through its ability to provide some crucial roles, the well-developed financial sector may also perform the function of sound institutions in influencing economic growth.     

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer–seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the value of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary whether buyers can interrogate the seller and the contextual richness. The buyers’ prediction accuracy is above chance, and is substantial for confident buyers. There is no evidence that the option to interrogate is important and only weak support that contextual richness matters. These results show that the information asymmetry is partly eliminated by people’s ability to spot deception.     

Are remittances good for economic growth? The role of political institutions

Within a sample of 109 developing countries for the period 1975–2014 and controlling for country and time-fixed effects, this article presents evidence that workers’ remittances are more effective in promoting growth in developing countries with strong democratic institutions. The evidence is robust to alternative samples and different measures of democratic institutions.     

How do currency misalignments’ threshold affect economic growth?

Based on panel smooth transition regressions, this paper determines for a large sample of developed and emerging countries, the value of currency misalignments from which we observe a regime shift in economic growth, over the 1980–2009 period. Misalignments, defined as the difference between the current real exchange rate and its equilibrium counterpart, are derived from the behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) approach. Our estimate relies on recent panel cointegration techniques that allow for heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependencies. We also control for the presence of structural breaks. Our findings show that our misalignments index plays a key role in the reversal of trend growth. Although the undervaluation of their currency acts positively on their growth, emerging countries cannot base their strategy on this finding to promote growth. We relate this result to the adverse effects of depreciation, as in “original sin”. The implications of our findings, in terms of economic policy, clearly emphasise the economic leverage role of undervaluation: it remains a powerful cyclical instrument but has to be, nevertheless, employed with precautionary to be globally and internationally consistent.     

How relevant are nominal contracting schemes for monetary policy?

Due to the scarcity of pertinent evidence, there is currently no general agreement on how to introduce nominal rigidities into monetary macroeconomic models. We examine the role of alternative assumptions about the wage and price setting mechanisms for the assessment of the welfare costs of nominal rigidities and the performance of alternative monetary policy rules in an otherwise standard New Keynesian general equilibrium model. We find that the choice of a particular price and wage setting scheme matters quantitatively for the welfare costs of nominal rigidities. However, the ranking of the welfare costs associated with alternative wage and price setting schemes is robust to changes in the monetary policy rule, and the ranking of the welfare costs associated with alternative monetary policy rules is robust to changes in the wage and price setting scheme. The difference between sticky nominal contracts and sticky information matters more than the difference in the age distribution of prices wages and information implied by alternative price and wage setting schemes.     

Does democracy facilitate economic growth or does economic growth facilitate democracy? An empirical study of Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the relationship between democracy and economic growth in 30 Sub-Saharan African countries. As our proxy for democracy we first use the democracy index constructed by Freedom House and then check the sensitivity of our findings using, as an alternative proxy for democracy, the Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC). We find support for the Lipset hypothesis - in the long run, real GDP Granger causes democracy and an increase in GDP results in an improvement in democracy - in Botswana and Niger with both datasets, for Chad with the Freedom House data only and for Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon with the LIEC data only. Support for the compatibility hypothesis - in the long run democracy Granger causes real income and an increase in democracy has a positive effect on real income - is found for Botswana with the Freedom House data and for Madagascar, Rwanda, South Africa and Swaziland with the LIEC data. Support for the conflict hypothesis - in the long run democracy Granger causes real income and an increase in democracy has a negative effect on real income - is found for Gabon with the Freedom House data and Sierra Leone with the LIEC data.