Self-selection in the market of teachers

Public school teachers are usually paid according to centralized earning schedules, in which their income depends mainly on experience. By contrast, in private schools, there is high wage dispersion, and salaries correspond mainly to teachers’ performance. That dichotomous labour regulation encourages teachers with better unobservable skills to self-select into private schools because the likelihood of earning higher wages is higher than in public schools. The other side of the coin is the self-selection of ‘bad’ teachers into public schools. Using a representative sample of Chilean teachers, we estimate a two-sector Roy model to test self-selection. We find evidence of negative self-selection of teachers into public schools.     

How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment

How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2859 students to help at the ‘ESA Europe 2012’ conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply to help at the conference and, if so, also specify the working time they wanted to provide. Just asking subjects to volunteer or offering them a certificate turned out to be significantly more motivating than mentioning that the regular conference fee would be waived for helpers. By means of an online-survey experiment, we find that intrinsic motivation to help is likely to have been crowded out by mentioning the waived fee. Increasing monetary incentives by varying hourly wages of 1, 5, and 10 Euros shows positive effects on the number of applications and on the working time offered. However, when comparing these results with treatments without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.     

How much versus who: which social norms information is more effective?

We conduct an experiment to investigate how different types of information about social norms affect individuals’ stated contributions to a specific pro-environment program, a student ‘green fee’, in the context of a referendum. Compared to students that receive no information about peer contributions, on average, students that receive information about the dollar value range of contributions at peer institutions contribute less while students that learn about the high percentage of students voting ‘yes’ on green fee programs at peer institutions contribute more. The results are economically significant as the absolute values of both effects represent approximately 25% of average contributions. These results suggest that information about participation rates can be more effective than information about dollar amounts in encouraging contributions to environmental initiatives. Of interest to stated preference researchers, we find that results do not change when controlling for self-selection into survey completion.     

Welfare distribution of collective in-kind transfers in education: an application to the extended schools programme

In this study, we employ the distributional characteristics approach to analyse the welfare distribution of the Extended Schools Programme, a social programme that fights inequality in Northern Ireland’s public schools. Our main result is that increasing funding to schools as their size increases penalizes the most deprived students. This is because the school size, although related to the educational supply, does not reflect the distribution of deprivation within schools. Thus, although in the Northern Irish context the largest welfare gains are possible if funds are redistributed among middle-size schools, our general result indicates an excessive support of small-size schools at the expenses of large-size schools.     

Teachers’ versus parental choice and the tracking distribution of students: a natural experiment

This article studies the secondary school track choice and considers to what extent parents’ and teachers’ assessment of students diverge. We take advantage of a reform in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) in 2006. The reform replaced parents’ choice about their children’s secondary school type by a binding teacher recommendation. Our data comprise class-level information on all public primary schools in the state. We find that teachers tend to recommend higher school types than parents. However, more precise analysis shows that this effect can be limited to districts with above average proportion of immigrants.     

Incentives and teacher effort

Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of how much students learn in school, and how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of lively policy debate in both rich and poor countries. This paper examines how teacher incentives, both pecuniary and non‐pecuniary, correlate with teacher effort. Using school survey data from Lao PDR, we estimate measures of teacher effort, including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring outside of class hours, which are not the typical measures used in previous research. Estimation results fit well under the standard labour supply framework and indicate that greater teacher effort is associated with non‐pecuniary incentives such as more teacher autonomy over teaching materials and monitoring as measured by the existence of an active parent – teacher association and the ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, this paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous OLS‐probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision.     

PRIVATE GOOD,EXTERNALITY, PUBLIC GOOD*

In two recent investigations into the economic problems of externality the authors have noted in passing that the welfare or optimality conditions in the case of a consumption externality seemed identical with the welfare conditions in the case of public goods as originally stated by Samuelson.¹ The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the welfare conditions for a public good are a special case of the welfare conditions for a consumption externality where a public good is defined as a good ‘which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good’ (Samuelson [4]). Since the welfare conditions for a private good are also a special case of the welfare conditions for a consumption externality, it follows that we have a range of externality with the pure private good and the pure public good as polar cases.     

Fiscal incidence in an overlapping generations model with a fixed asset

We analyze a model of overlapping generations with a fixed factor (‘land’), malleable capital, and labor. We consider the dynamic effects of various fiscal policies including taxes on rent, wages, and creation of public debt on capital accumulation, land prices, and intergenerational welfare. Minimal assumptions (uniqueness and stability) imply that a land tax may initially raise land values, but the upper bound is less than one-half of the tax revenues. Assuming homothetic utility, the ratio between the long-run capital responses to a land tax and to a lump-sum transfer of equivalent revenue from the young to the old depends solely on the share of labor.     

How do school ‘report cards’ affect school choice decisions?

Abstract. We estimate the effect of information about school achievement that is disseminated to the public through websites and school ‘report cards’ on school choice decisions. We find that students are more likely to leave their school when public information reveals poor school‐level performance. Some parents’ school choice decisions respond to information soon after it becomes available. Others, including non‐English‐speaking parents, alter their school choice decisions only in response to information that has been disseminated widely and discussed in the media. Parents in low‐income neighbourhoods are most likely to alter their school choice decisions in response to new information. JEL classification: I21, D83     

In search of the good samaritan: estimating the impact of ‘altruism’ on voters' preferences

This paper continues the development of a theoretical foundation for measuring ‘altruistic’ behaviour with respect to tax versus expenditure preferences in three specific spheres: health, education and welfare payments. Particular emphasis is placed on analysing the choice theoretic calculus that underlies individual preferences. Using this theoretical foundation, econometric techniques allow progress to be made in measuring the characteristics of the underlying utility function. The empirical work relates to the UK and confirms that both self-interest and public interest (with a slight emphasis on the latter) determine overall preferences. The implications of this for the public choice school are then examined.     

Impact of Chinese growth and trade on labor in developed countries

This paper examines the impacts of growth in China's economy and trade on the skill premium of labor in developed countries. We utilize a unique global dataset that disaggregates workers by occupations to identify impacts across labor categories with different skill sets, complementing the widely used GTAP Data Base in the CGE framework offered by the GTAP model. To study the impacts of China's fast-paced growth, we model the counterfactual, i.e., what if China grew and opened at a more modest rate; we then compare this baseline with China's actual growth. Results indicate that a strong rise in manufacturing exports from China to the US impacts output and employment in the US. The US shifts its production away from light manufacturing sectors to more service-oriented sectors that also tend to engage higher skilled labor. There is a small decrease in the real wages of unskilled labor and a rise in the real wages of skilled labor. Interestingly, not all categories of unskilled labor lose, rather those that are more directly linked with manufacturing sectors are impacted; unskilled ‘service and shop workers’ and the unskilled ‘agricultural workers, machine operators, assemblers, craft workers, and others’ observe a small decline in real wages, while the impact on unskilled ‘clerks’ is insignificant. For all categories of skilled workers, there is an increase in real wages primarily driven by the shift in production to services and high-skilled labor intensive categories, resulting in the rising skill premium. Hence disaggregating the labor data provides greater depth on the understanding of the differential impacts on domestic workers resulting from trade, and thereby guides policy on how these differential impacts can be smoothed through redistribution of benefits. Consistent with other study findings, there is a positive impact on overall growth and welfare in the US, EU and Australasia.     

Should civil servants be restricted in wage bargaining? A mixed-duopoly approach

Should civil servants (employees in the public sector) be allowed to bargain collectively? To answer this question, we construct a model of unionized mixed duopoly and examine the regulatory framework of public institutions, especially focusing on a wage regulation imposed on the public firm. The wage regulation turns out to yield critical welfare implications as it gives rise to two opposing strategic effects: the wage regulation intensifies downstream-market competition while it loosens upstream-market competition. The overall welfare effect is ambiguous, depending crucially on the degree of product differentiation between the firms. We also show that, in contrast to the popular belief, granting the right to bargain collectively to civil servants would not necessarily help them because they tend to demand excessively high wages when they are allowed to bargain collectively. Finally, we briefly discuss a new perspective on the role of profit motives in public institutions when the wages are determined endogenously.     

A signalling model of school grades under different evaluation systems

We examine the role of school grades as a signal of worker productivity under different examination systems in relation to errors that may affect student performance. Firms use school grades as a signal of workers’ effective skills, taking into account that these evaluations are effected by stochastic shocks. We show that more precise evaluation systems, being associated with a higher reactivity of wages to school grades, induce students to provide more effort. Low ability students tend to react less than high ability students. Moreover, individuals with low abilities may prefer less accurate evaluation systems. Nevertheless, when productivity increases, these systems become less convenient and the number of individuals preferring them diminishes. Our analysis highlights an important trade-off between centralised and decentralised evaluation systems. On the one hand, frequent evaluations, typical of decentralised systems, weaken the impact on grades of those errors which influence student performance and, so, reduce signal noise, while, on the other hand, different teachers generally adopt different performance assessment standards, leading to noisier evaluations.     

Privatization in a Small Open Economy with Imperfect Competition

We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff‐distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare‐improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization.     

How does a mixed ownership firm license a patent?

This paper demonstrates that a cost disadvantaged innovator increasingly relies on licensing with a fixed fee as its public ownership share grows. Moreover, when the innovation is drastic, a cost disadvantaged innovator frequently licenses by fixed fee when it has a public share even as a fully private firm will never use a fixed fee. As the fixed fee improves welfare, these results suggest that the licensing method of a partial public firm helps correct the market failure of imperfect competition.     

Detecting policy effects with wage rigidity and instability – evidence on the Taiwan labour market

With stagnant wages and growing productivity, a widening gap is becoming prevalent in global labour markets. The relationship between wages and productivity has become indeterminate, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. This article presents the phenomenon for why salary rarely follows up with productivity after an economy recovers. By using the GMM method, this study shows the interaction among wage, productivity and tightness, in which we illustrate the Taiwan labour market as an example to show how hiring system changes press wages away from an efficient allocation, causing instability and market failure. Surveying 35 labour markets for different industries, we reveal that the situation in the labour markets has drastically changed since 2008. We find that this resulted in a severe problem when the Taiwan firms got used to policies like ‘22K’, ‘fix-term contract’ and ‘unpaid leave’ programmes. These plans negatively impacted the economy and raised market failure with instability.     

Advance disposal fee vs. disposal fee: A monopolistic producer’s durability choice model

This study examines how the timing of waste disposal fee collection affects the producer’s choice of built-in product durability and social welfare in a durable-goods monopoly model. We categorize the waste disposal fee policies into two: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We show that a DF policy has two opposing effects on durability. Firstly, a DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase durability in order to delay the households’ waste disposal and to discount future payments of the disposal fee (the payment-discounting effect). Secondly, a DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally in order to mitigate the payment of the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce durability in order to avoid market saturation and the associated future price cuts (the illegal-dumping effect). When the disposal fee is low, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect under a DF policy, leading to the enhancement of durability. In this case, from a social welfare viewpoint, a DF policy may be more desirable than an ADF policy if the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is not serious. However, when the disposal fee is high, a DF policy induces more illegal dumping, reduces durability, and inflicts more environmental damage. Therefore, an ADF policy is more socially desirable than a DF policy when the disposal fee is high. Moreover, we consider an oligopoly case and find that an ADF policy is more socially desirable in an industry with smaller market power.     

Price Discrimination in Public Healthcare

Could a public healthcare system use price discrimination—paying medical service providers different fees, depending on the service provider's quality—lead to improvements in social welfare? We show that differentiating medical fees by quality increases social welfare relative to uniform pricing (i.e. quality‐invariant fee schedules) whenever hospitals and doctors have private information about their own ability. We also show that by moving from uniform to differentiated medical fees, the public healthcare system can effectively incentivise good doctors and hospitals (i.e. low‐cost‐types) to provide even higher levels of quality than they would under complete information. In the socially optimal quality‐differentiated medical fee system, low‐cost‐type medical‐service providers enjoy a rent due to their informational advantage. Informational rent is socially beneficial because it gives service providers a strong incentive to invest in the extra training required to deliver high‐quality services at low cost, providing yet another efficiency gain from quality‐differentiated medical fees.     

DO “CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS” FOR PUBLIC GOODS REVEAL THE PUBLIC'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY?

This article develops a welfare theoretic framework for interpreting evidence on the impacts of public programs on housing markets. We extend Rosen's hedonic model to explain how housing prices capitalize exogenous shocks to public goods and externalities. The model predicts that trading between heterogeneous buyers and sellers will drive a wedge between these “capitalization effects” and welfare changes. We test this hypothesis in the context of changes in measures of school quality in five metropolitan areas. Results from boundary discontinuity designs suggest that capitalization effects understate parents’ willingness to pay for public school improvements by as much as 75%.     

In the wake of austerity: social impact bonds and the financialisation of the welfare state in Britain

This paper provides an analysis of the financialisation of the British welfare state. In a continuation of neo-liberal privatisation and labour market activation, the financialised welfare state pursues a policy of welfare retrenchment, while engaging in forms of social engineering aimed at producing self-responsibilised individuals and communities who are financially literate, ‘investment-ready’ and economically productive. New financial instruments such as social impact bonds are deployed to these ends, both to ‘solve social problems’ and enable cost saving. Through the use of such financial instruments, the implementation of regulatory infrastructures and tax incentives, the financialised welfare state becomes a vehicle for the transfer of wealth from the public to private investors, while subjecting the domain of social policy to the vicissitudes of global financial markets. This paper offers a critique of these developments, situating the case of Britain within the broader global context and with regard to the implications for understanding the current political economy of the welfare state.