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1.
This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries. 相似文献
2.
Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently. The smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit. Over time, inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt. By contrast, imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions. 相似文献
3.
This paper builds a micro-behavior model of central bank and financial institutions from the perspective of property-rights.
By analyzing the theoretical model and the practice, we conclude that, in the framework of the present financial stabilization
policies in China, the central bank’s functions of monetary policy and financial stabilization are enslaved to financial institutions.
Thus, central bank independence has been damaged because of the actual property-right relation between the central bank and
the financial institutions. The policy implication is to cut off the property-right relation between the central bank and
the financial institutions.
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Translated from Caijing wenti yanjiu 财经问题研究 (Research on Finanical and Economic Issues), 2007, (6): 3–9 相似文献
4.
中央银行独立性、责任性与通货膨胀目标制 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
近年来不少学者提出,我国货币政策应转向通货膨胀目标制。我国现行的政策实际上正是一种隐性的通货膨胀目标制,20世纪90年代以来所发生的几次通货膨胀偏倚很大程度上是由于央行的独立性不够。鉴于通货膨胀目标制并不能解决当前我国货币政策调控中的问题并可能带来更多的问题,今后货币政策改革应坚持由直接调控向间接调控、由数量型调控向价格型调控的转变思路,在提高央行独立性的同时,增强其责任性并提高货币政策的透明度。 相似文献
5.
In this paper, we survey the case for central bank independence (CBI). We conclude that CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for monetary stability. CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several, and CBI should not be treated as an exogenous variable. Instead, the question that should be addressed is why societies decide to make their central banks independent? The reasons why CBI is chosen are related to legal, political, and economic systems. A number of empirical studies find correlations between CBI and low inflation rates. Endogeneity of CBI suggests, however, that the correlation has no implications for causality. 相似文献
6.
This paper studies the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in promoting central bank independence (CBI). While anecdotal evidence suggests that the IMF has been playing a vital role for CBI, the underlying mechanisms of this influence are not well understood. We argue that the IMF has ulterior motives when pressing countries for increased CBI. First, IMF loans are primarily transferred to local monetary authorities. Thus, enhancing CBI aims to insulate central banks from political interference to shield loan disbursements from government abuse. Second, several loan conditionality clauses imply a substantial transfer of political leverage over economic policy making to monetary authorities. As a result, the IMF through pushing for CBI seeks to establish a politically insulated veto player to promote its economic policy reform agenda. We argue that the IMF achieves these aims through targeted lending conditions. We hypothesize that the inclusion of these loan conditions leads to greater CBI. To test our hypothesis, we use a recently available dataset on IMF programs that includes detailed information on CBI reforms and IMF conditionality for up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012. Our findings indicate that targeted loan conditionality plays a critical role in promoting CBI. These results are robust towards varying modeling assumptions and withstand a battery of robustness checks. 相似文献
7.
This paper develops a new de facto measure of central bank independence (CBI) based on two recent measures of the turnover rates of central bank governors introduced by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), complemented with measures of alliance with the government in power, captured by prior executive appointment, tribe proximity, and political party affiliation. Using 1980–2009 data from 13 countries from the CFA zone (a currency union) and 18 non-CFA countries, the new index is used to 1) examine whether CBI can help achieve price stability in Africa and 2) show how CBI affects African countries that are part of a monetary union. We find that higher turnover rates lead to higher inflation. Our results are robust to the decomposition of the turnover rates into premature removals and ally replacements. Furthermore, we find that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy has no effect on inflation and instead inflation is driven by other variables such as the fixed exchange rate regime or commodity price shocks. 相似文献
8.
International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt. 相似文献
9.
This article investigates the dynamic relationship between political instability and exchange rates in five Arab Spring countries over the period 1992Q1–2016Q4. We include macroeconomic fundamentals to identify the transmission channels through which political instability may affect exchange rates. Based on VAR and ARDL models, our results report that political instability is associated with a significant drop in the value of domestic currencies of these countries. Economic growth is found to be the key mechanism channel. We find also that the dependence between variables is more emphasized in the short run than in the long run. 相似文献
10.
Tony Caporale 《Applied economics》2013,45(4):394-399
This study investigates, using annual data from 1974–2004, whether unionization rates, trade openness and central bank independence can help explain cross-national and inter-temporal variations in level of peak inflation prior to a disinflationary policy adjustment. I find that unionization is positively associated with both peak inflation rates whereas more independent central banks and trade openness are correlated with lower inflation levels. These results are robust to controlling for the high inflation decade of the 1970s and to using average (rather than peak) inflation as the explanatory variable. 相似文献
11.
Recent evidence shows central banks suffering from losses in some developing countries. This is a surprise to economists and policymakers. At the same time, these banks are asked to conduct monetary policy within a more transparent framework. Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the following question: Would more transparency in developing countries suffering from central bank losses be beneficial?This paper shows that the cost constraints of conducting monetary policy, central bank losses, in both transparency and opacity alike is significant and affects positively the error of the private sector in expected inflation rate and the output gap. In a country suffering from central bank losses, the expected benefits of transparency and the existence of cost constraint move in two opposite directions. As a result, it is unwise for developing countries suffering from central bank losses to focus on transparency. Priority should be given to fixing monetary policy and to developing financial markets. 相似文献
12.
Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Wojciech S. Maliszewski 《Economics of Transition》2000,8(3):749-789
The paper discusses recent changes in central bank laws and the relationship between inflation and central bank independence in transition economies. Two indices of legal independence are constructed, covering political and economic aspects of independence. Most of the countries experienced high-inflation episodes in the recent past and changes introduced to the laws after, or simultaneously, with stabilization programmes strengthened the position of the central banks. In further analysis, an inverse relationship emerges between inflation and indices of central bank independence. However, the robust relationship is present only at a high level of economic liberalization. This conclusion is supported by results from regressions on time-aggregated and panel data, even after controlling for the government fiscal position and the absence/presence of an IMF stabilization package. 相似文献
13.
Inequality, inflation, and central bank independence 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
What can account for the different contemporaneous inflation experiences of various countries, and of the same country over time? We present an analysis of the determination of inflation from a political economy perspective. We document a positive correlation between income inequality and inflation and then present a theory of the determination of inflation outcomes in democratic societies that illustrates how greater inequality leads to greater inflation, owing to a desire by voters for wealth redistribution. We conclude by showing that democracies with more independent central banks tend to have better inflation outcomes for a given degree of inequality. JEL Classification E5, H0 Inégalité, inflation et l'indépendance de la banque centrale. Quels sont les facteurs qui pourraient expliquer les expériences inflationnistes tellement différentes des divers pays dans le passé récent, et l'expérience tellement différente d'un pays donné dans le temps? Les auteurs analysent ce problème de la détermination du taux d'inflation dans une perspective d'économie politique. Ils déterminent qu'il y a une corrélation positive entre l'inégalité et l'inflation, et présentent une théorie de la détermination de l'inflation dans les sociétés démocratiques qui montre comment une inégalité plus grande entraîne une inflation plus grande à cause du désir des électeurs de demander une redistribution de la richesse. Le mémoire montre en terminant que les démocraties e´quipées de banques centrales plus indépendantes tendent à avoir de meilleurs résultats en terme d'inflation pour un degré d'inégalité donné. 相似文献
14.
中央银行的宏观监管职能:经济效果与影响因素分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
文章以跨国数据为基础,对中央银行是否应分离银行监管职能这一问题进行了系统的实证分析。结果表明,在中央银行未分离或未完全分离银行监管职能的国家,其金融稳定性通常更高,经济增速更快,而且未出现明显的"通货膨胀倾向"。这意味着金融监管的独立性并不是简单地将监管职能从中央银行分离的问题,中央银行的独立性也并不必然排斥其继续实施金融监管职能。通过将货币政策和金融监管的兼容性置于政治经济学框架下加以解读,文章发现真正影响金融监管实际独立性的并非监管主体的设置问题,而是更广泛地依赖于不同的政治制度条件。上述结论表明,如何在既定的政治制度和政策框架下切实加强货币政策和金融监管的协调与配合才是问题的核心和关键。 相似文献
15.
Osama D. Sweidan 《International Review of Economics》2010,57(4):395-409
This paper seeks to adjust Taylor rule to mimic an environment that has central bank inability (losses). Moreover, the current paper is aiming at investigating the effect of the new features of Taylor rule within a context of a New-Keynesian model on a developing economy. The current paper concludes that we can utilize Taylor rule within a New-Keynesian model to introduce the influence of the central bank inability on the economy. Central bank inability decreases both expected future real interest rate and expected future real output. On the contrary, it increases expected future nominal interest rate and expected future inflation rate. Moreover, we prove that the effect of central bank inability has larger effect on the expected inflation rate more than the influence of targeted inflation rate. 相似文献
16.
Muhammad Khan 《Applied economics》2019,51(38):4203-4217
The recent monetary search models argue that the real effects of inflation on economic activity can be gauged through relative price variability (RPV). Our study uses a large panel data of 32 developed and emerging European economies to test the relationship between inflation and RPV. We use a panel threshold model to explore the regime-specific effects of inflation on RPV. Our results confirm a non-linear profile of the relationship between inflation and RPV. Consistent with the monetary search models, our results show that the effects of inflation on the RPV are more significant in its low (below 0.792% per annum) and high (beyond 2.064% per annum) regimes. Finally, we also report a strong moderating role of central bank independence (CBI) in the inflation–RPV relationship. 相似文献
17.
This paper challenges the time-inconsistency case for centralbank independence. It argues that the time-inconsistency literaturenot only seriously confuses the substance of the rules vs discretiondebate, but also posits an implausible view of monetary policy.Most worryingly, the inflationary bias featured prominentlyin the time-inconsistency literature has encouraged the developmentof a dangerously one-sided approach to central bank independencewhich entirely ignores the potential risks involved in maximisingcentral bankers' latitude for discretion. The analysis showsthat a more balanced and symmetric approach to central bankindependence is urgently needed. The views of Maynard Keynesand Milton Friedman are shown to shed some illuminating anddisconcerting light on a fashionable free-lunch promise thatis based on rather shallow theoretical foundations and empiricalevidence. 相似文献
18.
In this paper we adopt the Markov-switching heteroscedasticity model to analyse the inflation series for G7 countries and examine the interaction between inflation rate and its uncertainty over both the short- and long-run. It is found that the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty depends on whether the shock is permanent or transitory. The relationship also differs from country to country. High uncertainty about long-run inflation is associated with a significant positive shift in inflation for Canada, Germany, and Japan. High uncertainty about short-run inflation is associated with a significant positive shift in inflation for Germany and USA, and a significant negative shift in inflation for Canada. The modelling approach employed in this paper is empirically supported by various diagnostics including the Vuong test. We also derive the two components of the variance of inflation forecast for a particular forecast horizon. It is found that the inflation uncertainty increases at all horizons in the middle of 1970s and return to the low level in the middle of 1980s.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: October 2003We would like to thank three anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions. 相似文献
19.
Using a dynamic panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the political and institutional factors on inflation. Estimation results show that a lower degree of political instability generates lower inflation only for developed and low-inflation countries. However, when political freedom is taken into account, political instability appears to be influential on inflation also for developing countries and turns out to be significant only for high-inflation countries. Such findings emphasize the inflation-reducing effects of political stability depending on democratic political structure. 相似文献
20.
澳大利亚中央银行经过几十年的改革和发展,其独立性已有很大进展,这一点已为学们的研究所证实。建立市场经济体制的中国迫切需要一个独立的中央银行,为此需借鉴包括澳大利亚在内的西方发达国家的经验,增强和完善中国中央银行的独立性。 相似文献