关于构建我国环境税制的思考

随着经济增长和社会发展,我国的环境恶化问题日益突出。为实现新世纪的可持续发展目标,我国应考虑建立环境税制体系,深化税制改革,调整、完善相关税种,建立完整的环境税制度。     

循环经济视野下的绿色税制建设

绿色税制亦称税制体系的绿化,是对原有税收制度的一种变迁,凸现税制的环境资源保护功能。在我国现行的税制框架内,虽然有很多与环境资源有关、有利于促进循环经济发展的税种及措施,但缺乏总体性、前瞻性的与循环经济发展相适应的税制设计。本文借鉴西方发达国家的成功经验,立足于我国实际,构建和完善我国绿色税制的具体措施包括:依托费改税,开征独立型环境税;改革现行税制,对相关税种进行绿化以及完善相关税收优惠措施,并加强彼此之间的协调和配合。     

创新型城市建设中的环境税征收对策研究

鉴于西方实施环境税的经验,文章认为,创新型政府在进行环境税法律制度的构建时,应明确以经济激励机制为核心,完善多制度协调的调整机制,"绿化"现有税制结构,新开征一系列环境税种,改革排污收费制度的思路并完善我国的税务行政诉讼制度。     

论我国环境税制的完善

本文认为应从环境税制建构的应然性和实然性角度对我国现行税种进行总体上的把握.对于环境税的有关税种、税收优惠政策应有充分的认识,并将环境税制改革的意义置于优先认可和信赖的前提下.同时,寻找符合我国基本国情,彰显公平、正义价值诉求的环境税制.     

英国环境税制的演变及效应评估

英国的环境税制初建于20世纪90年代,近年来,在绿色环保政策的导向下,英国已经形成一套相对完善的环境税法体系。文章具体介绍了英国的各种环境税税种,并从经济发展、环境改善、能源节约等角度对其污染治理和节能减排效果进行了评估,为我国环境税的开征提供了借鉴。     

可持续发展的环境税效应分析及税制设计

随着我国经济的快速增长,环境问题日趋严重,已成为制约我国可持续发展的重要因素之一。为此,建立和完善环境税制,对于解决我国目前面临的环境问题,实现可持续发展的战略目标具有十分重要的意义。基于这一背景,本文从可持续发展的角度出发,深入剖析了环境税的经济效应,提出了适合我国国情的环境税税制设想。     

“十二五”时期环境税成为地方主体税种的可能性分析

本文在阐述"十二五"新政赋予环境税的优势的基础上,从资源税改革推动环境税收入剧增、碳税的开征强化环境税收的主体地位、广义环境税中其他税种增收可观等方面分析了环境税成为地方主体税种的可能性。并由此得出这样一个结论:营业税将不再是地方主体税种,而独立的环境税即将建立并很可能成为地方主体税种之一。     

借鉴欧盟经验,建立健全我国环境税制

一、环境税制建设的目标——环境红利。从20世纪90年代初开始,欧洲国家一方面积极推行环境税改革,纷纷开征并逐步提高环境税税率,降低劳动所得税;同时在劳动力市场施行"一揽子"改革措施,包括加大对劳动力市场的公共财政投入,完善社会保障制度,有效地协调处理了环境问题和失业问题,为税收制度生态化改革提供了政策联动的制度保障,从而促使环境税取得了"双重红利"的效果。目前,我国实现环境税"双重红利"的条件仍不具备。     

为什么开征环境税应先试点?

开征环境税是治理我国环境污染和适应严峻的环境保护形势的需要,是贯彻落实科学发展观和转变经济发展方式的需要,是完善环境经济手段和构建我国环境政策体系的需要,是完善环境税制和深化税制改革的需要。我国目前对于废气、废水、固体废物和噪音等污染排放实行的是排污收费制度,因而对这些污染物排放征税实际上就是排污收费的费改税问题。环境税的纳税人是指在我国境内直接向自然环境排放应税污染物的单位和个     

欧盟税收制度生态化改革对我国环境税制建设的启示

二十世纪九十年代,欧盟在经济不景气、环境问题日益突出的双重压力下,将环境税作为矫正负外部性的重要政策工具,进行了以环境税为核心的税收制度生态化改革,取得了良好的环境效益、经济效益和社会效益。目前,我国面临着同样的经济和环境问题,需要环境税发挥应有的作用。根据欧盟经验及中国国情,我国环境税应以"环境红利"为目标,以"收入中性"为原则,将税收负担在商品税和环境税之间进行重新分配。在融入型环境税建设基础上推动独立环境税建设。目前,应对现有税种进行生态化改良,在"十二五"中后期,分步将废水、二氧化硫、固定废弃物以及二氧化碳纳入环境税征收对象,征收独立环境税。     

Market Access and WTO Border Tax Adjustments for Environmental Excise Taxes under Imperfect Competition

The literature identifies linkages between domestic environmental policies and trade, the treatment of imports being an important issue in administration of domestic environmental excise taxes. With the aim of ensuring foreign exporters do not attain a competitive advantage, border tax adjustments are used. Since most environmental excise taxes apply to intermediate goods, the relevant border tax adjustment applies to final imported goods. However, when both intermediate and final goods markets are oligopolistic, border tax adjustments may be non‐neutral. Moreover, even if market access is unchanged, border tax adjustments can still lead to redistribution of profits between domestic and foreign firms.     

Optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency with an externality in an overlapping generations model

This paper examines optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency, integrating them in a second-best world with pollution by using an overlapping generations model. The second-best world is characterized by the comparative statics of green preferences. The main results obtained are as follows. First, the marginal cost of public funds may be reduced by the externalities, regardless of the choice of taxes. Second, optimal environmental and non-environmental tax rules are additively and directly affected by the dynamic efficiency of capital accumulation per unit labour (DECAL), and indirectly by it, through the efficiency of the public sector. Environmental taxes going beyond Pigovian ones may be welfare-improving if the DECAL is improved by the environmental tax. Even optimal non-environmental tax rules should additively and directly counter the dynamics of pollution to consider the income effects of the optimal tax system for the future. Third, the “additivity property,” or the “principle of targeting,” does not hold even in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints. The essential reasons for this are clarified as follows: distortions that should be countered by taxes; that is, the income effects of the optimal tax system and the DECAL in this model, break the equality between optimal environmental taxes and the externalities measured by governments. Finally, growing environmental concerns may, in fact, increase pollution. The inverse relationship between environmental and labour income taxes may not hold.     

关于完善我国环保型税收政策的探讨

环保型税收在环境保护方面具有不可替代的作用。随着我国经济发展环境问题日益凸现,运用税收手段解决环境问题已成为各国通行的做法。鉴于我国目前以流转税为主,经济发展水平不高,所以不能完全照搬西方的做法,但西方发达国家生态税有许多值得我们借鉴的成功经验。我国税制中与生态环境有关的政策,散见于资源税、消费税、企业所得税等几个税种中,有些仍以费的形式存在,有较大的空间。建议应增加现行税种的环境保护内涵,实行专门的环保税种,实行费改税等。     

Consequences of Environmental Tax Reform for Unemployment and Welfare

We investigate the welfare effects of environmental tax reform, i.e. raising environmental taxes and using the proceeds to reduce distortionary taxes on labour. The framework of analysis is a small open economy with involuntary unemployment due to a rigid consumer wage. Environmental tax reform boosts not only environmental quality but also employment if substitution between labour and resources is easy, the production share of the fixed factor is large, and the initial tax rates on resources and profits are small. If the initial tax system is sub-optimal with a negligible tax on resources, profits rise as well.     

Environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers: an application to energy consumption in France

This paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply, consumption of polluting (energy related) and non-polluting (non-energy) goods, and emissions. It quantifies the model for the French economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second-best tax regimes. We find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage. These goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality ‘a lot’. Secondly, if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality-correcting role, they benefit all types—although the gains are rather modest. The gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well. Third, setting the environmental tax at its Pigouvian level, rather than its optimal externality-correcting-cum-redistributive level, benefits the high-income group at the expense of the low-income groups. Fourth, nonlinear taxation of polluting goods, and nonlinear commodity taxation in general, is a powerful redistributive mechanism. Fifth, introducing environmental taxes in the current French tax system, with its suboptimal income taxes, results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well-off persons.     

中国环境税制现状、问题及对策研究

环境污染已经成为当今世界面临的共同问题,制约着经济的发展,威胁着人类的生存。实施环境税则是解决这一问题的有效措施之一。本文介绍了环境税的理论基础,分析了中国环境税制度现状及存在的问题,认为中国现行有关环境保护的税费政策,由于存在缺少以保护环境为目的的专门税种、现有涉及环保的税种中有关环保的规定不健全、考虑环境保护因素的税收优惠单一等问题,其力度和系统性不足以形成对环境的保护。并对中国环境税制度建设对策进行了探讨,提出了在将部分排污费改为环境污染税,征水污染税、二氧化硫税和垃圾税,使其成为中国环境税的主体税种的基础上,调整现行资源税和消费税,构建中国环境税收体系的对策。     

完善我国环境保护税收制度的思考

当前,我国资源破坏和环境污染问题相当严峻,要实现中国跨世纪环保政策目标和可持续发展战略,必须依靠税收这种有效的经济手段。但是,我国现行的税费政策总体作用有限,因而必须进一步完善我国环境保护税收制度,一是改革和完善现行资源税;二是及时开征环境保护税;三是在其它一般性税收中采取各种税收调节措施,体现环保目标。     

DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES UNDER INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in the absence of explicit trade policies when both governments and firms act strategically. We demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady‐state equilibrium in a dynamic environmental tax game is lower than that in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the beginning of policy competition, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax. This implies that it is important to set cooperative environmental taxes in the beginning of policy competition because non‐cooperative environmental taxes in the dynamic game result in the race‐to‐the‐bottom, which does not lead to environmental improvement.     

Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividend

This paper investigates the employment and welfare effects of an environmental tax reform, i.e. raising environmental taxes and using the revenues to cut labor taxes. The analysis reveals that such a reform does not necessarily raise employment: it may replace explicit labor taxes by higher implicit taxes on labor. However, employment may rise if the reform succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from workers to those outside the labor force. The paper explores also how distributional concerns affect optimal environmental taxes.     

Green Tax Reform in an Oligopolistic Industry

OECD countries reduce or eliminate certain taxes when they introduce new environmental taxes. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the incidence of such green tax reform in an oligopolistic industry. The paper shows that a rise in taxes could result in the expansion of the aggregate pollution in the presence of a large technology gap. The paper further shows that the government loses tax revenue as a result of the green tax reform if it continues to apply the same environmental standard. This implies that the government needs to raise environmental standards to keep the existing level of public spending after a green tax reform.