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1.
Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Kin Chung Lo 《Economic Theory》1999,14(3):621-633
Summary. In a Nash equilibrium, players' rationality is mutual knowledge. However, both intuition and experimental evidence suggest
that players do not know for sure the rationality of opponents. This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept, cautious equilibrium, that generalizes Nash equilibrium in terms of preferences in two person strategic games. In a cautious equilibrium, players
do not necessarily know the rationality of opponents, but they view rationality as infinitely more likely than irrationality.
For suitable models of preference, cautious equilibrium predicts that a player might take a “cautious” strategy that is not
a best response in any Nash equilibrium.
Received: January 28, 1998; revised version October 2, 1998 相似文献
2.
Bernard Lebrun 《Economic Theory》2002,20(3):435-453
Summary. Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge
in the literature. Authors have also searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some
probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends
continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as
well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics.
Received: February 1, 1999; revised version: July 27, 2001 相似文献
3.
Sophie Bade 《Economic Theory》2005,26(2):309-332
Summary. This paper investigates Nash equilibrium under the possibility that preferences may be incomplete. I characterize the Nash-equilibrium-set of such a game as the union of the Nash-equilibrium-sets of certain derived games with complete preferences. These games with complete preferences can be derived from the original game by a simple linear procedure, provided that preferences admit a concave vector-representation. These theorems extend some results on finite games by Shapley and Aumann. The applicability of the theoretical results is illustrated with examples from oligopolistic theory, where firms are modelled to aim at maximizing both profits and sales (and thus have multiple objectives). Mixed strategy and trembling hand perfect equilibria are also discussed.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 24 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D11, C72, D43.I would like to thank Jean-Pierre Benôit, Juan Dubra, Alejandrio Jofre, Debraj Ray, Kim-Sau Chung and the seminar participants at NYU and at the Universidad de Chile for their comments. I am most grateful to Efe Ok, for his comments, criticism, suggestions and questions. 相似文献
4.
Summary. In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by
the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals
is essentially symmetric: the same profile of strategies is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and
strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies
attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially
symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation.
Received: June 20, 2001; revised version: January 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We wish to thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fran?oise Forges, Franco Donzelli, Leonidas Koutsougeras, Aldo Rustichini, Rajiv
Vohra and Nicholas Yannelis for their comments.
Correspondence to: H. Polemarchakis 相似文献
5.
John Duggan 《Economic Theory》2003,21(1):117-131
Summary. I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed production economies and regulatory problems with
negative externalities as special cases, and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general
sets of assumptions. I first construct a continuous mechanism to implement the (constrained) Lindahl allocations of an economy,
and I then extend this to arbitrary social choice rules based on prices. I end with a mechani
sm to implement any monotonic social choice rule, assuming only the existence of a private (not necessarily transferable)
good. In that general case, each agent simply reports an upper contour set, an outcome, and I need two agents to make binary
numerical announcements. I do not require the usual no-veto-power condition.
Received: February 19, 1998; revised version: January 30, 2002 相似文献
6.
Walter Trockel 《Economic Theory》2000,16(2):277-294
Summary. The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of -person bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a non-cooperative game in strategic form, whose
unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash solution of the bargaining game. Next this game
is modified in such a way that the unique Nash equilibrium that supports the Nash solution is even in dominant strategies.
After that an -stage game in extensive form is presented whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium supports the Nash solution of the bargaining
game. Finally, the support results are shown to induce implementation results in the sense of mechanism theory.
Received: October 3, 1999; revised version: October 26, 1999 相似文献
7.
Indrajit Ray 《Economic Theory》2001,17(1):223-231
Summary. This paper compares the sets of Nash, coalition- proof Nash and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of normal form games which
are closely related. We propose sufficient conditions for equivalent or closely related games to have identical sets of equilibrium payoffs.
Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: November 23, 1999 相似文献
8.
Pascal Bridel 《European Journal of the History of Economic Thought》2013,20(2):268-292
This paper concentrates on Patinkin's use of Walras' model in his attempt at providing a proper theory of the price of money integrated with the theory of relative prices. Patinkin stands as the last major contributor to a Walras-Hicks-Patinkin tradition based on an attempt at introducing money into the agent's utility function. More in Hicks than in Walras' footsteps, Patinkin gives a clear priority to money as a store of value over an assumed function as a means of exchange. It is also shown how confident the profession was in the early 1950s in the ability of general equilibrium to provide theoretical foundations to the neo-classical synthesis. However, the similitudes between the technique used by Walras and Patinkin are only a smokescreen behind which very different intentions are hidden. 相似文献
9.
10.
Ko Nishihara 《Economic Theory》1999,13(2):483-494
Summary. Nishihara [3] showed that N-person prisoners' dilemma has a cooperative Nash equilibrium, if the players decide their actions sequentially in the order
determined by Nature under a certain information structure, and if each player's payoffs satisfy a certain inequality. This
paper examines the stability of this cooperative equilibrium against two matters: players' slight mistakes and deviations
by coalitions. The main results are as follows: (i) if the inequality on each player's payoffs strictly holds, then the cooperative
equilibrium is a strictly proper equilibrium; (ii) if N≤3, and if full cooperation is Pareto efficient in N-person prisoners' dilemma, then the cooperative equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium; (iii) the cooperative equilibrium is in general a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Received: June 23, 1997; revised version: December 2, 1997 相似文献
11.
A note on asymmetric and mixed strategy equilibria in the search-theoretic model of fiat money 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Randall Wright 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):463-471
Summary. The simple search-theoretic model of fiat money has three symmetric Nash equilibria: all agents accept money with probability
1; all agents accept money with probability 0; and all agents accept money with probability y in (0,1). Here I construct an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium, payoff-equivalent to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium,
where a fraction N in (0,1) of agents always accept money and 1-N never accept money. Counter to what has been conjectured previously, I find N > y. I also introduce evolutionary dynamics, and show that the economy converges to monetary exchange iff the initial proportion
of agents accepting money exceeds N.
Received: September 10, 1997; revised version: April 24, 1998 相似文献
12.
Yan Chen 《Economic Theory》2002,19(4):773-790
Summary. We present a family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions
this family of mechanisms are supermodular games, which implies that they converge to Nash equilibrium under a wide class
of learning dynamics.
Received: April 27, 2000; revised version: January 16, 2001 相似文献
13.
Summary. For a number of reasons a large class of general equilibrium models from the field of resource economics does not allow for
an equilibrium analysis along the lines of the theory of infinite dimensional commodity spaces. The reasons concern the choice
of the commodity space and the applicability of properness assumptions with respect to preferences and the technology. This
paper illustrates the difficulties and shows for a prototype model how the problems can successfully be tackled by the use
of a limit argument on equilibria in the truncated economies.
Received: May 2, 1996; revised version: May 13, 1998 相似文献
14.
Vincent J. Vannetelbosch 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):353-371
Summary. This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information. For N-person sequential bargaining
games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium
approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by a refinement of rationalizability for
multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) whatever the impatience of the players. That is, once we adopt the non-equilibrium
approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity.
Moreover, this unique solution is the unique SPE.
Received: October 30, 1996; revised version: July 7, 1998 相似文献
15.
Lin Zhou 《Economic Theory》2005,26(2):301-308
Summary. In this paper I study a class of two-player games, in which both players action sets are [0,1] and their payoff functions are continuous in joint actions and quasi-concave in own actions. I show that a no-improper-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for a finite subset A of
to be the set of Nash equilibria of such a game.Received: 21 November 2002, Revised: 9 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
C65, C72.I am grateful to an editor of the journal and an anonymous referee for their very helpful comments. I also would like to thank the seminar participants at City University of Hong Kong, Georgia State University, Northwestern University, and Rice University. 相似文献
16.
Yves Balasko 《Economic Theory》2003,21(1):1-18
Summary. In a two-period pure exchange economy with financial assets, a temporary financial equilibrium is an equilibrium of the current
spot and security markets given forecast functions of future prices and payoffs. The temporary equilibrium model can then
be interpreted as an Arrow-Debreu economy where preferences depend on prices. This identification implies, among other consequences,
the existence and the generic determinateness of the financial temporary equilibria associated with given forecast functions.
Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2001 相似文献
17.
Summary. Recent experiments on mixed-strategy play in experimental games reject the hypothesis that subjects play a mixed strategy
even when that strategy is the unique Nash equilibrium prediction. However, in a three-person matching-pennies game played
with perfect monitoring and complete payoff information, we cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects play the mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. Given this support for mixed-strategy play, we then consider two qualitatively different learning theories
(sophisticated Bayesian and naive Bayesian) which predict that the amount of information given to subjects will determine
whether they can learn to play the predicted mixed strategies. We reject the hypothesis that subjects play the symmetric mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium when they do not have complete payoff information. This finding suggests that players did not use sophisticated
Bayesian learning to reach the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Received: August 9, 1996; revised version: October 21, 1998 相似文献
18.
Emmanuel Thibault 《Economic Theory》2000,15(3):709-715
Summary. This note deals with the existence and uniqueness of a non-trivial steady-state equilibrium in an overlapping generations
(OLG) model with productive capital and altruistic agents. We establish a necessary and sufficient condition for operative
bequests which extends Abel (1987) and Weil (1987). Interestingly, we prove that the OLG model with production and altruistic
agents always experiences a non-trivial steady-state equilibrium.
Received: July 16, 1998; revised version: January 29, 1999 相似文献
19.
Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Marcos B. Lisboa 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):555-575
Summary. The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk, aggregate uncertainty and moral hazard. There
is a large number of households, each facing two individual states of nature in the second period. These states differ solely
in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period each household chooses a non-observable action. Higher levels of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower levels of utility. Households' utilities are assumed
to be separable in action and the aggregate uncertainty is independent of the individual risk. Insurance is supplied by a collection of firms who behave
strategically and maximize expected profits taking into account that each household's optimal choice of action is a function of the offered contract. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows
that the appropriate versions of both welfare theorems hold.
Received: December 7, 1998; revised version: October 25, 1999 相似文献
20.
Summary. We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in recent evolutionary literature to a class of coordination games played
simultaneously by the entire population. In these games payoffs, and hence best replies, are determined by a summary statistic
of the population strategy profile. We demonstrate that with simultaneous play, the equilibrium selection depends crucially
on how best responses to the summary statistic remain piece-wise constant. In fact, all the strict Nash equilibria in the
underlying stage game can be made stochastically stable depending on how the best response mapping generates piece-wise constant
best responses.
Received: February 12, 2001; revised version: October 29, 2001 相似文献