The impact of IMF term loans on US bank creditors’ equity values: an event study of South Korea's case

This study investigates whether the IMF term loan announcements to South Korea in late November and early December 1997 significantly increased the implicit value of the U.S. bank loans and investments to South Korea and hence, the equity values of its U.S. bank creditors. Using both the market model and the SUR model, this paper examines the potential abnormal performance of a total of 230 U.S. banks during mid-November to early December 1997. The findings show that there was a statistically significant positive equity response to the international bank creditors during the major event announcements. Further, the evidence shows the existence of different pricing behavior of different groups: groups that were more exposed experienced a more positive equity-price response.     

Bank bailouts and economic growth: Evidence from cross-country,cross-industry data

In this paper, we revisit the question of how bank bailouts affect economic growth. We adopt a broad concept of bailouts, which includes both capital injections and liquidity support to the banking system. We employ an identification strategy that controls for the various dimensions of bailout endogeneity and find that liquidity support has a significant positive real economic effect. The effect of recapitalizations per se is not statistically significant, but they reinforce the positive impact of liquidity interventions. Utilizing bank-level data, we provide evidence that this is the case because better-capitalized banks and banks in significantly recapitalized systems have a higher propensity to lend, thus raising aggregate-level real economic growth.     

Bank runs, foreign exchange reserves and credibility: When size does not matter

The paper considers the sizes of banking sectors that are vulnerable to runs when the central bank cares about economic stability and currency peg credibility. It is shown that when banks are small, the central bank will recapitalize unhealthy banks because doing so will not compromise its peg. While recapitalizations of large banking sectors will compromise a peg, central banks will also bailout large banking sectors in distress to prevent great economic instability. Given the central bank's expected response, a range of sizes for banking systems, which are vulnerable to runs, is found along with a condition in which size will not matter. That is, if that condition is satisfied, banking sectors of all sizes will be immune to runs. The experiences of Asia and Argentina are discussed to provide anecdotal support for the model.     

A note on deposit rate deregulation, Super NOWs, and bank security returns

This paper empirically investigates the effects on the weekly returns of almost 100 banking organizations of the December 1982 authorization of Super NOWs. Examination of excess returns around the announcement date suggests that the announcement of the Super NOWs had a statistically significant (and negative) effect and that the impact differed significantly by type of bank. While returns for money center banks were generally unaffected, excess returns for regional retail banks were highly significant.     

国际货币基金组织的困境与改革探讨

国际货币基金组织自成立以来,在维持国际经济和金融稳定方面做出了重要贡献,但是面对21 世纪全球经济一体化所产生的巨大跨境资本流动、竞争优势的突变以及频繁发生的金融危机,其监督机制、借贷功能和治理结构等方面已不能满足新世纪世界经济形势变化的需要.本文在对国际货币基金组织代表性与全球经济发展之间的冲突、危机救济方式与目标之间的冲突、成为发达国家手中的工具与其独立性之间的冲突等困境分析的基础上,提出了国际货币基金组织改革的主要任务和核心内容,即保持国际金融稳定和国际收支的平衡,增加国际货币基金组织的普遍代表性,改革国际货币储备体系.     

Capital ratios and bank lending: A matched bank approach

This paper examines the impact of bank capital ratios on bank lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are matched based on geographic area as well as size and various business characteristics. We argue that such comparisons are most effective at controlling for local loan demand and other environmental factors. For comparison we also control for local factors using MSA fixed effects. We find, based on data from 2001 to 2011, that the relationship between capital ratios and bank lending was significant during and shortly following the recent financial crisis but not at other times. We find that the relationship between capital ratios and loan growth is stronger for banks where loans are contracting than where loans are expanding. We also show that the elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios is higher when capital ratios are relatively low, suggesting that the effect of capital ratio on bank lending is nonlinear. In addition, we present findings on the relationship between bank capital and lending by bank size and loan type.     

The effects of DIDMCA on bank stockholders' returns and risk

In this paper we examine the effects of the 1980 DIDMCA on bank stockholders' returns and risk. While at the time of the announcement both commercial banks and thrifts appeared to benefit (measured by abnormal returns), over a longer period of time surrounding the announcement week, it is evident that thrift stockholders were the primary beneficiaries of the acts passage. When the effects of DIDMCA on risk was analysed, it was found that after the act's passage the (total) return risk of both money center and regional banks increased while that for thrifts decreased. However, some of the beneficial effects of the Act appear to have been mitigated by an increase in the absolute size of unexpected interest-rate risk in the post- enactment period.     

Independence in bank governance structure: Empirical evidence of effects on bank risk and performance

We investigate how different governance arrangements affect risk and return in banks. Using a new data set for UK banks over the period 2003–2012, we employ a simultaneous equations framework to control for the reciprocal relationship between risk and return. We show that separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman increases bank risk without causing a concurrent increase in return. We also find that oversight by a Remuneration Committee and Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) lowers the probability of bank failure, indicating that empowering an independent Chairman has different effects from empowering independent NEDs. Overall, our results underline the importance of accounting for the heterogeneity in corporate governance arrangements within banks.     

Commercial bank mutual fund activities: Implications for bank risk and profitability

This paper examines the risk structure of bank holding companies and the effect of mutual fund activities on bank risk and profitability over the period 1987–1994. Findings from structural change tests indicate a significant decline in bank risk occurred near the mid-point of the study. Results from a confirmatory factor analytic model employed to examine the impact of mutual fund activities on banks suggest that mutual fund activities moderated bank industry systematic risk during the sample period. Mutual fund activities also increased the profitability of banks. These results suggest that mutual funds represent a productive avenue of expansion for bank holding companies.     

IMF治理机制基本框架的演变、困境与变革前景

作为二战后建立起来的最重要的国际金融组织,IMF在维护国际金融稳定方面发挥了重要作用。文章介绍了IMF治理机制的基本框架及演变,分析了其治理结构中存在的问题,如决策权更多地被欧美发达国家所主导,危机处理能力不足等,指出IMF应顺应国际经济金融格局的变化,不断完善机构自身治理,更好地反映发展中国家的权益,提升维护国际金融稳定的能力。     

Social capital and bank stability

Using a sample of public and private banks, we study how social capital relates to bank stability. Social capital, which reflects the level of cooperative norms in society, is likely to reduce opportunistic behavior (Jha and Chen 2015; Hasan et al., 2017) and, therefore, act as an informal monitoring mechanism. Consistent with our expectations, we find that banks in high social capital regions experienced fewer failures and less financial trouble during the 2007–2010 financial crisis than banks in low social capital regions. In addition, we find that social capital was negatively associated with abnormal risk-taking and positively associated with accounting transparency and accounting conservatism in the pre-crisis period of 2000–2006, indicating that risk-taking, accounting transparency, and accounting conservatism are possible channels through which social capital affected bank stability during the crisis.     

Bank size, market concentration, and bank earnings volatility in the US

We examine whether bank earnings volatility depends on bank size and the degree of concentration in the banking sector. Using quarterly data for non-investment banks in the United States for the period 2004Q1-2009Q4 and controlling for the quality of management, leverage, and diversification, we find that bank size reduces return volatility. The negative impact of bank size on bank earnings volatility decreases (in absolute terms) with market concentration. We also find that larger banks located in concentrated markets have experienced higher volatility during the recent financial crisis.     

Minimum capital requirements,bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.     

Debt-equity swaps, regulation K, and bank stock returns

Since the early 1980s, the financial health of several highly levered LDCs has become increasingly precarious. Their financial problems, in turn, imply potentially serious financial problems for their creditors, foremost among whom are some of the largest banks in the American financial system.In order to relieve some of the pressure on the lending firms, the Board of Governors has recently amended Regulation K, which provides guidelines for international banking operations, to allow for unrestricted investment in foreign nationalized firms through the mechanism of the debt-equity swap.This paper examines the capital market reaction to the regulatory change and we find that (1) investors, on average, viewed the change as a wealth-increasing event, (2) the magnitude of the market reaction was significant and positively related to the level of foreign lending exposure, and (3) among LDC lenders, the capital market reaction differed significantly between money-center and non-money-center banks.     

How can IMF policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities?

Costly crisis prevention has positive external effects, which leads to free-riding of governments on each other's efforts. “Ordinary” IMF loans aggravate existing externalities, reinforcing the under-investment problem. We consider the reform proposals of the “Meltzer commission” in both loan and insurance models and show how the IMF can eliminate country moral. The efficiency-ensuring loan policy accounts for given externalities and involves effort-contingent discounts on interests or the extension of credit volume. Similar results hold for the insurance framework. Ex ante participation requires that smaller countries be “subsidized” by large ones, or that IMF policy consider distributional aspects in addition to efficiency.     

Guarantees,transparency and the interdependency between sovereign and bank default risk

Bank debt guarantees have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to prevent bank runs. However, as recent experiences in some European countries have demonstrated, guarantees may link the coordination problems of bank and sovereign creditors and induce a functional interdependence between the likelihoods of a government default and bank illiquidity. Employing a global-game approach, we model this link, showing the existence and uniqueness of the joint equilibrium and derive its comparative statics properties. In equilibrium, the guarantee reduces the probability of a bank run, while it increases the probability of a sovereign default. The latter erodes the guarantee’s credibility and thus its effectiveness ex ante. By setting the guarantee optimally, the government balances these two effects in order to minimize expected costs of crises. Our results show that the optimal guarantee has clear-cut welfare gains which are enhanced through policies that promote greater balance sheet transparency.     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.     

The effects of resolution methods and industry stress on the loss on assets from bank failures

In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.     

Correlated bank runs,interbank markets and reserve requirements

This article extends the application of global games of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to account for correlation in the quality of banks’ long term investment, when banks are linked through cross deposits and there is a central bank. The goal is to study how these elements affect the deposit contract that banks offer to depositors and the ex ante probability of a bank run. We show that the coexistence of a central bank, which determines banks’ reserve requirements, and an interbank market, which redistributes reserves, leads to a smaller probability of a bank run and to fewer inefficient bank runs, relative to the case with no central bank and no interbank market. By adequately choosing the level of reserves to store, the central bank can improve the equilibrium outcome and allow banks to offer a higher interim payment to depositors, relative to the situation with no cross deposits.     

Inflation volatility effects on the allocation of bank loans

This paper examines the distortionary effects of inflation volatility on the allocation of bank loans. We argue that inflation volatility would render bank managers to behave more conservatively in issuing new loans. In contrast, when inflation volatility is low, bank managers would have the latitude to lend more idiosyncratically. Using a large panel of commercial bank data gathered from 15 countries, we provide support for our hypothesis by demonstrating a strong negative relation between inflation volatility and the dispersion of loans-to-assets ratio. Similar results are obtained when we split the sample between EU and non-EU country groups. The robustness of our findings is confirmed by a battery of sensitivity checks.