Do Managers Have Capital Structure Targets? Evidence from Corporate Spinoffs

The two main theories of capital structure—the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory—have opposite predictions about the expected relationship between corporate leverage and profitability. According to the tradeoff theory, companies that earn higher profits will use more debt both to shield their income from corporate taxes and to discipline corporate investment policy. In contrast, the pecking order theory predicts that more profitable companies will borrow less mainly because they have less need to borrow.
Corporate spinoffs provide a unique opportunity to investigate the influence of profitability and other asset characteristics on the design of capital structure. In their study of 98 spinoffs over the period 1979–1997, the authors began by investigating the popular argument that managers routinely assign more debt to subsidiaries than parents in order to leave the parents less encumbered—a possibility they reject after finding that the average leverage ratios of the parents and spunoff units were roughly equal. At the same time, the authors reported large differences in the leverage ratios among both parents and spun-off units, and that the variation was explained primarily by differences in three factors: asset tangibility and the level and variability of cash operating profits. Consistent with the tradeoff theory (but not the pecking order), the study found a significantly positive correlation between a post-spinoff company's cash profitability and its assigned debt load, as well as a negative correlation between debt and the variability of operating cash flow.     

股利税与资本结构:中国的经验证据

已有研究主要考察了企业所得税对资本结构的影响,却较少有研究探讨个人所得税对资本结构的影响,基于中国的此类研究则处于空白。我国2012年颁布的股息红利差别化个人所得税政策,将投资者的股利税与持股时间相结合。基于这一税收改革,我们发现,投资者持股时间越长(短)的企业,因为在改革之后其投资者的股利税会下降(上升),这些企业债务融资的比重显著降低(提高)。此外,股利税对资本结构的影响,在股利支付力度较大的企业更为显著。进一步,股利税对不同类型债务融资比重的影响存在差异。本文的结论不仅为"税收与公司财务"这一经典的学术领域提供了来自中国的经验证据,也补充了中国在相关学术领域的缺失。     

关于我国国际资本流动影响因素计量模型的构建和分析

本文对我国国际资本流动影响因素进行了比较深入的计量分析。第一部分分析比较和概括总结了国际学术界关于国际资本流动影响因素的现有理论的研究成果,总结了影响国际资本流动的一般因素。第二部分在参考第一部分研究的基础上,构建了我国国际资本流动影响因素的模型,对利率、汇率、通货膨胀率、开放度以及政策变量等因素对我国国际资本流动的影响进行了计量分析,并提出相关政策建议。     

公司的资本成本与投资理性——来自沪深上市公司的证据

本文对我国上市公司的投资行为及其影响因素进行了实证研究。结果表明：（1）上市企业的投资决策受资本成本的约束显著，符合市场理性；（2）企业投资对内部现金流、外部负债融资和股权融资都具有敏感性，但回归系数依序递减，可能说明了不同融资形式的成本差异；（3）产品市场需求增长为企业带来了有价值的投资机会，具有拉动企业投资的显著作用。     

国有商业银行改革：应从治理结构转向资本结构

目前我国国有商业银行面对的是单一国有产权结构,这种产权结构的特征是产权具有不可交易性,产权交易的实现和交易规则的形成的前提是实现资本结构多元化。国有商业银行通过股改上市,初步打破了资本结构独资化状况,意味着产权交易的启动。可以预见,多样化资本竞争和并购重组离国有商业银行并不遥远。     

企业融资行业与资本结构研究的新发展及启示

西方企业融资行为新的理论模型及实证研究表明，不少融资决策和资本结构管理行为是企业基于产品市场竞争环境，公司战略以及资本市场环境的商业选择。……     

资本结构、产权结构与公司治理

资本结构也就是财产所有权的结构安排,而财产所有权往往最终与收益权对应,所以资本结构又牵系着产权安排,或者说资本结构决定了产权安排结构。这样作为股权资本与债券资本比例关系的资本结构,反映的是市场经济条件下企业的金融关系,即以资本和信用为纽带,通过投资与借贷构成的股东、债权人和经营者之间相互制约的利益关系。     

民营企业资本结构与公司治理结构分析

民营企业的公司治理结构不健全主要是资金结构不合理、政府职能不到位以及企业自身原因所造成的.应推进金融体制改革,培育信用环境,提高风险识别能力,加强政府协调,改善民营企业的外部融资环境,优化资本结构,健全公司治理结构,解决民营企业融资难问题     

Back to the Beginning: Persistence and the Cross-Section of Corporate Capital Structure

We find that the majority of variation in leverage ratios is driven by an unobserved time-invariant effect that generates surprisingly stable capital structures: High (low) levered firms tend to remain as such for over two decades. This feature of leverage is largely unexplained by previously identified determinants, is robust to firm exit, and is present prior to the IPO, suggesting that variation in capital structures is primarily determined by factors that remain stable for long periods of time. We then show that these results have important implications for empirical analysis attempting to understand capital structure heterogeneity.     

从资本结构到交易结构——探究企业金融微观结构

资本结构及融资行为是公司金融领域的重要论题,数十年来研究成果丰硕,但对商业实践真正有指导意义的成果却凤毛麟角。本文指出了到目前为止的资本结构研究的主要方向及其不足,提出了企业金融微观结构概念。本文认为,商学院的公司资本结构研究应该区别于经济学,深入到金融工具交易结构的微观层面,才能更深刻、真实地揭示金融实践原理,更好地指导金融实践。     

A Theory of Corporate Capital Structure and Investment

This article uses a general equilibrium framework to explorethe origins and limitations of financial intermediaries. Inthe model, investors have a generic lending technology thatthey can improve at a cost. Those who upgrade become intermediariesto exploit their advantage. However, conflicts with depositorswill limit the banks' market presence, and they will only lendto moderately endowed firms while bondholders will finance cash-richcorporations. The article also analyzes the extent to whichinvestors adopt the superior lending technique, the nature ofbank competition, and how corporate and bank conditions affectinterest rates and investment.     

资本结构选择偏好、成长性与公司绩效

本文通过基于不同资本结构选择偏好和成长性分类对上市公司资本结构和绩效的关系进行研究,研究发现:我国上市公司资本结构与绩效整体呈负相关;考虑内生性基础上,资本结构对绩效的负面影响提高了;不同负债水平下,资本结构对绩效的影响存在显著差异,且负债水平越高,资本结构对公司绩效的影响越大;在不同成长性水平下,资本结构与绩效都是负相关的,且成长性越低负面影响越大。     

Risk-Shifting Incentives and Signalling Through Corporate Capital Structure

This paper examines optimal corporate financing arrangements under asymmetric information for different patterns of temporal resolution of uncertainty in the underlying technology. An agency problem, a signalling problem and an agency-signalling problem arise as special cases. The associated informational equilibria and the optimal financing arrangements are characterized and compared. In the agency-signalling equilibrium the private information of corporate insiders at the time of financing is signalled through capital structure choices which deviate optimally from agency-cost minimizing financing arrangements, which in turn induce risk-shifting incentives in the investment policy. In the pure signalling case the equilibrium is characterized by direct contractual precommitments to implement investment policies which are riskier than pareto-optimal levels. Empirical implications for debt covenants and the announcement effect of investment policies and leverage increasing transactions on existing stock and bond prices are explicitly derived.     

资本结构对公司治理机制的影响：来自管理报酬的证据

财务杠杆能够强化管理报酬的业绩敏感度,并优化管理报酬的激励结构。公司债务所生成的约束机制有助于改善公司治理机制,促进管理效率,减少自由现金流的代理成本,并最终实现公司价值的提升。财务杠杆对公司价值有积极效应。     

Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis

This paper analyses the agency explanation for the cross-sectional variation of corporate dividend policy in the UK by looking at the managerial entrenchment hypothesis drawn from the agency literature. Consistent with predictions, a significant U-shaped relationship between dividend payout ratios and insider ownership is observed for a large (exceeding 600 firms) sample of UK companies and two distinct periods. These results strongly suggest the possibility of managerial entrenchment when insider ownership reaches a threshold of around 30%. Evidence is also presented that non-beneficial holdings by insiders can lead to entrenchment in conjunction with shares held beneficially.     

行业环境、创新战略与公司资本结构

通过实证研究发现,"-3企业处于相对稳定的行业环境下,创新战略与资本结构正相关;当企业处于变化较强的行业环境下,创新战略与资本结构负相关.这意味着公司越注重创新,其资本结构构成中的负债比例就越低.当企业处于相对稳定的行业环境下,资本结构与创新战略正相关,说明在这种情况下高财务杠杆有利于实施创新战略;在动态的行业环境下,资本结构与创新战略负相关,说明在这种情况下低财务杠杆更有利于实施创新战略.     

Capital Structure, CEO Dominance, and Corporate Performance

We use agency theory to investigate the influence of CEO dominance on variation in capital structure. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximize shareholders’ value. Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the evidence reveals that, when the CEO plays a more dominant role among top executives, the firm adopts significantly lower leverage, probably to evade the disciplinary mechanisms associated with debt financing. Our results are important as they demonstrate that CEO power matters to critical corporate outcomes such as capital structure decisions. In addition, we find that the impact of changes in capital structure on firm performance is more negative for firms with more powerful CEOs. Overall, the results are in agreement with prior literature, suggesting that strong CEO dominance appears to exacerbate agency costs and is thus detrimental to firm value.     

公司所得税对资本结构的影响——基于中国上市公司的实证分析

国外大量的经验研究表明,税收是影响公司资本结构的重要因素。而我国具有自身特有的制度与经济背景,通过对我国上市公司财务数据进行检验,可以为我国税收是否影响公司资本结构,以及影响程度的大小提供实证方面的证据,并为进一步改善税收经济调节作用提供思路。     

Concentrated Ownership, No Dividend Payout Requirement and Capital Structure of REITs: Evidence from Turkey

This paper studies empirically the capital structure of Turkish REITs as they offer unique and so far untested angles. They do not have to pay out dividends, yet enjoy the exemption from paying corporate taxes since their legal foundation in 1998. Several financial meltdowns occurred in the last three decades, keeping investors with a doubt about Turkey??s financial and political stability. The last meltdown in 2001 is part of the sample period. Findings show that Turkish REITs employ little long-term debt in their capital structure. The legal requirement that a leader entrepreneur be present with a minimum equity position of 25% introduces the agency problem between the majority and minority owners. The leader entrepreneurs, as non-taxable institutional investors, appear to dictate Turkish REITs?? dividend and debt policies and deplete REITs?? dividends, causing them to go to the long-term debt market. The financial meltdown of 2001 exerts negative short-term and positive long-term influence on the debt ratios while inflation??s effect is negative. Firm size, REITs?? engagement in development and stock market development influence debt ratios positively; tangibility and a few firm, ownership, and country-specific determinants appear to have either mixed or no influence on Turkish REITs?? debt policies.