Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers,Productivity, and Hours*

In this paper, we study the transmission mechanism of productivity shocks in a model with rule‐of‐thumb consumers. In the literature, this financial friction has been studied only with reference to fiscal shocks. We show that the presence of rule‐of‐thumb consumers is also very helpful when accounting for recent empirical evidence on productivity shocks. Rule‐of‐thumb agents, together with nominal and real rigidities, play an important role in reproducing the negative response of hours and the delayed response of output after a productivity shock.     

ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE,INTEREST‐RATE RULES,AND INDETERMINACY*

This paper extends the Benhabib et al. flexible‐price, money‐in‐the‐utility‐function model by considering endogenous time preference and re‐examines equilibrium indeterminacy in response to alternative interest‐rate rules. We show that either an active or a passive interest‐rate feedback rule can generate local indeterminacy even if consumption and real money balances are Edgeworth independent. This result is in sharp contrast to that in the related literature. We also find that in the presence of endogenous time preference, local indeterminacy may occur regardless of whether the monetary policy is based on the interest‐rate feedback rule or money growth‐rate targeting.     

Australian Stock Market Volatility: 1875–1987*

This paper investigates the volatility of monthly Australian stock returns over the period 1875–1987. There has been extensive work on this question in the United States, but little with data outside that country. Our analysis centres upon whether the 'stylized facts' regarding returns in the US also hold true for Australia. We find that there are both similarities and differences. There is little evidence for asymmetry in Australian returns but strong persistence of shocks into volatility. What is particularly interesting in the Australian series is the large volatility of the last two decades, an experience not matched in the US data     

AUCTIONS,EX POST COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*

ABSTRACT ** : Using an original database concerning 1102 French local public authorities in 2001, we explore the relationships between prices charged by private operators in water contracts and ex post competition. We show that prices charged in contracts in which operators are in a monopoly situation throughout the duration of the contract, are not affected by a ‘competition effect’ between private operators. However, a competition effect between private operators and public management appears to be crucial in explaining prices combined with a ‘termination effect’, reflecting the fact that the contract is close to being renewed, and hence re‐auctioned.     

COOPÉRATIVES ET GESTION COMMUNALE EN ÉLEVAGE: Un aperçu cornparatif entre pays en voie de développement anglophones et francophones

RESUME * : La gestion communale et les coopératives en élevage difèrent entre pays anglophnes et francophones. Les origines de ces différences remontent aux poliliques coloniales. Les pays francophones ont misé surl'amélioration des systèmes traditionnels existant, les pays anglophones sur l'installation de colons transférant des systèmes importés et lapromotion d'élites locales. Ilen résulte une tendance forte à la privatisation du foncier en zone anglophone qui s'oppose à la recherche d'une gestion comanunale de l'espace en pays francophone; aux initiatives des entrepreneurs anglophones népondent des programmes francophones de structuration du milieu éleveur. Onpeut encore souligner que les coopératives des PVD sont communément différentes de celles des pays industrialisés, notammentpar un moindre fonctionnement démocratique et une plus grande implication étatique .     

BENCHMARKING FOR PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT: A HEALTH‐CARE APPLICATION*

A methodology is developed and applied to compare the performance of publicly funded agencies providing treatment for alcohol abuse in Maine. The methodology estimates a Wiener process that determines the duration of completed treatments, while allowing for agency differences in the effectiveness of treatment, costs of treatment, standards for completion of treatment, patient attrition, and the characteristics of patient populations. Notably, the Wiener process model separately identifies agency fixed effects that describe differences in the effectiveness of treatment (“treatment effects”), and effects that describe differences in the unobservable characteristics of patients (“population effects”). The estimated model enables hypothetical comparisons of how different agencies would treat the same populations. The policy experiment of transferring the treatment practices of more cost‐effective agencies suggests that Maine could have significantly reduced treatment costs without compromising health outcomes by identifying and transferring best practices.     

The Displacement Effect of Labour‐Market Programs: MONASH Analysis*

A key question concerning labour‐market programs is the extent to which they generate jobs for their target group at the expense of others. This effect is measured by displacement percentages. We describe a version of the MONASH model designed to quantify the effects of labour‐market programs. Our simulation results suggest that: (i) labour‐market programs can generate significant long‐run increases in employment; (ii) displacement percentages depend on how a labour‐market program affects the income trade‐off faced by target and non‐target groups between work and non‐work; and (iii) displacement percentages are larger in the short run than in the long run.     

SELF‐CONTROL PROBLEMS AND CONSUMPTION‐SAVING DECISIONS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*

Time‐discounting is a fundamental preference which affects wealth accumulation. If people are impatient, they may spend their earnings instantaneously, and do not save enough for the future. People are often time‐inconsistent, i.e., they often put exceptionally high value on immediate consumption compared to any time in the future. Whether they are aware or not, these individuals are susceptible to self‐control problems. In this paper, we review theoretical and empirical research on time‐inconsistency and self‐control problems, particularly on consumption and saving, and discuss their policy implications.     

‘JUMPS’ IN MACROECONOMIC MODELS: AN EXAMPLE WHEN EIGENVALUES ARE COMPLEX‐VALUED*

The dynamic properties of continuous‐time macroeconomic models are typically characterised by having a combination of stable and unstable eigenvalues. In a seminal paper, Blanchard and Kahn showed that, for linear models, in order to ensure a unique solution, the number of discontinuous or ‘jump’ variables must equal the number of unstable eigenvalues in the economy. Assuming no zero eigenvalues and that all eigenvalues are distinct, this also means that the number of predetermined variables, otherwise referred to as continuous or non‐ ‘jump’ variables, must equal the number of stable eigenvalues. In this paper, we investigate the application of the Blanchard and Kahn results and establish that these results also carry through for linear dynamical systems where some of the eigenvalues are complex‐valued. An example with just one complex conjugate pair of stable eigenvalues is presented. The Appendix contains a general n‐dimensional model.