Environmental sustainability engagement of firms: The roles of social capital,resources, and managerial entrepreneurial orientation of small and medium enterprises in Vietnam

How firms in transition economies demonstrate their strategic engagement in sustainable environmental management given their limited resources and capabilities is less understood in the literature. This study explores how small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam, an exemplar of a country in transition from a closed and socialist economy to an open and liberal market, draw on their external social capital to access critical resources that are leveraged by the entrepreneurial orientation or capabilities of the firms' top management towards engagement in business-wide environmentally sustainable practices. Drawing on a database of more than 2000 firms from a large-scale survey of firms in Vietnam, this study tests the relationships between two facets of social capital, environmental management resources and environmental sustainability engagement. This study further contends that managerial entrepreneurial orientation moderates by enhancing the strategic utilisation of resources to enable firms in Vietnam to engage in environmental sustainability. The results offer novel theoretical insights and timely managerial or practical implications as well as promising directions for future research on the resources, strategies and capabilities of firms in transition economies.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game

This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects firms' R&D and production decisions in Cournot quantity competition. It is found that when R&D spillovers are small, owners strategically direct their managers away from profit maximization towards sales. Consequently, managerial firms invest more in R&D and have higher output and lower prices compared to their entrepreneurial counterparts. On the other hand, when spillovers are large, owners ‘penalize’ managers for sales. In this case, managerial firms have lower R&D, lower output and higher prices. Nonetheless, managerial firms have lower profits than their entrepreneurial counterparts regardless of spillovers. This paper also examines the welfare effects of a separation of ownership and management. It is found that in terms of first-best social welfare, managerial firms are more (less) efficient than their entrepreneurial counterparts with low (high) spillovers. However, in terms of second-best social welfare, managerial firms are less efficient with all spillovers. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial perceptions of corporate environmentalism: interpretations from industry and strategic implications for organizations

Environmental issues are becoming increasingly important in organization theory and practice. Corporate environmentalism is emerging as a process of addressing environmental issues facing business firms. In this paper I examine managerial perceptions of corporate environmentalism and describes how key organizational members interpret the relationship between their firm and the biophysical environment. Corporate environmental orientation and environmental strategy focus are two themes of corporate environmentalism that emerge from the study. I discuss managerial perceptions of regulatory forces, public environmental concern, top management commitment and need for competitive advantage, and how perceptions of these factors might translate into environmental strategies. I conclude by discussing implications of corporate environmentalism for organizational theory and practice.     

Career Concerns and Product Market Competition

This paper studies the effect of increased competition in the product market on managerial incentives. I propose a simple model of career concerns where firms are willing to pay for managerial talent to reduce production costs, but also to subtract talented executives from competitors. This second effect is privately valuable to firms, but is socially wasteful. As a result, equilibrium pay for talent can be inefficiently high and career concerns too strong. Explicit incentive contracts do not solve the problem, but equilibrium pay is reduced if managerial skills have firm‐specific components, or if firms are heterogeneous. In this second case, managers are efficiently assigned to firms, but equilibrium pay reflects the profitability of talent outside the efficient allocation. The effect of increased competition is ambiguous in general, and depends on the profit sensitivity to cost reductions. This ambiguity is illustrated in two examples of commonly used models of imperfect competition.     

The Link Between Diversity and Equality Management Practice Bundles and Racial Diversity in the Managerial Ranks: Does Firm Size Matter?

Invoking strategic human resource management (SHRM) theory and tenets of the resource‐based view of the firm, we explore how two bundles of diversity and equality management (DEM) practices influence racial diversity in the managerial ranks. By considering the conceptualization of DEM practices and the moderating role of firm size, our study disentangles subtle nuances in the DEM practices–racial diversity in managerial ranks relationship. Based on a sample of 137 Fortune 1,000 firms over a two‐year period, our results suggest that minority opportunity‐based DEM practices and manager accountability DEM practices positively relate to racial diversity in managerial ranks, and these relationships are stronger in smaller companies than large ones. Theoretical and practical implications for a strategic perspective on future diversity management research are elaborated.     

Management of paradox: a comparative study of managerial practices in Korean and Japanese firms

Numerous scholars are recognizing that paradoxes are indigenous to organizational functioning. Managers too are being challenged to do more and spend less, and delegate and know the details. As a corporate objective, neither efficiency nor innovation can be sacrificed. In this paper, we have attempted to capture this emerging trend empirically. Defining management of paradox as ‘managerial practices that realize the simultaneous accomplishment of multiple strategic objectives that are seemingly or actually incompatible,’ this paper explores how organizational capabilities of effectively dealing with paradox can be acquired. Specifically, the paper attempts to address two organizational mechanisms: decision-making structure and human resource practices (HRPs). Propositions deduced from the existing literature were tested with the data collected from 103 Korean firms and 136 Japanese firms. The data indicated that firms have to be multi-talented. It was found that firms that successfully accomplished innovation and efficiency objectives simultaneously were those that were able to mix paradoxical organizational practices: decentralization and control on the one hand and the three HRPs on the other. It was also found that the Japanese corporations were more apt in deploying paradoxical managerial practices than the Korean counterparts. The paper concludes by discussing a few theoretical implications.     

Optimal zoning of managerial duopoly

This paper investigates optimal zoning of two managerial firms in an unconstrained linear city. Comparing with the case in which firms are not managerial type, the strategic delegation increases the incentives of one firm to locate farther from the rival. Then, a welfare function is introduced to highlight zoning regulation as an influential competition policy tool. Depending on the regulator's objective function and the timing of location choice, we provide a new mechanism that allows the regulator to attain the optimal locations of managerial firms and can lead to strong or weak competition.     

Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets: Empirical Evidence from China

This study provides empirical evidence of managerial agency costs in socialistic internal capital markets. Listed Chinese companies are required to disclose the amount of resources that are reallocated to other firms of the parent company, which provides us with a direct measure of the socialistic subsidization of weak member firms by strong member firms within a business group. We hypothesize that in strong member firms, managerial compensation is less sensitive to firm performance because cross‐subsidization makes it difficult for group CEOs to hold the managers in strong firms accountable for their own firms' performance, and also increases the noise in performance measures. We also hypothesize that socialistic cross‐subsidization results in an increase in managerial agency costs of strong member firms due to the low pay‐performance sensitivity and low incentive to work hard. We document empirical results that are consistent with these two predictions.     

Managerial shareholdings, firm value, and acquired corporations

Prior research on the relationship between managerial shareholdings and firm value provides conflicting evidence. We take a different approach to its analysis and focus on managerial shareholdings in acquired firms. We argue that in a relatively unfettered market for corporate control, prior evidence of a nonlinear relationship between moral hazard costs and managerial shareholdings suggests that acquired corporations can be segmented according to managerial shareholdings, and that these segments will differ according to the source of wealth gains, managerial resistance, who acquires the company, and how target shareholders are paid. We find evidence consistent with these predictions.     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

内部控制、高管权力与审计费用——基于2009—2012年非金融上市公司数据

基于已有研究，厘清内部控制影响审计费用的逻辑关系，以2009—2012年沪、深两市非金融类A股上市公司数据为研究对象，利用迪博内部控制指数，检验内部控制对审计费用的影响，并在此基础上综合考察高管权力与内部控制之间的关联。结果发现：①内部控制水平与审计费用显著负相关，高管权力与审计费用正相关；②高管权力对于审计费用的不利影响会被内部控制所抑制；③在不同盈利水平的企业中，内部控制对审计费用的影响有所差异。     

HR in the small business enterprise: Assessing the impact of PEO utilization

Within small businesses, organizational leaders are themselves often responsible for the HR function, an area where they typically have limited training and experience. Not surprisingly, small business leaders have raised concerns about the quality of HR programs in their firms and the fact that HR consumes scarce managerial time. While professional employer organizations (PEOs) emerged in response to such concerns, much controversy exists as to whether and how small businesses benefit from PEO utilization. Using a survey of more than 740 small businesses, we examine the relationship between PEO utilization and two key small business outcomes: managerial time required by HR activities and satisfaction with HR outcomes. Our results indicate that firms not using a PEO reported significantly lower levels of satisfaction with HR outcomes than firms that used a PEO for a limited set of transactional services and firms that used a PEO for both transactional and strategic HR services. Among firms using a PEO, satisfaction with HR outcomes was significantly higher among firms that obtained a broader set of transactional and strategic HR services. Firms that used a PEO also reported that HR consumed significantly less managerial time relative to leaders in firms that made no use of a PEO. However, there was no significant difference in the time demanded by HR between firms that used a limited set of transactional services and those that used a broader range of transactional and strategic services. Implications for the role of PEOs and their use within small businesses are discussed. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Global challenges to replicating HR: The role of people,processes, and systems

Global firms often struggle to replicate practices among their culturally and geographically dispersed subsidiaries. Part of the reason for this is that certain practices, including human resource management (HRM) practices, are complex and context specific. In this study, we develop a framework to help identify how firms might overcome challenges of practice replication through alignment of information systems, application processes, and people. We find that managerial alignment of formal processes and systems, along with informal alignment of people (shared objectives), improve the capability of a multinational corporation (MNC) to replicate human resource practices across subsidiaries. We also discuss managerial implications. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Bank monitoring,managerial ownership and Tobin's Q: an empirical analysis for India

The paper examines how banking relationships and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both the number of banking relationships (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring by banks were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and the managerial group. On the other hand, the results indicate that increased external monitoring by banks will simultaneously raise the incentive on the part of managers to engage in internal monitoring. Also, firm valuation is found to be a significant determinant of managerial ownership. A disaggregated analysis of firms according to size and leverage suggests the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and managers, except for small‐sized firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial and program inefficiency for European meat manufacturing firms: A dynamic multidirectional inefficiency analysis approach

This paper proposes a dynamic multidirectional inefficiency analysis approach within the context of Data Envelopment Analysis to measuring input- and investment-specific managerial and program inefficiency for groups of firms characterized by different technologies. Dynamic managerial inefficiency refers to the distance to the firms’ group-specific dynamic frontier of best practices, and dynamic program inefficiency measures the difference between the group-specific dynamic frontier and the pooled dynamic frontier. The empirical application focuses on panel data of large meat processing firms in Eastern, Western and Southern Europe over the period 2005–2012. The results show that Eastern European firms have the highest dynamic managerial inefficiency for all inputs, but have the smallest values for dynamic program inefficiency. Western European firms perform worst in terms of program inefficiency for all inputs, while Southern European firms are the best with regard to dynamic managerial inefficiency. The results also reveal that regardless the dynamic inefficiency dimension considered, investments is the most inefficient input, followed by labor, and materials.     

Making sense of HR in family firms: Antecedents,moderators, and outcomes

Family business researchers have felt increasing distress with the lack of understanding about how families – i.e., their structure, relationships, emotions, and goals – shape how families manage family firms, leading to calls to more fully incorporate “family science” theories about the nature of family into research about family firms. It seems likely that families' first impact in family firms will be on how employees are treated and managed. Thus, this special issue brings together papers that offer an early glance at what is to be gained by leveraging theories about family to help explain how families influence human resource management within family firms, and how human resource management, in turn, impacts key family firm outcomes.     

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities. We illustrate the impact of this interaction on firm boundaries in a dynamic agency model. There may be disadvantages in merging two firms even when such a merger allows the internalization of externalities between the two firms. Merging, by making unprofitable certain decisions, increases the cost of inducing managerial effort. This incentive cost is a natural consequence of the manager's business-strategy-specific human capital.     

HR differentiation between professional and managerial employees: Broadening and integrating theoretical perspectives

Recent HR differentiation research has been concerned with HRM differences within job groups (such as between more and less talented managerial employees) and HRM differences between job groups of different strategic value (such as knowledge and manual workers). Less attention has been paid to HR differentiation among strategically valuable job groups. This paper reviews literature relevant to the question whether (and how) firms should differentiate their HRM systems between professional and managerial job groups. Four broad theoretical perspectives are adopted, including firm-level economic (“macro”), psychological (“micro”), institutional, and technical-feasibility perspectives. Psychological, institutional, and technical-feasibility perspectives are argued to favor a two-pronged approach, whereby professional HRM systems are nested within firm-level managerial HRM systems (while being subject to influence by field-level institutions). The economic (resource-based) perspective, by contrast, implies HR homogenization across the two job groups. Integrating the four perspectives, the paper points to potential longer-term negative effects of trends toward HR homogenization on professional skill standards and dedication to higher-order professional goals.     

Managing supply chain resilience to pursue business and environmental strategies

Resilience has become a crucial topic in the field of strategic management as it requires companies to design resilient business models to tackle managerial and environmental disruptions of individual firms and supply chains. However, extant research still lacks deep insights into how companies design and manage supply chains according to the resilience principles. With this premise, this paper aims at conducting a state of the art review on supply chain resilience (SCR) considering 125 relevant papers collected from Scopus and Web of Science academic search engine. Starting from the results of the literature review, this study proposes a systemic framework of SCR assessment and contributes to improve the understanding of the impact of different empirically tested constructs on the development of the resilience concept. Further, the findings are summarized in several areas including barriers in developing resilience, metrics to measure the resilience performance, and effective strategies to foster the SCR. Finally, this study outlines promising future research directions for scholars and practitioners.     

Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and opportunistic managerial behavior relating to earnings management. Economics theory identifies two apparently conflicting effects of managerial ownership on managers' incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment effect. We construct a theoretical model demonstrating the two effects. This model suggests that as managerial ownership increases, earnings management decreases for both high and low levels of managerial ownership, while it increases for intermediate levels of managerial ownership if the sensitivity of the probability of managerial dismissal to the corporate performance is high enough and/or the manager's private benefit derived from managerial position is high enough. In a sample of Japanese firms, we find a significant nonmonotonic relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals, consistent with our model.