The disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities: Evidence from asbestos litigation

I study firms with past asbestos ties that suffer from significant increases in legal liabilities after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1999. This event provides a natural experiment setting to estimate the indirect effects of financial distress on real activities. While direct litigation and bankruptcy costs are significant, value computations and clinical evidence at the operational level show that defendant firms suffer only minor indirect costs of financial distress. Furthermore, these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations during distress. Overall, my results provide support for potentially significant disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities.     

Variable Rate Debt Instruments and Corporate Debt Policy

Sustained high rate of inflation has led to the creation of debt instruments with variable interest rate. The availability of these debt instruments presents management with the problem of the choice of the optimal debt portfolio. This paper deals with this problem assuming a given, and optimal, debt to equity ratio. Given expected monetary value maximization, an efficient frontier is derived in terms of the expected net income and probability of bankruptcy, where net income is defined as operating income minus debt repayment. This efficient frontier is shown to be also mean-variance efficient. It is also shown that in most cases the optimal debt portfolio includes more than one debt instrument. In other words, the firm will avoid the policy of minimizing the expected cost of its debt repayments or the policy of minimizing the costs of bankruptcy. The optimal solution itself is affected by market variables like the relative expected cost of different debt instruments and by firm specific variables like the variability of its operating income stream, and the covariance between the operating income and the debt repayments.     

Employee Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy

An employee's annual earnings fall by 13% in the first full calendar year after her firm's bankruptcy, and the present value of lost earnings from bankruptcy to six years following bankruptcy is 87% of pre-bankruptcy annual earnings. More worker earnings are lost in thin labor markets and among small firms. Ex ante compensating wage differentials for this “bankruptcy risk” are up to 2% of firm value for a firm whose credit rating falls from AA to BBB, comparable in magnitude to debt tax benefits. Thus, wage premia for expected costs of bankruptcy are sufficiently large to be an important consideration in capital structure decisions.     

Direct Bankruptcy Costs: Evidence from the Trucking Industry

Direct costs of bankruptcy are measured for a sample of firms in the trucking industry that petitioned for bankruptcy protection from 1970 to 1985. Average direct bankruptcy costs represent 9.12 percent of the book value of total assets as of the year before filing. These costs are large compared with those reported in prior studies: 3.39 percent of book value of assets for retail firms, 4.31 percent for industrials, and .53 percent for railroads. We also find evidence of substantial economies of scale in bankruptcy costs in the trucking sample.     

Monetary policy and corporate default

When a corporation issues debt with a fixed nominal coupon, the real value of future payments decreases with the price level. Forward-looking corporate default decisions therefore depend on monetary policy through its impact on expected inflation. We build a general equilibrium economy with deadweight bankruptcy costs that demonstrates how nominal rigidities in corporate debt create an important role for monetary policy even in the absence of standard nominal frictions such as staggered price setting in the output market. Under a passive nominal interest rate peg, the direct effects of a negative productivity shock combine with deflation to produce strong incentives for corporate default. A debt-deflationary spiral results when there are real costs of financial distress. Inflation targeting eliminates this amplification mechanism but full inflation targeting requires permitting the nominal interest rate to depend explicitly on credit market conditions.     

THE SECURITY PRICE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC DEBT DEFAULTS

A debt default requires a restructuring that may take place in or out of court. By examining security returns around a sample of public debt defaults, only some of which end in bankruptcy, I provide new evidence on the costs and benefits of bankruptcy compared with workouts. Evidence from security returns implies that bankruptcy is more costly than a workout, but that the cost differential is reduced for firms with large net operating loss carryforwards. The evidence is also consistent with the argument that equity has greater option value in a workout relative to bankruptcy.     

Political connections and debt restructurings

This paper presents evidence that distressed firms with politically connected executives and board members are more likely to reorganize outside of court than to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This relation is more evident for firms that have more political importance, such as major employers within a state, firms located in swing states, and in periods leading up to major election dates. The evidence suggests that the expected costs of financial distress are lower for politically connected firms which may partially explain the higher leverage ratios of politically connected firms documented in the extant literature.     

Capital Structure Theory and the Fisher Effect

This paper incorporates capital structure theory to model the response of nominal interest rates to expected inflation in a world with taxes. Within an otherwise common framework, the model includes Modigliani-Miller (MM) and Miller capital structure theory, as well as a variation of the Miller model with bankruptcy costs, developed by DeAngelo and Masulis. Within this framework, we derive an equation to predict the response of nominal interest rates under each capital structure hypothesis. With MM theory, our model predicts di_D/d_π value consistent with empirically observed ranges. With Miller theory, the predictions are inaccurate. With DeAngelo-Masulis, the predictions vary widely; the midpoint of the predicted range is less accurate than with Miller theory.     

An Analysis of the Underreported Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

In this paper we examine 1,041 ongoing firms over the time period 1982–92. Using quarterly data for the detection and measurement of the magnitude of the indirect costs of financial distress, we find three important explanatory factors: (a) the distinctiveness of the pattern of increasing financial distress over time, (b) the degree of leverage in the capital structure and (c) the size of the firm. For those firms with a distinctive pattern of increasing financial distress over time, the average annual losses as a percentage of market value is –10.3%. The maximum loss is –76%. Even if the firm never fails, its market value can be severely impacted by the presence of the indirect costs of bankruptcy over time. This study finds a significantly positive relationship between Altman's Z-score and the firm capital investment growth rate. This relation holds after controlling for other variables such as leverage, firm size and market/book ratio. This implies that lost investment opportunities may be also an important part of the total indirect costs of financial distress, which appear now to be much larger than previously recorded.     

A MULTIPERIOD MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE

The continuing interest in the capital structure issue among financial researchers is evidenced by the stream of capital structure models that have appeared in the literature. Much of this research has used a risk-neutral and/or a single-period framework. In this paper, we develop a capital structure model for multiperiod firms and allow for the firm's cash flows to grow over time, for the firm to issue new debt, and for two types of bankruptcy costs to occur. The types of bankruptcy costs that occur are determined by the firm's uncertain operating cash flows and negotiations between the firm and creditors. Risk is priced via the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model. Multiperiod risk-priced models, we argue, realistically represent actual firms and are thus an important step toward the development of more testable and usable models of capital structure. We execute a demonstration example in which the value of the levered firm achieves a maximum and discuss the steps the firm would take to maximize shareholder wealth within this example. The example illustrates that the value of the firm passes through an interior optimum as the promised debt payment is increased. A simulation of the effect of changes in firm-specific parameters shows that the model exhibits expected and appealing relationships between these parameters and the value of the levered firm.     

Bankruptcy risk,costs and corporate diversification

This paper studies the impact of diversification on firms that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Prior research suggests that diversification affects both the probability and costs of distress. Treating bankruptcy as a special case of distress, we find that diversification reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy and liquidation in Chapter 11, which is consistent with the coinsurance hypothesis. However, we observe higher bankruptcy costs as measured by time spent in Chapter 11 and inefficient segment investment for diversified firms. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that diversification provides benefits to managers in terms of job security rather than to firms. Our findings may help firms to make diversification decisions and creditors determine lending policies toward different forms of organizations.     

Personal bankruptcy costs: Their relevance and some estimates

The paper argues that there is a need for the formal treatment of personal bankruptcy costs in the finance literature. The need arises out of the relevance of such costs to both corporate and personal financing decisions. We show that (a) personal bankruptcy costs (like personal taxes) are relevant to the corporate capital structure problem and that (b) differential bankruptcy costs across corporations and individuals can result in a clientele model of individual investment-borrowing decision which could lead to institutional arrangements designed to minimize combined bankruptcy costs. Further, we develop a theory of personal bankruptcy and a set of testable hypothesis with regard to their costs. Some preliminary estimates of personal bankruptcy costs are reported which suggest that they are higher than corporate bankruptcy costs. There is also some evidence of economics of scale in personal bankruptcy costs.     

Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value Creation

Firm value is influenced in many direct and indirect ways by financial risks which consist in unexpected changes of foreign exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices. The fact that a significant number of corporations are committing resources to risk management activities, however, represents only an indication for the potential of corporate risk management to increase firm value. This paper presents a comprehensive review of positive theories and their empirical evidence regarding the contribution of corporate risk management to shareholder value. It is argued that because of realistic capital market imperfections, such as agency costs, transaction costs, taxes, and increasing costs of external financing, risk management on the firm level (as opposed to risk management by stock owners) represents a means to increase firm value to the benefit of the shareholders.     

Dynamic capital structure and the contingent capital option

The financial crisis has emphasized the difficulties for financial companies to raise funds through conventional liabilities. In this environment, hybrid securities are becoming popular. In this paper we study the optimal capital structure of a company issuing a particular type of hybrid security: perpetual contingent capital, i.e., debt that converts into equity under some conditions. A two-period model with endogenous bankruptcy for a company with equity, straight debt and contingent capital is analyzed. We investigate the instrument under different conversion rules: automatic or optimally chosen by equity holders. We show that contingent capital reduces the coupon of straight debt and expected bankruptcy costs but can require a high spread. A trigger imposed by the regulatory authority in terms of par value of debt may induce a little use of contingent capital with an increase of bankruptcy costs.     

Does pre‐packed bankruptcy create value? An empirical study of postbankruptcy employment retention in The Netherlands

In recent years, there has been growing interest in whether pre‐packed bankruptcy can be a mechanism through which firms facing imminent insolvency can preserve value. Although an extensive body of literature exists on “pre‐packs,” whether such techniques really preserve value remains ambiguous. By analysing bankruptcy proceedings filed with Dutch courts in the period 2012–2018 through the lenses of real options and debt overhang theory, we examined employment retention postbankruptcy as a consequence of the type of bankruptcy proceeding (pre‐packed bankruptcy and conventional bankruptcy) and the severity of prebankruptcy financial distress. The results show that in the Netherlands, a pre‐packed bankruptcy, when compared with a conventional bankruptcy proceeding, positively impacts employment retention rates after bankruptcy. The severity of financial distress before bankruptcy does not affect employment retention rates postbankruptcy. This implies that despite the amount of resource slack, the preservation of employee value is better served under a pre‐packed bankruptcy than a conventional bankruptcy proceeding. This finding is important for insolvency practice, as up to 22 June 2017, employee rights in the Netherlands (including redundancy) were not considered to be automatically transferred to the firm acquiring the bankrupt debtor's assets when a pre‐packed bankruptcy was applied. Implications for insolvency regulation and practice are discussed.     

THE DEBT MATURITY CHOICE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

In this paper I develop and test three nonmutually exclusive hypotheses about the determinants of corporations' debt maturity choices using a sample of corporate bonds issued between 1982 and 1986. The empirical evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that firms use bond maturity to facilitate monitoring by outsiders (the monitoring hypothesis) and weakly supports the hypothesis that firms with high-quality projects use bond maturity to signal project quality (the signaling hypothesis). The evidence does not support the hypothesis that firms use bond maturity to achieve an optimal trade-off between interest tax shields and bankruptcy costs (the tax/bankruptcy cost hypothesis).     

Cash-flow shortage as an endogenous bankruptcy reason

This paper develops a simple model for a leveraged firm and endogenizes the firm’s bankruptcy point by assuming that equity issuance is costly. Equity-issuance costs reflect the difficulties in issuing new equity for firms that are close to financial distress. The resulting model captures cash-flow shortage as a reason to go bankrupt, though the equity value is positive. I analyze the optimal bankruptcy point as well as corporate bond prices and yield spreads for various levels of equity-issuance costs in order to study the impact of different liquidity constraints. Finally, I discuss the consequences on optimal capital structure.     

A simple correction of the WACC discount rate for default risk and bankruptcy costs

Standard discounted cash flow approaches suffer from a rudimental modeling of the possibility of a default, as the main characteristics such as the default probability and potential bankruptcy costs are commonly disregarded. This paper aims at providing a tractable extension of the well-known WACC approach for both default risk and bankruptcy costs. The corrected WACC discount rate reveals that default risk results in a systematically higher WACC because the tax component is scaled by the survivorship probability and an aditional component for bankruptcy costs must be added. This difference between the classical WACC discount rate and the simple modified WACC rate can be remarkable especially for firms from businesses with high bankruptcy costs and a relevant default probability.     

Bankruptcy Risk and Optimal Capital Structure

This study finds shortcomings in empirical tests of the capital structure irrelevance hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis is that firms choose value maximizing mixes of debt and equity on account of bankruptcy costs and the tax deductibility of interest payments. Based upon the cross-sectional implications of the tax shelter-bankruptcy cost hypothesis, an alternative test of the irrelevance hypothesis is performed. The test examines the relationship between failure rates and leverage ratios for 36 lines of business. The results are inconsistent with the irrelevance hypothesis.     

Corporate Debt Value,Bond Covenants,and Optimal Capital Structure

This article examines corporate debt values and capital structure in a unified analytical framework. It derives closed-form results for the value of long-term risky debt and yield spreads, and for optimal capital structure, when firm asset value follows a diffusion process with constant volatility. Debt values and optimal leverage are explicitly linked to firm risk, taxes, bankruptcy costs, risk-free interest rates, payout rates, and bond covenants. The results elucidate the different behavior of junk bonds versus investment-grade bonds, and aspects of asset substitution, debt repurchase, and debt renegotiation.