The biodiversity conservation game with heterogeneous countries

Biodiversity is an essential resource, which we classify as conditionally-renewable. In order to achieve conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity virtually all nation states signed the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. In this paper we investigate how the heterogeneity of countries in regard to ecosystems and wealth influences the stability of international biodiversity conservation agreements both without and with transfers. We further examine the effect of different degrees of ecosystem substitutability. We model a coalition formation game with players that have a continuous conservation choice. The conservation benefit is dependent on wealth and ecosystem quality. Aggregation of global benefits respects differences in ecosystem substitutability. In case of transfers, a fund redistributes coalition benefits according to a sharing rule. The main finding is that in the absence of transfers, compared to the homogeneous situation, heterogeneity in ecosystems and wealth reduces the size of a stable coalition. The destabilising effect is stronger the higher the ecosystem substitutability. Optimal transfers facilitate a large stable coalition.     

Wealth Distribution and Optimal Inheritance Taxation in Life-cycle Economies with Intergenerational Transfers

Intergenerational transfers are introduced into a general equilibrium life-cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity. In our overlapping generations model, heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their children. Furthermore, agents face stochastic employment opportunities. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US economy. Our results indicate that bequests only account for a small proportion of observed wealth heterogeneity. The introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare, as measured by the average lifetime utility of a newborn, and equality of the wealth distribution.
JEL classification : D 31; D 91; H 21; C 68; E 21     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF INCOME INSURANCE

Precautionary savings models suggest that wealth should rise with income risk. Risk is reduced by means-tested transfers, however, which implies that transfer programs should discourage private wealth accumulation. We offer a comprehensive empirical assessment based on variation across states in the generosity of a number of programs, specifically unemployment insurance and means-tested transfers (Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps). We use monthly data on married couples from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to regress wealth on income, income risk, and various measures of transfer generosity. The results support the precaution-ary savings model and reveal moderate negative wealth effects of both unemployment insurance and means-tested transfers, with an elasticity of about −0.18.     

Can remittances buy peace?

This paper offers new empirical evidence on the effects of remittance flows on conflict incidence, onset, and duration in recipient countries. It improves on previous studies by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among remittance recipient countries, serial correlation of conflict, and the possibility of conflict being endogenous to remittances. To motivate the empirical findings, a micro‐founded model of conflict is developed. The model shows that wealth transfers (such as remittances) can raise the opportunity cost of participation in conflicts which can lead to a reduction in both the number of rebels and the force used by the government forces.     

Bequests, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Wealth Distribution

This paper constructs a heterogeneous agent overlapping generations model with bequests and inter vivos transfers. In the model, households in the same family line behave strategically to determine their consumption, working hours, gifts, and savings. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, the paper measures time preference and parental altruism consistent with the economy's capital-output ratio and the size of intergenerational transfers. The model with intergenerational transfers better explains, although not fully, the wealth distribution of the United States. The paper also analyzes the effects of government policy changes on wealth accumulation, distribution, and social welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D64, D91, H31.     

The institutional determinants of self-governance: a comment on Edward Stringham’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis>

Many pages would be require to discuss Private Governance’s important contributions, so I focus on a relatively minor flaw: chapter 9 on moral beliefs is inconsistent with Stringham’s general treatment of private governance institutions as endogenous. Moral beliefs are essentially depicted as unchanging, but they actually are endogenous too. Individuals can pursue wealth through cooperative interaction, which requires trust, creating incentives to develop beliefs that encourage ethical and benevolent behavior. Alternatively wealth can be taken from others through force and/or guile. Beliefs to facilitate involuntary transfers also are institutionalized. For instance, in order to benefit from coercive wealth transfers “in good conscience,” recipients have incentives to see their victims as enemies to justify a moral “right” to transfers. Changing moral beliefs is costly, however, so they tend to be fixed in the short term. Once it becomes apparent that existing beliefs significantly conflict with an individual’s interests, she is forced to question those beliefs. The impetus for rationalizing new beliefs arises. The direction of evolution can be predicted with a rational decision-making model. To illustrate the endogeneity of moral beliefs, three institutional settings are examined: “dignity culture,” “honor culture,” and “victimhood culture”.     

Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.     

International Transfers from Rich to Poor Nations

A major shortcoming of the theoretical literature on international transfers is that it is not at all clear whether the welfare results obtained are consistent with transfers flowing from rich to poor nations. This is because economists hardly ever model the difference in wealth between the donor and recipient nations. This paper shows that, contrary to the literature, when international transfers are modeled explicitly to flow from rich to poor nations, donor-enriching recipient-impoverishing international transfers may not exist in a world which is accumulating capital.     

Economic prosperity, biodiversity conservation, and the environmental Kuznets curve

Many conservationists contend that economic growth and biodiversity conservation are incompatible goals. Some economists contest this viewpoint, arguing that wealthier countries have the luxury of investing more heavily in efforts to conserve biodiversity. Under this assumption, we expect a U-shaped relationship between per capita wealth and proportion of species conserved. We test this environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) using estimates of per capita income and deforestation rates (index of biodiversity threat) for 35 tropical countries. A prior analysis [Dietz, S., Adger, W.N., 2003. Economic growth, biodiversity loss and conservation effort. Journal of Environmental Management, 68:23-35] using conventional regression techniques failed to provide any support for the parabolic relationship predicted by the EKC hypothesis. Here, we introduce the use of quantile regression and spatial filtering to reanalyze this data, addressing issues of heteroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation. We note that preliminary analysis using these methods provides some initial evidence for an EKC. However, a series of panel analyses with country-specific dummy variables eliminated or even reversed much of this support. A closer examination of conservation practices and environmental indicators within the countries, particularly those countries that drove our initial support, suggests that wealth is not a reliable indicator of improved conservation practice. Our findings indicate that an EKC for biodiversity is overly simplistic and further exploration is required to fully understand the mechanisms by which income affects biodiversity.     

Stabilization mechanisms in a monetary union

The stability of a monetary union entails the establishment of mechanisms that allow the member countries to smooth their paths of consumption after negative shocks in their income. A centralized fiscal institution could help countries through a mechanism of taxes and transfers. In this paper we study the stabilizing effects of different mechanisms of compensation in a two-country general equilibrium model subject to asymmetric technology shocks. In particular, we have focused on an optimal system of taxes and transfers as opposed to a discretionary transfer mechanism, finding that the optimal transfer consists in an intertemporal distribution to the economy that experiences the negative shock instead of a current high transfer as in the non-optimal mechanism. Lastly, we have assessed the degree of stabilization related to the mechanisms in question, showing that the optimal mechanism can match the degree of stabilization the empirical literature attributes to the case of the United States.     

How widespread are nonlinear crowding out effects? The response of private transfers to income in four developing countries

This article investigates the relationship between household income and private transfers received in developing countries. If private transfers are unresponsive to household income, there is less likelihood of expansions in public social security crowding out private transfers. Most literature finds that private transfers are unresponsive, but this may be because responses have been obscured by the methods that ignore nonlinearities. Threshold regression techniques find such nonlinearity in the Philippines and scope for serious crowding out, with 30–80% of private transfers potentially displaced for low-income households (Cox et al., 2004). To see if these nonlinear effects occur more widely, semiparametric and threshold regression methods are used to model private transfers in four developing countries – China, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam. The results reported in this article suggest that nonlinear crowding out effects are not important features of transfer behaviour in these countries. The transfer derivatives under a variety of assumptions only range between 0 and ?0.08.     

How much to share: Welfare effects of fiscal transfers

Recent sovereign debt crisis has challenged policy makers to explore the possibility of establishing a fiscal transfer system that could alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric shocks across countries. Using a simple labour production economy, we first derive an analytically tractable solution for optimal degree of fiscal transfers. In this economy, fiscal transfers can improve welfare by moving the competitive equilibrium with fiscal transfers closer to the social planner's solution. We then extend the model to a DSGE setting with capital, international bond and linear taxes, and we analyze how implementation of a simple revenue sharing rule affects welfare and macroeconomic variables over time. Simulation results show that risk sharing through fiscal transfers always improves welfare in the long run. However, under certain model specifications, short‐run transitional welfare loss can outweigh the long‐run benefits. These results suggest that, in designing fiscal transfers across countries, government should take into consideration the intertemporal nature of welfare gains.     

The Gender Wealth Gap in Europe: Application of Machine Learning to Predict Individual-level Wealth

This article provides comparative estimates of the gender wealth gaps for 22 European countries, employing data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The data on wealth are collected at the household level, while individual-level data are needed for the estimates of gender wealth gaps. We propose a novel approach using machine learning and model averaging methods to predict individual-level wealth data for multi-person households. Our results suggest that random forest performs best as the predicting tool for this exercise, outperforming elastic net and Bayesian model averaging. The estimated gender wealth gaps tend to be in favor of men, especially at the top of the wealth distribution. Men have 24 percent more wealth than women on average. We also find that a high home ownership rate is associated with a smaller country-level gender wealth gap. Our estimates suggest that the individual-level wealth inequality is on average 3 pp higher than the household-level wealth inequality in multi-member households.     

Mutual Insurance,Individual Savings,and Limited Commitment

We examine a dynamic model of mutual insurance when households can also engage in self-insurance by storage. We assume that there is no enforcement mechanism, so that any insurance is informal and must be self-enforcing. We show that consumption allocations satisfy a modified Euler condition and that an enhanced storage technology can either improve or diminish welfare. Furthermore we show that the ex ante transfers introduced into dynamic informal insurance models recently by Gauthier et al. (Gauthier, C., Poitevin, M., and González, P. (1997). Journal of Economic Theory76, 106–144) are only used here in the first period, with the role of ex ante transfers being replaced by differential individual storage. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, C73, D90, E21.     

Should the north make unilateral technology transfers to the south?: North–South cooperation and conflicts in responses to global climate change

Whether developed countries should make unilateral technology transfers to developing countries in order to address global environment problems is debatable. This paper discusses the issue in a framework that recognizing nations' joint production of environmental externalities. Unlike the existing literature on unilateral transfers, this paper presents a North–South environmental–economic optimal growth model that allows transfers to mitigate externalities only. The paper derives criteria that would make such transfers feasible. By solving the transfer problem in a modified RICE model [Nordhaus, W.D., Yang, Z., 1996. A regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies, Am. Econ. Rev., 86 (4) 741–65], this paper also provides information on the timing and the amount of unilateral transfers from North to South to address potential global warming problem, one major global environmental externality. A policy implication from this study is that moderate employment of unilateral transfers would benefit North along with the world as a whole.     

Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain

We develop a general equilibrium model of wealth transfers in the presence of uncertain lifetimes and default. Without introducing exogenous debt constraints, agents are allowed to make collateral-backed promises at any state of their life span.     

Evolutionary Economics,Rational Expectations,and Monetary Policy

Wealth disparity is a critical factor in the perpetuation of blackwhite disparity in the United States. Intergenerational wealth transfers are the major determinant of household wealth formation. A program of reparations would acknowledge past and continued injustice, redress such injustices, and provide closure. Radical institutional analysis benefits this policy discussion in at least three areas: explaining the re-creation of discrimination; indicating the role of wealth disparity; and identifying the funding source for reparations. For centuries the economic surplus has enhanced white wealth relative to black wealth. A program of reparations suggests directing the surplus toward funding black-white equality.     

Leisure time, savings and trade patterns A two-country growth model

This paper proposes a simple two-country endogenous growth model with endogenous consumption, leisure time and wealth accumulation. The model examines possible causes for the world economic growth and the existence and persistence of trade patterns between countries with different preferceces and human capital under internationally free capital mobility. We show how differences in preferences in consumption, leisure time and wealth between the two countries may affect long-run world economic growth.     

Who enjoys ‘TRIPs’ abroad? An empirical analysis of intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round

Abstract.  Analysis of the Uruguay Round is extended by quantifying the impact of the TRIPs agreement. The static costs of raising the standards of patent protection are captured by the transfers of income between countries, with the majority of countries estimated to make net payments abroad, the United States being a major beneficiary. To offset these transfers the model provides estimates of the dynamic benefits from the greater incentive to innovate, revealing that there is potential for all countries to benefit from the TRIPs agreement in the long run. However, the distribution of these benefits is highly skewed towards developed countries. JEL classification: O34, F43