Managerial risk incentives and accounting conservatism

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We provide empirical evidence of the effect of managerial risk incentives on financial reporting conservatism. We hypothesize that firms use greater...     

A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financial institutions

In this paper we propose a framework for measuring and stress testing the systemic risk of a group of major financial institutions. The systemic risk is measured by the price of insurance against financial distress, which is based on ex ante measures of default probabilities of individual banks and forecasted asset return correlations. Importantly, using realized correlations estimated from high-frequency equity return data can significantly improve the accuracy of forecasted correlations. Our stress testing methodology, using an integrated micro–macro model, takes into account dynamic linkages between the health of major US banks and macro-financial conditions. Our results suggest that the theoretical insurance premium that would be charged to protect against losses that equal or exceed 15% of total liabilities of 12 major US financial firms stood at $110 billion in March 2008 and had a projected upper bound of $250 billion in July 2008.     

Managerial risk incentives and investment related agency costs

We assess the impact of compensation based incentives together with monitoring mechanisms on investment related agency costs. The results indicate that well structured compensation based incentives significantly reduce agency costs. Managerial firm based wealth delta has a significant, negative effect on agency costs for firms in all size categories. The significance of managerial firm based wealth vega in reducing agency costs is concentrated in small firms, suggesting that vega exposure is more effective where risk is higher. The significance of cash compensation in reducing agency costs is concentrated in the large firms. This result implies that higher cash compensation reduces agency costs by allowing risk-averse managers the opportunity to diversify outside the firm.     

Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension policy

We examine whether the compensation incentives of top management affect the extent of risk shifting versus risk management behavior in pension plans. We find that risk shifting through pension underfunding (and, to a lesser extent, through pension asset allocation to risky securities) is stronger with compensation structures that create high wealth-risk sensitivity (vega) and weaker with high wealth-price sensitivity (delta). These findings are stronger for chief financial officers (CFOs) than for chief executive officers (CEOs), suggesting that pension policy falls within the CFO’s domain. Risk shifting through pension underfunding is also lower when the CFO’s personal stake in the pension plan is larger. Overall, these findings show that top managers’ compensation structure is an important driver of corporate pension policy. They also highlight firms within which the moral hazard concerns fueled by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance are most relevant.     

Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises

It is widely believed that diversification at financial institutions benefits the stability of the financial system. This paper shows that it also entails a cost: even though diversification reduces each institution’s individual probability of failure, it makes systemic crises more likely. When systemic crises induce additional costs (over and above individual failures), full diversification is no longer desirable as a result and the optimal degree of diversification may be arbitrarily low. We show that the analysis can be extended beyond diversification, such as to interbank insurance and financial integration.     

Spillovers in risk of financial institutions

ABSTRACT

We analyse the total and directional spillovers across a set of financial institution systemic risk state variables: credit risk, real estate market risk, interest rate risk, interbank liquidity risk and overall market risk. We examine the response of the spillover levels, within the set of systemic risk state variables, to a number of events in the financial markets and to initiatives undertaken by the European Central Bank and the Bank of England. The relationship between the time-varying spillovers and policy-related events is analysed using a multiple structural break estimation procedure and looking at the temporary increases in the spillover indices. Our sample includes five European Union countries: core countries France and Germany, periphery countries Spain and Italy, and a reference country, the UK. We show that national stock markets and real estate markets have a leading role in shock transmission across selected state variables. However, the role of the other variables reverses over the course of the crisis. We document that the total and net spillover indices react strongly to the events relating to financial assistance packages in Europe.     

Managerial ability and firm risk-taking behavior

In this study, we show that managerial heterogeneity plays an important role in firm decisions. Our view is that in addition to the effects of previously examined determinants, firm decisions are affected not just by the managers’ explicit mandate to maximize firm value, but also by the ability of the manager in managing the firm. We find that high-ability managers and low-ability managers have opposite effects on firm behavior and firm value. High-ability managers are receptive to risk-taking whereas low-ability managers refrain from risk-taking. High-ability managers cut capital expenditures but spend significantly more on research and development projects; low-ability managers reduce both capital expenditures and research and development expenses significantly. High-ability managers are associated with higher levels of firm focus than low-ability managers. Managerial ability is negatively associated with firm leverage. In addition, our results show that high-ability managers are associated with increases in firm value whereas low-ability managers are associated with decreases in firm value.     

Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation

Equity-based compensation affects managers’ risk-taking behavior, which in turn has an impact on shareholder wealth. In response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 6%. This risk reduction is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives, in particular firms with low chief executive officer portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Furthermore, the risk reduction is value-destroying. Finally, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking.     

Board composition and operational risk events of financial institutions

We investigate the relation between board composition and operational risk events of financial institutions in the period from 1996 to 2010. Drawing from corporate governance literature, we consider the impact of board characteristics on the likelihood of operational risk events. Overall, our findings suggest that board size is negatively and non-linearly associated with the possibility of operational risk events. For the event types of “Clients, Products, and Business Practices,” and “Internal Fraud and External Fraud,” firms with a higher proportion of independent directors are less likely to suffer from fraud or failure to comply with professional obligations to clients. Our results on age and tenure heterogeneity also indicate that having a more diverse board can have an adverse impact on the board monitoring function. These results can shed new light on board demographics and operational risk management in financial institutions.     

The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm?s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.     

Managerial incentives, derivatives and stability

In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm.     

Estimating systemic risk in the international financial system

This paper develops three distinct methods to quantify the risk of a systemic failure in the global banking system. We examine a sample of 334 banks (representing 80% of global bank equity) in 28 countries around five global financial crises. Our results suggest statistically significant, but economically small, increases in systemic risk. Although policy responses are endogenous, the low estimated probabilities suggest that the distress of central bankers, regulators and politicians about the events we study could be overstated and that current policy responses to financial crises could be adequate to handle major macroeconomic events.     

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring U.S. banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two types of acquisitions: acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in our sample (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders). Our results control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and offer evidence consistent with a causal link between financial stability and the risk-taking incentives embedded in the executive compensation contracts at banks.     

Elimination of systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax

Financial markets are exposed to systemic risk (SR), the risk that a major fraction of the system ceases to function, and collapses. It has recently become possible to quantify SR in terms of underlying financial networks where nodes represent financial institutions, and links capture the size and maturity of assets (loans), liabilities and other obligations, such as derivatives. We demonstrate that it is possible to quantify the share of SR that individual liabilities within a financial network contribute to the overall SR. We use empirical data of nationwide interbank liabilities to show that the marginal contribution to overall SR of liabilities for a given size varies by a factor of a thousand. We propose a tax on individual transactions that is proportional to their marginal contribution to overall SR. If a transaction does not increase SR, it is tax-free. With an agent-based model (ABM) (CRISIS macro-financial model), we demonstrate that the proposed ‘Systemic Risk Tax’ (SRT) leads to a self-organized restructuring of financial networks that are practically free of SR. The SRT can be seen as an insurance for the public against costs arising from cascading failure. ABM predictions are shown to be in remarkable agreement with the empirical data and can be used to understand the relation of credit risk and SR.     

Managerial incentives,options, and cost-structure choices

This study explores the relationship between changes in managerial risk-taking incentives and adjustments of firms’ cost structures, particularly the operating leverage (fixed-to-variable cost ratio). We find managers reduce operating leverage by substituting fixed costs with variable costs, mainly in the selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) cost components, in response to reductions in option-based compensation following the issuance of FAS 123R. Managers facing a decrease in risk-taking incentives adjust operating leverage downward because high operating leverage intensifies the downside potential of earnings. Overall, we present compelling evidence that managers adjust the cost structure of their firms in response to a reduction in risk-taking incentives.     

Managerial incentives,capital reallocation,and the business cycle

We argue that when managers have private information about the productivity of assets under their control and receive private benefits, substantial bonuses are required to induce less productive managers to declare that capital should be reallocated. The need to provide incentives for managers to relinquish control links executive compensation to capital reallocation and managerial turnover over the business cycle, rendering them procyclical if expected managerial compensation increases when more managers are hired. Moreover, capital is less productively deployed in downturns because agency costs make reallocation more costly. Empirically, we find that both CEO turnover and executive compensation are remarkably procyclical.     

Executive stock options,differential risk-taking incentives,and firm value

The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms' total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative.     

Managerial responses to incentives: Control of firm risk, derivative pricing implications, and outside wealth management

We model a firm’s value process controlled by a manager maximizing expected utility from restricted shares and employee stock options. The manager also controls allocation of his outside wealth, which allows partially hedging of his exposure to firm risk. Managerial control increases the expected time to exercise for his employee stock options. It also reduces the gap between his certainty equivalent and the firm’s Fair Value for his compensation, but that gap remains substantial. Managerial control also causes traded options to exhibit an implied volatility smile. With costly control the same basic patterns remain, but the manager’s risk-taking is dampened.     

中国金融机构的使命

2006年11月中非合作论坛北京峰会上,胡锦涛主席宣布了对非合作八项重大举措,赢得了全场经久不息的掌声,建立中非发展基金便是其中的一项.不过半年多时间,今年6月26日,由国家开发银行出资并承办的中非发展基金有限公司在京正式开业.