Stock Returns, Dividend Yields, and Taxes

Using an improved measure of a common stock's annualized dividend yield, we document that risk-adjusted NYSE stock returns increase in dividend yield during the period from 1963 to 1994. This relation between return and yield is robust to various specifications of multifactor asset pricing models that incorporate the Fama–French factors. The magnitude of the yield effect is too large to be explained by a "tax penalty" on dividend income and is not explained by previously documented anomalies. Interestingly, the effect is primarily driven by smaller market capitalization stocks and zero-yield stocks.     

CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking

This paper shows the relation between CEO ownership and firm valuation hinges critically on the strength of external governance (EG). The relation is hump-shaped when EG is weak, but is insignificant when EG is strong. The results imply that CEO ownership and EG are substitutes for mitigating agency problems when ownership is low. However, very high levels of share ownership can reduce firm value by entrenching the CEO and discouraging him from taking risk, unless mitigated by strong EG. We identify channels through which CEO ownership affects firm value by examining R&D, which is discretionary and risky. We find CEO ownership similarly exhibits a hump-shaped relation with R&D when EG is weak, but no relation when EG is strong. Our results are robust to endogeneity issues concerning CEO ownership and EG.     

Employment protection, firm selection, and growth

How do firing costs affect aggregate productivity growth? To address this question, a model of endogenous growth through selection and imitation is developed. It is consistent with recent evidence on firm dynamics and on the importance of reallocation for productivity growth. In the model, growth is driven by selection among heterogeneous incumbent firms and is sustained as entrants imitate the best incumbents. In this framework, firing costs not only induce misallocation of labor, but also affect growth by affecting firms’ exit decisions. Importantly, charging firing costs only to continuing firms raises growth by promoting selection. Also charging them to exiting firms is akin to an exit tax, hampers selection, and reduces growth—by 0.1 percentage points in a calibrated version of the model. With job turnover very similar in the two settings, this implies that the treatment of exiting firms matters for growth. In addition, the impact on growth rates is larger in sectors where firms face larger idiosyncratic shocks, as in services. This fits evidence that recent EU-U.S. growth rate differences are largest in these sectors and implies that firing costs can play a role here.     

Expectations,Behavior, and Stock Market Volatility

Stock market volatility is caused by investors’ expectations and behavior. To study the implication relationship, on the one hand, we present an investor’s expectation-forming and decision-making model to summarize the key features of individual behavior. We think the individual expectation is determined mainly by the number of differences between positive signals and negative signals in the information flow. The behavior is determined by both the expectations of investors around him (her) and the expected returns from a potential action. On the other hand, we simulate an investor community to verify if the model is able to replicate the related stylized facts. Mainly, three conclusions are drawn from the simulation: (1) A relationship of asymmetrical conditional dependence exists between expectation consistency and behavior consistency. (2) Market volatility is caused mainly by the difference between expectation consistency and behavior consistency. As the density of connections in the investor community network increases, the difference between them grows. (3) Influential investors have profound impacts on the formation of normal investors’ expectations and behavior. Thus influential investors play an important role in determining the degree of market volatility.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

Banks, Bears, and the Financial Crisis

We test whether short selling is destabilizing comparing distressed financial firms to other firms using NYSE transactions records covering 4 years including the recent financial crisis. Aggressive short-selling is sometimes destabilizing by some measures, but its impact is small, vanishes quickly, is not necessarily larger for distressed firms or during the crisis, and is accompanied by other stabilizing effects. The evidence does not validate theoretical predictions from models of destabilizing speculative or predatory trading. Aggregate short-selling is largely unrelated to market-wide investor sentiment, credit risk, and ex ante volatility. Aggressive liquidation of long positions typically has more impact than short selling. Thus, the data cannot justify the restrictions on short sales of financial stocks imposed in September 2008.     

AUDITOR'S SKILL,AUDITING STANDARDS,LITIGATION, AND AUDIT QUALITY

This paper introduces a model of the market for audit services in which auditors differ in their levels of skill, which may or may not be observable and capture differences in ability. The model captures the interplay amongst auditing standards, litigation, and auditors’ levels of skill, which determines auditors’ responses to auditing standards. The paper shows that the quality of audit supplied by any auditor is increasing in the auditor's level of skill regardless of whether or not auditors’ levels of skill are observable. An increase in the quality of audit prescribed by auditing standards is shown to induce some auditors endowed with low levels of skill to decrease the quality of their audits so that the average quality of audit and economic welfare may actually decline as auditing standards are raised. Auditors’ choices of audit quality are furthermore shown to be increasing in trial awards. Incentives for trials and out-of-court settlements are shown to depend crucially on whether or not auditors’ levels of skill are observable. Only when auditors’ levels of skill are unobservable do trials obtain with some probability. When auditors’ levels of skill are unobservable, the introduction of either restrictions on costs awarded by the courts or an imperfection in the courts’ technology is shown to lead the most skilled auditors to supply audits of a quality strictly exceeding the quality prescribed by the prevailing auditing standards. When the courts err often enough, the most skilled auditors having exercised due care furthermore make offers to settle when sued.     

Fragility,stress, and market returns

We propose a novel risk measure that relates to subsequent negative conditional stock market returns. Our risk measure considers both the fragility and stress of the market. Fragility is measured by the Fragility Index developed by Berger and Pukthuanthong (2012) and market stress is based on several economic variables. Results show that incorporating both market stress and fragility improves the information content of a risk measure. Our risk measure relates to poor subsequent monthly market returns. We show the risk measure contains predictive information in a purely ex-ante specification.     

Risk,Mispricing, and Value Investing

We evaluate the stock return performance of a modified version of the book-to-market strategy and its implications for market efficiency. If the previously documented superior stock return of the book-to-market strategy represents mispricing, its performance should be improved by excluding fairly valued firms with extreme book-to-market ratios. To attain this, we classify stocks as value or glamour on book-to-market ratios and accounting accruals jointly. This joint classification is likely to exclude stocks with extreme book-to-market ratios due to mismeasured accounting book values reflecting limitations underlying the accounting system. Using both 12-month buy-and-hold returns and earnings announcement returns, our results show that this joint classification generates substantially higher portfolio returns in the post-portfolio-formation year than the book-to-market classification alone with no evidence of increased risk. In addition, this superior stock return performance is more pronounced among firms held primarily by small (unsophisticated) investors and followed less closely by market participants (stock price <$10). Finally, and most importantly, financial analysts are overly optimistic (pessimistic) about earnings of glamour (value) stock, and for a subset of firms identified as overvalued by our strategy, the earnings announcement raw return, as well as abnormal return, is negative. These last results are particularly important because it is hard to envision a model consistent with rational investors holding risky stocks with predictable negative raw returns for a long period of time rather than holding fT-bills and with financial analysts systematically overestimating the earnings of these stocks while underestimating earnings of stocks that outperform the stock market.     

Patent rights,innovation, and firm exit

We study the causal impact of patent invalidation on subsequent innovation and exit by patent holders. The analysis uses patent litigation data from the US Federal Circuit Court and exploits random allocation of judges to control for endogeneity of the decision. Invalidation causes patent holders to reduce patenting over a five‐year window by 50% on average, but the effect is heterogeneous. The impact is large for small‐ and medium‐sized firms, particularly where they face many large competitors, and for patents central to their research portfolio. We find no significant effect for large firms. Invalidation also increases exit from patenting by small firms.     

Money,interest, inflation and growth in Turkey

This paper estimates a two equation model of inflation and growth in Turkey over the period 1950–1977. Inflation is determined by the difference between the rates of change in nominal money supply and real money demand. The short-run growth function consists of an expectations augmented Phillips curve, to which a credit availability effect is added. Under Turkey's disequilibrium institutional interest rate and exchange control systems, the real supply of domestic credit is determined, in large part, by real money demand which is, in turn, influenced by the real deposit rate of interest. The central bank can use both the nominal money supply and the nominal deposit rate of interest as policy instruments for stabilisation purposes.     

Fundamentals,Misvaluation, and Business Investment

Does stock market misvaluation affect business fixed investment? To answer this question, we provide evidence based on U.S. firm‐level panel data. We examine the orthogonality conditions for the investment Q and Euler equations, and our qualitative tests reject the null hypothesis that investment is unaffected by misvaluation (this result is not driven exclusively by the late 1990s). To measure the quantitative effects on investment, we introduce a measure of misvaluation into standard investment equations. Our estimates imply that a one‐standard‐deviation increase in misvaluation increases investment between 20% and 60% relative to the mean level of investment in the sample.     

Financial Frictions,Financial Shocks,and Aggregate Volatility

The Great Moderation was accompanied by an increase in financial volatility. We explore the sources of these divergent patterns in volatilities by estimating a model with time‐varying financial rigidities subject to structural breaks in the size of shocks, the monetary policy rule coefficients, and the average size of the financial rigidity. Institutional changes are key in accounting for the Great Moderation and in shaping the transmission mechanism of financial shocks. The increase in financial volatilities is accounted for by larger financial shocks, but the vulnerability of the economy to these shocks is significantly alleviated by the estimated changes in institutions.     

Entry, exit, market makers, and the bid-ask spread

The probability of entry and exit of dealers on the NASDAQ NationalMarket (NNM) is significantly affected by trading intensity,volatility and the quoted bid-ask spread. Entry and exit ofmarket makers is a pervasive phenomenon. Large-scale entry (exit)is associated with substantial declines (increases) in quotedend-of-day inside spreads, even after controlling for the effectsof changes in volume and volatility. The spread changes arelarger in magnitude for issues with few market makers; however,even for issues with a large number of market makers, substantialchanges in quoted spreads take place. The results are consistentwith the competitive model of dealer pricing.     

Time-to-build, time-to-plan, habit-persistence, and the liquidity effect

The inability of sticky-price monetary business cycle models to generate liquidity effects has been extensively documented by a number of authors. This paper develops a sticky-price monetary business cycle model with investment gestation lags and habit-persistence in consumption that is capable of generating an empirically plausible liquidity effect.     

Momentum,Reversals, and Fund Manager Overconfidence

This paper examines the role of investor overconfidence and self‐attribution bias in explaining the momentum effect. We develop a novel measure of overconfidence based on characteristics and trading patterns of US equity mutual fund managers. Stocks held by more overconfident managers experience greater momentum profits and stronger return reversals than stocks held by less overconfident managers. The difference in momentum profits is not compensation for risk nor is it attributable to stock characteristics that influence momentum. Our results are consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) who argue that momentum results from delayed overreaction caused by overconfidence and biased self‐attribution.     

Volume autocorrelation,information, and investor trading

This study investigates whether the widely documented daily correlated trading volume of stocks is driven by individual investor trading, institutional trading, or both. We find that at least 95% of NYSE and AMEX stocks exhibit statistically significant, positive serial correlation. Volume autocorrelation decreases with the level of institutional ownership of a stock. We also show that the rate of arrivals of new information to the market contributes to the clustering of trades. When there is high information flow to the market, institutional trading generates a more pronounced effect on volume autocorrelation than individual investor trading. Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of trading volume patterns suggested by most theoretical models of stock trading and by empirical research on investor trading.     

Information, trade, and derivative securities

Hellwig's (1980) model is used to analyze the value of improvingtrading opportunities by more frequent trading in the underlyingasset, or by trading in a derivative asset. With multiple tradingsessions, uninformed investors behave as rational trend followers,while more informed investors follow a contrarian strategy.As trading becomes continuous, Pareto efficiency is achieved.With trading in an appropriate derivative security, Pareto efficiencymay be achieved in only a single round of trading. All derivativeclaims are then priced on Black and Scholes (1973) principlesand, in the absence of further supply shocks, no trading willtake place in subsequent trading rounds.     

Booms, Busts, and Fraud

Firms sometimes commit fraud by altering publicly reported informationto be more favorable, and investors can monitor firms to obtainmore accurate information. We study equilibrium fraud and monitoringdecisions. Fraud is most likely to occur in relatively goodtimes, and the link between fraud and good times becomes strongeras monitoring costs decrease. Nevertheless, improving businessconditions may sometimes diminish fraud. We provide an explanationfor why fraud peaks towards the end of a boom and is then revealedin the ensuing bust. We also show that fraud can increase iffirms make more information available to the public.     

Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment

How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.