Overconfidence,CEO Awards,and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

Theory and prior research suggest that overconfidence leads managers to overestimate their own ability to generate returns, leading to riskier corporate policies. We use a novel dataset of media awards as an exogenous shock to overconfidence to test whether award‐winning CEOs adopt more aggressive corporate tax policies. Using propensity score matching and a difference‐in‐difference design, we find strong evidence that firms with an award‐winning CEO exhibit significantly greater tax aggressiveness following the award. Overall, our results suggest that CEO overconfidence has a meaningful impact on corporate tax policy.     

公司治理、管理者过度自信与企业股利政策

文章基于公司行为财务学视角,以2008—2010年间在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的公司为样本,对我国上市公司的高管人员过度自信、公司治理与股利政策进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,管理者过度自信与股利政策正相关,有效的公司治理能抑制管理者过度自信对股利政策的影响。     

产业政策、管理者过度自信与企业流动性风险

本文对产业政策影响高管自信及企业流动性风险的机理进行分析,提出赶超产业政策激励的管理者过度自信影响企业流动性风险的理论框架,并选取典型案例企业"熔盛重工"进行理论检验。研究表明,产业政策及其传导机制一旦传递出过度激进甚至错误的政策信号,会使管理者的过度自信持续膨胀,进而加剧其对资源配置的认知偏差,导致企业流动性风险失控。这一结论扩展了管理者过度自信和企业流动性风险成因的研究视角,丰富了产业政策经济后果的研究内容,进一步说明应减少产业政策等政府资源配置手段的运用,发挥市场资源配置的决定作用。     

Lumpy Investment and Corporate Tax Policy

In the presence of both convex and nonconvex capital adjustment costs in a dynamic general equilibrium model, corporate tax policy generates both intensive and extensive margin effects via the channel of marginal Q. Its impact is determined largely by the strength of the extensive margin effect, which, in turn, depends on the cross‐sectional distribution of firms. Depending on the initial distribution of firms, the economy displays asymmetric responses to tax changes. Moreover, an anticipated increase in the future investment tax credit reduces investment and adjustment rate initially.     

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.     

管理者过度自信与企业盈余管理行为研究

本文以我国上市公司作为研究样本,依据行为金融理论,从管理者过度自信角度研究了企业盈余管理行为。研究发现,管理者过度自信既会导致公司正向盈余管理行为的发生,也会导致负向盈余管理行为的发生。进一步研究发现,女性比例越高的管理团队越有可能进行盈余管理,管理团队的年龄越小越有可能进行正向盈余管理,管理团队学历越低越有可能进行负向盈余管理行为。本文对研究公司选择会计政策行为,治理公司盈余管理行为乃至完善公司治理结构均具有一定的启示。     

Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited

This article presents the growing research area of Behavioural Corporate Finance in the context of one specific example: distortions in corporate investment due to CEO overconfidence. We first review the relevant psychology and experimental evidence on overconfidence. We then summarise the results of Malmendier and Tate (2005a) on the impact of overconfidence on corporate investment. We present supplementary evidence on the relationship between CEOs’ press portrayals and overconfident investment decisions. This alternative approach to measuring overconfidence, developed in Malmendier and Tate (2005b), relies on the perception of outsiders rather than the CEO's own actions. The robustness of the results across such diverse proxies jointly corroborates previous findings and suggests new avenues to measuring executive overconfidence.     

增值税留抵退税、融资约束与企业全要素生产率

本文以2018年部分行业的增值税留抵退税政策的实施作为准自然实验,基于长江三角洲先进制造业上市公司的数据,采用倾向得分匹配——双重差分法(PSM-DID),探究了增值税留抵退税政策对企业全要素生产率的影响.研究发现,短期内增值税留抵退税政策对企业全要素生产率的提高具有显著的促进作用;机制检验结果表明,增值税留抵退税政策通过降低企业的融资约束来促进企业全要素生产率的提高;异质性分析发现,增值税留抵退税政策对非国有性质、规模较小、成长性较好、杠杆率较低以及所处营商环境不理想的企业全要素生产率的促进作用尤为明显.根据研究结论,本文提出了进一步放宽增值税留抵退税政策限制与适度缩短留抵退税期限等相关建议.     

Overconfidence,CEO Selection,and Corporate Governance

We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value‐destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEO under value‐maximizing corporate governance. Moreover, a risk‐averse CEO's overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point, but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion. Overconfident CEOs also underinvest in information production. The board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident CEOs. Finally, Sarbanes‐Oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors, but to reduce project investment.     

国际风险冲击、税收政策工具与企业风险承担

国际风险冲击对我国企业风险承担的影响效应被显著低估。为此,选取2000—2020年国际风险数据、政府税收数据与上市企业微观数据,利用MCS小样本偏差修正的SVAR模型和CMPR门槛效应模型,实证研究国际风险、税收政策工具与企业风险承担的非线性关系。研究表明：国际风险冲击平均可以解释我国企业风险承担波动的33%;国际风险的负向门槛效应长期存在,只要风险累积不超过最低门槛值,就不会对税收政策工具与企业风险承担产生显著冲击;在持续性的国际风险冲击下,税收政策工具的有效性下降,有效税率与税收补偿机制对企业风险承担的助推作用减弱,甚至产生反向推动。     

Accounting Policy Choice: The Relationship Between Corporate Tax Burdens and Company Size

Whilst there have been a number of papers that test the Watts and Zimmerman positive accounting hypotheses in a UK setting, no similar test has been made of the size effect using corporate tax burdens as a proxy for political costs. Using data for 5,998 year-ends from 1968 to 1993 this paper finds that: during 1968–79 there is evidence of a size effect; in a number of years a negative association between firm size and tax burden exists; and of the five industry categories examined, the 'mineral extractive' industry had the highest tax burden throughout the period 1968–1979.     

Corporate Tax Holidays and Investment

Governments of developing countries commonly adopt tax holidaysto encourage investment. This article evaluates the incentivesprovided by company income tax holidays and explains the importanceof the timing of depreciation allowances in determining theeffective tax rates and the cost of capital to firms consideringadditional investment during the holiday. If an asset is long-livedand depreciation allowances for tax purposes are accelerated,the tax holiday, by preventing depreciation deductions duringperiods of peak profits, may actually penalize a company forinvesting during the holiday. The closer the investment to theend of the holiday period, the more severe the penalty. If,instead, depreciation allowances may be deferred until afterthe holiday, this program of incentives is quite generous tothe firm. How these sharply contrasting results may emerge isillustrated through estimation of effective tax rates and usercosts of capital under tax holiday systems in Bangladesh, Côted'lvoire, Malaysia, Morocco, and Thailand.     

企业税收成本极小化、企业税务管理与政府态度

传统意义上的税务管理属于政府或公共部门行为,事实上,企业同样存在税务管理问题。企业税务管理与企业税务筹划、政府税务管理既有联系又有区别。政府对企业税务管理的态度应该改变,应由传统的否定或反对态度转向鼓励和支持企业进行税务管理或税务筹划。     

工薪所得税筹划与企业创新

本文结合我国工薪所得税税负较重及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景,探讨工薪所得税筹划是否以及如何对企业创新产生影响。研究发现:(1)工薪所得税筹划程度与企业创新显著正相关;(2)员工应税压力越大,二者正相关关系越显著,且2011年个人所得税税制改革会抑制二者之间的正向关系,表明纳税筹划主要通过降低工薪税负的不利影响,强化薪酬的激励效应,进而促进企业创新;(3)当公司为国有企业或公司处在税收征管强度较大的地区时,二者的正向关系更强;(4)当企业人均薪酬波动较大时,二者的正向关系削弱;(5)当创新员工更有可能是避税行为的受益者时,二者的正相关关系更强。本研究对于降低工薪阶层税负,以及如何提高企业创新意愿,实现创新驱动发展战略,具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

Housing and Tax Policy

This paper investigates the effects of housing‐related tax policy measures on macroeconomic aggregates using a dynamic general‐equilibrium model featuring borrowing and lending across heterogeneous households, financial frictions in the form of collateral constraints tied to house prices, and a rental housing market alongside owner‐occupied housing. We analyze the effects of various tax policies and find that they all lead to significant output losses, with large long‐run tax multipliers of around 2. Among them, reducing the mortgage interest deduction is the most effective in raising tax revenue per unit of output lost, whereas reducing the depreciation allowance for rental income is the least effective.     

Corporate Investment and Dividend Tax Imputation

The capital investment/dividend decision of the firm is analyzed under alternative assumptions about the system of dividend taxation. Relative to the classical system, imputation can yield (1) more disagreement amongst shareholders as regards the optimal investment plan, (2) less capital investment on aggregate and (3) fewer gains from mergers. Moreover, in contrast to the classical system, shareholders with high marginal tax rates can be more disadvantaged by dividend deferral than shareholders with low marginal tax rates.     

战略联盟与公司税负

在全球迅速兴起的战略联盟是公司获取竞争优势的重要途径之一.本文以2009-2018年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,检验了公司参与战略联盟对其税收负担的影响.研究结果表明:参与战略联盟的公司,其整体税收负担显著低于未参与战略联盟的公司,且股权式联盟和契约式联盟均可降低公司税收负担.区分联盟伙伴及公司异质性特征的进一步研究发现:只有当联盟伙伴为民营公司时,参与战略联盟才能显著降低公司税负;当公司大股东存在关联关系、公司位于法律环境较差地区及公司的避税动机更强时,战略联盟对公司税负的降低效应更大.拓展性分析结果显示,关联交易(资本支出)是股权式联盟(契约式联盟)影响公司税负的主要渠道.本文丰富了战略联盟的经济后果和公司税负的影响因素研究,并为改善战略联盟的监管提供了政策参考.     

战略差异度与企业避税

本文以2008-2016年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,考察了战略差异度对企业避税的影响。研究发现,战略差异度对企业避税具有显著影响,战略差异度越大的上市公司,避税越激进。进一步研究发现,当企业处于非管制行业、所处地区税收征管强度较小时,战略差异度对避税的影响更加显著;并且,风险承担在企业战略差异度和避税之间关系中发挥着中介作用。本文丰富了企业战略差异度的经济后果以及避税影响因素的相关文献,有助于公司的利益相关者更好地理解公司战略对其决策行为的影响;同时,本文也为税收征管部门对采用非常规战略的公司加强税收监管提供了决策支持。     

Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior

We use a shock to the public scrutiny of firm subsidiary locations to investigate whether that scrutiny leads to changes in firms’ disclosure and corporate tax avoidance behavior. ActionAid International, a nonprofit activist group, levied public pressure on noncompliant U.K. firms in the FTSE 100 to comply with a rule requiring U.K. firms to disclose the location of all of their subsidiaries. We use this setting to examine whether the public pressure led scrutinized firms to increase their subsidiary disclosure, decrease tax avoidance, and reduce the use of subsidiaries in tax haven countries compared to other firms in the FTSE 100 not affected by the public pressure. The evidence suggests that the public scrutiny sufficiently changed the costs and benefits of tax avoidance such that tax expense increased for scrutinized firms. The results suggest that public pressure from outside activist groups can exert a significant influence on the behavior of large, publicly traded firms. Our findings extend prior research that has had little success documenting an empirical relation between public scrutiny of tax avoidance and firm behavior.     

解析企业所得税亏损弥补特殊政策

亏损弥补是国家对纳税人的一种免税照顾.由于相关的税收政策相对复杂,而且特殊项目弥补亏损的计算方法难以熟练掌握,导致纳税人进行纳税申报以及税务人员进行申报表审核时均会遇到很多政策执行的困难和计算错误.因此详细解析亏损弥补税收政策显得尤为必要.