公司治理、管理者过度自信与企业股利政策

文章基于公司行为财务学视角,以2008—2010年间在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的公司为样本,对我国上市公司的高管人员过度自信、公司治理与股利政策进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,管理者过度自信与股利政策正相关,有效的公司治理能抑制管理者过度自信对股利政策的影响。     

产业政策、管理者过度自信与企业流动性风险

本文对产业政策影响高管自信及企业流动性风险的机理进行分析,提出赶超产业政策激励的管理者过度自信影响企业流动性风险的理论框架,并选取典型案例企业"熔盛重工"进行理论检验。研究表明,产业政策及其传导机制一旦传递出过度激进甚至错误的政策信号,会使管理者的过度自信持续膨胀,进而加剧其对资源配置的认知偏差,导致企业流动性风险失控。这一结论扩展了管理者过度自信和企业流动性风险成因的研究视角,丰富了产业政策经济后果的研究内容,进一步说明应减少产业政策等政府资源配置手段的运用,发挥市场资源配置的决定作用。     

Lumpy Investment and Corporate Tax Policy

In the presence of both convex and nonconvex capital adjustment costs in a dynamic general equilibrium model, corporate tax policy generates both intensive and extensive margin effects via the channel of marginal Q. Its impact is determined largely by the strength of the extensive margin effect, which, in turn, depends on the cross‐sectional distribution of firms. Depending on the initial distribution of firms, the economy displays asymmetric responses to tax changes. Moreover, an anticipated increase in the future investment tax credit reduces investment and adjustment rate initially.     

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.     

管理者过度自信与企业盈余管理行为研究

本文以我国上市公司作为研究样本,依据行为金融理论,从管理者过度自信角度研究了企业盈余管理行为。研究发现,管理者过度自信既会导致公司正向盈余管理行为的发生,也会导致负向盈余管理行为的发生。进一步研究发现,女性比例越高的管理团队越有可能进行盈余管理,管理团队的年龄越小越有可能进行正向盈余管理,管理团队学历越低越有可能进行负向盈余管理行为。本文对研究公司选择会计政策行为,治理公司盈余管理行为乃至完善公司治理结构均具有一定的启示。     

增值税留抵退税、融资约束与企业全要素生产率

本文以2018年部分行业的增值税留抵退税政策的实施作为准自然实验,基于长江三角洲先进制造业上市公司的数据,采用倾向得分匹配——双重差分法(PSM-DID),探究了增值税留抵退税政策对企业全要素生产率的影响.研究发现,短期内增值税留抵退税政策对企业全要素生产率的提高具有显著的促进作用;机制检验结果表明,增值税留抵退税政策通过降低企业的融资约束来促进企业全要素生产率的提高;异质性分析发现,增值税留抵退税政策对非国有性质、规模较小、成长性较好、杠杆率较低以及所处营商环境不理想的企业全要素生产率的促进作用尤为明显.根据研究结论,本文提出了进一步放宽增值税留抵退税政策限制与适度缩短留抵退税期限等相关建议.     

Overconfidence,CEO Selection,and Corporate Governance

We develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager, who sometimes makes value‐destroying investments, has a higher likelihood than a rational manager of being deliberately promoted to CEO under value‐maximizing corporate governance. Moreover, a risk‐averse CEO's overconfidence enhances firm value up to a point, but the effect is nonmonotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion. Overconfident CEOs also underinvest in information production. The board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident CEOs. Finally, Sarbanes‐Oxley is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors, but to reduce project investment.     

Housing and Tax Policy

This paper investigates the effects of housing‐related tax policy measures on macroeconomic aggregates using a dynamic general‐equilibrium model featuring borrowing and lending across heterogeneous households, financial frictions in the form of collateral constraints tied to house prices, and a rental housing market alongside owner‐occupied housing. We analyze the effects of various tax policies and find that they all lead to significant output losses, with large long‐run tax multipliers of around 2. Among them, reducing the mortgage interest deduction is the most effective in raising tax revenue per unit of output lost, whereas reducing the depreciation allowance for rental income is the least effective.     

战略差异度与企业避税

本文以2008-2016年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,考察了战略差异度对企业避税的影响。研究发现,战略差异度对企业避税具有显著影响,战略差异度越大的上市公司,避税越激进。进一步研究发现,当企业处于非管制行业、所处地区税收征管强度较小时,战略差异度对避税的影响更加显著;并且,风险承担在企业战略差异度和避税之间关系中发挥着中介作用。本文丰富了企业战略差异度的经济后果以及避税影响因素的相关文献,有助于公司的利益相关者更好地理解公司战略对其决策行为的影响;同时,本文也为税收征管部门对采用非常规战略的公司加强税收监管提供了决策支持。     

Corporate Investment and Dividend Tax Imputation

The capital investment/dividend decision of the firm is analyzed under alternative assumptions about the system of dividend taxation. Relative to the classical system, imputation can yield (1) more disagreement amongst shareholders as regards the optimal investment plan, (2) less capital investment on aggregate and (3) fewer gains from mergers. Moreover, in contrast to the classical system, shareholders with high marginal tax rates can be more disadvantaged by dividend deferral than shareholders with low marginal tax rates.     

战略联盟与公司税负

在全球迅速兴起的战略联盟是公司获取竞争优势的重要途径之一.本文以2009-2018年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,检验了公司参与战略联盟对其税收负担的影响.研究结果表明:参与战略联盟的公司,其整体税收负担显著低于未参与战略联盟的公司,且股权式联盟和契约式联盟均可降低公司税收负担.区分联盟伙伴及公司异质性特征的进一步研究发现:只有当联盟伙伴为民营公司时,参与战略联盟才能显著降低公司税负;当公司大股东存在关联关系、公司位于法律环境较差地区及公司的避税动机更强时,战略联盟对公司税负的降低效应更大.拓展性分析结果显示,关联交易(资本支出)是股权式联盟(契约式联盟)影响公司税负的主要渠道.本文丰富了战略联盟的经济后果和公司税负的影响因素研究,并为改善战略联盟的监管提供了政策参考.     

Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior

We use a shock to the public scrutiny of firm subsidiary locations to investigate whether that scrutiny leads to changes in firms’ disclosure and corporate tax avoidance behavior. ActionAid International, a nonprofit activist group, levied public pressure on noncompliant U.K. firms in the FTSE 100 to comply with a rule requiring U.K. firms to disclose the location of all of their subsidiaries. We use this setting to examine whether the public pressure led scrutinized firms to increase their subsidiary disclosure, decrease tax avoidance, and reduce the use of subsidiaries in tax haven countries compared to other firms in the FTSE 100 not affected by the public pressure. The evidence suggests that the public scrutiny sufficiently changed the costs and benefits of tax avoidance such that tax expense increased for scrutinized firms. The results suggest that public pressure from outside activist groups can exert a significant influence on the behavior of large, publicly traded firms. Our findings extend prior research that has had little success documenting an empirical relation between public scrutiny of tax avoidance and firm behavior.     

企业税收成本极小化、企业税务管理与政府态度

传统意义上的税务管理属于政府或公共部门行为,事实上,企业同样存在税务管理问题。企业税务管理与企业税务筹划、政府税务管理既有联系又有区别。政府对企业税务管理的态度应该改变,应由传统的否定或反对态度转向鼓励和支持企业进行税务管理或税务筹划。     

解析企业所得税亏损弥补特殊政策

亏损弥补是国家对纳税人的一种免税照顾.由于相关的税收政策相对复杂,而且特殊项目弥补亏损的计算方法难以熟练掌握,导致纳税人进行纳税申报以及税务人员进行申报表审核时均会遇到很多政策执行的困难和计算错误.因此详细解析亏损弥补税收政策显得尤为必要.     

Income Tax, Commodity Tax and Environmental Policy

Using the self-selection approach to tax analysis, thepaper analyses the impact of environmental externalities on Pareto-efficientnon-linear income tax, proportional commodity taxes and publicexpenditure. Consideration of externalities within this frameworkreveals intuitive insights into environmental tax policy, suggestingthat some earlier conclusions drawn in the relevant literaturemight be misleading. The results indicate that, while the externalitysdirect harmful impact raises marginal tax rates, the influencethrough the self-selection constraint tends to decrease the rise.We also derive conditions under which the Pigovian tax can bedetermined purely on the basis of internalizing the externality.     

营改增影响

营改增试点范围的扩大,对我国相关行业发展、结构调整乃至税制改革都具有特殊意义,而在改革的推进中也不可避免会面临一些新问题、新挑战。正如中立诚集团董事长、中立信永税务师事务所主任曹丰良所说:"这是继会计电算化后又一次会计核算革命,但它对企业的影响不仅仅体现在核算层面,而是要渗透到生产经营管理层面,进而上升到对外战略层面。3个层面都要跟得上。"     

Dividend Policy and Corporate Performance

Substantial research has been conducted to determine the signal that results from dividend initiations and omissions. Our study extends from previous research by measuring the long-term valuation effects following dividend initiations and omissions. We find that firms initiating dividends experience favorable long-term share price performance. Conversely, firms omitting dividends experience unfavorable long-term share price performance. The long-term valuation effects resulting from dividend initiations are more favorable for firms that are smaller, that overinvest, and that had relatively poor performance prior to the initiations. The long-term effects resulting from dividend omissions are more unfavorable for large firms and for firms experiencing relatively large dividend omissions.     

企业所得税征管差异与税收遵从和公司价值研究——来自深市上市公司的经验证据

本文从企业所得税征管机构差异的角度,实证分析了企业所得税收入分享改革对公司税收遵从行为和公司价值产生的影响。研究发现:各地方税务局负责征管的公司,所得税遵从度较低,尤其在东部地区。当公司外部审计机构为国际"四大"会计事务所时,所得税遵从度较低。另外,税务部门的征管行为会对公司价值带来一定的影响。     

会计信息可比性与公司避税

会计信息可比性通过公司间信息溢出效应为外界理解和判断公司的经济业务提供增量信息,使避税活动难以实施,抑制避税代理成本从而抑制公司避税。本文从会计信息质量治理效应出发,运用2005-2015年我国A股非金融上市公司数据研究会计信息可比性对公司避税的影响,结果发现公司会计信息可比性越高,避税程度越低。可比性对避税的抑制在信息透明度较低的公司以及在面临产品市场竞争更激烈的公司中更显著。进一步研究发现可比性与税收征管之间存在替代效应,可比性对避税的抑制作用在税收征管强度较低的地区更显著。本文扩展和深化了会计信息质量的治理效应,为我国政府强化会计信息披露监管以营造公平税收环境提供理论依据。     

Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.